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Introduction
Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioeth-
ics.¹ Indeed, on their widely endorsed ‘four principles’ approach to biomedical ethics,
Beauchamp and Childress propose that the principle of respect for autonomy is one
of four fundamental principles of biomedical ethics (alongside the principles of
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice).² The concept of autonomy is also com-
monly understood to undergird the doctrine of informed consent, a doctrine that is
invoked ubiquitously in contemporary bioethics.
In light of this, it should come as little surprise that considerations of autonomy
are salient in a wide array of contemporary bioethical questions. To take just a
small sample, debates about the moral permissibility of euthanasia,³ gene-editing,⁴
so-called ‘sin taxes’,⁵ mandatory vaccination policies,⁶ markets for human organs,⁷
genome screening,⁸ and involuntary psychiatric treatment⁹ all turn to a significant
extent on arguments about personal autonomy. Furthermore, the emergence of new
neurotechnologies that can modulate neural circuits associated with thought, behav-
iour, and mood are raising important new questions about autonomy and its value in
contemporary bioethics.¹⁰
¹ For example, see Gillon, ‘Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for
Autonomy Should Be “First among Equals” ’; Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics;
Smith, ‘The Pre-Eminence of Autonomy in Bioethics’. However, for non-Western perspectives of auton-
omy’s value, see Yang, ‘Serve the People’; Kara, ‘Applicability of the Principle of Respect for Autonomy’;
Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 11.
² Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
³ Brock, ‘Voluntary Active Euthanasia’; Velleman, ‘A Right of Self-Termination?’
⁴ Habermas, The Future of Human Nature; Pugh, ‘Autonomy, Natality and Freedom’.
⁵ Barnhill and King, ‘Ethical Agreement and Disagreement about Obesity Prevention Policy in the
United States’; Green, ‘The Ethics of Sin Taxes’.
⁶ ; Grzybowski et al., ‘Vaccination Refusal’.
⁷ Annas, ‘Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Organ Sales’; Rippon, ‘Imposing Options on People in
Poverty’; Jaycox, ‘Coercion, Autonomy, and the Preferential Option for the Poor in the Ethics of Organ
Transplantation’.
⁸ Andorno, ‘The Right Not to Know’; Harris and Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’.
⁹ Dickenson, ‘Ethical Issues in Long-Term Psychiatric Management’; Rudnick, ‘Depression and
Competence to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment’; Tan et al., ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in
Anorexia Nervosa’.
¹⁰ Maslen, Pugh, and Savulescu, ‘The Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of Anorexia
Nervosa’; Kraemer, ‘Authenticity or Autonomy?’; Sharp and Wasserman, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation,
Historicism, and Moral Responsibility’; Pugh et al., ‘Brainjacking in Deep Brain Stimulation and
Autonomy’.
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How we conceive of autonomy has highly significant practical implications. If an
individual is deemed to be autonomous with respect to a decision, then that decision
is often taken to have considerable weight in bioethical discussions. For instance, it is
widely accepted that if a patient has made an autonomous decision to refuse
treatment, then this decision typically ought to be respected, even if we believe that
this decision is contrary to the patient’s best interests. In contrast, if an individual is
not autonomous with respect to a decision that will have harmful consequences for
them, then it is far less clear that this decision ought to be respected. This is of course
a descriptive, rather than prescriptive point at this stage; however, it is undeniable
that autonomous persons are typically understood to have a considerable (although
not complete) sphere of authority over self-regarding matters in Western bioethics.
To use Ranaan Gillon’s memorable phrase, although the four principles of biomed-
ical ethics are (in theory) meant to have equal weight, the principle of autonomy is
commonly understood to be ‘first amongst equals’.¹¹
As such, in developing a theory of autonomy, we are walking a tightrope between
two errors, each with a significant cost.¹² Most obviously, a theory of autonomy
might be deficient because it renders the standards of autonomy too demanding. An
overly demanding conception of autonomy would lead to ‘false negative’ judgements
that would serve to deny decision-making authority to individuals whose decisions
should warrant respect. However, a theory of autonomy can also be deficient if it fails
to make the standards of autonomy sufficiently demanding. Such a theory would lead
to ‘false positive’ judgements that would grant authority to potentially harmful
decisions, without the justificatory evaluative force of autonomy.
Accordingly, there is a great deal at stake in trying to develop an adequate
understanding of autonomy. Yet, autonomy is an ambiguous concept that has lent
itself to a plethora of different uses in moral philosophy.¹³ Indeed, the ambiguity of
the concept has led contemporary bioethicists to reach divergent conclusions about
bioethical issues (such as those listed above) in which autonomy related concerns are
salient. Moreover, abstract philosophical discussions about autonomy in a broadly
metaphysical sense are often divorced from the concerns about autonomy that are
raised by the clinical realities of medical decision-making in practical contexts.
In particular, there has been considerable disagreement amongst theorists about
the relationship between autonomy and concepts such as rationality and freedom.
Over the course of the development of bioethics, the claim that there is an important
relationship between autonomy and rationality has sometimes been treated as quite
uncontroversial, and perhaps even obvious. Nonetheless, as I shall go on to explain, a
number of theorists have vehemently objected to the apparent inherent elitism of
supposing that rationality lies at the heart of autonomy.
¹¹ Gillon, ‘Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should
Be “First among Equals” ’.
¹² Herring and Wall make a similar observation in Herring and Wall, ‘Autonomy, Capacity and
Vulnerable Adults’, 698.
¹³ See Arpaly,Unprincipled Virtue, 118–25 and Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 3–6 for
surveys of the different understandings of autonomy in the philosophical literature.
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Furthermore, this ambiguous treatment of rationality and autonomy is also
reflected to some extent in medical law. On the one hand, the recent Montgomery
ruling governing standards of disclosure in cases of medical negligence in England
and Wales explicitly appeals to the concept of rationality in outlining its standards of
information disclosure; information is deemed to be material if a ‘reasonable person’
in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to that information, or
if the doctor should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to
attach significance to it.¹⁴ In contrast, it is instructive to compare this feature of
medical law in England and Wales to Lord Donaldson of Lymington’s famous
judgment that competent patients have an absolute right to choose whether to
consent to medical treatment, regardless of whether ‘ . . . the reasons for making the
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.¹⁵
Whilst not contradictory, these two features of medical law certainly evidence
something of a tension regarding the relationship between rationality and autonomy.
The tension is exemplified even more clearly when we contrast the Donaldson
judgment with the approach to mental capacity enshrined in the 2005 Mental
Capacity Act of England and Wales. This approach seems to implicitly incorporate
considerations of rationality in claiming that mental capacity requires the ability to
‘weigh’ information that is relevant to a treatment decision. Indeed, in a recent case,
judge Jackson J concluded that an individual suffering from anorexia nervosa lacked
capacity to refuse treatment because her:
. . . obsessive fear of weight gain makes her incapable of weighing the advantages and disad-
vantages of eating in any meaningful way . . . The need not to gain weight overpowers all other
thoughts.¹⁶
Cases such as these raise a descriptive legal question of whether patients do have an
absolute legal right to make even irrational decisions concerning consent to treat-
ment (as Donaldson contends). Yet they also raise the moral question of whether
they ought to have such a right. I shall explore this question in more detail later in the
book. At this point though, I simply observe that the tensions alluded to above
arguably reflect deeper ambiguities in medical law, philosophy, and bioethics about
what we mean to capture when we invoke the concept of rationality, and how
different conceptions of rationality are understood to relate to autonomy and its
value.
My aim in this book is to outline a more fully developed account of how we may
plausibly understand one conception of rationality to play a significant role in an
account of autonomy that can be usefully invoked in bioethics. In doing so, I shall
attempt to unite some disparate threads in the literature on different aspects of
autonomy, and seek to present a unified theory of the concept, one that can elucidate
the relationship between autonomy, rationality, and freedom, and the nature of
forms of influence that can subvert autonomy. In this introductory chapter, I shall
¹⁴ Montgomery (Appellant) v. Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland). See also Canterbury
v. Spence (464 F.2d 772) 1972.
¹⁵ Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).
¹⁶ Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) EWHC 1639 (COP) at [49].
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make some preliminary remarks about the nature of autonomy broadly construed,
and delineate what has been termed the ‘standard view’ of autonomy in the bioethical
literature. I shall conclude by explaining the framework that I shall adopt in devel-
oping my own rationalist account of personal autonomy.
1. Introducing Autonomy
The term ‘autonomy’ is derived from the Greek ‘autos’ (self), and ‘nomos’ (law); as
such, the concept that the term ‘autonomy’ aims to capture seems to be, broadly
speaking, the property of self-government.¹⁷ Accordingly, as a preliminary observa-
tion, we might say that in investigating the nature of autonomy, we are investigating
what it is for an agent to be self-governing.
Even this formulation might be understood to be making an important presump-
tion, since it assumes that autonomy is a property of agents. Although Gerald
Dworkin has averred that this is one of the few claims that autonomy theorists
agree upon,¹⁸ in developing what has come to be seen as the standard account of
autonomy in bioethics, Beauchamp and Childress primarily focus their discussion of
autonomy as a property of choices or actions rather than agents.¹⁹ I shall argue below
that these differences in our understanding of what autonomy is a property of more
plausibly reflect a distinction between autonomy in a local sense, and autonomy in a
global sense. For the purposes of this preliminary discussion, I shall assume that
autonomy is a property of agents, and that a choice can be autonomous only
in a derivative sense, in so far as it is made by an agent who is autonomous with
respect to it.
What then is it for an agent to be self-governing? Immanuel Kant famously
claimed that in order to be autonomous, an agent must be governed by her noumenal
self, that is, the self as it is conceived as a member of the transcendent realm of pure
reason, and not the self as a member of the phenomenal realm, in which it is
subjected to external causes according to Kant’s dualist metaphysics. It is worth
noting three features of the Kantian account, as it is commonly understood.²⁰ First,
on Kant’s view, the autonomous agent is not moved to act by their desires; on the
contrary, this would be the paradigm of heteronomy on the Kantian account, since
desires represent contingent external causes on the will in Kant’s metaphysics.²¹
Second, autonomy is an inherently moral concept for Kant, since on his view pure
reason demands that agents act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. Third,
autonomy is a property that undergirds the unique value of human life on the
Kantian view; as autonomous agents, humans are understood to have dignity, a
non-fungible objective value beyond mere price.
Onora O’Neill has set out a detailed account of the role that Kantian autonomy can
play in bioethics, in particular how such ‘principled autonomy’ can provide the basis
¹⁷ Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 12. ¹⁸ Ibid., 6.
¹⁹ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 102.
²⁰ These are at least features of Kant’s account on orthodox understandings of his view. For an
alternative see Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment.
²¹ See Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 30.
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for our interpersonal obligations, and in turn a framework for human rights.²²
However, as O’Neill points out, the conceptions of autonomy that many bioethicists
invoke in their discussions are decidedly un-Kantian, instead taking their lead from
John Stuart Mill’s views regarding liberty and individuality.²³ Pace Kant, many
contemporary theorists understand an agent to be autonomous if they direct their
decisions in the light of their own desires, without the controlling influence of
others;²⁴ notice that on this understanding, an autonomous agent’s desires can
have non-moral content.
O’Neill suggests that contemporary admirers of personal autonomy in bioethics
‘ . . . crave and claim Kantian credentials’.²⁵ Whether or not this is true of others,
I want to quite clearly state that, despite my interest in the role of rationality in
autonomy, I neither crave nor claim Kantian credentials for the theory that I shall
develop here. As I shall explain in more detail below, in this book I shall be interested
in a Millian, rather than Kantian understanding of autonomy and its relation to
rationality.
Before setting the Kantian approach aside though, it is worth noting that Kant’s is
a substantive account of autonomy, in so far as it stipulates that the choices of
autonomous agents must have certain (on Kant’s account, moral) content.
According to substantive accounts of autonomy, an agent is not autonomous
‘ . . . unless she chooses in accord with certain values’.²⁶ We may contrast substantive
accounts of autonomy with procedural accounts; according to procedural accounts,
the question of whether an agent is autonomous with respect to a particular decision
depends on the manner in which they came to make that decision. The precise details
of the sort of decision procedures that are indicative of autonomous decision-making
will differ from theory to theory; however, the key point is that procedural theories do
not claim that the autonomous agent’s choices must have a particular content.
In this book, I shall develop a procedural theory of autonomy. There has admit-
tedly been a revived interest in substantive theories of autonomy in recent years.²⁷ As
I suggested above, Kant believed that autonomy requires that agents act in accord-
ance with pure reason, and that this implies a substantive account of autonomy, in so
far as reason demands that agents act in accordance with universalizable moral
maxims. In contrast, modern-day philosophers who endorse substantive accounts
have accepted a metaphysical claim that Kant denies here, namely that acting in
accordance with one’s desires can be compatible with autonomous agency. Instead,
they have rejected procedural theories for other reasons. For instance, some feminist
philosophers reject procedural theories on the basis that agents who make their
choices in accordance with such theories might still lack autonomy because their
²² O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics; see also Velleman, ‘A Right of Self-Termination?’; Secker,
‘The Appearance of Kant’s Deontology in Contemporary Kantianism’.
²³ O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 30.
²⁴ Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics, xiii.
²⁵ O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 30; see also Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 7–8.
²⁶ Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 19.
²⁷ For an insightful discussion of this development, see Dive and Newson, ‘Reconceptualizing
Autonomy for Bioethics’.
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choices are guided by values that have been determined by oppressive patriarchal
norms that run contrary to the very value of autonomy.²⁸
The debate on this point has important implications for the role that autonomy
can play in practical debates. One obvious example is the ethics of cosmetic proced-
ures. If one holds the view that a woman’s desire for a beautifying cosmetic procedure
is merely an artefact of the influence of a pervasive and oppressive societal ideal,²⁹
then one might deny that a woman can be autonomous with respect to that desire, no
matter how much she personally endorses it. Others have argued that procedural
theories are inadequate because they do not rule out the possibility of individuals
qualifying as autonomous when they decide on the basis of pathologies that distort
their values and beliefs.³⁰ Consider, for instance, the patient suffering from severe
and enduring anorexia nervosa who strongly endorses her desire to avoid weight-
gain, whilst understanding that her disordered eating behaviour may have fatal
consequences.
Problematic cases such as these have prompted some theorists to endorse sub-
stantive accounts that stipulate that there are normative restrictions, grounded by
objective moral norms or prudential values,³¹ upon what autonomous agents can
desire; for instance, such theories might claim that an autonomous agent cannot
choose a life of servitude³² or one of self-destruction.³³ Despite this revived interest in
substantive theories, I shall not directly consider them in this book. In order to justify
this narrower focus, it is prudent to highlight what I take to be the main issue facing
these theories. The crux of the debate between procedural and substantive theories
lies in the importance (or lack thereof) of the individual’s subjective understanding of
their own desires and values. On substantive accounts of autonomy, one cannot be
autonomous with respect to those of one’s choices that fail to comply with certain
norms, even if one does not endorse those norms, or the values they imply. Yet, even
at a pre-theoretical level, this seems somewhat jarring; autonomy, it seems, should
allow for the possibility that agents can reach different views about value, and that
part of being autonomous is choosing to act in accordance with one’s own beliefs
about value, even if those beliefs are not universally shared.
The significance of acting in accordance with one’s own values is something that
John Stuart Mill stresses in his discussion of the importance of what he termed
‘individuality’, when he claims:
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of
laying out his existence is the best not because it is the best, but because it is his own mode.³⁴
²⁸ Stoljar, ‘Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition’; Westlund, ‘Selflessness and Responsibility for Self ’;
Griffiths, Feminisms and the Self; Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’. See also Oshana, ‘Personal
Autonomy and Society’.
²⁹ For a detailed discussion of the beauty ideal, see Widdows, Perfect Me.
³⁰ Pettit and Smith, ‘Backgrounding Desire’; Ciurria, ‘A Virtue Ethical Approach to Decisional Capacity
and Mental Health’.
³¹ Although I believe that autonomy should be conceived as a value-neutral concept, I accept that it
must also be a value-utilizing concept, as will become clear in my discussion. For more on this distinction,
see Meyers, ‘The Feminist Debate Over Values in Autonomy Theory’.
³² See Benson, ‘Freedom and Value’. ³³ Nordenfelt, Rationality and Compulsion.
³⁴ Mill, On Liberty, 131.
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Mill’s claim here is not simply that individuals are in a privileged epistemic position
with regards to what mode of existence will be best for them, although this is also a
claim that he endorsed.³⁵ Rather, Mill’s broader claim is that even if we were to
concede that a third party is in a better epistemic position with regards to the
question of what is in another person’s interests, there is still significant value in
the individual herself making her own decisions about her life, even if these decisions
are not the best for her from a third-party perspective.
Reflecting on this passage reveals a reason to be wary of substantive theories of
autonomy in bioethics. The worry it raises is that such accounts threaten to subsume
the notion of autonomy into considerations of purely objective morality or well-
being. This, however, would overlook the fundamental thought motivating proced-
ural accounts of autonomy, namely that the individual’s acting in accordance with
their own understanding of the good is integral to that which we value in the concept
labelled ‘autonomy’, and, moreover, that considerations of autonomy can be distin-
guished from purely objective norms of morality and well-being.³⁶ Of course, this is
not a knock-down objection to substantive theories;³⁷ such theorists would surely
respond to the above observations by arguing that those values that are congruous
with oppressive norms are not truly ‘the agent’s own’, even if she cannot perceive that
this is so. However, I take this general issue to be sufficient to motivate an enquiry
into alternative procedural accounts of autonomy that take seriously the thought that
the salience attributed to personal autonomy is grounded by a concern to live a life of
one’s own; a concern to live a life that is valued by oneself, rather than simply
construed as one that is lived in accordance with that which is valuable.
In spite of my dismissal of substantive theories, the criticisms raised by opponents
of procedural theories are genuine concerns. The procedural theory that I shall
develop shall aim to engage with these issues, and will aim to be compatible with
at least some of the elements that have motivated substantive theories of autonomy.
First, the theory that I shall endorse is compatible with a broadly relational view of
the autonomous agent. However, contrary to some substantive theorists, I do not
believe that these relational influences must undermine procedural autonomy, even if
they lead an agent to endorse values that reflect oppressive norms. I shall say more
about this in Chapter 3. Second, the rationalist account that I shall develop shall draw
on an account of rationality and the good that grants the possibility of impersonal
goods, and denies relativism about the good.³⁸ Third, by outlining a detailed account
of rationality and its relationship to well-being, I shall explain how the procedural
theory that I develop can respond to cases of ‘pathological values’ raised by sup-
porters of substantive theories. Finally, in Chapter 9, I shall suggest that there is
considerably more overlap between the concepts of autonomy and well-being than is
³⁵ Ibid., 140.
³⁶ Frankfurt makes a similar objection in Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love, 130–5. See also
Haworth, Autonomy, 156–7 and Noggle, ‘Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation’, 96.
³⁷ For deeper refutation of substantive theories, see Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 19–25;
Christman, The Politics of Persons, 138–9.
³⁸ As Ciurria points out, concerns about relativism can plausibly motivate a move towards substantive
theories. See Ciurria, ‘A Virtue Ethical Approach to Decisional Capacity and Mental Health’.
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often taken to be the case in procedural theories. This somewhat complicates our
understanding of both the prudential value of autonomy, and how we ought to
conceive of the principles of beneficence and autonomy in medical ethics.
In the next section, I shall consider what an adequate procedural theory of
autonomy should aim to achieve, and suggest that procedural theories pertain to
one of two dimensions of autonomy.³⁹
2. The Decisional Dimension of Autonomy
Given the diverse array of approaches to the concept of autonomy, it seems unlikely
that we will be able to capture the essence of autonomy by attempting to unite all the
disparate accounts into one single theory. Rather, as Neil Levy suggests, it seems that
in attempting to provide an adequate theory of autonomy we must ‘restrict the range
of meanings that we attribute to the word’.⁴⁰
In this book, I shall be interested in the concept of autonomy in bioethics. From
the outset, it should be acknowledged that this focus shall unavoidably influence my
understanding of the concept, given the role that it plays in this specific context. To
illustrate the significance of specifying the context in which I shall be discussing
autonomy, consider the fact that theorists who are interested in autonomy as a
broader social ideal have often suggested that one can only qualify as autonomous
with respect to one’s life-choices if one has a range of qualitatively different choices
available.⁴¹ Whilst it may be important to stress the necessity of adequate opportun-
ities for autonomous agency in a broad social context, in bioethics we may often be
interested in the autonomy of individuals who are facing severely restricted choice
sets. For instance, we may be interested in what might affect the autonomy of a
patient who faces a choice between certain death and undergoing an invasive medical
procedure. This is not to deny that the breadth of an individual’s choice set can
matter. Rather the point here is that focusing on autonomy in the bioethical context
means that it may be appropriate to set different thresholds for satisfying the
minimum conditions for autonomy in this context, which may not translate straight-
forwardly to the use of the concept in other contexts.
Accordingly, in this book, I shall understand the concept of autonomy to denote a
particular capacity to which we attribute value in bioethical contexts, and that we
mean to invoke with respect to two particularly salient concerns:
³⁹ There are of course other ways of cutting the autonomy pie. Recently, Catriona Mackenzie has
suggested that there are three dimensions of autonomy in Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy’.
Her dimensions of self-determination and self-government roughly map onto what I call below the
decisional and practical dimensions of autonomy. Mackenzie also postulates a third dimension of self-
authorization pertaining to an individual’s regarding oneself as having the normative authority to be self-
determining and self-governing. Notably, though, Mackenzie suggests that it is a mistake to believe that
this is a necessary condition of self-government (Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy’, 35).
Furthermore, we may note that self-authorization is plausibly less of a concern in bioethics than in broader
social contexts given the widely accepted normative authority of individual decision-making, and the
various instruments through which that is facilitated, most notably through robust consent procedures.
⁴⁰ Levy, ‘Autonomy and Addiction’, 429.
⁴¹ For example, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’; see also
Mackenzie’s discussion of self-determination, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy’.
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(i) Is an agent making her own decisions about what to do?
(ii) Is an agent able to act on the basis of those decisions?⁴²
In view of the first concern, a theory of autonomy must be able to explain what it is
for an agent to make their own decisions. I shall refer to this dimension of autonomy
as ‘the decisional dimension of autonomy’. In this section, I shall explain that the
decisional dimension of autonomy incorporates elements that pertain to two differ-
ent senses of voluntariness. In the next section, I shall turn briefly to the second
concern outlined above, according to which autonomy, on the understanding that
I shall employ, is an inherently practical concept.
To begin this discussion of the decisional dimension of autonomy with a meth-
odological point, we should note that an adequate account ought to reflect at least
some of our pre-theoretical intuitions about which agents are autonomous. Of
course, it would be a mistake to claim that an adequate theory of autonomy should
be able to justify all of our pre-theoretical intuitions about which agents might
appropriately be deemed to be autonomous in bioethical contexts. After all, it may
be possible to debunk some of these intuitions. However, it seems plausible to claim
that we should aim for a reflective equilibrium between theory and our robust
intuitions in our thinking about autonomy.⁴³
According to what I shall call the ‘standard view’ of this dimension of autonomy in
bioethics,⁴⁴ an agent is autonomous with respect to an action, including an act of




(3) without controlling influences that determine their action.⁴⁵
The standard account sets out conditions that constitute an agent’s autonomy with
respect to their decisions. As Friedman notes, we can distinguish such conditions
from those conditions that may be causally necessary for the realization of autono-
mous choices and actions.⁴⁶ In the biomedical context, the second kind of conditions
will be spelled out in theories of decision-making competence or capacity. In the first
part of the book though, I shall be concerned with conditions of the first kind—those
that constitute the agent’s autonomy with respect to their decisions.
The standard account of autonomy implicitly reflects a distinction that Aristotle
draws between two types of non-voluntary action at the beginning of Book III of the
Nicomachean Ethics.⁴⁷Here, Aristotle claims that an action can be thought to be non-
⁴² For a similar understanding, see Brock, Life and Death, 28.
⁴³ See also Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 9.
⁴⁴ Rebecca Walker refers to this as the standard view of autonomy per se in bioethics. I agree with this
sentiment, but suggest that this account only captures the decisional dimension of autonomy. See Walker,
‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’, 340.
⁴⁵ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 103. See also Faden and Beauchamp, A
History and Theory of Informed Consent, ch. 7.
⁴⁶ Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 4.
⁴⁷ In the interests of accurate exegesis, it should be acknowledged that Aristotle’s discussion of the
voluntary here is situated within an examination of virtue, and is motivated, not by considerations of
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voluntary if it is either performed from reason of ignorance, or if the action takes
place by force, in such a manner that the moving principle of the action is most
appropriately understood to be ‘external’ to the agent.⁴⁸ Conditions (1) and (3) of the
standard account above can primarily be understood to reflect this latter sense of
voluntariness, whilst condition (2) primarily reflects the former (although deception
represents a form of controlling influence that can be understood to determine action
by adversely affecting the patient’s understanding). The standard account of auton-
omy thus understands the concept of autonomy to incorporate both of these senses
of voluntariness.
It is generally accepted that conditions (1) and (2) of the standard account are
necessary conditions of autonomy. For instance, although there may be considerable
debate about how we should cash out the details of what sort of understanding
autonomy requires, the basic thought that autonomous choice requires some min-
imum degree of understanding is uncontroversial. As Savulecu and Momeyer write
in discussing the relevance of true beliefs to evaluative choice, ‘we cannot form an
idea of what we want without knowing what the options on offer are like’.⁴⁹
However, the standard account becomes more controversial when we consider
condition (3). The main inadequacy of the standard account in this regard is that it
fails to offer a sufficient account of the sorts of influences that can undermine our
decisional autonomy. Contra the standard account, the mere fact that an influence
can be understood to ‘determine action’ is not sufficient to establish that the influence
in question undermines autonomy.⁵⁰ To claim otherwise would be to beg the
question against compatibilist views of autonomy of the sort that I shall consider
in the first two chapters of this book. On these compatibilist theories, autonomy is
understood to be compatible with the truth of causal determinism; on these views,
not all forms of determining influence are understood to undermine autonomy.
Moreover, as relational theories of autonomy correctly point out, autonomous
decision-makers are relationally situated beings, and will thus be subject to unavoid-
able but legitimate influences.⁵¹
In Aristotle’s discussion of the sense of voluntariness under consideration, he
claims that actions are forced in the relevant sense when their cause is in the ‘external
circumstances’, and when the agent contributes nothing.⁵² Whilst this may seem like
a natural way to draw the relevant distinction between internal and external moving
forces of action, it is not an adequate approach for understanding voluntariness in a
bioethical context. The reason for this is that on this Aristotelian understanding, the
autonomy, but rather by the thought that voluntariness is a necessary condition of praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness. See Meyer, ‘Aristotle on the Voluntary’. It might be argued that conditions of volun-
tariness undergirding ascriptions of praiseworthiness may differ from those undergirding the validity of
consent. See Wertheimer, ‘Voluntary Consent’, 239.
⁴⁸ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a. Note that acting from ignorance or forced action is only
sufficient for non-voluntariness for Aristotle. In order for the action to qualify as involuntary, the agent
must also be pained by the action or regret it afterwards. See Aristotle, 1110b18–20.
⁴⁹ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 283.
⁵⁰ For a similar criticism, see Walker, ‘Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy’, 601.
⁵¹ Ploug and Holm, ‘Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical Context—Four Views on Nudging
and Informed Consent’, 30.
⁵² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110b.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
 
decision to comply with a coercive threat should be understood as voluntary, in so far
as the moving principle of compliance lies within the agent herself.⁵³ However, this
approach runs contrary to the widespread view that coercion undermines voluntari-
ness in bioethical contexts.
Naturally then, the standard account of autonomy in bioethics rejects the
Aristotelian understanding of coercion and voluntariness, instead explicitly claiming
that coercion is a controlling influence that can determine action. It also suggests that
other forms of external influence such as manipulation and deception undermine
autonomy, in addition to forms of internal influence including ‘ . . . conditions such as
debilitating disease, psychiatric disorders, and drug addiction’.⁵⁴
However, the standard account lacks a unified explanation of what it is that makes
these forms of influence controlling in the sense that undermines the voluntariness of
an agent’s decision, and a fortiori, their decisional autonomy. Those who defend the
standard view simply stipulate that coercion, non-rational persuasion, and manipu-
lation can all render putative acts of autonomy void,⁵⁵ whilst other influences (such
as rational persuasion) are paradigmatic examples of influences that are compatible
with autonomy.⁵⁶ Yet, even if we assume that these stipulations are correct, it seems
that an adequate theory of autonomy should be able to explain how and why these
forms of influence undermine autonomy; listing examples of internal and external
controlling influences is not satisfactory and instead appears to be simply ad hoc.⁵⁷
Even more problematically though, in some cases the standard account’s concep-
tion of the forms of controlling influence that undermine autonomy seems mis-
guided. For instance, although Beauchamp and Childress suggest that psychiatric
disease can undermine autonomous choice, it is far from clear that patients suffering
from such diseases must lack autonomy with respect to their choices, particularly if
they identify and positively endorse their choice to act in certain ways. More
generally, Rebecca Walker expresses scepticism about the standard account’s condi-
tion of controlling influences because the fact that an action is controlled does not
entail that the individual lacks autonomy with respect to it. As she points out, some
paradigmatic examples of autonomous choice involve decisions to do things that are
highly controlled, in the sense that they are necessitated by moral or emotional
commitments such as love. What seems to matter in these cases is not the fact that an
action is controlled per se, but rather ‘ . . . the sources of that control and the reasons
why those sources necessitate the action’.⁵⁸ Accordingly, she claims that the standard
⁵³ Aristotle is initially somewhat ambivalent about this claim. He starts by noting that such decisions are
‘mixed’ with regards to voluntariness (Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a 12–20). Ultimately, though, he con-
cludes that such decisions should be understood to be voluntary, even if they do not appropriately occasion
blame (Nicomachean Ethics, 1110b 1–9).
⁵⁴ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 138. ⁵⁵ Ibid., 139.
⁵⁶ Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of Voluntary Consent’, 7–8.
⁵⁷ The criterion of intentionality offers little assistance here. The criterion merely states that intentional
action amounts to the agent acting in accordance with a plan proposed for the execution of an action,
corresponding to the actor’s own conception of the act in question. Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of
Voluntary Consent’, 10.
⁵⁸ Walker, ‘Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy’, 602.
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accounts’ requirement of the absence of controlling influences is a requirement of the
wrong sort, at least when those controls are ‘internal’.
What we need then is to develop a theory about what sorts of control are
compatible with autonomy and which are not. One way in which it is possible to
develop such a theory is to draw on legalistic approaches to voluntariness, and to
develop an account of controlling influence grounded by the moral significance of the
illegitimate, intentional control of third parties.⁵⁹ However, such theories adopt a
narrow conception of voluntariness that overlooks an important point captured by
the standard account, namely that non-agential forces (such as debilitating disease)
can plausibly be construed as undermining voluntariness in some cases.
In view of this, the alternative strategy that I shall adopt in order to supplement the
standard account in this regard shall be to draw on the philosophical literature
concerning autonomy, rationality, and authenticity. I shall suggest that the standard
account of autonomy should be supplemented with a rationalist authenticity condi-
tion, which can explicate what it is for an agent’s motivating desire to be ‘external’ to
the self in the manner that may aptly be construed to undermine the second sense of
voluntariness identified in the Aristotelian distinction. Further, by reflecting on the
role that rationality plays in autonomy, we will be able to offer a deeper justification
for why certain forms of external controlling influence undermine autonomy.
Crucially though, whilst I have identified the standard view of autonomy as having
broadly Aristotelian roots, the theory that I offer here departs from both the standard
view and an Aristotelian conception of voluntariness in emphasizing the role of
rationality in the relevant sense of voluntariness.⁶⁰
To close this section I shall illustrate two cases in which agents seem to face
internal impediments to making decisions in the light of their own desires and values,
impediments that philosophical accounts of authenticity may serve to illuminate, and
which the legalistic approach to voluntariness neglects. To begin, we may observe
that being autonomous cannot always simply be a matter of ‘doing what one wants to
do’. Such sheer independence will often not be sufficient for autonomous agency,
since one’s motivating desire might be an impostor on one’s will.⁶¹ To illustrate,
consider the following example:
⁵⁹ Appelbaum, Lidz, and Klitzman, ‘Voluntariness of Consent to Research’; see also Wertheimer,
‘Voluntary Consent’. This sort of account also seems to be implicit in Taylor, Practical Autonomy and
Bioethics; Bublitz and Merkel, ‘Autonomy and Authenticity of Enhanced Personality Traits’.
⁶⁰ Although Aristotle acknowledges that rational choice is obviously voluntary, he notes that volun-
tariness is a broader notion, since non-rational agents can act in voluntary ways, even though they cannot
choose voluntarily (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b7–10). Furthermore, he notes that non-rational
feelings are also a part of human nature, and that it would thus be odd to class them as involuntary
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b3–4). Although my account is broadly compatible with the elements
of truth in these statements (truths that are contingent on particular understandings of rationality), I am
not intending to provide an Aristotelian conception of autonomy here. For a broadly Aristotelian
conception that can be invoked in medical ethics, see Radoilska, Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of
Today (L’Actualité d’Aristote en Morale).
⁶¹ As David Velleman has pointed out, it is possible to formulate examples of motivating desires that an
individual lacks agential authority over, but which are not deviant in the sense that they are compulsive. See
Velleman, ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’, 474. For further discussion of construing autonomy as
sheer independence, see O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 26–7.
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Jane is a drug addict. She is aware that her addiction is jeopardizing her ability to maintain her
career and family, aspects of her life that she values. However, she continues to take drugs
knowing that this will destroy her career and her marriage. Although Jane continues to take
drugs, she feels alienated from her action whenever she does so; she believes that it is not a
reflection of what she really wants.⁶²
It seems that part of the reason that Jane is not self-governing is that she is moved to
act by a desire from which she feels alienated. We might say that her motivating
desire is thus ‘inauthentic’ in some sense; it does not reflect what Jane truly wants.
Although I use the example of drug addiction to illustrate an ‘inauthentic’ desire,
there are various medical conditions that could cause an agent to be alienated from
their desires in this manner. For instance, some (although clearly not all) sufferers of
psychiatric disorders might be understood as being motivated by a desire that they
feel alienated from when they engage in self-harming behaviour. Furthermore, my
use of this particular example should not be understood to imply that all addicts lack
autonomy in the manner that Jane does;⁶³ it is rather an illustrative example of how
one individual might plausibly lack autonomy.
Of course, an advocate of the standard account might point out that Beauchamp
and Childress stipulate that drug addiction is an internal form of controlling influ-
ence that undermines autonomy. However, as I suggested above, without a deeper
account of why drug addiction in particular threatens autonomy, this observation
lacks explanatory power; in contrast, a theory of authenticity and its role in autono-
mous agency, could plausibly give us a deeper explanation of why drug addiction and
psychiatric disorders may represent forms of internal control that undermine auton-
omy. Furthermore, it is possible to construct cases that raise a similar problem for the
standard account that do not involve pathological behaviour. For example, Rebecca
Walker describes the case of a woman named Desiree who feels an impulsive desire
to undergo cosmetic surgery, despite the fact that she herself strongly believes that
this is an immoral practice, and that women should be accepted ‘as they are’.⁶⁴ Like
Jane, Desiree is plausibly not self-governing because her motivating desire is
‘inauthentic’ in some sense.⁶⁵
These cases both suggest that in order for an agent to be autonomous, they must
bear a certain sort of relation to the motivational states that give rise to their decisions
and actions. Procedural theorists tend to cash this out by claiming that agents are
only autonomous with respect to their motivating desires if they carry out some sort
of reflection on these desires to ensure their authenticity to the agent. In carrying out
such reflection on one’s motivating desires, it is believed that agents can have a
greater degree of assurance that those desires are in some way ‘their own’, and not
⁶² This is adapted from Frankfurt’s example of the unwilling addict in Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will
and the Concept of a Person’, 12.
⁶³ For accounts of how addiction can be compatible with autonomy, see Foddy and Savulescu,
‘Addiction and Autonomy’; Foddy and Savulescu, ‘A Liberal Account of Addiction’.
⁶⁴ Walker, ‘Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy’, 598. Walker has two further examples that
speak against the standard account.
⁶⁵ Substantive theorists might claim that Desiree lacks autonomy even if she endorses her desire for
cosmetic surgery, and does not hold the belief that it is immoral.
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merely the outcome of determining forces of the sort that serve to undermine
autonomy.
I propose that the above discussion suggests that an adequate theory of decisional
autonomy will incorporate what we may term a reflective element that captures what
it is for an agent to make decisions in accordance with her own desires and values.
This dimension reflects the second Aristotelian senses of voluntariness discussed
above, pertaining to actions that are motivated by forces that are in some sense
‘internal’ to the self. This can be understood as a primary explanandum of procedural
theories of the decisional dimension of autonomy.
A second explanandum pertains to the criterion of understanding, which reflects
the first sense of voluntariness identified in the Aristotelian distinction. I shall refer to
this as the ‘cognitive element’ of decisional autonomy. Whilst considerations relevant
to the cognitive element shall arise in the first three chapters, I shall consider this
element in much more detail in my discussion of informed consent in Chapter 6.
Henceforth, when I intend to refer to agents who meet the conditions pertaining to
both of these elements of a procedural theory of autonomy, I shall say that such
agents are ‘autonomous’ with respect to their decision, on that theory. In turn, when
I intend to refer to agents who meet only the conditions pertaining to a theory of the
reflective element of decisional autonomy, I shall say that such agents are reflectively
autonomous.
Many of the questions that I shall consider in my investigation of the decisional
dimension of autonomy have also been understood as pertaining to the concept of
moral responsibility, rather than autonomy. This is a by-product of the fact that
these two concepts have often been conflated in the philosophical literature.⁶⁶ I lack
the space here to consider the extent to which these two concepts differ. However,
it is prudent to warn the reader against extrapolating the arguments that I shall
make regarding autonomy to the concept of moral responsibility, and the questions
that these theorists are seeking to answer. Where possible, I shall restrict my
discussion of autonomy to works that ostensibly discuss autonomy as opposed to
moral responsibility.
Bioethicists should similarly take care not to simply extrapolate philosophical
theories of moral responsibility and autonomy to the bioethical context without
reflecting on the role that these concepts might be playing in different contexts.
Theories developed in the philosophical sphere are often designed to answer a
narrow set of questions about internal control, without attending to issues relating
to the cognitive element of decisional autonomy, or the practical dimension of
autonomy I introduce below. Accordingly, they may not be well-placed to answer
the questions that are the primary concern of medical ethicists. Nonetheless, bio-
ethicists who reject the standard view of autonomy have appealed (either implicitly
or explicitly) to a diverse range of philosophical theories of both autonomy and moral
responsibility, often without acknowledging important philosophical objections to
⁶⁶ See Fischer, ‘Recent Work on Moral Responsibility’, 98 for discussion of this point. For attempts to
differentiate the two concepts, see Oshana, ‘The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy’;
McKenna, ‘The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency’.
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these theories.⁶⁷ Moreover, the standard view itself explicitly eschews reference to
what I have termed the reflective element of autonomy due to concerns that it would
render autonomous decision-making too demanding, and so risk the first error that
I identified at the beginning of this introductory chapter.
Accordingly, once we have decided to leave the standard account behind, there is
still a significant amount of work for bioethicists to do to develop their thinking
about autonomy beyond the theories of the concept developed in the philosophical
sphere. Having introduced what I have called the decisional dimension of autonomy,
and its cognitive and reflective elements, let me now turn to what I shall call the
practical dimension of autonomy. This is a distinct, but importantly related part of
how we might understand the concept of autonomy in bioethics, and a dimension
that has been somewhat neglected in the philosophical sphere.
3. The Practical Dimension of Autonomy
Philosophers who write on the concept of autonomy sometimes purport to provide a
comprehensive analysis of autonomy by giving an account of the decisional dimen-
sion of autonomy. Still others consider only the reflective element of this dimen-
sion.⁶⁸ However, meeting conditions pertaining to decisional autonomy is not
sufficient for autonomy in toto on the understanding of autonomy that I am invoking
here. Autonomy, on this understanding, involves not only being able to make
decisions on the basis of one’s own desires and values, but also being able to act in
accordance with those decisions (or to otherwise have those decisions realized) in
some minimal sense.
This sort of understanding of autonomy is implicit in the bioethical application of
the principle of respect for autonomy. The principle of respect for autonomy
incorporates a positive obligation that enjoins us to facilitate an agent’s ability to
make an autonomous decision; however, it also incorporates a negative obligation
not to restrain the autonomous actions of others.⁶⁹ For instance, the principle might
enjoin us to respect a patient’s decision to refuse a treatment that is necessary for
saving her life. In view of this negative obligation, we can be accused of undermining
another agent’s overall autonomy if we obstruct their pursuit of an end that they have
chosen to pursue (in accordance with the conditions of a theory of decisional
autonomy). Accordingly, this negative obligation implies that autonomy can be
understood as having a practical dimension, pertaining to the agent’s ability to act
effectively in pursuit of their ends.
⁶⁷ For a limited sample, Doorn, ‘Mental Competence or Capacity to Form a Will’ endorses a
Frankfurtian hierarchical approach; for a bioethical endorsement of historical approaches, see Juth,
‘Enhancement, Autonomy, and Authenticity’; Sharp and Wasserman, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation,
Historicism, and Moral Responsibility’. DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, 95–106 endorses a
hybrid of these two approaches. Kihlbom, ‘Autonomy and Negatively Informed Consent’, 147 endorses
a coherentist approach. Walker, ‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’ endorses a rationalist account.
⁶⁸ See Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, 83–6, for an analysis of this tendency in the
philosophical literature.
⁶⁹ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 107.
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I shall further defend this view in Chapter 3. However, I introduce the practical
dimension here because I shall use the distinction between the decisional and
practical dimensions of autonomy to frame my overall theoretical discussion of the
nature of autonomy. Crucially, I am not claiming that we should recognize this
dimension of autonomy simply because we need to be able to make sense of the
negative obligation incorporated into the principle of respect for autonomy. I shall
claim that neglecting to incorporate a practical dimension into our overall theory of
autonomy actually leads to an impoverished view of the nature of decisional auton-
omy. For the purposes of this introductory chapter though, I suggest that an adequate
theory of autonomy in toto for use in bioethical contexts must incorporate conditions
pertaining to both the decisional and practical dimensions of autonomy.
With this in mind, we can present a conceptual map of autonomy in the following
way (see Figure 1).⁷⁰ In the interests of completeness, this diagram reflects a claim
that I have not yet defended, namely that the practical dimension of autonomy






































Figure 1 A conceptual map of autonomy
⁷⁰ This is an expanded version of a conceptual map I first outlined in Pugh et al., ‘Brainjacking in Deep
Brain Stimulation and Autonomy’.
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4. Local and Global Autonomy
I have delineated an understanding of autonomy that frames the concept in terms of
both a decisional and practical dimension. To conclude this introductory chapter,
I shall explain the distinction between local and global autonomy that I shall also use
throughout my discussion.⁷¹
Our interest in being self-governing seems to stem from our interest in being in
charge not only of our individual decisions and acts, but also of our diachronic
projects, and indeed, our own lives. Accordingly, when we consider the question of
whether an agent is autonomous, it is possible to ask this question at both a global
and local level. Conceived as a global concept, autonomy is:
. . . a feature that evaluates a whole way of living one’s life (that) can only be assessed over
extended portions of a person’s life.⁷²
Dworkin claims that autonomy is intuitively only a global concept, on the basis that it
is odd to claim that people can switch back from autonomy to non-autonomy over
short periods of time.⁷³ I do not share this intuition; it is not at all clear why it must be
odd to suppose that an agent might be autonomous with respect to a particular
decision but not to another one shortly after. This is particularly true in bioethical
discussions of informed consent; for instance, it seems plausible that a physician
could ensure that a patient was able to autonomously consent to some intervention
by adequately informing them about the nature of the intervention, but fail to do so
for another intervention shortly after. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that
decision-making capacity should be treated as specific to particular decisions.
Indeed, as I shall suggest below, this perhaps partly explains why the standard
account of autonomy treats autonomy as a property of particular decisions and
actions, rather than persons per se. However, I see no reason to deny that both
conceptions can be coherent. We can conceive of autonomy as a global property, but
we can also conceive of it as a local property that an agent instantiates in a specific
time-slice with respect to particular acts and decisions.⁷⁴
The question of whether an agent is locally autonomous is perhaps less complex
than the question of whether an agent is globally autonomous. Although it might be
clear how to assess an agent’s autonomy with regards to a particular decision in a
certain specified set of circumstances, it is not immediately clear how we are to
evaluate a person’s autonomy as a feature that pertains to extended portions of their
life, given the varied circumstances which ‘a significant portion of one’s life’ can
include.
One plausible way in which we might assess an agent’s global autonomy is to
consider whether the agent lives in accordance with diachronic plans of her own
choosing, where a diachronic plan is understood to stipulate long-term goals that
serve to guide the individual’s local decision-making. These diachronic plans may
⁷¹ Meyers draws the same distinction using the terms episodic and programmatic autonomy. See
Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, 48–9.
⁷² Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 16. ⁷³ Ibid.
⁷⁴ Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 3.
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vary in length; for example, in a biomedical context, we may say that a patient might
have a diachronic plan to overcome some health problem, and that they may make
local decisions that will have an effect on their pursuit of that long-term goal.
However, some diachronic plans may cover the agent’s whole life. Furthermore, it
seems that some diachronic plans may be of more importance to the agent than
others; typically, it seems that an agent’s life-plans concerning her career and family
will often be central to the agent’s sense of ‘who she is’, whilst other diachronic plans,
such as finishing an enjoyable TV series say, may not represent goals that are
particularly central to the agent’s self-conception.
There has been little discussion concerning how we should understand the rela-
tionship between global and local autonomy. On one view, it might be claimed that
global autonomy arises as a result of the aggregate of instances of local autonomy
over a person’s life.⁷⁵ I shall not employ this sense of global autonomy here, since it
seems plausible to claim that some instances of local autonomy can serve to under-
mine the pursuit of global commitments. Suppose an agent values two mutually
exclusive diachronic goals, such as living a healthy lifestyle and becoming a gour-
mand. She continually changes her mind about which goal to prioritize. Here, it
seems that the agent might make a locally autonomous decision to act in pursuit of
one goal that will threaten the successful fulfilment of the other competing goal. The
mere fact that the agent might be autonomous with respect to each of her local
decisions does not seem to contribute to her global autonomy in this case, because
her locally autonomous decisions to act in pursuit of alternating competing goals
undermines her ability to successfully pursue either of them.
In stressing the importance of diachronic plans to global autonomy, I am not
claiming that an agent’s life must be unified by a certain single set of static diachronic
plans throughout her life.⁷⁶ Clearly, people, and their circumstances, change over
time, and people may change their diachronic plans accordingly. However, it seems
that at least some threshold level of stability is required, so that the agent has
sufficient time to commit to long-term goals that can confer an intelligible diachronic
purpose to her decisions and actions. Furthermore, the nature of the way in which we
change our plans is important. If an agent is to maintain their global autonomy
despite a significant change in their plans, then they must be locally autonomous with
respect to their decision to change their plans.
I mentioned above that Beauchamp and Childress’ primary focus on autonomy as
a property of choices rather than agents belies a failure to acknowledge the distinc-
tion between local and global autonomy; I am now in a position to explain this point.
Beauchamp and Childress claim that the reason why autonomy should not be
understood as a property of agents in a bioethical context is that:
. . . even autonomous persons with self-governing capacities sometimes fail to govern them-
selves in particular choices . . . [and] some persons who are generally not capable of autono-
mous decision-making can, at times, make autonomous choices.⁷⁷
⁷⁵ Ibid. ⁷⁶ Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 37 raises this concern.
⁷⁷ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 102.
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Pace Beauchamp and Childress, these cases do not demonstrate that autonomy
should not be conceived of as a property of persons; rather, these cases just show
the importance of distinguishing local and global autonomy. With respect to the first
case, there is no reason to think that a person’s failure to make a locally autonomous
decision must necessarily undermine their status as a globally autonomous person;
indeed, I shall suggest in Chapter 9 that sacrificing our local autonomy with regards
to a particular decision might sometimes be necessary for facilitating our global
autonomy. Furthermore, we can also claim that a person might lack the capacities
that are necessary to autonomously form and execute diachronic plans, and yet claim
that they can be locally autonomous with respect to simple, synchronic decisions.
As such, I shall claim that autonomy is a property of persons, and that a person’s
desires, intentions, actions, and decisions are autonomous in a derivative sense; they
are, I suggest, things that an agent can be autonomous ‘with respect to’.
Conclusion
I have attempted to map some of the contours of a plausible pre-theoretical under-
standing of autonomy, in preparation for the theoretical analysis that I shall under-
take in the following chapters. In Chapter 1, I shall outline four distinctions
concerning rationality that shall play an integral role in my discussion of the
relationship between rationality and autonomy. In Chapter 2, I shall go on to outline
how considerations of rationality can be incorporated into a plausible account of
decisional autonomy. In Chapters 3 and 4, I explain how this rationalist approach
can allow for a deeper understanding of how and why deception, manipulation, and
coercion serve to undermine autonomy.
In Chapter 5, I turn to defend the inclusion of conditions pertaining to the
practical dimension of autonomy in an overall theory of autonomy in bioethics,
and consider the relationship between freedom and autonomy, and how we might
seek to enhance autonomy. I also claim that considerations of the practical dimen-
sion of autonomy provide crucial insights about the beliefs that are central to the
cognitive element of decisional autonomy. Building on this analysis, in Chapter 6
I consider the ramifications that my theory has for the justification and elements of
informed consent. In doing so, I further flesh out how we might understand the
boundaries of the cognitive element of decisional autonomy. In Chapter 7, I turn to
the implications of a rationalist theory of autonomy for the related question of
decision-making capacity, and respond to prominent anti-paternalist objections to
such theories of autonomy. In Chapter 8, I further develop this discussion by
considering decision-making capacity in the context of decisions to refuse life-saving
treatment. Finally, in Chapter 9, I consider the prudential value of autonomy, and its
relation to well-being.





As I pointed out in the introductory chapter, bioethicists and medical lawyers
frequently invoke the language of rationality in their discussions of autonomy.
However, they often do so without fully explicating the understanding of rationality
they mean to invoke, or the nature of its relationship to autonomy. This is problem-
atic because different understandings of rationality and its relationship to decisional
autonomy can lead to contrasting conclusions about the sorts of decisions that
qualify as autonomous in bioethical contexts.
To illustrate, consider the much-discussed question of whether a Jehovah’s
Witness who refuses a life-saving blood transfusion can be said to be making a
‘rational decision’. It seems that a case can be made for both the interpretation that
the decision is rational, and the interpretation that it is irrational, depending on the
sense of rationality that one invokes. On the one hand, given that the Jehovah’s
Witness believes that they will be unable to enjoy eternal bliss in the afterlife if they
receive a blood transfusion, it seems in one sense rational for them to refuse the life-
saving transfusion; it is quite rational to prefer eternal bliss over living for the
remainder of one’s mortal lifespan. On the other hand, we might question whether
the Jehovah’s Witness can rationally believe that they will not receive eternal bliss in
the afterlife if they receive the transfusion; on this reading, there seems to be a good
case for claiming that their decision is irrational.
I will consider the autonomy of individuals who refuse life-saving treatment in
greater detail in Chapter 8. However, I mention this example here to illustrate how
different assumptions regarding the nature of rationality can easily creep into
bioethical discussions. Crucially, these assumptions can have hugely important
effects if one also holds that decisional autonomy requires that one makes rational
decisions, or that one acts on the basis of rational desires. Indeed, similar questions
about rationality and autonomy will arise in cases in which individuals either choose
to act (i) in ways that others believe are contrary to their best interests (which might
include, for example, individuals deciding to engage in unhealthy behaviours like
smoking), or (ii) on the basis of dubious beliefs (such as certain anorexic patients who
refuse food on the basis of a belief that they are overweight, despite the fact that they
are really dangerously underweight).
Accordingly, in order to develop an adequate rationalist account of decisional
autonomy, it is imperative to first be clear about the understanding of the nature of
rationality that one is invoking, and its relationship to autonomy. My task in the
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following two chapters is to delineate an understanding of the nature of rationality,
and how it should be understood to relate to decisional autonomy. To begin to do so,
in this chapter I shall elucidate four key distinctions concerning the nature of
rationality. In doing so, I shall draw on Derek Parfit’s recent work on the nature of
rationality, and join him in endorsing an objectivist account of reasons.
Although the discussion of this chapter concerns somewhat technical philosoph-
ical distinctions, it is, I believe, impossible to begin a conversation about the role that
rationality plays in autonomy without having an adequate grasp of the distinctions
that I shall outline here. Indeed, I believe that a failure to grasp these distinctions, and
the conflation of quite distinct concepts is responsible for a number of important
confusions about the role of rationality in autonomy, as I shall go on to explain in
later chapters. Once we are clear about the nature of what an objectivist account of
reasons entails, I will be able to explain how it may be used to supplement existing
rationalist theories of autonomy in bioethics and philosophy, so that they can
overcome important criticisms. This shall be my task in Chapter 2.
With this motivation in mind, I shall outline four distinctions in this chapter. The
first distinction, between theoretical and practical rationality, concerns the different
norms of rationality governing beliefs and desires. The second, between real and
apparent reasons, concerns whether our beliefs about our practical reasons map onto
reason-giving facts that actually obtain in the world. The third, between objectivism
and subjectivism about reasons, concerns the fundamental source of all of our
practical reasons, that is, what it is that ultimately grounds our having a reason to
want or do something. The fourth, between personal and impersonal reasons,
concerns the different kinds of facts that ground practical reasons on objectivist
theories. Accordingly, these distinctions focus on progressively narrower features of
particular conceptions of rationality.
It should be noted that there is very little consensus in the philosophical literature
regarding the precise terms that one should use to capture these distinctions about
rationality. For instance, what I am calling theoretical rationality is sometimes called
epistemic rationality, and the distinction I follow Parfit in drawing between object-
ivism and subjectivism about reasons significantly (although perhaps not completely)
overlaps with some understandings of what has been called internalism and exter-
nalism about reasons. However, rather than get bogged down in questions of
semantics and exegesis here, I shall instead have to be somewhat stipulative in my
choice of terms, and simply choose to follow some philosophers rather than others in
my framing of the discussion below. To be clear though, it is the distinctions that
matter, and not the terms we use to describe them.
1. Theoretical and Practical Rationality
Whilst beliefs and desires are both kinds of mental states, it is common for philo-
sophers to distinguish them on the basis of what has been called their ‘direction of
fit’.¹ Since it is generally the case that the aim of a belief is for it to be true, a belief can
¹ Humberstone, ‘Direction of Fit’.
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be said to be successful if it fits the world as it is. If I hold a false belief, then I should
seek to change my belief so that it better fits the world. In contrast, generally the aim
of a desire is to realize the object of the desire. Like belief then, a desire is successful if
it fits the world, but in the case of an unrealized desire the flaw does not lie in the
desire. Rather, one should keep the desire and attempt to change the world to fit it; a
desire’s ‘direction of fit’ thus differs from that of a belief.²
Rationality can be partly construed as a set of norms that govern these different
mental states. Theoretical rationality relates to the set of norms that govern how we
come to form and sustain our beliefs.³ These norms may involve, among other things,
being responsive to evidence in sustaining one’s beliefs, drawing logical implications
from matters of fact and probability, and holding broadly consistent and coherent
sets of beliefs.⁴ To illustrate a failure of theoretical rationality in the medical context,
consider the following example (from Savulescu and Momeyer) of a patient who is
deciding whether to undergo an operation, and reasons as follows:
(1) There is a risk of dying from anaesthesia. (true)
(2) I will require an anaesthetic if I am to have this
operation. (true)
Therefore, if I have this operation, I will probably die.⁵
This patient comes to hold an irrational belief because, due to a failure in logical
reasoning, they have derived a false conclusion from the true beliefs in (1) and (2).
There is thus an important relationship between the theoretical rationality of our
beliefs, and their truth. In following the norms of theoretical rationality, we come to
form and sustain rational beliefs that are more likely to be successful, in the sense that
they are more likely to be true; they are more likely to ‘fit the world’. Conversely,
failures of theoretical rationality will often lead to false beliefs. This is clearest in the
case of many delusions and confabulations; whilst delusions and confabulations
typically (but not necessarily) amount to false beliefs, they represent particularly
pernicious kinds of false belief because they are typically based on underlying failures
of theoretical rationality.⁶
However, it is important to notice the limits to this relationship. First, theoretical
rationality does not guarantee the truth of our beliefs. In some cases, we can form a
² Platts, Ways of Meaning, 257.
³ I use the terminology of theoretical rationality in accordance with existing rationalist theories of
autonomy that employ this terminology. Notably, Derek Parfit, whose work I will draw on substantially in
this chapter, refers to what I am terming theoretical rationality as ‘epistemic rationality’ (Parfit, On What
Matters). It is also worth noting that although Parfit claims it is possible to distinguish theoretical
(epistemic) rationality and practical rationality by appealing to considerations pertaining to the different
‘directions of fit’ of these mental states, he believes that it is better to draw the distinction in another way.
He claims that the deeper distinction between the two lies in the fact that we respond to practical reasons
with voluntary acts, whilst our responses to theoretical (epistemic) reasons are non-voluntary (Parfit, On
What Matters, 118). However, for my purposes, nothing of great significance turns on the way in which we
draw this distinction.
⁴ For other discussions of norms of theoretical rationality in bioethics, see Walker, ‘Respect for Rational
Autonomy’; Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’
⁵ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 283.
⁶ Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.
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false belief in a manner that nonetheless meets the requirements of theoretical
rationality. Suppose you go to your kitchen, turn the tap and collect the forthcoming
liquid in a glass. It would be theoretically rational for you to believe the liquid in the
glass is safe to drink, given your previous experience of drinking water from the tap,
and the coherence of this belief with your various other beliefs. However, it might still
be the case that the liquid is not safe to drink; perhaps, unbeknownst to you, the
water supply has been contaminated today. In this example, your belief that the
liquid in the glass is safe to drink is false, even though you formed it in a theoretically
rational manner.
Second, theoretical irrationality does not preclude one’s beliefs from being true.
For instance, there can be cases in which delusions do not concern false beliefs.
Fulford and Radilowska offer the example of an individual suffering from ‘Othello’
syndrome, which involves the persistent belief that one’s spouse is being unfaithful.
They note that it is quite possible for an individual to manifest this belief in a manner
that fails to adhere to norms of theoretical irrationality, even if it happens to be true.⁷
This is an example in which an individual’s doxastic justification (i.e. the agent’s
justification for believing his wife is being unfaithful) is divorced from propositional
justification (i.e. that which actually provides a sufficient reason to believe the
proposition in question).⁸ Whilst theoretical rationality does not guarantee the
truth of our beliefs, abiding by norms of theoretical rationality helps to ensure that
one’s doxastic justification for a belief will align with its propositional justification,
and make it more likely that one’s beliefs will be true.
Whilst theoretical rationality pertains to the rationality of your beliefs, practical
rationality pertains to the rationality of what we do, or the desires that move us to
action.⁹ On one prominent approach, practical rationality might be understood to
derive from theoretical rationality. On the view under consideration, a desire is
understood to be rational if it is causally dependent upon beliefs that the individual
has attained in a theoretically rational manner. Indeed, some discussions of ration-
ality and autonomy seem to implicitly rely on this sort of view.¹⁰ However, although
it is true that many of our desires causally depend on our beliefs, merging the two
forms of rationality in this way is problematic. As Derek Parfit argues, an individual’s
theoretical irrationality need not transmit to her practical rationality in the way that
the view I am considering here implies.
⁷ Fulford and Radoilska, ‘Three Challenges from Delusion for Theories of Autonomy’.
⁸ Turri notes that it is widely claimed that if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having
reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. For a discussion
and rejection of this view, see Turri, ‘On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic
Justification’.
⁹ This phrasing implicitly adopts the Humean view of motivation, according to which desires are
necessary for motivation. Whilst this view is not universally accepted, the rationalist theories of autonomy
I survey in the next chapter are phrased in terms of ‘rational desires’ rather than the rationality of other
motivational states. Accordingly, I shall follow these theorists in adopting this Humean assumption
regarding the role of desires in practical reasoning.
¹⁰ For example, Julian Savulescu claims that a necessary condition of autonomy is that one acts on the
basis of a rational desire, which in turn is a desire that one holds on the basis of an evaluation that is
grounded in theoretically rational beliefs. See Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life
Sustaining Treatment’.
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To see why, compare two cases. First, suppose that Alice holds the irrational belief
that smoking will improve her health, and that she forms a desire to smoke on the
basis of this belief. In light of my discussion above, we may say that Alice is
theoretically irrational here because she holds the belief that smoking will improve
her health, despite the overwhelming evidence she has against the veracity of this
claim.¹¹ However, her desire to smoke given that she has that belief can plausibly be
described as practically rational. One might explain this by claiming that Alice wants
‘what, if (her) beliefs were true, (she) would have strong reason to want’.¹²
Alice’s case is thus a counterexample to the claim that causal dependence on a
rational belief is a necessary condition for the rationality of a desire. Consider now a
case that suggests that casual dependence on rational beliefs is also not sufficient to
establish the rationality of a desire. Suppose that Rosie holds the rational belief that
smoking will damage her health, and that she forms the desire to smoke on the basis
of this belief that it will damage her health.¹³
Some philosophers might deny the claim that Rosie is being practically irrational
here. They might claim that desires for particular ends are not an appropriate target
of rational assessment; we can only assess the rationality of the beliefs upon which
these desires depend, and the rationality of acting in certain ways as a means to those
ends. I shall consider this sort of view in the next section, where I discuss subjectivism
about reasons.
In contrast to this view, I suggest that it is plausible to claim that Rosie is
practically irrational here, despite the fact that her desire causally depends on a
rational belief. The reason for this is that, certeris paribus, Rosie’s belief that smoking
will damage her health plausibly gives her a strong reason not to want to smoke. Of
course, there may be other reasons that do count in favour of smoking (perhaps Rosie
finds it pleasurable; perhaps she may even want to die prematurely). These other
reasons might even outweigh the reasons against smoking. I will consider this point
later. However, the more basic point about practical rationality that I am highlighting
here is that, Rosie’s forming a desire to smoke as a result of the belief that it will
damage her health in isolation can plausibly be understood to involve a breakdown in
practical rationality, and one that is not attributable to an underlying irrational belief.
In order to fully support this interpretation, I need to explain what it is for a
consideration to count as a practical reason. I shall elaborate on this over the course
of this chapter. For now though, I shall make the more general observation that the
problem in Rosie’s case is that her rational belief causes a desire that is not justified by
the content of that belief; her desire to want to smoke is not a rational response to the
belief that smoking is bad for her health. More generally, some of our desires can be
aberrant in a sense that denotes irrationality because they causally depend on entirely
irrelevant (yet rational) beliefs, or even (rational) beliefs that contra-indicate the
desire in question, like Rosie’s desire to smoke. In short, the fact that a rational belief
causes a desire does not entail that the belief justifies the desire in question, in the
sense that it provides rational grounds for having the desire.¹⁴
¹¹ Parfit, On What Matters, 115. ¹² Ibid., 113. ¹³ Ibid., 115. ¹⁴ Ibid., 112.
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Rather than claim that the rationality of a desire is conditional on the rationality of
the belief upon which it depends, we should instead claim that it is the content of
these beliefs that matters when we are thinking about whether a desire is rational.¹⁵
That is to say, the relevant question for practical rationality is whether we have a
reason to want the object of a particular desire, given our beliefs. Naturally, this raises
the question of what kinds of beliefs are relevant to establishing that we have a reason
to want the object of a particular desire. This question concerns a distinction between
what Parfit calls subjectivism and objectivism about reasons. Prior to turning to that
distinction, it is first important to be clear about the difference between real and
apparent practical reasons.
2. Apparent and Real Practical Reasons
When we are deciding what to do, we typically tend to lack epistemic access to a
number of important facts. In such scenarios, we have to decide how to act on the
basis of the reasons that we understand ourselves as having given our beliefs.
However, when our beliefs are false, our understanding of what we have reason to
do may not map onto reality. As such, in assessing our practical reasons, and in
thinking about the relationship between autonomy and practical rationality, it is
essential to distinguish what we have ‘real’ reasons to do (notwithstanding our
beliefs), from what we have ‘apparent’ reasons to do, given our beliefs. In some
cases, the two can come apart, and we can have very strong ‘real’ reasons to refrain
from some course of action, despite the fact that we may have very good apparent
reasons to do that thing.
This is best illustrated by way of example. Recall my earlier example of turning on
the tap in your kitchen, and setting about to drink the liquid in your glass. Suppose
that the liquid that you believe to be potable water, is (unbeknownst to you) actually
acid.¹⁶ Here, you have a strong reason to not drink the liquid in the glass; it will kill
you. We may say that you have a real reason here, one that is not dependent on what
you believe. However, because you lack epistemic access to facts about what is in the
glass (the contaminated liquid looks exactly the same as water, and you have no other
cause to doubt that it is safe), and because you believe that drinking the liquid will
serve as a means to an end that you value (quenching your thirst), we may say that
you have an ‘apparent reason’ to drink the liquid. Whether or not an agent’s apparent
reasons amount to ‘real’ reasons (that is, the reasons that do, as a matter of fact
obtain) depend on the truth status of the beliefs upon which the apparent reason
causally depends. If the beliefs are true, the apparent reason will also be a real reason;
if not, the apparent reason is ‘merely apparent’.¹⁷
Since we typically make our decisions without complete information about our
decision-making context, questions about the role that practical rationality plays in
¹⁵ Ibid., 113.
¹⁶ I adapt this from Williams, Moral Luck, 102. Notice that Williams uses this example in defence of a
subjectivist view about reasons. For Parfit’s specific comments on Williams’ view, see Parfit, On What
Matters, 65 and 77.
¹⁷ Parfit, On What Matters, 35.
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autonomous decision-making should be understood to pertain to apparent rather
than real reasons. Drawing this distinction can enable a rationalist theory of auton-
omy to avoid some important confusions, as I shall explore in the next chapter.
3. Subjectivism and Objectivism about Reasons
The two theories about reasons that I consider in this section are theories about the
source of our practical reasons, that is, what gives us reasons to do or to want certain
things.
According to Parfit’s conception of subjectivism about reasons, our practical
reasons are always grounded by some set of our (perhaps hypothetical) present
desires and aims. There are of course more complex versions of this basic view.
For instance, some subjective theories might stipulate that only some of our desires
can ground reasons; for instance, it might be claimed that our desires can only
ground reasons if they are based on true beliefs, or perhaps if they are the desires
that we would have if we were aware of all the relevant available information. These
details about different subjective theories need not concern us here; what matters for
my purposes is the fundamental thought underlying subjective theories, namely, the
claim that all of our practical reasons are grounded by our desires. The relative
strength of one’s practical reasons on this view will thus be a function of the strength
of the desire upon which the reason depends.
To illustrate, on a subjectivist account, if I harbour only one desire, which is to
engage in a boring and meaningless activity, such as counting the blades of grass on
my lawn every day, I thereby have a reason to do this; it is practically rational for me
to count the blades of grass every day. Simply wanting to do something can create
practical reasons. On more basic subjectivist accounts, simply desiring a very bad
outcome, perhaps one that involves you suffering severe harm unnecessarily, can
create a practical reason for one to act in ways that will bring about this outcome. If
these desires are also adequately informed, or if they are the desires that we would
have if we were aware of all the relevant information, then these desires would also
create practical reasons on more complex subjective theories. David Hume famously
captured the essence of the subjectivist view of practical reason in his claim that, ‘’tis
not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching
of my finger’.¹⁸
On subjectivist accounts then, our beliefs have a somewhat limited role in practical
rationality. The beliefs that are relevant to establishing that I have a reason to do
something (or to want something) are my beliefs about the means that are necessary
to realize my more fundamental desires. I do not need to have any evaluative beliefs
about the value of the object of my desires in order to be rational in pursuing them.
The subjectivist can of course claim that I may need to have some kind of pro-
attitude towards them; but that is not the same as believing that the object is
good. Notice then that the subjectivist will have difficulty in explaining why Rosie
¹⁸ Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. I am not claiming here that the subjectivist is committed to a
Humean conception of desires, as is sometimes thought to be the case. See Persson, The Retreat of Reason,
125 for discussion.
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(in the example from the previous section) is in any sense practically irrational if she
starts smoking.
In contrast, objectivism about reasons denies that an individual’s desires funda-
mentally ground her practical reasons; rather it is evaluative facts about the object of
the agent’s desire that provide her with reasons to act. In outlining his objectivist
account, Parfit claims that there are facts that make certain outcomes worth pursuing
that ‘ . . . give us reasons both to have certain desires or aims, and to do whatever we
can to fulfil them’.¹⁹ More specifically, an outcome may be understood as worth
pursuing for a particular person if ‘ . . . there are certain facts that give this person self-
interested reasons to want this event to occur’.²⁰Wemay also note that outcomes can
be worth pursuing for reasons other than prudential ones concerning what is in our
own interest. For instance our reasons may be moral or aesthetic; alternatively, they
might concern the well-being of others. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, I shall
frame my discussion of practical rationality in the majority of this book in terms of
prudential reasons. However, we should not overlook the possibility of other rational
grounds; in particular, our other-regarding reasons are a corollary of the relational
nature of autonomy, a point to which I shall return in the next chapter.
On the objectivist account then, it would only be rational for me to count the
blades of grass in the above example if there were facts about performing that activity
that make it worth my pursuing it; does it, for instance, give me pleasure? Further,
I would have no reason to cause myself harm (like Rosie) that did not serve as a
means²¹ to some further end that I did have reason to care about. This is true even if
(like Rosie) I harboured a desire to cause myself such harm.
Unlike the subjectivist account then, the mere fact that I harbour a desire for
some outcome does not itself render behaviour aimed at achieving the object of
the desire rational. Rather my actions to realize a desire (and indeed the desire itself)
are rational when there are facts about the object of the desire that make it worth
pursuing. I shall say more about what it is for an object of a desire to be worth
pursuing below.
Despite this considerable difference between subjectivism and objectivism, there is
some overlap between the two. Most saliently, the objectivist account is compatible
with the thought that some of our reasons can be grounded by our desires in a
derivative sense. Let us suppose that being healthy is something that I believe to be
worth pursuing, and that I form a desire to be healthy in response to this belief about
the value of health. This is a rational desire on the objectivist account. We might say
that this rational desire to be healthy now gives me a reason to do a number of other
things that are instrumental to remaining healthy, such as exercising and eating well.
However, the fact that this desire to be healthy is grounding my reasons to exercise
and eat well does not mean that the desire is grounding a practical reason in the same
way that subjectivism about reasons claims. The difference here is that for the
objectivist, the normative force of these reasons is not fundamentally derived from
the desire to be healthy itself (as the subjective account would claim); rather, on the
¹⁹ Parfit, On What Matters, 45. ²⁰ Ibid., 41.
²¹ Or that did not constitute a foreseeable side-effect.
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objectivist view, the normative force of these reasons is fundamentally derived from
the facts that gave me the reason to desire being healthy in the first place.
The subjectivist and the objectivist can thus agree that a fundamental norm of
practical reasoning is that we have reasons to do things that are necessary to realizing
our desire for a certain end to obtain. However, they disagree about what funda-
mentally grounds these reasons. For the subjectivist, the mere fact that I desire the
end in question is sufficient; for the objectivist, I only have a reason to do the things
that are necessary to realizing my desire if the desire is itself rationally grounded by
facts about the value of the object of my desire. I only have a reason to exercise if it is
rational to want the end to which exercising serves as a means, in this case, being
healthy (let us suppose). Crucially, on this view, if objectivism is true, it must apply
fundamentally to all of our practical reasons.²²
This may seem a somewhat technical distinction about the nature of practical
rationality. However, it can have important practical upshots in medical ethics.
Consider, for example, an individual who is suffering from severe and enduring
anorexia nervosa. Many sufferers of this disease hold theoretically irrational beliefs
about their weight, but they need not; some sufferers understand that they are
dangerously underweight, yet harbour a desire to maintain a low weight, a desire
that trumps all others. If such a patient refuses food, then it seems that the subjectivist
is committed to the claim that such a patient is being practically rational; refusing
food is a necessary means to achieving the end of maintaining low weight, the end
that the patient most strongly desires (and one that she may hold whilst being aware
of relevant information, having deliberated, and despite knowing that this desire is
threatening her life). In contrast, on the objectivist approach, the rationality of the
patient’s desire to refuse food depends on whether the patient’s desire to maintain
low weight is a response to a belief that there are facts about low weight that make it
valuable, or worth pursuing. I shall consider this objectivist interpretation further
later in this chapter, and also in Chapter 8.
There is a considerable debate in philosophy about whether we should endorse
subjectivism or objectivism about reasons. On the one hand, objectivists argue that
there are clearly some things that we have reasons to want or do, irrespective of either
our actual inclinations, or even what our fully informed inclinations might hypo-
thetically be. For example, one of Parfit’s own main arguments in defence of an
objectivist account is that on subjectivist theories, we have no basis for explaining
why an agent who has no desire to avoid a period of agony in the future after ideal
deliberation is being practically irrational; this, Parfit claims, is surely implausible,
terming this objection to subjectivist theories ‘The Agony Argument’.²³ In response,
the subjectivist may be sceptical of the claim that the objectivist can succeed in
providing justifiable criteria for explaining why we have a reason to want or avoid
certain things (such as agony) that do not appeal to the agent’s desires.²⁴
²² This is the conclusion of Parfit’s All or Nothing Argument. Parfit, On What Matters, 102–8.
²³ Parfit, On What Matters. The Agony Argument against subjectivism is also supplemented by Parfit’s
Incoherence Argument (Parfit, On What Matters, 108–15).
²⁴ For the classic defence of subjectivism, see Williams, Moral Luck, 101–13. For further discussions,
Velleman, ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’; Brewer, ‘The Real Problem with Internalism About
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I cannot hope to resolve this long-standing dispute here. However, I believe that
the objectivist view that Parfit has developed can provide rationalist theories of
autonomy with the conceptual apparatus to respond to problems facing existing
rationalist accounts of autonomy. I shall spell out further details of Parfit’s objectivist
account over the course of this chapter, though I shall not provide a detailed defence
of objectivism over subjectivism about reasons. I direct the interested reader to
Parfit’s own powerful and to my mind persuasive arguments in this regard.²⁵ In
the next chapter I shall also suggest that subjectivism about reasons is ill-suited to
serve as the basis for a rationality criterion of autonomy.
Having assumed that objectivism is true, and before turning to a final distinction
between different kinds of reason that objectivism about reasons can accommodate,
let me conclude this discussion with some comments about the relative strength of
our reasons on the objectivist account. The relative strength of our practical reasons
on the objectivist account depends on the relative value of the objects of our desires,
rather than the strength of the desires themselves (as per the subjectivist account). If
we believe that the object of one desire is more valuable than the object of another
desire, then we have stronger reason to realize the former. Parfit also offers some
further terminology that is useful for comparing the relative strength of reasons on
the objectivist account. He writes:
If our reasons to act in some way are stronger than our reasons to act in any of the other
possible ways, these reasons are decisive, and acting in this way is what we have most reason to
do. If such reasons are much stronger than any set of conflicting reasons, we can call them
strongly decisive.²⁶
Accordingly, some possible act of ours would be:
rational if we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us
sufficient reasons to act in this way,
what we ought rationally to do if these reasons would be decisive,
less than fully rational if we have beliefs whose truth would give us clear and
decisive reasons not to act in this way,
and
irrational if these reasons would be strongly decisive.²⁷
I believe we should also add the following definition to Parfit’s list, for reasons that
shall become clear in the following chapter. We may say that an act is arational, if we
choose to perform it without believing that there are any particular facts that speak in
favour of or against the act in question; our mere whims on this definition would be
arational, rather than irrational.
Reasons’; Goldman, ‘Desire Based Reasons and Reasons for Desires’; Sobel, ‘Parfit’s Case Against
Subjectivism’; Sobel, ‘Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action’; Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity;
Manne, ‘Internalism about Reasons’.
²⁵ Parfit, On What Matters, Part One. For criticism, see Smith, ‘Parfit’s Mistaken Meta-Ethics’.
²⁶ Parfit, On What Matters, 32. ²⁷ Ibid., 34.
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With these comments about the relative strength of different reasons on the
objectivist account, I now want to consider a final distinction about different kinds
of reason that might obtain on the objectivist account.
4. Personal and Impersonal Reasons
Subjectivism and objectivism about reasons have different implications for the kinds
of practical reasons that are possible. Since the subjectivist claims that desires
fundamentally ground our practical reasons, and we only have practical reason to
act in ways that serve as a means to achieving the outcomes we desire, a practical
reason would only ever be universally applicable if every existing person held a desire
for the same outcome. Only then would everyone have the same practical reason to
do what it takes to bring about that outcome. However, it is not clear that this would
often be the case;²⁸ to slightly improvise on Hume’s remark above, some people
might prefer the destruction of worlds to finger-scratching.
In contrast, the claim that there are some universally applicable practical reasons is
readily compatible with the objectivist account. Recall that the objectivist claims that
our practical reasons are grounded by the value of the objects of our desires. It is now
time to consider what it is for a consideration to count as a practical reason in this
sense. One important way in which an outcome may be understood as worth
pursuing for a particular person is if ‘ . . . there are certain facts that give this person
self-interested reasons to want this event to occur’.²⁹ In turn, ‘self-interested reasons’
are reasons provided by facts concerning the person’s well-being.³⁰
Whilst there are a number of different kinds of facts and considerations that can
ground practical reasons, the kind that is most salient for a discussion of personal
autonomy are these facts about well-being.³¹ Naturally, this raises the question of
what sort of facts might concern a person’s well-being. Again following Parfit,
theories of well-being are commonly classified into one of the following three
types, as schematized below:
Hedonistic Theories—What would be best for someone is what would make
their life happiest.
Desire-Fulfilment Theories—What would be best for someone is what, through-
out their life, would best fulfil their desires.
Objective List Theories—Certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not
we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.³²
²⁸ Such reasons would be grounded by what Ingmar Persson terms intersubjective values, values that as
an empirical matter of fact are shared by all persons. Persson argues that there are evolutionary reasons for
thinking that there may be some significant intersubjective values, such as concern for one’s future well-
being. See Persson, The Retreat of Reason, 102–3. Michael Smith notably defends a the view that fully
informed individuals would hold the same set of desires if they were formed in that (counterfactual)
condition. Smith, The Moral Problem. For criticism, see Joyce, The Myth of Morality.
²⁹ Parfit, On What Matters, 41. ³⁰ Ibid., 39–40.
³¹ Recall that moral and aesthetic facts might also plausibly ground practical reasons.
³² Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Appendix I.
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I mentioned above that Parfit’s Agony argument is taken to offer strong support to
objectivism about reasons. However, in accepting this argument, we are accepting the
claim that well-being incorporates objective elements. Even if we do not want to
avoid some period of future agony despite having full awareness of the relevant facts,
we still have a reason to avoid future agony.³³ The thought implicit in this argument
is that we all have some self-interested reason to avoid agony because it is simply bad
for us (in the prudential sense associated with well-being) to be in the conscious state
of having a sensation that we dislike, regardless of our desires.
The terminology of ‘objective elements’ to describe this feature of well-being is
widespread; however, in the context of a discussion concerning objectivism about
reasons in the broader context of rationalist theories of autonomy, it is somewhat
unfortunate. The reason for this is that this terminology lends itself to an important
confusion between objective elements of well-being, and objectivism about reasons.
However, the two are quite distinct; although objectivism about reasons allows for
the possibility that practical reasons can be grounded by so-called ‘objective values’, it
also allows for the possibility of reasons that are grounded by other facts about well-
being. Moreover, contrary to what is commonly assumed, objectivism about reasons
is compatible with the claim that reasons grounded by so-called ‘objective values’
need not trump all others.
I believe this confusion is rife in discussions of rationality and autonomy, and
undergirds some prominent objections to rationalist theories of autonomy. In order
to avoid this confusion as far as possible, I shall abandon the terminology of
‘objective values’ to describe the things that are postulated to be good for us, whether
or not we want to have them. For want of a better term, I shall instead use the term
‘impersonal goods’ to refer to these goods, and call the practical reasons they ground
our ‘impersonal reasons’.³⁴
The first thing to note about impersonal reasons is that they have somewhat
limited scope. The sorts of goods that are typically postulated as impersonal goods
are often quite abstract; for instance, one might claim that pleasure is an impersonal
good. Yet, even on a theory of well-being that incorporates only impersonally good
ends, agents may differ with regards to what they have self-interested instrumental
reasons to want. Suppose our theory of well-being suggests that we all have a reason
to pursue a certain final outcome, let us say pleasure; I shall follow Parfit in terming
this latter form of reason a ‘telic reason’, that is a reason to pursue a particular end.
Even on the assumption that agents have a self-interested telic reason to want to be in
the conscious state of having a pleasurable experience, agents will achieve this same
goal in very different ways. For example, if the sensation of eating ice-cream were
pleasurable for Ben, then this fact would give Ben a self-interested reason to want to
³³ Parfit, On What Matters, 73–82.
³⁴ This choice of terminology is also not ideal, since Parfit himself uses the term ‘impersonal’ to describe
a type of goodness that contrasts with goodness for a particular person. Parfit, On What Matters, 41.
However, a somewhat confusing choice of terminology is unavoidable, since Parfit also uses other terms
that one could plausibly use to clearly make the distinction that I draw above for other purposes. For
example, he uses the term ‘impartial reasons’ to refer to reasons that we have to care for anyone’s well-
being. Ibid., 40. Furthermore, he uses the term ‘objective’ to refer to the theory that facts concerning the
objects of our desires give us reasons. Ibid., 45.
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eat ice-cream; however, if the sensation of eating ice-cream were painful for Chris
(say because he has toothache), Chris would have a self-interested reason not to eat
ice-cream. They would have different instrumental reasons that are grounded by the
same sort of telic, impersonal, reason.
However, as I shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter 9, objectivism about reasons
is also compatible with accounts of well-being that incorporate subjective elements.
I shall call those reasons that are understood to depend on facts concerning subjective
elements of well-being, including those contingent facts about what particular indi-
viduals have instrumental reasons to want in order to achieve impersonal goods, their
‘personal self-interested reasons’. Notice though, that what I call both impersonal and
personal practical reasons are still objectivist reasons; they are grounded by claims
about the value of their objects, and not by the mere fact that the objects are desired
(as per subjectivism about reasons).
This distinction has important implications for how we assess the relative strength
of our practical reasons. Accepting the claim that there are impersonal goods does
not entail that there is also an impersonal ranking of such goods. Such a claim would
have the unpalatable implication that the strength of our practical reasons would be
determined by where the object of a particular telic desire appears on this hypothet-
ical impersonal ranking of goods. Although this view is sometimes implicitly
assumed to be an implication of objectivist theories, they need not have this impli-
cation. In addition to the fact that individuals can have personal reasons of the sort
that I described above, rational agents can disagree to a significant extent about the
weight they assign to different impersonal goods.
Indeed, Parfit himself is absolutely clear on this point. Although he is a champion
of what I have called impersonal reasons, he also claims that, ‘[t]hough there are
truths about the relative strength of different reasons, these truths are often very
imprecise’,³⁵ and that:
. . . there are many intrinsically good ends, but no ends have supreme value. Nor are there
precise truths about which ends are most worth achieving. We often have to choose between
many good ends or aims, none of which is clearly better than the other, and in such cases there
is no end that reason requires us to choose.³⁶
To be clear then, objectivism about reasons is quite distinct from, and does not imply
the claim that rationality demands acting in accordance with what is ‘objectively
most valuable’, or what I would rather term is of ‘highest impersonal value’.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this particular distinction when talking
about the relevance of rationality to autonomy. A failure to adequately distinguish
objectivism about reasons from impersonal reasons, and/or an impersonal ranking of
such goods and reasons can lead to three related objections to rationalist accounts of
autonomy. First, the strongest objection that this conflation might lead to is that a
rationalist approach to autonomy will essentially collapse into a substantive theory of
autonomy. After all, if rationality requires choosing in accordance with one’s stron-
gest reasons, and the strength of one’s reasons can be determined impersonally, then
³⁵ Parfit, On What Matters, 33. ³⁶ Ibid., 100.
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the claim that autonomous choice must be practically rational would amount to the
claim that we must choose in accordance with this impersonal ranking of goods. To
illustrate, suppose that we believe that on an impersonal ranking of goods, the
pleasure that one gets from smoking and/or drinking will be outranked by the
goods associated with health that these activities might jeopardize. On this view,
one might easily draw the conclusion that someone who knows the relevant risks and
benefits at stake cannot rationally and autonomously choose to smoke and/or drink.
Yet this sounds suspiciously like a substantive account of autonomy.
The conflation between objectivism about reasons and the claim that rationality
demands acting in accordance with what is ‘objectively most valuable’might lead one
to think that a rationalist account of autonomy will be doomed to fail for another
reason. It might lead one to think that such a theory cannot accommodate the
possibility that agents can be alienated from impersonal judgements about what
they have most reason to do, and that such alienation undermines their autonomy.
Third, and finally, one might take these so-called ‘implications’ of objectivism about
reasons to lend support to a theory of rationalist autonomy grounded instead by
subjectivism about reasons, and the problems that may be associated with these
theories.
Fortunately, these problems can be circumvented by carefully drawing the dis-
tinctions I have outlined in this chapter. In the next chapter, I shall show how
objectivism about reasons can be used to supplement existing discussions of rational
autonomy in bioethics, so that they are able to overcome some prominent objections.
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With the preceding chapter’s discussion in mind, I am now in a position to consider
what role rationality might play in decisional autonomy. Recall that the standard
account of autonomy in bioethics claims that decisions are only autonomous if they
are made intentionally, with understanding, and in the absence of controlling
influences. However, as I pointed out in the introduction, there are some cases in
which our intuitions speak strongly in favour of the claim that an agent can lack
autonomy with respect to their decision, even though it meets the conditions set out
in the standard account. Moreover, the standard account lacks a deep explanation of
what constitutes a controlling influence.
Recall Jane, the unwilling addict who acts on a compulsive desire to take drugs. If
Jane’s failure of autonomy here could be attributed to her being irrational in some
sense, then this would provide some motivation for claiming that the standard
account should be supplemented with a rationality condition that precludes these
agents from being autonomous with respect to irrational decisions.¹ However, this
strategy raises three important questions. First, we might ask whether all forms of
irrationality preclude autonomous choice. Second, we might ask whether the ration-
ality of a decision makes a positive contribution to an agent’s autonomy with respect
to it, or whether we should simply make the weaker negative claim that irrationality
precludes autonomy. Finally, and most importantly, we might wonder whether we
can say anything more to justify the general strategy of appealing to rationality
conditions to supplement the standard account, other than the fact that it accords
with our intuitions in certain paradigm cases.
I shall answer these questions in this chapter by outlining an account of the role
that theoretical and practical rationality play in decisional autonomy. In doing so,
I shall particularly contrast my view with Rebecca Walker’s recent defence of a
rationalist account of autonomy. Walker endorses a negative rationality criterion
on autonomy, according to which both practical and theoretical irrationality pre-
clude autonomous choice. However, she does not commit herself to the claim that
rationality might positively contribute to the autonomy of a decision (although she
does leave open that possibility).² Instead, she claims that the ‘straightforward’
explanation for why one cannot be autonomous with respect to an irrational choice
is that ‘ . . . choosing irrationally is choosing on the basis of an error’.³
¹ Walker, ‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’, 343. ² Ibid., 344. ³ Ibid., 344.
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Whilst I agree with Walker about the significance of both theoretical and practical
rationality, I shall argue that we need a deeper explanation of the role that rationality
plays in autonomy than she provides. In outlining my own account of this, I shall
suggest that a deeper explanation points us towards the view that rationality makes a
positive contribution to autonomy. I shall begin by explaining why autonomous
decision-making requires some degree of theoretical rationality, before turning to
consider practical rationality.
1. Theoretical Rationality and Autonomy
In the introduction, I claimed that the standard account of autonomy reflects
Aristotle’s distinction between two types of non-voluntary action. In particular,
I suggested that the criterion of understanding in the standard account reflects
Aristotle’s claim that an action is non-voluntary if it is performed from reasons of
ignorance. Understanding is thus crucial to our ability to make voluntary choices in
this sense; as Savulescu and Momeyer rightly point out, ‘we cannot form an idea of
what we want without knowing what the options on offer are like’.⁴ We may add to
this that in some cases a person may fail to understand the significance of their choice
because they do not understand certain key features of their alternatives.
The criterion of understanding thus implies that agents must hold at least some
true (and not merely rational) beliefs about their alternatives if they are to make an
autonomous decision in that particular choice context. Call these ‘decisionally
necessary’ true beliefs. What sort of beliefs might qualify as decisionally necessary?
This is a complex question that I shall only be able to answer once further theoretical
claims are in place (in Chapter 5). Roughly here though, we may say that there are at
least some true beliefs that an agent must hold if they are to be able to minimally
draw accurate connections between their values and their available options, in the
manner that autonomous decision-making seems to require. Crucially, this view does
not entail the strong claim that autonomous decision-making requires that we only
choose on the basis of true beliefs; this is implausibly strong, given that we often
cannot know for certain whether our beliefs are true. This is most clearly the case
with our beliefs about future states of events. However, this does not mean that there
cannot be any true beliefs that an agent must hold in order to make an autonomous
decision.
To give one example here, suppose that a patient decided to undergo a vasectomy
without understanding that this procedure will render him infertile. It seems doubt-
ful that such a decision could qualify as autonomous. The individual has no idea
about the implications that the procedure will have for him; we can even go further
and say that it is doubtful that the patient in this case is even consenting to a
vasectomy at all if he lacks this understanding. In my view, the belief that a vasectomy
will cause infertility is thus decisionally necessary; to make an autonomous decision,
we must know what our options are like in some minimal sense. This is a corollary of
⁴ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 283.
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the Aristotelian claim that actions performed from reasons of ignorance are in an
important sense non-voluntary.
I shall attempt to further flesh out the concept of decisionally necessary beliefs later
in the book. Here though, I am interested in the point that the criterion of adequate
understanding may not preclude all forms of ignorance that are inimical to decisional
autonomy. One’s decision may be grounded in reasons of ignorance even when one
holds the relevant decisionally necessary true beliefs. The explanation for this is that
an individual may be theoretically irrational with respect to the way in which they use
this information.
One illustration of this is the example of the patient I raised in my initial discussion
of theoretical rationality in the previous chapter, who infers that they are likely to die
from a surgery involving anaesthesia. Indeed, Savulescu and Momeyer raised this
case to defend the view that autonomy requires theoretical rationality.⁵ To illustrate
the point further, Walker provides an example of a woman, called Maureen, who has
been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, and who refuses medication that there is a strong
evidence base to suggest will be statistically likely to dramatically increase her
chances of survival. However, Maureen believes that her statistical chances of
survival with and without treatment are irrelevant to her, simply because they do
not affect the more basic fact of fate that it is either the case that she will die in the
next ten years, or she will not. In short, although she understands the relevant
information and the statistical evidence about the treatment, her other fatalistic belief
prevents her from applying this evidence to her own case.⁶
One might argue that the individuals in both of these cases of theoretical irration-
ality would fail to qualify as autonomous even on the standard account of autonomy,
because they do not truly understand the information relevant to their decision if
they reason in these ways. I am not convinced that the standard account’s criterion of
understanding is intended to capture such forms of theoretical irrationality, but the
point is somewhat moot for my purposes here.⁷ The reason for this is that if an
advocate of the standard account conceptualizes the understanding criterion in this
way, then this amounts to the concession that autonomous choice is precluded by
irrational beliefs.
So why should we think that theoretical irrationality undermines autonomy? Is it
simply the case that theoretical irrationality only undermines autonomy, or can
theoretical rationality make a positive contribution to decisional autonomy?
Walker advocates the former view, and justifies this by adverting to the further
claim that theoretical irrationality undermines autonomy because it entails that
one chooses on the basis of an error. Of course, this will only be a satisfactory
explanation if all errors undermine the autonomy of the choices to which they lead.
Yet this seems unlikely; indeed, Walker herself denies this, since she denies that true
beliefs are necessary for autonomy.⁸ By her own lights, autonomy is compatible with
choosing on the basis of some errors in belief, namely decisions based on rational but
false beliefs. Moreover, as I noted in the previous chapter, failures of theoretical
⁵ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’
⁶ Walker, ‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’, 347.
⁷ For exegesis of the standard account on this point, see ibid., 349. ⁸ Ibid., note 11.
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rationality can be compatible with true beliefs, as was the case in the example of the
Othello syndrome; why should we suppose this error undermines autonomous
decision-making?
We might also observe that Walker’s denial of the importance of true beliefs is
somewhat in tension with her apparent endorsement of the standard account’s
criterion of understanding. As I suggested above, the criterion of understanding
implies that some true beliefs may be necessary for decisional autonomy. I shall
further support this view later in the book, but we can leave that support aside for the
time being. The point I wish to make here is that if Walker’s negative approach is to
be convincing, then it needs to be supplemented with a deeper explanation of why
she thinks all errors of theoretical rationality threaten autonomy (even in cases where
they do not lead to false beliefs), an explanation which is also compatible with her
commitment to the claim that autonomy is compatible with holding (rational) false
beliefs.
Alternatively, one can endorse a different view of the relationship between theor-
etical rationality and autonomy, one which is compatible with the thought that
autonomous decision-making requires that the individual holds at least some true
beliefs. On this view, we should avoid the claim that autonomous choice is compat-
ible with choosing on the basis of only false beliefs, or with complete ignorance about
information that is crucial to one’s choice, as Walker seems to imply. This view is
implausibly strong, if there can be decisionally necessary beliefs.
The claim that an individual must hold some true beliefs in order to be autono-
mous with respect to a particular decision is implicitly defended by Julian Savulescu.
Savulescu argues that a necessary condition of autonomy is that individuals make
their decisions on the basis of rational desires. In turn he defines a rational desire as
one that results from an evaluation of the alternatives available, according to which
one option (say A) is better than the other (B). The evaluation must involve at least
the following three elements:
(1) knowledge of relevant, available information concerning each of the states of
affairs A and B,
(2) no relevant, correctable errors of logic in evaluating that information, and
(3) vivid imagination by P of what each state of affairs would be like for P.⁹
I agree with the spirit if not the precise letter of Savulescu’s view. In view of the way in
which I distinguished practical and theoretical rationality in the previous chapter,
I am reluctant to claim that these are conditions of rational ‘desires’. Instead,
I suggest that condition (1) (and to some extent [3]) pertains to the kinds of true
(and not merely rational) beliefs that individuals must have in order to make a locally
autonomous decision. Condition (2) in contrast is a theoretical rationality condition
on autonomy. However, we may also note that the language of ‘evaluation’ that
Savulescu employs suggests that considerations of practical rationality also have an
important role to play in his view, as I shall explore below.
⁹ Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life Sustaining Treatment’.
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On the alternative view that I am outlining here, theoretical rationality can
positively contribute to autonomy because when we form and sustain our beliefs in
a theoretically rational manner, our beliefs are more likely to be true. In some cases
our decisional autonomy may be enabled by our holding certain true beliefs, if these
beliefs are decisionally necessary. I shall attempt to offer a deeper explanation of why
true beliefs matter for decisional autonomy in this way in Chapters 5 and 6.
We can also make a stronger claim about the relationship between theoretical
rationality and autonomy. Abiding by the norms of theoretical rationality can be
important not just because doing so makes it more likely that we will form individual
true beliefs. Theoretical rationality is also indispensable for placing these true beliefs
in their broader informational context, for how we understand the world and how it
relates to what we value. It is rarely the case that our decisions simply concern one
particular belief in isolation; rather, in order to adequately understand our decision-
making context, we often have to consider the extent to which a particular belief
coheres with our other beliefs, about both descriptive and evaluative features of the
world. Theoretical irrationality can undermine our understanding in this broader
sense, even when it is compatible with the truth of a particular belief.¹⁰ This suggests
that delusions of the sort considered in the previous chapter can undermine decisio-
nal autonomy in two ways. They can either involve holding a false belief about an
element of one’s choice that is in fact decisionally necessary (in ways that I shall
explain in later chapters) or delusional states can involve ongoing violations of norms
of theoretical irrationality that otherwise jeopardize the individual’s broader
understanding.¹¹
But theoretical rationality may also be said to enhance our practical autonomy as
well as enabling our decisional autonomy. If our beliefs are true, the apparent reasons
that ground our decisions are more likely to track our real reasons (rather than
merely apparent reasons).¹² I am not here claiming that decisional autonomy
requires that we must choose in accordance with our real reasons; this would make
autonomy far too demanding for reasons explored above. However, when the
apparent reasons that ground our decisions are more likely to reflect our real reasons,
it is more likely that we will be successful in realizing the object of our desires.
To conclude this discussion of theoretical rationality and autonomy, I agree with
Walker that a plausible minimal theoretical rationality condition of decisional
autonomy may be phrased in the negative. We may plausibly say that decisional
autonomy minimally requires the absence of theoretical irrationality, in so far as such
¹⁰ For similar reasons, we may also be concerned about instances where doxastic justifications of true
beliefs do not align with their propositional justifications. Indeed, this is why we should be concerned about
what Shlomo Cohen has called the Gettier problem of informed consent. See Cohen, ‘The Gettier Problem
in Informed Consent’.
¹¹ Notice that this claim is quite compatible with the thought that delusions can be beneficial in some
regards. Bortolotti et al. go further and argue that the fact that delusions do not undermine the capacity to
form self-narratives suggests that delusions are compatible with self-governance (Bortolotti et al.,
‘Rationality and Self-Knowledge in Delusion and Confabulation’). However, whilst I agree that something
like a self-narrative condition is a plausible condition of autonomy, it is not a sufficient condition. For
reasons that I have discussed here, delusions can undermine decisional autonomy in ways other than
undermining the capacity to form a self-narrative.
¹² Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’
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irrationality is likely to lead us to (i) fail to hold a particular decisionally necessary
true belief and/or (ii) to render us unable to place our beliefs in a broader coherent
informational context that bespeaks understanding.
Of course, this claim will only be convincing if it is aligned with a criterion of
understanding that sets out conditions on the decisionally necessary beliefs that
individuals must hold in order to be able to make a particular autonomous decision.
Yet, going beyond the minimum threshold condition of theoretical rationality, we
may say that theoretical rationality can also make a positive contribution to decisio-
nal autonomy, in so far as it makes it more likely that we will hold crucial true beliefs.
Further, in light of my claims in the preceding paragraph, I shall suggest in the next
chapter that certain true beliefs may be necessary for the practical dimension of
autonomy, that is, for us to be able to act effectively in pursuit of our ends. In any case
though, contra Walker, the explanation for the role that theoretical rationality plays
in autonomy goes beyond the fact that choosing on the basis of irrational beliefs
involves choosing on the basis of an error.
2. Practical Rationality and Autonomy
A condition of theoretical rationality cannot explain why Jane the unwilling addict
lacks autonomy. Jane can clearly be theoretically rational when she is acting on the
basis of a compulsive desire. But is she being practically rational? And does this
matter for her autonomy?
Rebecca Walker argues that the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes’. Walker
distinguishes between two kinds of goals that agents can have. Sometimes a goal is
‘contingently’ true of a person, in the sense that it is just a goal a particular individual
has or chooses.¹³ She gives the example of a person called ‘James’ who is a healthy
weight, and who decides he wants to lose 10 pounds.¹⁴ Crucially, she claims that there
is nothing necessarily rational or irrational about such goals. In contrast, she con-
tends that other goals may be rationally necessary (such as ‘living well’) or prohibited
(such as ‘self-destruction’) for ‘us as human beings’.¹⁵
In turn, Walker claims that these different kinds of goals are associated with
different norms of practical rationality. With respect to rationally necessary goals,
she suggests that one can be practically irrational simply by virtue of ‘failing to
recognise and choose in accordance with these goals’.¹⁶ In contrast, with respect to
contingent goals, practical rationality pertains only to the agent’s willing the means
that are necessary to achieve their goal. Failing to adhere to either of these norms can
be sufficient for practical irrationality. In turn, since practical irrationality involves
choosing on the basis of an error, practical irrationality undermines autonomous
choice on Walker’s approach.
Jane is most plausibly understood as acting irrationally in the first sense that
Walker identifies. Recall that Jane wants to return to live a normal family life, and
she knows that her drug-taking is jeopardizing this. If we understand her desire to
return to a normal family life as a contingent goal, then her failure of practical
¹³ Walker, ‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’, 342. ¹⁴ Ibid., 343. ¹⁵ Ibid. ¹⁶ Ibid.
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rationality is a failure of doing what is necessary to achieve her desired end. Walker’s
theory also allows for the possibility that an agent who endorses their desire to take
particularly dangerous drugs could also qualify as being practically irrational, if one
holds that the avoidance of self-destruction is a rationally necessary goal.
Walker’s account can thus offer us an explanation of why Jane is practically
irrational. However, I believe that some misunderstandings in her conception of
practical rationality lead her to overlook some other potential forms of practical
irrationality, and to overplay others. These problems arise in part because Walker
seems to conflate the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism about
reasons, with the distinction between what I have called personal and impersonal
reasons. More specifically, she adopts a subjectivist approach about reasons when
discussing what she calls our contingent goals, and an overly narrow form of
objectivism about reasons to what she calls our rationally necessary goals. As well
as leading to an incomplete understanding of what errors of practical rationality
might involve, we may also note that Walker’s approach here is problematic for a
deeper theoretical reason. It is not the case that objectivism or subjectivism about
reasons are the sorts of theory that are true of some reasons but not others; rather
these theories are about the fundamental grounding of all of our reasons.¹⁷
Consider first our ‘contingent goals’. Walker takes the subjectivist line that such
goals are not appropriate targets of rational assessment. However, it is entirely
possible to offer an objectivist interpretation of these goals, and the norms of
practical rationality that should apply to them. Indeed, ‘contingent goals’ bear a
striking similarity to goals that an agent might have grounded by what I have called
her ‘personal reasons’.
Subjectivists and objectivists about reasons agree that practical rationality can
demand that we should do the things that are necessary to realizing our desires. In
accordance with a subjectivist view about reasons, this is essentially the only norm of
practical rationality that Walker suggests is relevant for our contingent goals.
However, objectivists can also not only offer a deeper justification for why this
norm should obtain, they can also claim that our contingent goals themselves can
be targets of rational assessment, given their relation to what I have called our telic
reasons. Our desires to act in ways necessary to bring about some desired end can
nonetheless lack rational justification, if the desire for the end in question is not itself
rational.
To illustrate these different failings of practical rationality, return to Walker’s
example of James. Is it true that we can say nothing about the rationality of James’
desire to lose 10 pounds, as Walker claims? Perhaps not; for instance, the objectivist
might claim that James’ goal is only rational if he decides to pursue this goal in
response to his belief that he has some (perhaps self-interested) reasons to lose
weight. Yet it is entirely possible that James does not adopt the goal as a rational
response to such beliefs; it may just be a mere whim that he can’t explain. Perhaps
closer reflection would reveal to James that he does not actually care about losing the
extra 10 pounds; he is after all already a healthy weight, and it will take an extreme
¹⁷ Recall that this is the conclusion of Parfit’s All or Nothing Argument.
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amount of effort to lose the extra weight. In this permutation, James’ contingent goal
is one that he sustains in an arational sense.
It is also worth noting that contingent goals can be adopted irrationally, as an
irrational response to reason-giving facts. Suppose for instance that Helen is on the
brink of dying of starvation and yet still desires to lose 10 pounds—the objectivist
might say that this contingent goal is irrational for Helen, even though it may not be
irrational for James. The explanation for this is that there are facts that give Helen
very strong self-interested reasons to avoid even limited weight loss, reasons which
do not apply to James who ex hypothesi is a healthy weight.
The preceding discussion suggests that whilst an agent is practically irrational
when failing to will the means necessary to achieving a contingent goal, she can also
be practically irrational if she has adopted the contingent goal irrationally. In such
cases, the agent will believe that she has strongly decisive reasons not to want the
contingent goal. Alternatively, we may say that she may have adopted the goal
arationally, on the basis of a brute desire that does not reflect what she actually
cares about. This raises the question of whether autonomy is incompatible with
practical arationality as well as practical irrationality. I shall defend the claim that it is
below.
Walker’s assumption of subjectivism about reasons with respect to our contingent
goals leads her to overlook these potential deficits of practical rationality. I shall now
suggest Walker’s version of objectivism about reasons regarding our necessarily
rational goals leads her to overplay apparent failures of practical rationality, and
puts her theory in danger of collapsing into a substantive account of autonomy.
According to Walker, a failure to choose in accordance with a necessarily rational
goal is sufficient to qualify as a failure of practical rationality. Yet this is too strong.
Objectivism about reasons is not committed to the claim that goals must be rationally
necessary in this sense; we can have competing personal and impersonal reasons, and
the truths about the relative strength of these reasons are highly imprecise. On more
plausible versions of objectivism about reasons, one can be practically rational but fail
to choose in accordance with a particular impersonal reason that we have ‘as
humans’, as long as one is choosing in accordance with some other reason.
Julian Savulescu and Richard Momeyer make an even stronger claim about the
apparent compatibility of autonomy and practical irrationality in their discussion of
the following case:
Assume that the harms of smoking outweigh the benefits. Jim has good reason to give up
smoking. However, he may choose to smoke knowing all the good and bad effects of
smoking.¹⁸
Savulescu and Momeyer use this example to illustrate their claim that ‘a person may
autonomously choose some course which he or she has no good reason to choose’.¹⁹
In discussing this example, Savulescu and Momeyer claim that Jim’s choice in this
situation would be irrational; however, it would be autonomous if it were grounded
¹⁸ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 283.
¹⁹ Ibid.
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by rational beliefs. On this reading then, their position seems to be that autonomous
choice is compatible with errors of practical rationality.
Prima facie, many of Savulescu and Momeyer’s claims in response to this example
are appealing. Indeed, to claim that Jim cannot autonomously choose to smoke in
this example might be understood to come close to endorsing a substantivist under-
standing of autonomy. Moreover, it also seems plausible to claim that Jim’s choice to
smoke would be practically irrational. Despite this, once we further unpack the
example, I do not believe that it shows that autonomy is compatible with all forms
of practical irrationality.
Let me take the points of agreement first; Savulescu and Momeyer equate ‘having a
good reason’ with what I have called having a ‘real reason’. Recall that such reasons
do not depend upon the agent’s beliefs (unlike their ‘apparent’ reasons). I wholly
agree that autonomous choice is quite compatible with making errors about our real
reasons; to claim otherwise would be to make autonomy all but impossible given the
fact that we typically lack epistemic access to reason-giving facts that actually obtain.
However, this example does not establish that autonomy is compatible with all
kinds of practical irrationality, or that practical rationality has no bearing on deci-
sional autonomy. Much depends on how we flesh out the case. We are told that Jim
knows all the good and bad effects of smoking. We are also told to assume that the
harms of smoking outweigh the benefits, and that Jim thus has a real reason to give
up smoking. Crucially though, we are not told whether Jim himself agrees with this
impersonal ranking of the reasons associated with the harms of smoking and the
reasons associated with its hedonic benefits for Jim. Yet, this feature is integral to
understanding if we should understand his choice to be irrational in the manner that
matters for autonomy.
The claim that Jim is autonomous with respect to his choice to continue smoking
has more intuitive appeal when we assume that he does not agree with this imper-
sonal ranking of values. In that way, his choice to smoke is a reflection of his own
personal judgement about the relative strength of the reasons associated with the
alternatives available to him; he values the pleasure smoking gives him over the
longevity it threatens. It may be that his assessment of the strength of these reasons
differs from the way in which others weigh them. Yet, further argument would be
required to show that Jim would be evidencing a failure in practical rationality if he
were to weigh his reasons in this way, particularly given the imprecise truths
governing the strength of the reasons associated with different goods. This is not to
say that such an argument would not be forthcoming. One way in which Jim may
nonetheless evidence irrationality in weighing his values in this way is if he prioritizes
the pleasure from smoking now over additional years of life in the future just because
of an irrational bias towards what happens to oneself in the near future than in the
more distant future.²⁰ Crucially though, an argument to that effect is necessary to
establish the absence of decisional autonomy.
²⁰ For discussion about the nature of this bias, see Parfit, Reasons and Persons; Persson, The Retreat of
Reason, ch. 15.
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In contrast to those who conflate objectivism about reasons with acting in accord-
ance with impersonal standards about impersonal reasons, the truths about the
relative strength of many of our reasons, including those associated with the goods
of health and pleasure, are imprecise. There is room for reasonable disagreement
about which reasons are stronger. In so far as irrationality denotes a failure to act in
accordance with clear and decisive reasons, it is hard to see how one could qualify as
being irrational for simply holding a different view about which reasons win out in
these cases.
To press the point further, suppose that someone like Jim, let’s say Jimmy, does
endorse the judgement in question; he agrees that he has stronger reasons to stop
smoking than to continue, given what he knows about its harms and benefits. Yet
Jimmy continues to smoke. It now becomes far less intuitively appealing to suppose
that Jimmy is autonomous with respect to his decision to smoke; his action does not
flow from his own evaluative judgements about what he ought to do.
In short then, whilst I agree with Savulescu and Momeyer that autonomy is
compatible with errors concerning one’s ‘real’ reasons, we should treat with caution
their claim that Jim can be practically irrational and yet still be autonomous with
respect to his decision. Much depends on whether we judge Jim to be irrational by
some impersonal ranking of the strength of his reasons, or whether we judge Jim to
be irrational given his own judgement about the strength of his reasons. Interestingly,
my interpretation of the case seems broadly compatible with Savulescu’s earlier work,
which I delineated in my discussion of theoretical rationality above. In this earlier
work, Savulescu claims that autonomy requires deciding on the basis of ‘rational
desires’, that is desires that arise from an evaluation that the individual carries out in
accordance with certain conditions (outlined above). The important point for my
purposes here though is that it is the agent herself who must evaluate her options, in
accordance with her own beliefs about the good.
This latter point raises an important feature of the rational autonomy view that
I am outlining. Theoretical and practical rationality are not entirely separate domains
of rationality. In particular, with respect to our thinking about autonomy, they are
interlinked in the following important way: If we believe that decisional autonomy
requires both theoretical rationality and practical rationality, in the sense that
autonomous decision-makers must choose in accordance with what they believe
they have sufficient reasons to do, then consistency demands that autonomous agents
should be theoretically rational with respect to their evaluative beliefs about the
strength of their different practical reasons. They must be receptive to reasons to
think that some things have value, even if they do not need to prioritize a particular
value in their decision-making. This feature will become important below, as I shall
suggest that some agents who are practically rational may nonetheless lack autonomy
because they are theoretically irrational with respect to their beliefs about what is
good or valuable.
An objectivist account of reasons can thus offer a more nuanced account of how
agents can be practically irrational. I now turn to the deeper question of why failures
of practical rationality should be understood to undermine autonomy. As I have
explained, for Walker the explanatory buck stops at the mere fact that practical
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irrationality involves choosing on the basis of an error. I want to suggest that there
are reasons for thinking that we should go deeper.
If one believes that errors of practical rationality undermine autonomy, and one
also endorses objectivism about reasons (as I have assumed since Chapter 1), then
one is committed to the claim that what matters for autonomy is acting in accordance
with one’s judgement about the relative strength of one’s practical reasons. The
deeper problem with simply saying that practical irrationality undermines autonomy
because it involves choosing on the basis of an error, is that we still need an account
of why we should trust that this aspect of our agency is the right place for the buck to
stop with regards to autonomous decision-making. Why suppose that these judge-
ments speak for us, or that they are the appropriate seat of self-government?²¹
To give a concrete example of the issue at stake here, Jillian Craigie has astutely
observed that in some cases anorexic patients can express regret for their earlier
refusals of treatment, and we may suspect that these patients’ earlier decision-making
suffered from a deeper kind practical irrationality. For some such patients, it is not
the case that they were irrational because they failed to choose in accordance with
what they valued (or what they desired); rather their regret for their earlier choices is
grounded in the fact that they regret holding the values that undergirded their
choices at the time of their decision, or for what they desired at that time.²²
Craigie’s example raises deep and important questions about the role of rationality
in autonomy. I join her in believing that we can provide some of the answers to these
questions by considering the positive role that practical rationality can play in a
theory of decisional autonomy. It is not simply the case that practical irrationality
undermines decisional autonomy because practical irrationality involves choosing on
the basis of an error; rather, by fleshing out the objectivist approach to practical
rationality that I have outlined here in certain ways, we can explain why our
evaluative judgements about our rational desires can be the seat of autonomous
decision-making. To make this argument, I will now consider how rationalist
theories of autonomy have been developed in the wider philosophical literature
concerning the philosophy of action. This, and my discussion of controlling influ-
ences in Chapter 3, will provide me with the necessary platform to engage with
Craigie’s discussion in more detail when I turn to the issue of rational competence
in Chapter 8.
3. Values, Identification, and Authority
Questions concerning which aspect of our agency constitutes the source of our
autonomy have been widely discussed in philosophy of action. In this section, I shall
briefly trace the history of this discussion before defending the account I favour in the
following section. Readers who already are familiar with the philosophical literature
on autonomy and identification may wish to skip this section.
²¹ Note that a similar problem will arise for subjectivist but with respect to why one’s desires should play
this role.
²² Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and What a Patient Values’.
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In an influential paper that has somewhat set the terms of the debate in this area,
Harry Frankfurt sought to answer the question of why agents who act on compulsive
desires (like Jane the unwilling addict) seem to lack freedom of the will.²³ The
explanation for this, on Frankfurt’s account, is that such agents do not identify
with their motivating desires.
According to Frankfurt, conscious entities have ‘first-order desires’ to do or have
certain things. Some of these desires are the ones that actually motivate them to act;
for Frankfurt, it is these ‘effective’ first-order desires that constitute ‘the will’.²⁴ So, on
this view, if I have a desire to x and I end up x-ing, this particular first-order desire is
effective, and thereby constitutes my will. In so far as we are creatures that have such
first-order desires, nothing separates humans from other members of the animal
kingdom. However, according to Frankfurt, ‘persons’ are unique in that they can also
have ‘second-order desires’; these desires are ‘higher order’ desires that have as their
object a certain first-order desire.²⁵ Further, persons can have second-order volitions;
such volitions are a particular species of second-order desire, defined by their object.
The object of these volitions is that a particular first-order desire becomes effective in
moving them to act.²⁶
The relationship between the agent’s effective first-order desires, and their second-
order volitions is integral to freedom of the will for Frankfurt. He writes:
. . . it is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions . . . that a person
exercises freedom of the will.²⁷
Frankfurt’s approach can seemingly explain why being alienated from one’s motiv-
ating desire can undermine autonomy. Recall the example of Jane from the intro-
duction.²⁸ We can understand Jane as having two conflicting first-order motivating
desires; she has an urge to take drugs, but she also harbours a desire not to do this.
We can also understand her as having a second-order volition: for the latter first-
order desire (to refrain from this behaviour) to constitute her will. Nonetheless,
Jane’s first-order desire to take drugs becomes effective; accordingly, she lacks
autonomy with respect to her drug-taking on Frankfurt’s approach. We may contrast
Jane with another addict Beatrice who would be autonomous on Frankfurt’s
approach: suppose that Beatrice has only one first-order desire; she wants to take
drugs. However, unlike Jane, suppose that Beatrice’s second-order volition is that this
desire should come to constitute her will. She embraces her addiction, and would
reinstate her first-order desire to engage in this behaviour should it wane.²⁹
The reason that Beatrice is autonomous with respect to her drug-taking on
Frankfurt’s approach is because her motivating desire is authentic to her in a way
that Jane’s is not. At least by the lights of his original theory, Beatrice’s identification
²³ Frankfurt’s intention in the work was to provide a theory of freedom of the will and its relation to
personhood, rather than autonomy per se. However, this has not prevented many commentators regarding
his theory as a prominent example of a theory of autonomy. Taylor is a notable exception. See his
arguments against this interpretation in Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics, ch. 3.
²⁴ Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, 8. ²⁵ Ibid., 10. ²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ Ibid., 15. ²⁸ Introduction, 00.
²⁹ These examples correspond to Frankfurt’s examples of the unwilling addict and the willing addict.
Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, 12–15.
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with her desire ensures that it is a reflection of what she really wants, or of the central
elements of her ‘true self ’.
Given the controversial nature of ‘the self ’,³⁰ it is perhaps apposite here to clarify
the role that the concept is playing here.³¹ On this understanding it is not merely a
‘grammatical error’³² to claim that agents have a self in some sense; rather the self can
be understood as the metaphorical locus of the agent’s ‘character’,³³ or of the
psychological continuities that ground personal identity on some theories.³⁴ In
holding that the self is something that both persists over time and can undergird
the intelligibility of the agent’s long-term diachronic plans, this understanding of the
self is naturally not compatible with those theories that deny that the self can persist
over long periods of time,³⁵ or in a diachronically continuous sense.³⁶ However, it is
compatible with a number of claims that are incorporated into a diverse range of
theories of the self. Most critically, it is not committed to the contentious claim that
the self is static, or an extant metaphysical essence;³⁷ the true self can be construed to
persist even if the elements that constitute it change over time, as long as the agent
changes them in accordance with the sorts of procedure that procedural theories of
autonomy seek to explicate.³⁸
Frankfurt’s theory has been highly influential, and it is still appealed to in bio-
ethical discussions of autonomy. However, it faces a similar question to the one that
I raised about rationalist theories of autonomy in bioethics at the end of the previous
section. Why should we trust that our second-order volitions should serve as the
proxy for the ‘true self ’ and as the seat of self-governance? Here, it seems Frankfurt
faces a choice between two unappealing alternatives. First, perhaps an even higher
order volition authenticates one’s second-order volitions as being one’s own.
However, this reply is problematic because it seems to lead inexorably to a regress
³⁰ For instance, Ekstrom writes ‘ . . . in order to understand autonomous action . . . we need a working
conception of what constitutes the “self” ’ (Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’, 599). In contrast,
Berofsky argues against conceiving of autonomous agency as that which proceeds from some extant
metaphysical self. See Berofsky, Liberation from Self.
³¹ For a deeper discussion of the role of the self in conceptions of authenticity, see Friedman, Autonomy,
Gender, Politics, 3–29.
³² Kenny, The Self, 4.
³³ Both Mill and Aristotle invoke the agent’s character as a ground of choice in their discussions of
individuality and voluntariness respectively. See Mill, On Liberty; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book
III. See Meyer, ‘Aristotle on the Voluntary’ for a useful discussion of how character relates to voluntariness
in Aristotle’s theory of virtue.
³⁴ See Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Part Three) for a classic psychological theory of personal identity.
Michael Bratman explicitly points out that the self-governing policies that undergird autonomy on his view
are inextricably related to the agent’s identity, since they concern plans that are constituted by psycho-
logical continuities. See Bratman, ‘Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency’, 41.
³⁵ For example, see Strawson’s ‘Pearl View of the Self ’ in Strawson, ‘The Self ’, 424. For an explanation of
how Strawson’s and David Hume’s seminal view differ, see Strawson, ‘Hume on Himself ’.
³⁶ For example, see Hume’s exposition of his so-called ‘Bundle Theory of the Self ’; Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature (section entitled ‘Of Personal Identity’). For a rejection of the Strawsonian and Humean
approaches to the self, see Olson, ‘There Is No Problem of the Self ’.
³⁷ For criticism of this essentialist view, see DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, 233–4.
³⁸ For further discussion of this understanding of the self and how it functions in the kind of account of
autonomy that I develop here, see Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and
Value’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
    
of increasingly higher order conative attitudes. Alternatively, he might claim that at
some level, a higher order desire cannot be authenticated, and does not require
authentication.³⁹ However, this reply leads to what John Christman terms the ab
initio problem,⁴⁰ since it implies that the authenticity of one’s first-order desires can
only be ensured by a second- (or higher) order desire that is not itself authentically
the agent’s. As Christman puts it, this would involve the claim that ‘ . . . desires can be
autonomous without foundations’,⁴¹ and this, he claims, renders the second response
‘implausible’.⁴²
One might suppose that the problem with Frankfurt’s theory here is its over-
reliance on non-cognitive elements as constituting the true self. One reason for
doubting that our second-order volitions in particular can constitute the true self is
that agents can, as Frankfurt concedes, form these desires in a capricious manner,
and without any serious consideration.⁴³ If these volitions are thus ‘blind or
irrational’⁴⁴ impulses, then it is hardly surprising that they cannot serve as an
appropriate seat of self-governance. In contrast, one might suppose that a rationalist
theory would not fall foul of the same problem because reason allows us to identify
the good in our evaluative judgements, and our rationally warranted desires are thus
not blind impulses.⁴⁵
Yet such appeals to the authority of ‘rationality’ will not be sufficient unless one
discounts the possibility that agents could similarly be alienated from their values;
why suppose that our values constitute the real self? This objection has more and less
plausible variants. First, one might object that the prospect of alienation can arise
because rationalist theories entail that the agent’s values must track some objective
good, and that they are thus unable to account for the undeniable fact that we
‘ . . . sometimes place value on senseless or masochistic ends, that is, ends that have
no objective value’.⁴⁶ However, my discussion of objectivism about reasons, real and
apparent reasons, and the difference between personal and impersonal reasons
should make it clear that a suitably nuanced theory of rationalist autonomy need
not fall foul of this form of the objection.
However, the objection can be raised in a more nuanced and fundamental way.
David Velleman writes:
The agent’s role cannot be played by any mental states or events whose behavioural influence
might come up for review in practical thought at any level. And the reason why it cannot
be played by anything that might undergo the process of critical review is precisely that it must
be played by whatever directs that process. The agent, in his capacity as agent, is that party who
³⁹ This is the horn of the dilemma that Frankfurt grabbed in his later work, appealing to the concepts of
decisiveness and satisfaction. See Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 21; Frankfurt,
Necessity, Volition, and Love, 104.
⁴⁰ Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 7. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid.
⁴³ Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, 13, note 6.
⁴⁴ Watson, ‘Free Agency’, 208.
⁴⁵ For an early rationalist response to Frankfurt in this vein, see Watson, ‘Free Agency’.
⁴⁶ Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 80. Berofsky’s complaint here is most readily raised against rationalist
theories that employ a Platonic conception of objective goods. See Watson, ‘Free Agency’; Wolf, Freedom
within Reason.
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is always behind, and never in front of, the lens of critical reflection, no matter where in the
hierarchy of motives it turns.⁴⁷
In light of these remarks, Velleman posits that agency is not grounded in some
collection of psychological elements that constitute a ‘true self ’; rather, it must be
grounded by a motive that is never subject to critical reflection, and which is
nonetheless functionally equivalent to the agent herself. Initially, he identifies this
motive as the fundamental concern that all agents share to act in accordance with
reasons, where reasons are ‘considerations by which an action can be explained and
in light of which it would therefore make sense to the agent’.⁴⁸ In more recent work,
Velleman has further specified his understanding of the constitutive motive of agency
in accordance with this understanding of reasons. On the further developed view, the
constitutive inclination of agency is not merely the inclination to act for reasons, but
rather the inclination to acquire self-understanding, that is, the inclination to render
oneself ‘intelligible’ in the folk psychological sense.⁴⁹ I shall use the latter under-
standing in my discussion below.
Whilst Velleman offers an account for how the rationalist might respond to the
problem of alienation, I shall not pursue it further here for two reasons. First, aspects
of the view are in tension with objectivism about reasons that grounds the theory of
rational autonomy that I am developing here. On Velleman’s understanding, our
reasons for action only apply if we have the higher order inclination to render our
actions intelligible. In making this claim, he is seeking to forge a middle ground
between objectivism and subjectivism about reasons, insofar as our reasons still
depend on a particular inclination, but one that is central to understanding ourselves
as agents. However, the subjectivist element of this claim still seems open to Parfit’s
criticism of such theories; in particular, one might object that one’s reason to avoid a
period of agony is not merely contingent on whether one has the inclination to
render one’s actions intelligible. Moreover, Velleman’s articulation of the nature of
our reasons for actions also incorporates subjectivist commitments. On Velleman’s
view, holding a particular lower order desire for some outcome, in conjunction with a
higher order desire for my actions to be intelligible, is sufficient for having a reason to
act to bring about this outcome; the two desires can explain the action in the required
sense. However, for reasons I explored in Chapter 1, the objectivist will find this
claim and the absence of evaluation in this model problematic; for the objectivist, it is
crucial that our practical reasons justify our actions, rather than merely explain them.
However, the second more fundamental issue with this approach is that we may
doubt the underlying premise that motivates it, namely that the only mental state that
can have the authority to speak for the agent is one that is itself not subject to critical
review. This assumption motivates Velleman’s claim that agency requires an inclin-
ation towards self-understanding. This is not only a considerable theoretical com-
mitment about the nature of agency, it is also empirically dubious that the individuals
that we would typically categorize as agents all share this inclination. Yet, rather than
making this assumption, one might instead claim that the relevant psychological
⁴⁷ Velleman, ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’, 477. ⁴⁸ Ibid.
⁴⁹ Velleman, How We Get Along.
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elements can plausibly receive agential grounding, even if they themselves can be
subject to critical review. Instead of being grounded by some fundamental and ‘pure’
inclination as Velleman claims, it seems plausible that certain psychological elements
could be mutually reinforcing and justificatory. Not only that, but these mutually
reinforcing psychological elements can plausibly have agential authority just because
they constitute our practical identities.⁵⁰ This is the thrust of Laura Waddell
Ekstrom’s coherence approach, a modified version of which I shall defend in the
remainder of this chapter.⁵¹
4. Defending a Modified Coherence Approach to
Rationalist Authenticity
On the coherence approach, an agent is autonomous when they act on a first-order
desire if they have a ‘personally authorized preference’ for that desire to be effective.
This terminology requires some explanation. First, a ‘preference’ in this context is
understood to be a desire for a certain first-order level desire to be effective in moving
the agent to act. However, this understanding of a preference moves away from a
Frankfurtian picture of second-order volitions, since a preference on this account is
formed in accordance with the agent’s subjective conception of the good. Crucially,
although this evaluation need not occur at the conscious level, it must actually be
performed at some point.⁵² Notice then that this understanding of ‘preferences’ is
compatible with objectivism about reasons; the point is the agent forms her prefer-
ences on the basis of her beliefs about what is valuable. Such preferences are thus
grounded by reasons of the sort that objectivists champion and subjectivists deny.
Second, a preference is personally authorized if it ‘coheres’ with the agent’s
‘character system’,⁵³ that is, the agent’s set of preferences at time t, in conjunction
⁵⁰ Michael Bratman adopts a similar approach in Bratman, ‘Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency’.
However, like Velleman, Bratman’s approach incorporates a number of important subjectivist assump-
tions. In particular, he is quite clear that planning attitudes that undergird autonomous agency do not need
to be grounded by an evaluative judgement. For Bratman’s own understanding of valuing, see Bratman,
‘Valuing and The Will’ and Bratman, ‘Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason’.
⁵¹ Although I am choosing to explicate autonomy in terms of authenticity conditions, an alternative
approach from the moral responsibility literature that is amenable to my rationalist approach claims that
moral responsibility requires some form of reasons responsiveness. See Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility
and Control; Haji, Moral Appraisability. In turn, reasons responsiveness requires that agents are both
receptive and reactive to a broad set of reasons. An agent is receptive to reasons if they are able to identify
and process good reasons. An agent is reactive to reasons if their decision-making mechanism would give
rise to different action in some hypothetical cases where different reasons obtained. Although I am
sympathetic to the claim that autonomy requires reasons receptivity, I am less certain that it requires
reasons reactivity. For discussion, see Mele, ‘Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility’, 288–94. For
other objections to the claim that autonomy (as opposed to responsibility) requires reasons reactivity, see
Christman, The Politics of Persons, 141.
⁵² Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’, 603.The criterion of unconscious reflection is pre-
sumably a pre-emptive defence against the charge that people do not typically reflect on their motivational
states at the time of action. In a similar vein, Savulescu appeals to the claim that autonomy is a dispositional
property—evaluative reflection must occur at some point, although it need not be at the point of action. See
Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life Sustaining Treatment’, 199–200.
⁵³ Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’, 606.
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with the set of propositions that the agent accepts at t. The latter are termed the
agent’s ‘acceptances’, and are beliefs formed in accordance with the individual’s
subjective conception of the true.⁵⁴ Finally, a preference for a particular desire to
be effective coheres with an agent’s character system if it is either (i) more valuable
for the agent to prefer that desire than it is for her to prefer a competing desire, on the
basis of their character system, or (ii) as valuable for the agent to prefer the
conjunction of that desire and another neutralizing desire n, as it is for her to prefer
a competing desire.⁵⁵
It is important to clarify an ambiguity here regarding Ekstrom’s terminology of it
being ‘more valuable for an agent to prefer a desire’. It may be more valuable for an
agent to prefer one thing to another for two different kinds of reason. The reason
might be object-given in the sense I have been so far considering; that is, the object of
one desire can be more valuable than another. Alternatively, it could be more
valuable for an agent to prefer a desire because she has state-given reasons to hold
a particular preference. To illustrate, suppose that someone threatened to torture you
unless you held a particular desire. This would give you a state-given reason to be in
the state of holding the desire in question, even if you had no object-given reason to
want the object of the desire itself (suppose that you would be tortured unless you
held a desire to do something you find repulsive). Whilst Ekstrom’s choice of
terminology might lead one to think that she is appealing to state-given reasons,
I think it is most natural to understand her view as appealing to object-given
reasons.⁵⁶
There is much to be said in favour of the coherence theory. It can explain why
those of an agent’s preferences that cohere with her character system have agential
authority, in so far as the agent’s coherent preferences and acceptances may plausibly
be understood as representing the agent’s ‘true self ’. There is a strong case in favour
of this view, since cohering elements of the self are likely to be ‘particularly long
lasting’,⁵⁷ since they are ‘well-supported with reasons’.⁵⁸ By virtue of this support,
they will also be ‘fully defensible against external challenges’,⁵⁹ as well as being
preferences that the agent feels ‘comfortable owning’.⁶⁰ However, our characters
are not thereby static; elements of our character systems can and do change.
Crucially though, if new elements of our psychological economies are to cohere,
then they must admit of rational justification in accordance with other elements of
our characters. Accordingly, character change that is compatible with autonomy will
be gradual, and akin to rebuilding Neurath’s raft. New elements have to fit with the
pre-existing structure; moreover, replacing the complete structure wholesale in one
fell swoop would rupture the continuity of the agent’s identity.
The coherence approach can thus offer a model for how our evaluative judgements
about what we have reasons to do can be understood as the appropriate seat of self-
governance. Practical rationality, understood as acting in accordance with our
⁵⁴ Ibid. ⁵⁵ Ibid., 611.
⁵⁶ See Parfit, On What Matters, 50–2 and appendix A for further discussion of state-given reasons.
Notably, he is sceptical about the import of such reasons, if they do in fact obtain in separation from object-
given reasons.
⁵⁷ Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’, 608. ⁵⁸ Ibid. ⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ Ibid., 609.
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rationally warranted preferences, has a positive role in autonomy because our
preferences are abiding elements of our characters, and thus have agential authority.
To conclude this chapter, I shall defend the coherence approach from three objec-
tions, and in doing so slightly refine the view. To be clear, in light of the distinction
I drew in the introduction, the objections I consider here are objections to the claim
that a rationalist coherentist condition should feature amongst the conditions of
what constitutes decisional autonomy. I shall consider further objections to the
implications of my theory for the causal conditions of autonomy (including objec-
tions grounded in concerns about demandingness and the role of emotions in
rationalist autonomy), in Chapter 7.
(i) An Asymmetry of Theoretical and Practical Rationality?
On Ekstrom’s description, the coherence theory allows for a possible asymmetry
between theoretical and practical rationality. Preferences have to be rationally
warranted in the objectivist sense that the agent must believe that they have reasons
to have those preferences, reasons that are based upon their subjective beliefs
concerning the good. Yet, acceptances need only be held in accordance with the
agent’s ‘subjective conception of the true’; as such, the coherence theory denies that
the autonomous agent’s beliefs must be in any way rationally warranted. However,
this asymmetry between practical and theoretical rationality is problematic. In
section 1, I argued that autonomous decision-making plausibly requires a degree
of theoretical rationality. Towards the end of section 2, I also mentioned that if one
accepts this point, then consistency demands that we should claim that autono-
mous agents should be theoretically rational with respect to the evaluative beliefs
about the good. Crucially, these evaluative beliefs significantly ground our practical
rationality. This point comes to fore in cases where agents might plausibly lack
autonomy with regards to their motivating desire, not because the motivating
desire itself is incongruous with their subjective conception of the good, but rather
because the agent’s beliefs about the good are theoretically irrational. For instance,
as Fulford explains, delusions that threaten autonomy can be evaluative and not
simply factual.⁶¹
To illustrate this point, consider a sufferer of clinical depression. In some cases of
this psychiatric disorder, the sufferer may have a suicidal desire that they personally
authorize; but this authorization may stem from a belief about the disvalue of their
own life that they hold irrationally.⁶² In saying that the belief is irrational in this
sense, I do not mean to say anything about whether the content of the belief is
objectively true or false. As I observed in the previous chapter, it is a mistake to
assume that delusions are necessarily false; so accepting that evaluative delusions are
possible does not entail the claim that they involve false evaluative judgements.
Moreover, as I shall clarify in Chapter 8, I am not denying that a desire to end
one’s own life can never be practically rational, nor grounded by theoretically rational
evaluative beliefs. The point here is rather that in some cases agents are not them-
selves able to offer any cogent reasons as to why they hold certain dubious evaluative
⁶¹ Fulford, ‘Evaluative Delusions’. ⁶² See Beck, Depression, 3.
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beliefs (perhaps about their own self-worth), or to respond to any epistemic reasons
with which they are presented against holding such beliefs (for instance, evidence
that other people care about them, contrary to their own impression). Instead, they
may simply adopt these beliefs unshakeably in a manner that bespeaks a delusional
state.
There are important questions about how we should delimit the scope of the
concept of an ‘evaluative delusion’ to which I shall return in Chapter 8. Moreover, we
should of course take care not to automatically assume that sufferers of psychiatric
disorder always lack autonomy with respect to desires that constitute a significant
diagnostic criterion of their condition (again, a point to which I shall return). Yet, it
seems plausible to claim that the agent in the particular case under consideration
plausibly does lack autonomy with respect to their suicidal desire given the nature of
the evaluative belief upon which it is based; I suggest that just as we believe that an
agent can lack autonomy if they are compelled by a motivating desire from which
they feel alienated, so too can an agent lack autonomy if their endorsement of their
motivating desire is based upon an irrational belief about the good. In cases such as
the one I am considering here, it seems possible that an agent’s decisional autonomy
can be undermined by delusional evaluative beliefs, as well as compulsive first-order
desires.⁶³
Whilst the coherence theory’s appeal to a purely subjective understanding of the
truth with respect to the agent’s acceptances is problematic for this reason,
the problem is easily remedied. Like rationalist theories of autonomy in bioethics,
the coherence approach should adopt a condition of theoretical rationality with
respect to acceptances.
(ii) Competing Desires and Coherence
The second objection pertains to the criteria of what it is for an agent’s preferences to
cohere. On Ekstrom’s view, when agents have to decide which of two competing
preferences should win out and cohere with their other central preferences, the
autonomous agent will decide that one preference defeats another on the basis that
it ismore valuable for her to prefer the object of desire d to the object of desire g, or at
least as valuable to prefer the object of desire d and some neutralizing desire n.
A problem with this view is that it is unable to account for the possibility that an
agent could be autonomous with respect to a desire to act in manner that they believe
to be sub-optimal. Consider the following example. Suppose that Jim values having a
career in medicine, but also values spending more time with his family. Following a
great deal of consideration, let us suppose that Jim forms the judgement that it would
be slightly more valuable for him to prefer that his desire to spend more time with his
⁶³ Radoilska argues that depression can undermine decisional autonomy because it involves paradoxical
identification, in which one identifies with what one loathes, in this case, oneself. See Radoilska,
‘Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy’. I am sympathetic to this view, and acknow-
ledge that this is a related way in which depression can serve to undermine decisional autonomy.
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family be effective in moving him to act.⁶⁴ Would it really be the case that, having
made this assessment about what is more valuable (and sticking to it), Jim would no
longer be autonomous with respect to his decision if he became motivated to instead
pursue a career in medicine? Admittedly, he would be doing so in the knowledge that
he could be doing something else that he believed to be slightly more valuable;
however, it still seems plausible to claim that Jim could nonetheless still be autono-
mous with respect to this decision.⁶⁵Notice that this is compatible with the claim that
Jim would have been more autonomous if he had chosen to act in accordance with
what he believed to be his strongest reasons. The point that I am making here is that
it is more plausible to make these two claims, rather than to rule out the possibility of
Jim’s autonomy here.
Indeed, as I have stressed throughout this chapter, truths regarding the relative
strength of our different competing self-interested reasons can be highly imprecise,
and there may just be no clear way of deciding which of two competing preferences A
and B it would be more valuable for one to prefer. Paul Hughes has argued that when
a person acts from volitional ambivalence like this:
. . . she is not autonomous either with respect to the desire that prompts her action or the
action itself . . . [since] . . . in cases of volitional ambivalence there is no single conative ‘self ’
directing the agent’s actions.⁶⁶
Hughes seems to be making a similar assumption to Velleman here in appealing to
the need for a single conative self directing critical evaluation. As I have explained,
the coherence approach can explain why this is not necessary; cohering elements of
our character systems admit of both rational justification, and mutually reinforcing
justifications. Moreover, pace Hughes, it is not clear why an agent in this situation
would not be autonomous with respect to their action once they had elected to act in
accordance with, say, preference A rather than preference B. Once the agent has
plumped for A, it seems plausible to claim that they will be autonomous with respect
to acting in pursuit of A in so far as preference A is itself still rationally warranted.
In plumping this way, otherwise ambivalent agents simply act in a manner that serves
to constitute their will.⁶⁷ Although A is no better or worse than B, this only means
that the agent may lack a rational basis for their choice of A over B; but this does not
mean that they lack autonomy with respect to their acting in pursuit of A, since that
act itself is still rationally warranted.⁶⁸ The choice of A over B is thus a choice to
prioritize a certain set of reasons over another, and to emphasize the corresponding
⁶⁴ For simplicity, I am assuming here that the beliefs that Jim knows he has at the time of deliberation
prior to this judgement exhaust all of the beliefs he has relevant to this decision. However, as Arpaly points
out, this need not be the case. See Arpaly, ‘On Acting Rationally against One’s Best Judgment’.
⁶⁵ Sher discusses a similar example. Sher, ‘Liberal Neutrality and the Value of Autonomy’, 143. See also
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 304.
⁶⁶ Hughes, ‘Ambivalence, Autonomy, and Organ Sales’, 238–9. Bratman also raises this sort of under-
determination case as raising a concern for theories of autonomy that appeal to rationalist considerations.
See Bratman, ‘Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency’.
⁶⁷ Ruth Chang defends a similar view, and a detailed account of the nature of what she calls ‘hard
choices’ in Chang, ‘Hard Choices’.
⁶⁸ Sher, ‘Liberal Neutrality and the Value of Autonomy’, 144 makes a similar point.
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aspects of one’s character system, even whilst acknowledging that the alternative
choice also represents elements of one’s character system that one would not
otherwise repudiate.⁶⁹ An agent’s chosen preference can still cohere with her other
central preferences and acceptances, and ground an autonomous choice in such
circumstances. Indeed, in light of this discussion, it is notable that in medical
contexts, a patient’s demonstrable ambivalence in the face of difficult choices in an
end of life decision-making context is not understood to readily undermine decision-
making competence.⁷⁰
In light of the above, the coherence approach should adopt the weaker claim that
autonomous agents should choose in accordance with preferences that they have a
sufficient reason to adopt. On this understanding, coherence is incompatible with
irrationality in Parfit’s sense, but not with choosing in a less than fully rational
manner. With this amendment, the coherence approach can accommodate the
plausible claim that autonomous agents can make sub-optimal choices, which may
still reflect central elements of the agent’s characters, particularly in the light of the
imprecise truths governing the strength of our competing practical reasons.
(iii) Authentic Alienation?
Suzy Killmister has recently raised an important challenge for rationalist theories of
autonomy that is apposite here.⁷¹ She asks us to consider a case in which an agent
accepts that a motivational attitude they hold is irrational, but which they nonethe-
less regard as providing them with sufficient justificatory reasons to act, because it
reflects what they take to be their true self. Most theories of autonomy, she claims,
cannot account for the thought that such an agent seems to be autonomous along
some dimensions, but less autonomous along others.
To give a concrete bioethical example, an anorexic patient might regard her desire
to refrain from eating as irrational, and yet also regard it as providing her with
sufficient justificatory reason to refrain from eating. The justificatory reason arises
from the fact that the patient understands this irrational desire to partly constitute
her real self.⁷² Killmister claims that in order to account for this sort of case, we need
to split what I am calling the reflective element of autonomy into two components,
which she terms ‘self-definition’ and ‘self-realization’. Self-definition pertains to the
reasonableness of an agent’s attitudes, whilst self-realization pertains to the extent to
which the agent’s intentions track what she takes herself to have most reasons to do.
However, the rationalist theory developed here can also provide a theoretical basis
for those who are ambivalent with regards to such an agent’s autonomy, providing
certain assumptions are met. The theory can also provide a basis for critiquing the
intuition that the autonomy of such an agent is in some way ‘mixed’. To see why, we
need to think more deeply about both the nature of the reasons and the conceptions
of rationality in play in Killmister’s example. Recall that the patient in this example
⁶⁹ Joesph Raz argues that such choices play a particularly important role in shaping our character. See
Raz, Engaging Reason, 242.
⁷⁰ Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 248. ⁷¹ Killmister, ‘The Woody Allen Puzzle’.
⁷² For some empirical support for the plausibility of such an example, see Tan et al., ‘Competence to
Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa’.
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regards her desire to refrain from eating as irrational. Nonetheless, she takes that
desire as providing her with reasons for action, in so far as she regards that desire as
partly constitutive of her authentic self. On Killmister’s model, such a patient would
lack autonomy in one sense, that is, with respect to her self-definition (in so far as her
authentic self incorporates elements that she herself takes to be irrational). Yet she
would also, in some sense, be autonomous with respect to her self-realization, in so
far as she is acting in accordance with what she believes she has most reason to do,
that is, act in accordance with her authentic self.
On the framework that I have presented here, the plausibility of such a patient
being ‘mixed’ with respect to their autonomy in this way relies on two assumptions.
First, that an agent’s authentic self could incorporate attitudes that she herself takes
to be irrational. Second, that acting in accordance with one’s authentic self for its own
sake can be regarded as good in a reason-implying sense. I shall consider each in turn.
Our views regarding the plausibility of these assumptions are likely to be compli-
cated by different interpretations of the ‘true self ’. On some understandings of
authenticity that are implicit in philosophical theories of autonomy, the true self is
understood as being perpetually created; living authentically is a matter of con-
sciously shaping one’s own character in accordance with one’s desires and values.⁷³
In contrast though, one might endorse an alternative essentialist understanding of
authenticity, according to which the true self is an extant and largely static essence
that we need to discover rather than create.⁷⁴
The claim that the above anorexic patient is partly autonomous in the way that
Killmister understands her to be seems to rely on an essentialist conception of
authenticity.⁷⁵ The reason for this is that many existentialist understandings of
authenticity would most likely reject the first assumption outlined above: If, as
existentialist approaches maintain, it is the agent herself who decides how to shape
her authentic self on the basis of her own values and conception of the good, then it is
not clear how the authentic self could be understood to incorporate elements that the
agent herself takes to be irrational. Notice though that this claim is compatible with
the thought that an existentialist conception of the true self might plausibly incorp-
orate elements that one believes others will deem to be irrational. Indeed, some
anorexic patients might claim that their true selves incorporate irrational elements in
this normative sense, in so far as they might admit that it would be more rational to
prioritize their health over a low weight, from a third-party perspective. Crucially
though, this need not commit such patients to regarding their desire to maintain a
low weight as irrational; they may yet believe that they are acting in accordance with
what they have strongest reason to do.
⁷³ For a discussion of the existentialist approach and autonomy, see DeGrazia, Human Identity and
Bioethics, ch. 3.
⁷⁴ For discussions of this distinction, see Levy, ‘Enhancing Authenticity’; Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu,
‘Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value’.
⁷⁵ Interestingly, Killmister’s interpretation of the anorexic case here runs contrary to an essentialist
tradition in bioethics that claims that the ‘anorexic self ’ must be inauthentic, on the basis that it is
grounded by pathological or self-destructive values. See Tan et al., ‘Competence to Make Treatment
Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa’; Nordenfelt, Rationality and Compulsion. I shall discuss such accounts
in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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The rationalist theory that I have developed here can accommodate the thought
that such individuals can be autonomous with respect to desires that are rationally
endorsed in this sense, as long as the beliefs about the good upon which they are
based are not held in a theoretically irrational manner. Yet, if this is the correct
interpretation of Killmister’s view, then the agent is not mixed with regard to her
autonomy; she is acting in accordance with a desire that she rationally endorses, even
though she acknowledges its apparent irrationality. Yet this just means that she
disagrees about the strength that we ought to attribute to different reasons; this
alone is not sufficient for practical irrationality as I have described it in this chapter.
The authentic self cannot incorporate irrational elements in this motivational
sense on a number of plausible existentialist understandings of authenticity.
However, this is not a problem for the essentialist understanding; one’s static essence
may incorporate attitudes that one now takes to be irrational on the basis of one’s
own beliefs about value, or one’s beliefs about what one should value according to
impersonal criteria. So Killmister’s suggestion that the agent in her case partly lacks
autonomy seems to rely on an implicit essentialist conception of authenticity.
The second question is whether this essentialist conception of authenticity can
provide a sufficient justificatory reason for action, as Killmister’s second assumption
requires. Naturally, the first potential problem with this claim is that the essentialist
conception of authenticity is somewhat contentious, in so far as it seems to rely on
the assumption that we have a deep, immutable, hidden essence that is immune to
our own evaluative stance.⁷⁶ Notwithstanding this issue, the essentialist understand-
ing also owes us an account of why living authentically on this conception should be
regarded as good in a reason-implying sense. Even assuming that an essential self
exists, to claim that this essence must be good and that it ought to be promoted
without further argument seems to come close to making the naturalistic fallacy.
Suppose, though, that such an account can be provided;⁷⁷ if living in accordance
with an essentialist conception of the self can be construed as good in a reason-
implying sense, and that conception of the self incorporates elements that the agent
herself takes to be irrational, then it seems that Killmister’s ambivalent intuition
about the agent’s autonomy in this case can be compatible with the rationalist
account that I have developed here. However, we may notice that the strength of
one’s reason to live in accordance with this essence on such an account would also
have to be particularly strong. After all, the reasons associated with living authentic-
ally would need to be sufficient to compete with the agent’s reasons to pursue other
goods, perhaps even including survival in the case of severe anorexia.
The rationalist framework I have outlined here can not only account for
Killmister’s own ambivalent intuition in such cases, but it can also account for the
possibility that we may not find the intuition about ambivalence compelling.
Whether we share Killmister’s intuition will depend on our credence in essentialist
conceptions of authenticity, their value, and the possibility that an agent could
⁷⁶ Strohminger, Knobe, and Newman, ‘The True Self ’; DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, 233–4.
⁷⁷ For a classic defence of essentialist authenticity as a normative ideal in this respect, see Taylor, ‘The
Ethics of Authenticity’. For some considerations that speak in favour of this approach in the context of
mental disorders, see Erler and Hope, ‘Mental Disorder and the Concept of Authenticity’.
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rationally prioritize this value over other goods that may be in play in her decision-
making.
In contrast to the essentialist conception of authenticity upon which Killmister’s
case seems to rely, the coherence approach I have outlined in this chapter draws on
both essentialist and existentialist themes in the conception of authenticity that it
invokes. From the essentialist tradition, it takes the claim that we may have certain
more or less fixed elements that partly constitute our character system. From the
existentialist tradition, it takes the claim that we may be able to choose which of these
more or less fixed elements to bring to the fore in a coherent nexus, and which to
downplay on the basis of the web of values that we come to develop. On this
approach, if the individual herself believes that a certain element of her character
system is not valuable, as Killmister’s anorexic patient does, then this element of her
character system is inauthentic, and cannot be understood as a suitable ground of
autonomous decision-making. However, as I shall explore in Chapter 8, the theory is
also compatible with the thought that some anorexic patients may coherently
experience their disorder as a part of their authentic self. In this part of the book,
I shall also return to Craigie’s concern that such patients may also later regret the
values that previously informed their decision-making, and the implications that this
should be understood to have for their autonomy.
Conclusion
The assumption that there is a close relationship between autonomy and rationality
in bioethics is well-grounded. Whilst previous theories of rationalist autonomy have
made important progress in outlining the kind of role that rationality might play in
autonomy, they have been somewhat hampered by certain misunderstandings about
the nature of rationality. Furthermore, they have not adequately engaged with the
deeper question of why our evaluative judgements should be understood to serve as
an appropriate seat of self-government. By drawing on an objectivist account of
reasons and the broader literature on philosophy of action in this chapter, I am now
in a position to offer the following rationalist minimal conditions of autonomy:
Theoretical Rationality: Decisional autonomy is precluded by theoretically
irrational beliefs about information that is material to one’s decisions.
Practical Rationality: The autonomous agent’s motivating desires must be
rational in the following sense:
They must:
(a) Be endorsed by preferences that are sustained on the basis of the agent’s
holding (rational) beliefs that, if true, would give the agent reason to pursue
the object of the desire.
And
(b) These preferences must cohere with other elements of the agent’s character
system.
In turn, a preference coheres with other elements of an agent’s character system if
there is a sufficient reason for the agent to maintain that preference in the light of
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other competing preferences and theoretically rational acceptances. Coherence is
thus incompatible with irrationality, but it is compatible with being less than fully
rational.
As I mentioned above, Rebecca Walker claims that a negative rationality condition
should replace the standard account’s condition concerning the absence of internal
control. I agree with this sentiment, but I have made the stronger claim that
considerations of practical rationality should feature in a positive condition on
autonomy, one that requires that autonomous decisions be grounded by authentic
preferences. This account can offer a deeper justification for why practical rationality
matters for autonomy.
We may also notice that the positive condition of practical rationality is stronger
than the negative criterion of theoretical rationality. One reason for this is that in the
case of practical rationality it is possible to draw a meaningful distinction between
irrationality and arationality, and both are incompatible with the approach that I am
advocating here. The explanation for this is that the positive contribution that
practical rationality makes to autonomy is to facilitate our ability to decide in
accordance with elements of our character that should be understood to have agential
authority. Our decisions can clearly lack that authority if they are irrational, but they
also lack it if they are arational. Furthermore, they also lack this authority if they are
not endorsed by cohering elements of the agent’s character system.
Yet, even if these conditions are necessary they may not be sufficient. It still seems
that a suitable theory of autonomy should follow the standard account in maintain-
ing a condition excluding controlling forms of influence such as manipulation,
deception, and coercion. It is to these forms of influence that I shall now turn. In
particular, in the next chapter, I shall argue that the rationalist conditions that I have
set out here can provide a plausible foundation for understanding why manipulation
and deception undermine autonomy, and the bearing that this should have on our
understanding of authenticity.
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3
Controlling Influences
Recall that the standard account of autonomy states that autonomy requires the
absence of both internal and external controlling forces that determine the agent’s
decision. As I suggested in the introductory chapter, the claim that autonomy
requires the absence of internal controlling forces is too strong if it is understood
to foreclose the possibility of compatibilist approaches to autonomy. Accordingly,
I have argued that we should replace the condition concerning the absence of internal
control with a rationalist authenticity condition. In this chapter, I now want to
consider the implications of this account for the external forms of controlling
influence to which the standard account appeals: manipulation, deception, and
coercion.¹
Although it is all but universally agreed that manipulation, deception, and coer-
cion can undermine an agent’s decisional autonomy, it is less clear how we ought to
distinguish these forms of influence from those that are compatible with decisional
autonomy. After all, our decisions are continually and (as relational theorists of
autonomy stress) unavoidably influenced in a number of ways that are not aptly
construed as undermining decisional autonomy.
To illustrate, suppose I tell you that you ought to buy a novel, telling you that
it incorporates beautiful prose and cutting social commentary. Ceteris paribus, it
does not seem that this way of attempting to influence your decision is aptly
construed as undermining your autonomy with regards to your decision about
which book to buy. Even at a pre-theoretic stage, this clearly stands in stark
contrast to a case in which I threaten to significantly harm you if you do not read
the book. Consider also a case in which I maliciously deceive you into reading a
book that I know you will dislike, or, even more fantastically, hypnotizing you
into doing so.
Accordingly, the challenge that we face in understanding controlling influence is
to explain how we are to distinguish those forms of influence that serve to undermine
an individual’s decisional autonomy from those that do not. Although the standard
account stipulates a condition regarding the absence of controlling interference, the
¹ ‘Undue influence’ is arguably a more natural term for what I am referring to as controlling influence.
However, I have avoided this term due to the fact that, in some circles it is taken to have a rather more
specific meaning than I intend. For example, the Belmont Report defines undue influence as follows:
‘Undue influence . . . occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper
reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance.’ See Largent et al., ‘Misconceptions about Coercion
and Undue Influence’ for discussion. I shall discuss the implications of incentives for autonomy in the next
chapter.
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account itself provides us with few clues about how to draw these distinctions;
it simply stipulates by fiat that coercion, psychological manipulation, and deception
are examples of interventions that undermine autonomy. It relies on the intuitive
plausibility of these judgements in order to justify partially defining autonomous
decisions as those that are made in the absence of these influences. This seems
somewhat theoretically unsatisfactory.
The rationalist approach that I developed in the previous chapter can offer a
deeper account of the relationship between autonomy and these different forms of
influence. On this approach, an individual’s decisional autonomy can be undermined
if either the cognitive or reflective elements of decisional autonomy are disrupted as
follows:
(i) The individual is led to either (a) sustain theoretically irrational beliefs or (b)
fail to hold decisionally necessary true beliefs.
(ii) The individual is led to sustain a motivating desire in a manner that bypasses
the cognitive element of autonomy, such that they either (a) do not endorse
the desire, or (b) they endorse it with a preference that fails to cohere with
other cohering elements of their character system
In accordance with this framework, we may categorize deception as amounting to
(i)[b] but not necessarily (i)[a]. It can be theoretically rational to believe others who
are lying to us. However, informational manipulation more broadly may involve
either (i)[a] or [b]. I shall consider these forms of controlling influence in sections 4
and 5.
In contrast, psychological manipulation involves the manipulation of motivational
states rather than beliefs, and may be said to amount to forms of influence that are
involved in either (ii)[a] or [b]. One might argue that psychological manipulation
could also operate at a more global level, such that an agent is brainwashed into
holding an entirely new character system as follows:
(ii)[c] An individual is led to radically change the overall coherent nexus of
preferences and acceptances by which she endorses her motivating desires.
Whilst the theory of autonomy that I outlined in the previous chapter can explain
why (ii)[a] and [b] undermine autonomy, it is not clear that it can explain why global
manipulation of the sort identified in (ii)[c] would. As I shall explain, this has led
some philosophers to argue that an adequate theory of autonomy should certain
incorporate historical conditions.
I shall reject this view in section 3. Prior to doing so though, I shall in the first two
sections begin by outlining more mundane forms of psychological manipulation that
may more plausibly be employed in biomedical contexts, and explaining how they
differ from forms of rational persuasion that are compatible with decisional auton-
omy. I shall delay consideration of coercion until the next chapter, and explain why it
does not fit naturally within the framework I have just outlined.
To conclude these introductory remarks, it is important to be clear that I am only
interested here in the implications of these forms of influence for the autonomy of the
targeted individuals. I do not mean to deny that these influences can have other
important moral implications that can and should factor into an all things considered
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moral analysis of them.² For instance, there has been a great deal of recent debate
regarding the extent to which instances of psychological manipulation might violate
a putative right to mental integrity, even if they do not constitute threats to autonomy
per se.³ Although my autonomy-based analysis of manipulation is not entirely
unrelated to these other questions, we should not assume that the conclusions
I draw here translate straightforwardly to how we should understand other import-
ant moral properties of manipulation and deception.
Finally, the terminology of ‘controlling influence’ is perhaps somewhat unfortu-
nate, since it seems to imply that these forms of influence must be exerted intention-
ally, in a manner that connotes that the one who influences is actively controlling the
target of their influence. However, as I shall explain in this chapter, non-intentional
and indeed non-agential forces can cause the phenomena indicated in (i) and (ii)
above. Despite this unfortunate implication, I shall retain this terminology in the
interests of consistency with the literature.
1. Rational Persuasion
On the standard account, rational persuasion is understood to be compatible with
autonomy on the basis that it enhances understanding; persuasion is thus broadly
similar to simply informing.⁴ However, on the approach that I outlined in the
previous chapter, we can understand persuasion in a broader sense to involve
attempting to change an agent’s beliefs by drawing their attention to reasons.
Rational persuasion on this approach thus involves attempting to change an indi-
vidual’s desires indirectly, by actively engaging with the cognitive element of their
practical decision-making process. This can include interacting with both the target’s
descriptive beliefs about the world (as the standard account implies), but also their
evaluative beliefs about the good. Desires that are formed following rational persua-
sion are thus likely to accord with the cohering elements of the agent’s character
system in a manner that betokens autonomy, because they will have been explicitly
developed in light of the individual’s acceptances. When successful, persuasion must
appeal to the values we hold, or convince us to change our values in response to
reasons.
Typically, rational persuasion will involve highlighting descriptive facts about
another’s options; for example, you might persuade a friend not to cross a bridge
by drawing their attention to the large hole in the middle of it. We may call this
factual persuasion. In factual persuasion, the persuader presumes that both they and
the subject of their persuasion share an understanding of the target’s preferred
outcomes. One explanation for why factual persuasion can fail is that the persuader
has made an incorrect assumption about the target’s preferred outcome.
² For a comprehensive discussion, see Blumenthal-Barby, ‘A Framework for Assessing the Moral Status
of “Manipulation” ’.
³ Bublitz and Merkel, ‘Crimes Against Minds’; Douglas, ‘Neural and Environmental Modulation of
Motivation’.
⁴ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 354–68; Beauchamp and
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 137–9.
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Alternatively, the two parties may agree on all the relevant descriptive facts of the
matter but disagree about the outcome that ought to be pursued in a particular
context. In such cases, simply bringing further relevant descriptive facts to the
target’s attention is unlikely to be successful. Rather, if persuasion is to succeed in
such a context, it must involve what I shall call ‘evaluative persuasion’; that is, the
persuader must bring reason-giving facts about other outcomes to the target’s
attention, in an attempt to change their assessment of the relative strength of their
reasons to pursue different courses of action.
Evaluative persuasion might involve advocating the value of goods that the target
will forgo if they follow through on their planned course of action; for example, we
might seek to persuade a suicidal person against their planned course of action by
drawing their attention to various good things in their life that are worth living for.
Alternatively, evaluative persuasion might involve questioning the value of the
agent’s preferred outcome, asking her to explain the grounding of her belief that
the outcome in question is good in a reason-implying sense. For example, one might
attempt to persuade a person to stop smoking by asking her to reflect on whether she
actually enjoys the experience of smoking, or whether she simply reaches for her
cigarettes on a habitual, non-rational basis.
In the context of medical ethics, evaluative persuasion is often viewed with
suspicion, particularly by those who endorse the so-called shared decision-making
model of the doctor–patient relationship.⁵ On strong versions of this view, it is
assumed that:
The physician should objectively answer questions but should avoid influencing the patient to
take one path or another, even if the physician has strong opinions or if the patient asks for
advice.⁶
On this model, it is usually assumed that physicians would be exerting controlling
influence if they were to encroach on the evaluative domain of the decision-making
process. The General Medical Council (GMC) adopts a weaker version of this
position, stating that:
The doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the patient,
but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice.⁷
Whilst there are different ways of understanding the shared decision-making model,
we should reject versions of the model that construe the doctor–patient relationship
in a manner that demands that doctors should adopt a wholly value-neutral
approach in their dealings with patients.⁸ First, it is highly questionable to assume
that it is even possible for doctors to provide medical information in a value-neutral
manner. After all, medical concepts such as health and disease are themselves value-
laden, in so far as they are commonly understood to imply certain value judgements
⁵ Veatch, ‘Abandoning Informed Consent’.
⁶ Quill and Brody, ‘Physician Recommendations and Patient Autonomy’, 764.
⁷ General Medical Council, ‘Ethical Guidance for Doctors, Part 1’.
⁸ Veatch, ‘Abandoning Informed Consent’. For an understanding of the doctor–patient relationship
that corresponds to the rationalist approach that I am defending here, see Savulescu, ‘Liberal Rationalism
and Medical Decision-Making’.
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(particularly in the conversational context of a treatment discussion).⁹ Second,
physicians must make certain evaluative judgements in deciding upon what infor-
mation to disclose to patients (such as information about risks associated with
treatment) and deciding what treatment options to propose to their patient. In
both cases, it seems that the physician’s evaluative judgements will inevitably bear
upon what is (and is not) disclosed.
However, the theory of autonomy that I am outlining also gives us reasons to reject
even the weaker version of this value-neutral approach adopted by the GMC. The
strategies of evaluative persuasion noted above should not be understood to consti-
tute controlling influence of the sort that undermines decisional autonomy, because
evaluative, as well as factual, persuasion can facilitate autonomous decision-making.
Evaluative persuasion does not involve seeking to impose values on the target; rather,
it involves seeking to elicit the rational justification underlying the values that are
now guiding the agent’s conduct, and alerting them to other reasons that are at stake
in a particular choice context. In so far as this mode of persuasion causes the subject
to reflect on these reasons, it can be construed as enhancing the agent’s autonomy
with respect to their decisions, even if it is not successful.¹⁰ Indeed, part of the
physician’s role can be to advocate the import of certain sorts or reasons, reasons
that reflect the values that shape the profession of medicine.¹¹ Moreover, in an era in
which physicians have to battle with the widespread distribution of misinformation
about medicine proliferating in the online world, it may be a mistake to assume that
the dispassionate provision of medical facts alone can be enough to allow them to
adequately compete in this environment, and to ensure that their patients are
appropriately informed about their treatment options.¹²
Of course, a decision to engage in evaluative persuasion must be sensitive to the
particular vulnerabilities of specific patients. In particular, it is important to be clear
that the physician is engaging in evaluative persuasion rather than simply aiming to
elicit the patient’s capitulation to their view. Whilst this is an important danger, we
should not simply assume that the best way to avoid it is to require that doctors say
nothing in the face of patient decisions that seem to be grounded by badly skewed
evaluative judgements. To illustrate, a physician would be quite warranted in
engaging in evaluative persuasion to persuade a patient that she really ought to
receive a life-saving shot to prevent an anaphylactic shock, if her reason for refusing it
is that she wants to avoid the small pain involved in the injection. A physician can go
beyond merely recommending the injection in this sort of case without unduly
encroaching on the patient’s autonomy.
Having outlined forms of persuasion that are compatible with autonomous
decision-making, I now want to turn to forms of influence that are not, starting
with psychological manipulation.
⁹ For a classic account of conversational implicature, see Grice, Studies in the Way of Words.
¹⁰ For defence of similar views, see Savulescu, ‘Liberal Rationalism and Medical Decision-Making’;
Widdershoven and Abma, ‘Autonomy, Dialogue, and Practical Rationality’.
¹¹ Brock, Life and Death, ch. 2, especially 69.
¹² For a sobering editorial on this point, see Ranjana Srivastava ‘My Patient Swapped Chemotherapy for
Essential Oils. Arguing Is a Fool’s Errand’.
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2. Psychological Manipulation
In rational persuasion, one attempts to alter the target’s motivational states indirectly
by engaging with the cognitive element of their decisional autonomy, including their
beliefs about the world and the good. Psychological manipulation involves attempt-
ing to directly alter the motivational states themselves, in a manner that bypasses the
cognitive element of the target’s decisional autonomy.
As Anne Barnhill notes, one of the difficulties in theorizing about manipulation is
that ethicists often fail to provide a working definition of what they are talking about,
or they offer definitions that are either over-inclusive or under-inclusive.¹³ Indeed,
one over-inclusive theory that Barnhill adverts to is an account of psychological
manipulation that Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Faden develop in outlining a detailed
version of the standard account of autonomy in bioethics. According to Beauchamp
and Faden, psychological manipulation can be defined as:
any intentional act that successfully influences a person to belief or behavior by causing
changes in mental processes other than those involved in understanding.¹⁴
This account of psychological manipulation is theoretically incomplete because the
link between this type of manipulation and the explanation for why it undermines
autonomy is left unclear. This is particularly problematic because there are ways in
which the definition is both over- and under-inclusive. One way in which the theory
may be under-inclusive is that it rules out the possibility that manipulative influence
could be non-intentional. However, one reason for questioning Beauchamp and
Faden’s claim to the contrary is that they (and other advocates of the standard
account of autonomy) readily accept that some non-intentional forces can amount
to controlling influence that undermines decisional autonomy. This is due to the fact
that advocates of the standard account accept the possibility of internal controlling
forces (such as psychiatric disease) that may undermine decisional autonomy.
There are of course some pragmatic reasons for understanding manipulation to
require intentional agency. First, one might want to stress the semantic point that the
term ‘manipulation’ itself seems to connote intentional agency, in the same way that
the term ‘controlling’ influence does. Furthermore, there may be a range of morally
relevant features of intentional manipulation that are not applicable to non-
intentional forms of the same sort of phenomenon. For my purposes here though,
these points are somewhat moot. As I stipulated in the introduction to this chapter,
I am solely interested in the effects of manipulation on the target’s autonomy.
Crucially, that non-intentional forces can exert forms of influence that have rele-
vantly similar effects on the target’s autonomy as intentional psychological manipu-
lation follows straightforwardly from the account of autonomy that I have defended.
If authenticity of a certain sort is required for decisional autonomy, and if authen-
ticity as I have spelled it out can be threatened by non-intentional and non-agential
forces (as well as agential forces), then we should deny the claim that autonomy-
¹³ Barnhill, ‘What Is Manipulation?’, 51.
¹⁴ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 366.
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undermining psychological manipulation is necessarily intentional.¹⁵ What matters
for decisional autonomy is that we endorse our motivating desires with certain kinds
of rationally endorsed preferences, namely, ones that fit in with other cohering
elements of our characters. Now, it is true that we might fail to act on the basis of
such a desire because another agent has intentionally induced a different motivating
desire. However, it is also possible that our failure in this regard may not be due to the
machinations of another intentional agent. ‘Internal’ forms of controlling influence
of the sort I considered in the previous chapter can lead individuals to form and
sustain desires in this way, and undermine autonomy for the same reason.
I shall consider some further arguments regarding the necessity of intention that
have been made specifically with respect to deception in section 5. To return to
psychological manipulation though, one might worry that my theory of autonomy
will lead to too broad an understanding of manipulation. For instance, Barnhill
argues a theory of manipulation ought to exclude drugs and brainwashing as
examples of interference that undermine autonomy, on the basis that they evince
global changes to the target’s psychology. Such global changes mean that these
interventions do not directly target particular elements of the target’s psychological
economy in the manner that manipulation arguably requires.¹⁶ It seems plausible
that psychiatric diseases could also constitute another example of what Barnhill has
in mind here.
I am sympathetic to Barnhill’s claim here; indeed, in the next section, I shall
explain why forms of interference that evince global changes to a person’s psychology
do not threaten autonomy per se. However, I do not believe that these examples are
problematic for the conception of manipulation that can be grounded by my
rationalist approach. First, I am sceptical of the claim that drugs or psychiatric
disorders must always involve such global changes. Indeed, some drugs have direct
effects on a limited set of motivational states. Consider, for example, the use of
chemical castration in the punishment of individuals who have been convicted
of sexual offences. Contrary to Barnhill’s analysis, this seems a paradigm case of
psychological manipulation; these individuals are compelled to take a drug that has a
direct effect on their libido, but which may nonetheless leave large swathes of their
character systems intact. Indeed, they may lament their lack of sexual drive whilst
experiencing the effects of the drug, in accordance with preferences that they have
sustained from a point in time prior to the intervention. Furthermore, with respect to
psychiatric diseases, we may also note that the standard account of autonomy
explicitly accepts the claim that psychiatric disease can undermine decisional
autonomy.
As I mentioned above, Barnhill also claims that Beauchamp and Faden’s account
of manipulation is over-inclusive. According to Beauchamp and Faden’s approach,
methods of changing beliefs and desires that do not qualify as rational persuasion will
constitute psychological manipulation. Yet as Barnhill argues, it appears that inten-
tional expressions of emotions may serve to change another’s beliefs or behaviour,
¹⁵ Mele makes a similar point with respect to his theory in Mele, Autonomous Agents, ch. 6, section 2
and Mele, Free Will and Luck, 177–90.
¹⁶ Barnhill, ‘What Is Manipulation?’, 65.
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but this does not entail that such expressions must be manipulative.¹⁷ It might be
argued that my approach will fall foul of a similar complaint, given the emphasis
I place on the fact that psychological manipulation involves inducing desires directly
by bypassing the cognitive element of autonomy. However, my approach can accom-
modate the thought that emotional influences can be compatible with autonomy, as
I shall now explain.
One explanation for this is that emotional influences need not lead us to develop
motivational states in a manner that bypasses the cognitive element of decisional
autonomy. To illustrate, consider Barnhill’s own example of a woman deciding to
hand back some embezzled money after her father tells her that ‘he didn’t raise her to
be a thief ’.¹⁸ I agree with Barnhill that this is plausibly an example of a non-
manipulative, yet emotional form of influence (via shame) that is compatible with
autonomy.
However, I deny that it involves inducing a desire in a manner that entirely
bypasses the cognitive element of the agent’s autonomy. It is a mistake to assume
that decisions substantially grounded by affective experiences are wholly divorced
from our beliefs about what is valuable. Whilst it is true that emotional experiences of
fear and anger (amongst others) can involve us becoming divorced from our evalu-
ative judgements or theoretically rational beliefs about the nature of the world, some
affective attitudes and emotional experiences can instead give rise to values, ground
certain kinds of reasons for choice, and even reveal the presence of certain reasons
that were previously obscure to us. Indeed, an increased understanding of our
reasons can sometimes also be facilitated by emotional engagement, as well as
simpler forms of information disclosure. In this particular case, my claim is that
the emotional influence of the woman’s father enabled her to perceive a powerful set
of reasons not to steal.
Of course this may not be true of all forms of emotional influence; when it is not,
I suggest that emotional influence can be manipulative. However, we should also
acknowledge the point that the fact that one has been initially manipulated into
holding a desire (by emotional means or otherwise) does not entail that one must
thereby forever lack autonomy with respect to it. One can come to critically reflect on
the content of the manipulated desire, and to decide for oneself whether or not to
sustain it in the light of one’s preferences.
To illustrate, suppose that you were brainwashed by subliminal advertising to form
the desire to give money to charity. Even if you later came to reject the causal history
of this desire (having been made aware of it), it still seems plausible to claim that you
could autonomously hold the desire, just because you endorse the content of the
desire itself. As Bernard Berofsky points out, one may reasonably have objections
to the causal process that led one to develop a desire, without having any qualms
about the results.¹⁹ By reflecting on a desire that one has been manipulated to
develop, one can come to take ownership of the desire itself in a manner that
betokens autonomy; call this ‘post-factum reflection’.
¹⁷ Ibid., 62. ¹⁸ Ibid. ¹⁹ Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 212.
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Post-factum reflection on changes to our motivational states following emotional
influence may often lead to their endorsement, because our emotions can plausibly
serve as a source of reasons that may not be immediately accessible at the time of
deliberation, but which may nonetheless ground rational behaviour.²⁰ More broadly
though, we are of course more likely to engage in post-factum reflection on manipu-
lated desires if they represent either a striking departure from our characteristic
motivations, or if the manipulative process itself was particularly overt. The problem
is that many manipulative processes, including many forms of emotional influence,
subvert this sort of post-factum reflection because their effects are covert and subtle.
Accordingly, they do not give us cause to reflect on, or indeed even recognize, the
changes that they have evinced.
On a related point, we may note that on the approach that I am defending here is
that psychological manipulation need not be covert.²¹ In light of the above remarks
though, my account is compatible with the claim that covert manipulation is likely to
be more successful in sustaining a lack of autonomy with respect to a desire; after all,
if the target of manipulation is aware of the existence of a manipulative influence they
are more likely to be able to both employ mechanisms to resist its influence, and to
engage in post-factum reflection that will allow them to repudiate or take ownership
of the desire itself. However, it is also compatible with the claim that overt influences
can still involve psychological manipulation. This seems to me a benefit of the
account. To see why, reconsider the use of mandatory chemical castration in the
criminal justice system.²² Now, whatever we think of the permissibility of this sort of
policy, it seems quite clear that intervention can be understood to be a form of
psychological manipulation, despite the fact that it is not covert, if the target
repudiates their lack of sexual desires following the intervention.
With this in mind, what might plausible forms of psychological manipulation look
like in the biomedical context? Philosophers who discuss manipulation typically
appeal to extraordinary cases of manipulation involving nefarious neurosurgeons
and hypnotists. However, the justification for appealing to such examples is the
theoretical clarity that they permit, rather than the fact that they represent common
cases of manipulation. Yet, there are a number of common ways in which we might
be subjected to this form of interference in the biomedical sphere. For instance,
physicians may exert control in these sorts of ways through subliminal suggestion,
and by appealing to irrationally grounded emotional attitudes such as guilt.²³ To
illustrate, a physician could psychologically manipulate a patient who refuses a
treatment by telling them that they are just ‘being awkward’, or by telling the patient
that all of their other patients just ‘do what their doctor says’. In such cases, the
physician is attempting to influence the patient, not by appealing to reason-giving
facts about the nature of the treatment that could give the patient reasons to change
their decision, or by making an emotional appeal that serves to reveal the strength of
²⁰ Arpaly, ‘On Acting Rationally against One’s Best Judgment’.
²¹ For accounts that claim that manipulation must necessarily be covert, see Goodin, Manipulatory
Politics, 9; Ware, ‘The Concept of Manipulation’, 165.
²² Forsberg and Douglas, ‘Anti-Libidinal Interventions in Sex Offenders’.
²³ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 366–7.
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the patient’s reasons (such as an injunction to ‘think of your family’ in making a
treatment decision). Instead, this is an appeal to a non-rational bias that the patient
may have to conform to a ‘norm’ of ‘the good patient’ perpetuated by a medical
authority.
Over the latter half of the twentieth century, psychologists and behavioural
economists have also highlighted ways in which environmental cues can be stra-
tegically used to influence our practical decision-making in ways that might be
deemed manipulative in various ways. Following Thaler and Sunstein, such strategies
are commonly referred to as ‘Nudges’. According to Thaler and Sunstein’s own
definition, a nudge can be constituted by:
Any aspect of a person’s choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.²⁴
The debate in the bioethical literature about whether nudges are compatible with
autonomous choice has been somewhat impeded by the exceedingly broad nature of
this definition of nudges. The problem with the definition is that it can be understood
to incorporate both strategies that influence decision-making by facilitating the
involvement of the cognitive element of our decision-making, and also those that
subvert this. In doing so, it conflates two morally distinct categories of influence.²⁵
For instance, rational persuasion as I have described it above could qualify as a nudge
on this definition; so too could the use of incentives.²⁶
However, I suggest that there are some cases in which nudges are psychologically
manipulative, by virtue of the fact that they entirely bypass the cognitive element of
our decision-making (as well as subverting post-factum reflection). Consider for
example the use of priming. In one famous example of priming, criminal justice
authorities found that if they exposed prison inmates to a particular shade of pink,
violent behaviour amongst those inmates dramatically reduced. It is not as if the
colour prompted the inmates to engage in reflection about their reasons to engage in
violent behaviour. Rather, their exposure to this environmental factor seemed to
somehow serve to diminish their violent impulses without engaging with the
offenders’ rational processing.²⁷ Moreover, the covert and subtle nature of this
influence makes it less likely that the targets will be aware of the changes evinced,
and to critically reflect on the question of whether to endorse or reject them
(assuming that the effects themselves could indeed be wilfully resisted).
Despite the breadth of the commonly invoked definition, discussions of the effects
of nudging on autonomy do not always attend to the particular significance of nudges
that bypass (and subvert) the rational processes alluded to above.²⁸ A number of
commonly discussed nudge strategies, such as priming, would fall into this category
²⁴ Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 6.
²⁵ For other defences of the claim that not all nudges need pervert our decision-making processes, see
Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’; Cohen, ‘Nudging and Informed Consent’.
²⁶ Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs, ‘Seeking Better Health Care Outcomes’.
²⁷ For discussion, see Pugh, ‘Moral Bio-Enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle’;
Douglas, ‘Neural and Environmental Modulation of Motivation’.
²⁸ Some authors employ a narrower definition of nudging, according to which nudges by definition take
advantage of non-rational processes. For example, see Hausman and Welch, ‘To Nudge or Not to Nudge’.
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quite uncontroversially. However, in the case of some strategies the matter is not so
straightforward. One reason for this is that some nudges involve forms of informa-
tional manipulation, rather than psychological manipulation as I have defined it here,
and the distinction between informational manipulation and enhancing understand-
ing through information disclosure can be somewhat blurred. I shall consider this
form of influence in section 4.
Prior to doing so, to complete my analysis of psychological manipulation, I shall in
the next section consider forms of global psychological manipulation outlined in (ii)
[c] in the introduction to this chapter. Such instances of psychological manipulation
have prompted some philosophers to argue that we ought to understand authenticity
in a strictly historical sense. I shall defend my account from this objection, and in
doing so outline how my theory can accommodate the pervasive relational influences
on our values within a framework of decisional autonomy.
3. Global Manipulation and Autonomy
One might be sceptical that there is a practical need for a theory of autonomy to
accommodate the prospect of global manipulation. For instance, Marilyn Friedman
has argued that philosophers should refrain from engaging with bizarre counter-
examples to autonomy, and that we should only refine such concepts in ‘helpful
practical ways’.²⁹ I am sympathetic to Friedman’s frustration in this regard.
Nonetheless, some comments on global manipulation are necessary. One reason
for this is that critics of the kind of rationalist approach that I have endorsed here
might contend that it is ill-equipped to accommodate the pervasive relational
influences that we are all subject to as members of society. This is important because
these influences arguably represent a very real way in which external forces can
substantially mould and shape our character systems as a whole. As I shall explain,
this sort of observation has led some relational theorists to abandon the idea that
autonomy requires authenticity conditions (since authenticity would inevitably be
tainted by this social influence). Second, cases of global manipulation have led other
theorists to argue that authenticity should be understood in an explicitly historical
sense. I shall consider each point in turn.
(i) The Pervasiveness of Relational Influence and Autonomy
It is undeniable that relational autonomy theorists have captured a number of
important insights about autonomy. We are social beings, and our decisions are
both guided and enabled by societal influences in a pervasive fashion.³⁰ Yet, these
insights are compatible with a wide range of theories of decisional autonomy,
including the one developed in the previous chapter.³¹
²⁹ Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 28.
³⁰ For detailed discussion of the forms that relational influence can take, see the entries in the seminal
Mackenzie and Stoljar, Relational Autonomy. See also Christman, The Politics of Persons, ch. 8; Oshana,
‘Personal Autonomy and Society’; Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’.
³¹ Foster suggests that relational theorists who have supposed otherwise are largely attacking a straw
man. See Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 14–15.
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In particular, most theories are compatible with the claim that certain relational
conditions are causally necessary for autonomy.³² This is significant, as the key claim
of relational autonomy theory is sometimes understood as a claim about the causal
conditions of autonomy. Consider for example, Anderson and Honneth’s claim that:
The key initial insight of social or relational accounts of autonomy is that full autonomy . . . is
only achievable under socially supportive conditions.³³
This is an important claim, but it is also one that can (and should) be accommodated
straightforwardly by procedural theories of decisional autonomy that outline consti-
tutive conditions of autonomy. In the terms of the theory that I have developed, one
may maintain that decisional autonomy requires both theoretical and practical
rationality whilst accepting both (i) that these capacities themselves may be socially
mediated and (ii) the more fundamental point that one can only exercise these
capacities in a social environment that furnishes one with the opportunities and
abilities to make one’s decisions in this way.³⁴
The more challenging question arising from relational theory concerns whether
the constitutive conditions of decisional autonomy adequately accommodate the
pervasiveness of relational influences.³⁵ Indeed, a widespread criticism of the kinds
of procedural theories of autonomy that I discussed in the previous chapter is that
they focus on an unduly individualistic conception of autonomy and the self.³⁶
I believe that this criticism is somewhat misplaced with regards to the rationalist
theory that I have developed, since the theory is compatible with relational influence
on the self and autonomy in a number of ways.³⁷ First, many of our practical reasons
can be other-regarding. Our practical reasons are often self-interested reasons; but
they can also include the reasons we might have to promote the interests of others, or
reasons grounded by the value that our relationships instantiate. Accordingly, the
theory is well-placed to accommodate the fact that our relationships can be of the
utmost importance to us as autonomous agents.³⁸
Furthermore, the claim that decisional autonomy requires practical and theoretical
rationality is quite compatible with the claim that many of the values, desires, and
beliefs that ground our rationality will often have been formed as a result of our
relationships and social forces. Accordingly, I wholeheartedly agree with John
³² John Christman makes a similar point. See Christman, The Politics of Persons, 177–82.
³³ Anderson and Honneth, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice’, 130. For further
discussions of relational causal conditions of autonomy, see also Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’;
Mackenzie and Stoljar, ‘Autonomy Reconfigured’; Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’.
³⁴ Nedelsky particularly stresses this point in Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’.
³⁵ Oshana similarly identifies this as the most significant challenge posed by relational influences. See
Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, 97.
³⁶ For example, see Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’; Mackenzie and Stoljar, ‘Autonomy
Reconfigured’; Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice; Anderson and Honneth, ‘Autonomy,
Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice’.
³⁷ Christman’s theory, which I criticize below, is also compatible with these claims. See Christman, The
Politics of Persons, chs. 7 and 8. For discussions of this trend more broadly with regards to liberal
conceptions of autonomy, see Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 81–97.
³⁸ Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves’.
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Christman when he writes that there are a number of ways that any plausible theory
of autonomy must:
. . . take into account the various ways in which humans are socially embedded, intimately
related to other people, groups, institutions and histories, and that they are motivated by
interests and reasons that can only be fully defined with reference to other people and things.³⁹
The theory of autonomy I have outlined readily accepts these claims; the important
point is whether individuals are able to reflect upon these socially mediated values in
the process of cultivating their characters. It does not require that these values were
developed in a social vacuum. However, the agent must take ownership of these
values by ensuring that they hold their evaluative beliefs in a theoretically rational
sense, and incorporate them into a coherent character system.
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, some feminist philosophers have
argued that the fact that our values have a social source is a damaging criticism of
theories of autonomy that incorporate considerations of authenticity. If our ‘true
selves’ have been uncritically forged in the crucible of a society that ensures that
individuals simply internalize socially oppressive norms, then perhaps we should be
sceptical of the claim that these selves are the locus of autonomous agency.⁴⁰ Instead,
perhaps we ought to appeal to substantive conceptions of autonomy, or to develop
non-authenticity based procedural accounts that appeal to social conditions, or
competency conditions.⁴¹
I have already noted that relational competency conditions can be compatible with
a wide range of procedural theories of decisional autonomy. However, procedural
and substantive relational accounts of autonomy face a deeper conflict. The crux of
the issue here is captured in the example of cosmetic surgery that I alluded to in the
introduction. If one holds the view that a woman’s desire for a beautifying cosmetic
procedure is merely an artefact of the influence of the patriarchal society in which she
lives, then one might deny that a woman can be autonomous with respect to that
desire, no matter how much she personally endorses it. In this sort of example,
procedural and substantive relational accounts come into irreconcilable conflict.
It would be impossible to significantly advance the debate between substantive and
procedural theories on this point in the space available here. I must make do with
adverting to existing work that extensively defends the procedural approach in this
regard,⁴² and reiterating my own concern (outlined in the introduction) that sub-
stantive accounts could legitimize paternalistic interference under the rubric of
autonomy. Further, I suspect that part of the reason that this conflict appears
irreconcilable is that at least some substantive theorists conceive of autonomy as
something akin to a socialized ideal of what it would be live a life of independence
and equal standing, rather than to live one’s life in accordance with one’s own
³⁹ Christman, The Politics of Persons, 165. ⁴⁰ Stoljar, ‘Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition’.
⁴¹ Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy’, 31. See Westlund, ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy’;
Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice; Benson, ‘Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization’; Benson,
‘Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance of Autonomy’; Stoljar, ‘Autonomy and the Feminist
Intuition’.
⁴² Christman, The Politics of Persons, ch. 8; Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, ch. 1.
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values.⁴³ It may be that autonomy theorists in this context are simply interested in
different things that nonetheless get lumped together under the umbrella term of
autonomy.
(ii) A Need for Historical Conditions?
Rather than attend further to the debate between procedural and substantive theor-
ists, I shall instead consider whether these considerations of pervasive relational
influence suggest a need to incorporate historical conditions into our understanding
of what it is for a motivating desire to be authentic.
Advocates of historical theories claim that the theories of decisional autonomy that
I considered in the previous chapter are ahistorical.⁴⁴ These theories are ahistorical in
the sense that they claim that an agent’s subjecting their motivating desire to a certain
sort of psychological scrutiny at a particular point in time is sufficient for their being
autonomous with respect to it. They are not particularly concerned about how the
agent came to form the desire (or indeed the components of their psychology that
might critically reflect on the desire). The motivation for claiming that an adequate
theory of decisional autonomy should incorporate historical conditions is that agents
may have been caused to have either their motivating desires, or other elements of
their psychological economies in ways that appear to undermine their autonomy.
In the previous section, I explained how the account I have developed can explain
why certain forms of influence constitute psychological manipulation that under-
mines autonomy. However, I noted that the mere fact that a desire was elicited via
manipulative means does not entail that the agent must forever lack autonomy with
respect to it. As I shall explain, this is a point that historical theories can also
accommodate (although at some cost). However, the main point of disagreement
between the theory of autonomy that I have outlined and historical approaches is that
my theory cannot account for why global forms of manipulation (as outlined in (ii)
[c] in the introduction to this chapter) would undermine autonomy.
One of the most widely discussed cases of global manipulation is Alfred Mele’s
case of Beth and Ann, in which Beth, an unproductive philosopher, is covertly
brainwashed to become psychologically identical to Ann, a very productive philoso-
pher. The brainwashers instil the same hierarchies of value that Ann has into Beth,
while eradicating all of Beth’s other competing values; she embraces her newfound
passion for philosophy following critical reflection.⁴⁵
Historical theorists typically use this case to object to ahistorical theories on the
basis that the latter cannot account for the plausible intuition that Ann is autono-
mous with respect to her future philosophical behaviour in a way that Beth is not; ex
hypothesi, both Ann and Beth (following the intervention) have identical
⁴³ Christman identifies this implicit conception of autonomy in some feminist discussions of autonomy
in Christman, The Politics of Persons, 175.
⁴⁴ Mele distinguishes between internalist and externalist forms of psychological autonomy rather than
ahistorical and historical forms. Mele, Autonomous Agents, 146–56. I have avoided the former terminology
to avoid confusion with the way in which internalism and externalism have featured in debates about
practical reason.
⁴⁵ Mele, Autonomous Agents, 145.
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psychologies and thus reflectively endorse their love of hard philosophical work (a
new passion in Beth’s case).⁴⁶
In contrast, one might accommodate the intuition that Beth lacks autonomy by
claiming that there is either an objective or subjective historical condition of authen-
ticity. I shall first briefly consider Mele’s own approach, before turning to consider
Christman’s historical approach in more detail, given its recent influence in bio-
ethical discussions.
According to Mele, a necessary condition of an agent’s possessing an authentic
desire is that she was not ‘compelled’ to have that desire, such that she is practically
unable to shed it.⁴⁷ To be compelled is not merely to be caused to have some desire;
rather it is to be caused to have a desire in a manner that bypasses the subject’s
capacities for control over their mental life.⁴⁸ Notice here that Mele appeals to
objective facts about how the agent came to hold the desire in question; it can thus
be construed as an objective historical account. Notice also that the account is framed
negatively; authenticity requires the absence of certain types of causes. A further
necessary condition is that the agent neither performed nor arranged for the bypass-
ing that led her to develop the psychological characteristic in question.⁴⁹
I shall have cause to refer to a further necessary condition that Mele specifies in the
course of refining his view below. However, the first two conditions specified here are
enough to see that Mele’s account can offer a way of explaining how Beth might lack
autonomy in a way that Ann does not. She is compelled to now value the life of a
productive philosopher in a manner that bypasses her control over her mental life.
The main challenge facing Mele’s account as I have so far specified it is that it sets a
seemingly high bar for autonomy. As those who espouse relational views of auton-
omy point out, we are all, at least in part, an outcome of social and environmental
forces that determine many of our values and desires at a pre-critical stage of our
development. There is ‘ . . . no self before the socialization that creates it’⁵⁰ in pre-
critical childhood development. In a sense then, by Mele’s lights, we are all victims of
manipulative processes that serve to undermine our autonomy, in so far as we have
all had certain values and desires imputed to us during the pre-critical stages of our
development, some of which we are now practically unable to shed. Accordingly, it
seems plausible that autonomy is compatible with the fact that many of our desires
were caused in ways that bypassed our mental control.⁵¹
Consider now John Christman’s alternative subjective historical account. Rather
than appealing to objective facts about how a desire was caused, subjective accounts
instead ask ‘ . . . if the person would have, or did resist the adoption of a value or
desire, and for what reasons’.⁵² In the early iteration of the view, Christman argued
that the relevant question for autonomy is whether the agent would have resisted the
process by which she came to have a particular desire (in a minimally rational, and
self-aware manner). One obvious problem with this initial iteration of the view is a
phenomenon I explored in the previous section. One can reject the process by which
⁴⁶ Ibid., 145. ⁴⁷ Ibid., 166. ⁴⁸ Ibid., 171. ⁴⁹ Ibid., 166.
⁵⁰ Noggle, ‘Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation’, 104.
⁵¹ Christman raises a similar criticism at Christman, The Politics of Persons, 141.
⁵² Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 10.
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one acquired a desire, and yet still hold that desire autonomously if one endorses
it on other grounds. Partly in view of this objection, Christman has recently revised
his subjectivist view by defending the following three necessary⁵³ authenticity con-
ditions of an agent’s being autonomous with respect to some basic evaluative
characteristic C:
1. Were the person to engage in sustained critical reflection on C over a variety of
conditions in the light of the historical processes (adequately described) that
gave rise to C;
2. She would not be alienated from C in the sense of feeling and judging that
C cannot be sustained as part of an acceptable autobiographical narrative
organized by her diachronic practical identity;
3. The reflection being imagined is not constrained by reflection-distorting
factors.⁵⁴
Notice that condition 1 shifts the focus of the relevant reflection from the causal
history of a particular desire, to the desire itself, in light of its causal history. This
move circumvents a significant part of the above criticism. However, it does so at the
cost of considerably weakening the relevance of history per se to authenticity. The
relevant reflection now concerns the nature of the psychological characteristics
themselves, rather than the manner in which one came to acquire them. Indeed,
I suggest that the need for historical theories to make this move suggests that
historical views of autonomy are in fact focusing on the wrong aspect of our desires,
since these revised versions maintain that it is not the causal history of our desires
that really matters with regards to our autonomy; what really matters is whether the
agent now believes that they ought to endorse their desires. The history of the desire
is one thing that may contribute to that decision, but it is not the only consideration.
This latter point emphasizes the fact that it is uncharitable to characterize the
rationalist view that I have defended as entirely ahistorical. The rationalist view
rejects what David Zimmerman refers to as source historicism; that is, it rejects the
thesis that our autonomy with respect to a particular psychological property depends
on the manner in which it is acquired. However, it is perfectly compatible with what
Zimmerman calls process-historicism, that is, the thesis that ‘autonomy grounding
psychological states and processes are temporally extended’.⁵⁵ As I explained in the
previous chapter, the constituents of our character systems have authority to speak
for the ‘true self ’ because they are diachronically extended, and relatively stable
features of our psychological economies.⁵⁶ Process-historicism matters for auton-
omy, but it is not at all clear that source-historicism does.
We may also note that the objective historical account can also make a similar
move to the one discussed above to circumvent Berofsky’s concern. That is, the
⁵³ Necessary but not sufficient. These authenticity conditions are supplemented with three conditions
concerning the competencies that are causally necessary for autonomy. See Christman, The Politics of
Persons, 155.
⁵⁴ Ibid., 155. ⁵⁵ Zimmerman, ‘That Was Then, This Is Now’, 642.
⁵⁶ Indeed, what I refer to as the agent’s character system shares a number of salient similarities with
what Christman refers to as the agent’s diachronic practical identity in Christman, The Politics of Persons.
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objectivist can (and should) claim that an agent can initially acquire a desire in a
manner that bypasses her mental control, and yet still be autonomous with respect to
it, as long as she later exerts mental control by deciding to sustain that desire once she
is made aware of its dubious causal history.⁵⁷ Indeed, Mele supplements his theory
with the following necessary condition that responds to this kind of problem: S will
only fail to be autonomous with respect to a particular value P which she was
compelled to have in a manner she did not arrange if it is also true that:
S neither presently possesses nor earlier possessed pro-attitudes that would support his
identifying with P, with the exception of pro-attitudes that are themselves practically unshed-
dable products of unsolicited bypassing; then S is compelled* to possess P.⁵⁸
With this condition, Mele’s account moves closer to the view of manipulation that
I defended in the previous section. In typical cases of manipulation where the agent
endorses the changes evinced, it seems plausible that they do so by virtue of the fact
that the new characteristic coheres with pre-existing elements of their character
system. Such agents can be autonomous because they do not meet the above
necessary condition of compulsion. Mele and I are in agreement on this point.
However, our approaches come apart when we consider cases in which the agent’s
endorsement of a manipulated psychological characteristic is itself a product of
elements of one’s character system that one has also been compelled to have.
Crucially, Beth endorses her manipulated values in this kind of way. For Mele,
endorsement of a manipulated value by other compelled values would meet the
further necessary condition just outlined, and so such an agent would fail to be
autonomous because they would meet all the necessary conditions of having been
compelled to have the relevant values in a manner that she did not arrange. This is an
important point, because it is here where the relational objection to the objectivist
externalist account shows its teeth. Why does Beth lack autonomy in a way that most
people do not, if their character systems as a whole are unsheddable in a relevantly
similar way, by virtue of their formation in pre-critical periods of their lives?
One response to this problem is to appeal to the subjectivist approach, and claim
that Beth lacks autonomy because she would hypothetically feel alienated from her
new values were she to reflect on them in light of their causal history. I am not
convinced by the subjectivist explanation of why Beth lacks autonomy, but we can
put that point to one side.⁵⁹ Instead of attacking this explanation, I believe that we
should adopt the revisionist view that both Beth and Ann are autonomous in an
important sense, even if Beth meets all of Mele’s conditions of compulsion in a way
⁵⁷ Mele, Autonomous Agents, 165. ⁵⁸ Ibid., 172.
⁵⁹ Briefly, my concern is that Beth could plausibly have been manipulated in such a manner that she
would not feel so alienated. Christman’s third condition outlined above is intended to block off this kind of
example. Yet, it is not clear that it can be successful; for it to be so, we would need a good theory of what it is
for a factor to be reflection-distorting in the relevant sense. In his discussion, Christman relies on our
‘independent knowledge’ of such factors. Yet, in borderline cases, this is precisely what seems to be missing.
Consider for example a young woman who prioritizes the avoidance of weight-gain over all other values
including her own survival; alone, the mere fact that we might diagnose such an individual as having a
psychiatric disease tells us little about whether we should understand her mode of reflection to be distorted
in the relevant sense.
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that Ann does not. On this revisionist view, Mele’s example is still powerful because it
raises a plausible question about whether we should employ historical conditions on
Beth’s prospective morally responsibility following global manipulation. However,
the point is that we should be wary of assuming that these intuitions translate
straightforwardly to the claim that Beth is not autonomous.⁶⁰
This is particularly true when we think about the way in which we understand
autonomy in the biomedical sphere. To illustrate, suppose that following the
manipulation, Beth is told that she has a medical condition that will result in paralysis
unless she undergoes a neurosurgical procedure that is likely to cause a mild
cognitive impairment (equivalent let us say to her losing 5 IQ points). Prior to her
global manipulation, it may be that Beth would have prioritized her motor capacities
far above a small reduction in her cognitive capacities. Following the manipulation
though, let us suppose that her priorities have changed; she no longer cares for non-
philosophical pursuits, and even a small reduction in her cognitive capacities would
be hugely damaging. Here is the key point: all other things being equal, ‘post-
manipulation’ Beth can clearly autonomously decide to refuse to consent to the
procedure, even though she did not arrange for the global change in values that
manipulation evinced, and which now grounds the autonomy of her decision. We
may also note that a significant benefit of claiming that Beth is autonomous is that it
obviates the problem facing Mele’s theory, of how to explain the way in which we can
generally be autonomous in a way that Beth is not, if all of our characters are
grounded by values that appear to be unsheddable by his lights.
However, why should we think that the intuitive appeal of Mele’s example is
grounded in the fact that our judgements regarding Beth’s autonomy and moral
responsibility can diverge?⁶¹ In defending a similar view, Nomy Arpaly alludes to the
way in which our judgements about moral responsibility may be muddied by
conflicting understandings of the notion of personal identity. However, for this
argument to succeed, one would need to explain why these intuitions do not similarly
affect our judgements about autonomy. An alternative explanation for why our
judgements about autonomy and responsibility might differ can be sourced in
Gary Watson’s distinction between accountability and attributability. According to
Watson, it can be possible for conduct to be attributable to an individual, where the
conduct itself admits of appraisal and when it make sense to appraise the individual
herself as an adopter of ends. Yet, the attributability of conduct does not entail that
the agent is also accountable for that conduct, in the sense of her deserving sanction
for it. One way in which we can cash out the conflicting claims about the responsi-
bility and autonomy in the Beth/Ann case is to make the following two claims:⁶² (i)
these agents’ conduct is attributable to them following global manipulation, but they
⁶⁰ Nomy Arpaly defends this revisionist view in Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, 126–30.
⁶¹ Mele has offered a response to Arpaly’s critique. However, he is mainly concerned with demonstrat-
ing that certain counterexamples raised by Arpaly to the bypassing condition (not provided here) fail.
Crucially, he does not engage with the point regarding the putative differences between autonomy and
moral responsibility, which are fundamental to Arplay’s argument and my own criticism. See Mele, Free
Will and Luck, 179–84.
⁶² Watson, ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’, 263.
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are not accountable for that behaviour and (ii) autonomy only requires that our
conduct is attributable to us, whilst accountability may be necessary for some
conceptions of moral responsibility.⁶³,⁶⁴
On the view that I am proposing here then, cases of global manipulation epitom-
ized in the Beth/Ann case and identified in (ii)[c] in my schema above are primarily
relevant to questions of personal identity and moral responsibility rather than
autonomy, at least with regards to the sort of autonomy that is of practical interest
in bioethics. Notably, although I have suggested Christman’s subjective approach
would imply that Beth lacks autonomy, it seems that the view could be amended to
endorse the same conclusion on the Beth/Ann case that I have suggested here. To
conclude my analysis of the role of history in decisional autonomy, I shall highlight
two ways in which the theory I presented in the last chapter further departs from a
subjective account that might be amended in this way.
As I discussed above, although considerations of history are no longer the primary
consideration on Christman’s revised theory, they still play a significant role; the
agent must not (hypothetically) feel alienated from a given psychological character-
istic in light of its causal history. However, whilst I agree that the dubious causal
history of a desire may mean that we ought to critically assess the content of those
desires to ensure that we endorse them, I remain sceptical of the claim that the
agent’s own attitude towards that causal history itself should matter with respect to
the authenticity of their psychological characteristics themselves.
Indeed, an agent’s own attitude towards the causal history of a characteristic can be
irrelevant to their autonomy with respect to it. Suppose Alex loathes Ben and detests
his world-view. Ben is giving a detailed, well-researched speech about why the
government ought to adopt policy A rather than policy B. Although Alex previously
endorsed policy B, he finds that he is rationally persuaded by the arguments in Ben’s
speech to now endorse policy A. Nonetheless, he feels alienated from this new
preference, simply by virtue of the fact that it was Ben, his fiercely detested enemy,
who succeeded in persuading him. By Christman’s lights, it seems that Ben is not
autonomous with respect to this new preference, but this seems implausible. The
mere fact that Alex feels alienated from his preference because of Ben’s role in it is not
sufficient to show that Ben’s rational persuasion is a form of controlling influence
that serves to undermine Alex’s autonomy.
Furthermore, Christman’s theory can only provide practical guidance if we assume
that we have an adequate grasp of the causal history of our psychological character-
istics. However, the causal histories of some of our desires may remain opaque to
us,⁶⁵ and we may even hold false beliefs about them. Indeed, this represents a
considerable challenge in the psychiatric context, where clinicians may face the
challenge of distinguishing between those forms of apparently psychotic phenomena
⁶³ For a defence of the claim that Beth/Ann are in fact both morally responsible, see Talbert, ‘Implanted
Desires, Self-Formation and Blame’.
⁶⁴ Of course, there may be other differences between the two concepts. For instance, we may lack
autonomy due to reasons of ignorance without thereby lacking moral responsibility on the basis that our
ignorance was culpable.
⁶⁵ Levy, Hard Luck, 105.
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that constitute pathological but benign delusional states, from eccentric beliefs and
values that are deeply embedded within an individual’s character system.⁶⁶ In some
cases, there may be little clear difference in the causal history of the cognitive states in
question. Christman denies that his theory is problematic in this sort of way, because
his account requires that the agent’s conception of the relevant causal history need
only be ‘minimally adequate . . . in the sense that it be consistent with accepted
evidence and known causal sequences’.⁶⁷ Yet, a recent application of Christman’s
theory in neuroethics reveals that the opacity of the causal histories of our psycho-
logical characteristic still affects the practical application of his theory.
In a recent paper, Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman have argued that
Christman’s theory can provide much needed illumination about questions of
moral responsibility that are arising in problematic real-life cases in which patients
who have undergone neurosurgical treatment (Deep Brain Stimulation) exhibit
uncharacteristic behaviours following the intervention.⁶⁸ In considering a hypothet-
ical example of an individual who develops a gambling addiction following neuro-
surgical treatment, and who endorses this new behaviour, the authors write:
Many (ourselves included) have the intuition that the gambler is not fully responsible for his
conduct because his endorsement itself appears to be caused by personality-altering effects of
DBS.⁶⁹
Setting aside the important point that Christman’s theory is primarily intended as a
theory of autonomy rather than responsibility, I want to focus on the emphasized
phrase here. Philosophers and neuroethicists generally assume that changes to
behavioural traits or personality that are sometimes observed following Deep Brain
Stimulation are directly caused by the treatment itself. However, as Frederic Gilbert
and colleagues have forcefully argued, we have very little evidence to suggest that this
is the case; the phenomenon could also be adequately explained by a host of other
mechanisms. It could be the result of the treatment unmasking extant psychiatric
symptoms or of the patient experiencing difficulties with social integration following
the amelioration of a chronic medical condition.⁷⁰
The problem here is that the very context that the historical theory is apparently
required to illuminate is one in which we lack even a minimally adequate under-
standing of the causal history of the relevant psychological characteristics. It is one
thing to assume that an individual would hypothetically be alienated from a desire
that has been induced by brain stimulation. It is another to assume that they would
be alienated from a desire that they have formed as a result of their recovering from a
chronic medical condition.
⁶⁶ For discussion of some enlightening case studies in this regard, and an argument for basing a
distinction between spiritual and pathological forms of psychotic phenomena in considerations of their
role in what I have called the agent’s character system (and not the causal history of these cognitive states),
see Fulford and Jackson, ‘Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology’.
⁶⁷ Christman, The Politics of Persons, 154.
⁶⁸ Sharp and Wasserman, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation, Historicism, and Moral Responsibility’.
⁶⁹ Ibid., 179, my emphasis.
⁷⁰ Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen, ‘Deflating the “DBS Causes Personality Changes” Bubble’.
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Finally, Christman stipulates that the reflection that his theory demands is only
hypothetical, and that it can thus accommodate the thought that many central
aspects of our lives have never been reflectively endorsed.⁷¹ In contrast, rationalist
theories tend to stipulate that critical reflection must be carried out at some point,
even if only unconsciously, or in a dispositional sense.⁷² The virtue of Christman’s
hypothetical approach is that it makes his account of autonomy significantly less
demanding; however, in the biomedical context it also comes at a cost, since it
renders the view difficult to operationalize. In assessing an agent’s autonomy with
respect to a decision, rather than simply enquiring about their general values, we not
only have to know the causal history of the agent’s desires, we have to make a
judgement about what that agent would hypothetically feel about that causal history
if it was brought to their attention.
This feature of the view raises the bar for third-party assessments of autonomy.
However, in other ways the view also lowers the bar too far for the standards of
decisional autonomy itself (rather than its third-party assessment); if it is true that an
agent has never evaluated some central element of their psychological economy in
any way, be it implicitly or unconsciously, then I do not hasten to conclude that the
agent lacks autonomy with respect to that aspect of her psychology. Whilst this may
seem a hard bullet to bite, we may note that those who endorse the hypothetical
reflection condition have to bite the bullet of accepting that an agent qualifies as self-
governing without ever actually attending to any element of his practical identity, no
matter how minimally. I struggle to agree that this would be indicative of an agent
engaged in any sort of active self-governance.
4. Informational Manipulation
At the beginning of this chapter, I distinguished psychological manipulation from
informational manipulation, and deception. The latter two forms of influence affect
the agent’s beliefs, albeit in somewhat different ways. Beauchamp and Childress
classify deception as a form of informational manipulation in outlining the standard
view of autonomy. However, I believe that the clarity of the discussion will be best
served by separating the two. One reason for this is that it can often be theoretically
rational to believe x when one has been deceived into believing x, since we can be
rationally justified in believing the testimony of others, even when it is false. In
contrast, whilst informational manipulation may also involve leading another to
develop false beliefs, it more typically involves leading an agent to adopt theoretically
irrational beliefs.
We humans are subject to a considerable number of cognitive biases when it
comes to forming our beliefs, and these biases can compromise our autonomy in a
number of ways. Some biases may lead individuals to misapply their values, either by
⁷¹ Christman, The Politics of Persons, 145.
⁷² Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’; Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life
Sustaining Treatment’.
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causing them to form a false belief about the world or to make basic logical errors;
others can cause a patient to act in a way that does not reflect her values.⁷³
Cognitive biases that can compromise autonomy in the first way include the
phenomenon of motivated reasoning, in which agents regard an argument as falla-
cious simply because they are already predisposed to reject its conclusion.⁷⁴ Consider
also the framing effect. Evidence from behavioural psychology suggests that if
information provided to a patient is framed positively, then agents deciding on the
basis of that information are more likely to be risk averse than if the information is
framed negatively. Savulescu uses the following example to illustrate the importance
of the framing effect in medical consultations:
. . . (l)ung cancer can be treated by surgery or radiotherapy. Surgery is associated with greater
immediate mortality (10 per cent v 0 per cent mortality), but better long-term prospects (66
per cent v 78 per cent five-year mortality). The attractiveness of surgery to patients is
substantially greater when the choice between surgery and radiotherapy is framed in terms
of the probability of living rather than the probability of dying.⁷⁵
The framing effect engenders a form of theoretical irrationality because it involves
logical incoherence; in the above example, it would be contradictory for a patient to
prefer surgery when the comparative risk/benefit profiles are framed positively, but to
also prefer radiotherapy when the (very same) comparative risk/benefit profiles are
framed negatively.
Cognitive biases that can compromise autonomy in the second way include the
bias that agents exhibit towards the present, and their reluctance to consider the
possibility of future harms when they weigh their reasons for pursuing different
outcomes.⁷⁶ For example, a patient may reject their physician’s recommendation that
they stop smoking, not because they believe that the pleasure they get from smoking
is more valuable than increasing the probability of a longer lifespan, but rather
because they fail to attend to the disvalue of the later consequences of smoking.
The evidence regarding cognitive biases suggests a further reason to reject value-
neutral approaches to the shared decision-making model that I considered in section
1. It is a mistake to assume that the information we might need to give to individuals
to ensure they adequately understand their options can be provided in a value-
neutral way. Although the content of the information we provide can enable auton-
omy by ensuring adequate understanding, the manner in which it is presented can
covertly influence individuals to develop irrational beliefs, or to act in practically
irrational ways. Indeed, it seems that some nudge techniques are designed to capit-
alize on the forms of theoretical irrationality to which our propensity to cognitive
biases makes us particularly vulnerable.
However, it is not always clear how we should demarcate kinds of informational
manipulation from forms of influence that enhance the understanding that is
necessary for decisional autonomy. To illustrate, Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs
suggest that the use of vivid examples and explanations can constitute a nudge,
⁷³ Levy draws this distinction in Levy, ‘Forced to Be Free?’, 298. ⁷⁴ Ibid., 298.
⁷⁵ Savulscu, ‘Rational Non-Interventional Paternalism,’ 328–9. See also Brock, Life and Death, 88.
⁷⁶ Levy, ‘Forced to Be Free?’, 6. See also Brock, Life and Death, 84.
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noting that these items can elicit strong emotional responses that powerfully shape
decisions and behaviours. By way of example, they describe the following study by
Volandes et al.:
A group of elderly adults was shown a 2-minute video about what life with advanced dementia
was like along with a written description, while the other group was just given the written
description. The group that saw the video had 86% of its members indicate that they would
want ‘comfort care only’ in such a state, whereas in the control group that number was only
64%.⁷⁷
Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs’ discussion suggests that they understand this to
be an instance of the use of affect to influence decision-making, and that such use of
affect will typically amount to a manipulative interference.⁷⁸ However, it seems that
more needs to be said in favour of this interpretation, particularly in light of my
discussion of emotions and persuasion in section 2. In particular, it seems plausible
that the video in question may simply have made reason-giving facts about
the badness of life with dementia more vivid to the viewers; if so, it seems that the
strategy should be construed as facilitating rather than impeding rational decision-
making.⁷⁹
In light of my discussion of the kinds of psychological and informational manipu-
lation that nudge techniques can employ, what should we say about the implications
of these techniques for decisional autonomy? Advocates of these techniques often
argue that they are compatible with individual autonomy by appealing to the fact that
they do not limit the agent’s choice set (unlike bans) or involve significantly altering
incentives.⁸⁰ Whilst true, such observations miss what is primarily at stake in the
debate about nudging and autonomy. The fact that nudges do not undermine
autonomy in some ways (by restricting freedom or coercing) does nothing to answer
the fact that they may yet pose other threats to our decisional autonomy by inducing
forms of theoretical and/or practical irrationality.⁸¹
Proponents of nudges alternatively might advert to the fact that normal human
decision-making is plagued by non-rational influences.⁸² Here, it might be claimed
that nudges can do little to undermine decisional autonomy if we already lack such
autonomy. Of course, the fact that non-rational influence of some sort is inevitable in
a given choice domain does not imply that steps should not be taken to mitigate these
non-rational effects. Recall the example of the framing effect above. In this circum-
stance, even though the physician has to make a choice about whether to frame the
⁷⁷ Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs, ‘Seeking Better Health Care Outcomes’. ⁷⁸ Ibid., 5.
⁷⁹ Indeed, these videos might prompt the sort of ‘vivid imagination of alternatives’ that Savulescu argues
is a requirement of autonomous decision-making. See Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of
Life Sustaining Treatment’.
⁸⁰ Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge.
⁸¹ Saghai has developed a philosophically robust defence of a closely related argument that nudges are
compatible with autonomy, by invoking considerations of freedom of choice and resistibility. See Saghai,
‘Salvaging the Concept of Nudge’. See Ploug and Holm, ‘Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical
Context—Four Views on Nudging and Informed Consent’ for a rebuttal of this argument drawing on
rationalist themes.
⁸² Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge; Blumenthal-Barby and Naik, ‘In Defense of Nudge–Autonomy
Compatibility’.
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information positively or negatively, this does not entail that he cannot seek to then
mitigate the non-rational influence his framing might have on the patient’s choice, by
asking the patient to justify or explain their choice.⁸³
Notwithstanding these claims, I shall suggest below that nudges may infringe an
interpersonal form of voluntariness that standard non-rational decision-making does
not. To conclude this part of the discussion though, we should, I believe, concede that
some (but not all) of the nudge strategies that aim to influence individual behaviour
are manipulative in a manner that serves to undermine autonomous decision-
making. Despite the powerful, and potentially beneficial effects of such strategies,
we should not labour under the illusion that interventions are always compatible with
local autonomous choice. As I argued in section 2, they may fail to be so if they
bypass and subvert the cognitive element of our practical rationality. However, they
will also fail to be so if they engender forms of theoretical irrationality.
Again, it is important to be clear that this is a point about the implications of
nudges for decisional autonomy, and not an all things considered moral judgement
on their use. One might argue that broadly beneficence-based concerns could
outweigh these considerations of local autonomy; however, such a strategy will
naturally require that one is able to respond to the (justified) allegation of paternal-
ism that would be weighed against it.⁸⁴ An alternative, and I believe more promising
strategy, might seek to justify these strategies of influencing behaviour by appealing
to the value of the agent’s global, rather than local autonomy. I shall explore this
point when I consider the value of different kinds of autonomy in Chapter 9.
5. Deception
On one prominent understanding, deception involves imparting false beliefs to
another person.⁸⁵ If it is the case that decisional autonomy requires that agents
hold certain decisionally necessary true beliefs, then deception (so-construed) will
serve to undermine autonomy just in so far as it leads individuals to hold false beliefs
about features of their choice domain that are subjects of what I am terming
‘decisionally necessary’ beliefs. However, the account of autonomy and true beliefs
that I have been sketching so far (and which I shall flesh out further in Chapter 5)
points towards a broader account of deception. I have suggested that decisional
autonomy can require that agents hold certain true beliefs about features of the
decision in question; crucially, it seems that there can be cases in which one causes
another to fail to hold the relevant true beliefs by omitting key information. If this is
⁸³ Ploug and Holm, ‘Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical Context—Four Views on Nudging
and Informed Consent’. See also Miller and Fagley, ‘The Effects of Framing, Problem Variations, and
Providing Rationale on Choice’. In their discussion, Ploug and Holm imply that the framing effect
undermines autonomy in so far as it undermines the understanding required for autonomous decision-
making. I agree with Blumenthal-Barby and Naik’s criticism of this claim. Blumenthal-Barby and Naik, ‘In
Defense of Nudge–Autonomy Compatibility’.
⁸⁴ This strategy corresponds to what Ploug and Holm describe as the ‘priority view’. See Ploug and
Holm, ‘Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical Context—Four Views on Nudging and Informed
Consent’, 36 for discussion.
⁸⁵ Shiffrin, Speech Matters, 19.
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so, then it is also possible to undermine autonomy by deception via omission on the
theory that I am outlining here.⁸⁶ Accordingly, in the following discussion, I shall
seek to defend a broader conception of deception as involving either causing another
to hold false beliefs, or causing them to fail to hold decisionally necessary true beliefs.
This is a controversial way of broadening the scope of deception. Another con-
troversial implication of the view that I have so far defended is that deception need
not be intentional. In discussing psychological manipulation I noted that the claim
that manipulation need not be intentional follows straightforwardly from the claim
that rational authenticity is a necessary condition of decisional autonomy. Strikingly,
an analogous claim can be made with regard to deception if one holds that sufficient
understanding is a necessary condition of autonomy. Deception need not be inten-
tional in order to undermine decisional autonomy as long as it serves to lead agents
to fail to hold decisionally necessary beliefs.
The clarity of the following discussion will be aided by making some distinctions
between possible forms of deception. Of course, one of the most common methods of
deception is lying. However, lying is not co-extensive with deception, in so far as a lie
does not entail that a liar successfully imparts a false belief in the manner that
deception connotes.⁸⁷We may say that an agent lies, when she intentionally provides
her target with information that she believes to be incorrect, and her doing so
manifests her intention to get her target to treat the information as an accurate
representation of what she (the liar) believes.⁸⁸ A lie will also deceive if this has the
effect of imparting a false belief to the target. In contrast, unintentional deception can
occur when one provides an agent with information that they believe to be true, but
which is in fact false. Deception via omission occurs when the target is led to develop
a false belief, or to fail to hold a decisionally necessary true belief because of the
omission of certain key information.
Of course, a great deal here turns on the feasibility of decisionally necessary beliefs.
I briefly defended this view in the previous chapter, and I shall offer a more
principled defence in Chapter 5. Here though, to illustrate deception via omission
in a medical context, a physician may so deceive their patient by providing them with
only a partial disclosure about their condition, or employing euphemisms to obscure
the true nature of the condition. In such a case, deception via omission may lead the
patient to explicitly hold false beliefs, or to fail to hold true beliefs of the sort that are
crucial for making certain future decisions with the kind of understanding that
autonomy requires. Suppose that tests revealed that Maurice has motor neurone
disease; however, instead of explicitly informing Maurice of this particular diagnosis,
the physician tells him that he has a condition that will cause him increasing
weakness, but that he will be made ‘as comfortable as possible’. On the basis of the
⁸⁶ For another detailed defence of this view, see Cox and Fritz, ‘Should Non-Disclosures Be Considered
as Morally Equivalent to Lies within the Doctor–Patient Relationship?’
⁸⁷ Shiffrin, Speech Matters, 19–21.
⁸⁸ Ibid., 13. Notice that on this account, it is possible to lie without deception in the sense that ‘ . . . a lie
does not depend on its recipient being deceived’. In such cases, I suggest that the lie may not undermine the
voluntariness of the recipient’s decision, but that there may nonetheless be reasons to sanction the liar.
Another interesting feature of Shiffrin’s account is that lying must be intentional in the sense indicated
above, but it need not involve the intention to deceive.
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conjunction of this euphemism, and the partial disclosure about the effects of the
increasing weakness caused by motor neurone disease, Maurice forms the false belief
that his condition is not all that serious. If so, on the definition that I am employing
here, the physician would have deceived Maurice via omission, even if this were not
his intention; Maurice fails to understand his situation in a manner that allows him to
draw accurate connections between his values and his available options.
There is a significant philosophical debate as to whether lying is morally on a par
with deception via omission.⁸⁹ However, as I mentioned at the outset of this chapter,
I am interested only in the question of the effects of different sorts of influence on
autonomy. Insofar as lying and omission can lead individuals to either form the same
false beliefs or to fail to have decisionally necessary true ones, I claim that both can
undermine autonomy. However, there are some important distinctions between the
two. First, there is often a straightforward causal connection between the telling of a
lie, and the target holding a false belief, such that the target can straightforwardly
blame the liar for the fact that they hold a false belief. However, in the case of
deception via omission, this causal relationship is far less straightforward, particu-
larly when the deception is non-intentional. The explanation for this is that it seems
plausible that autonomous agents have some degree of doxastic responsibility to
obtain their own true beliefs about the world. If so, the fact that others omit to
provide one with information cannot be said to be the only causal factor in one’s
ignorance. Just as we can distinguish between culpable and non-culpable ignorance
in discussions of moral responsibility and blame, it also seems possible to distinguish
between autonomy-undermining ignorance that is the fault of a third party, and that
which is the fault of the agent herself.⁹⁰
Accordingly, in some cases an individual’s failure to hold a decisionally necessary
belief is not best attributed to the fact that others have omitted to provide certain
information. In everyday life, individuals plausibly have some responsibility to make
attempts to understand the situations in which they find themselves, and the reasons
that obtain for them in those situations. However, in biomedical decision-making,
patients place a great deal of trust in their physician due to the considerable
knowledge gap that exists between them with regards to salient medical facts. An
upshot of this is that patients may transfer much of their everyday responsibility to
cultivate decisionally necessary beliefs onto the physician in this context, in the form
of a presumed duty of the physician to disclose information that is necessary for the
patient to make an autonomous treatment decision. This represents an important
way in which individuals in the biomedical context are more vulnerable to deception
(broadly conceived) than they are in everyday life.
The understanding of deception I am employing here also runs contrary to the
claim that only intentional deception undermines autonomy.⁹¹ Interestingly,
⁸⁹ Pugh et al., ‘Lay Attitudes toward Deception in Medicine’; Benn, ‘Medicine, Lies and Deceptions’;
Gillon, ‘Is There an Important Moral Distinction for Medical Ethics between Lying and Other Forms of
Deception?’; Jackson, ‘Telling the Truth’; Bakhurst, ‘On Lying and Deceiving’.
⁹⁰ For discussions of the doxastic responsibilities of patients, see Kukla, ‘How Do Patients Know?’;
Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 104.
⁹¹ See Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’.
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Beauchamp and Childress claim that only intentional deception undermines auton-
omy. This is somewhat perplexing given their view that substantial understanding is
a necessary condition of autonomy; why suppose that only intentional forms of
deception can subvert substantial understanding? The claim that only intentional
deception undermines autonomy is on more solid ground when it is held in con-
junction with the claim that autonomy does not require certain true beliefs.
Wilkinson, for instance, adopts this strategy.⁹² He writes:
A person may have false beliefs about his or her options without his or her autonomy being
affected; who has true beliefs about all their options? But if those beliefs came about through
deceit, his or her autonomy has been harmed.⁹³
However, the fact that holding some false beliefs is compatible with decisional
autonomy does not entail that any particular false belief about one’s options is
compatible with decisional autonomy. To illustrate, an individual can autonomously
decide to undergo a medical procedure on the basis of a belief that it will be successful
in ameliorating their condition, even if their belief turns out to be false. This reflects
the fact that not all sorts of information about our choices are decisionally necessary,
a point I raised in Chapter 2. However, this is quite compatible with the claim that
some information is. To repeat an example from earlier in the book, an individual
cannot be said to have autonomously decided to undergo a vasectomy if they fail to
understand that it will lead them to be infertile.
More generally, simply showing that autonomy is compatible with individuals
holding some false beliefs is not sufficient to demonstrate that decisional autonomy
does not require that individuals must hold any true beliefs. To appeal to the
compatibility of autonomy with certain false beliefs in order to deny the existence
of any decisionally necessary beliefs is rather like pointing to a white swan in order to
disprove the possibility of a black one. Following the Aristotelian claim that we can
sometimes fail to be autonomous due to reasons of ignorance, and in accordance
with the standard account’s criterion of understanding, we should, I believe, acknow-
ledge the possibility of decisionally necessary beliefs, and their implications for our
understanding of deception. I shall offer a principled approach to identifying deci-
sionally necessary beliefs in Chapter 5.
There are of course important non-autonomy based moral reasons to separate out
the different forms that deception can take. Intentional deception plausibly involves
wrongs that non-intentional deception does not, and intentional deceivers will often
be culpable in a manner that may not be the case if deception was unintentional.
Indeed, from a legal perspective, the question of whether a physician intentionally
lied to their patient or unintentionally omitted vital information in obtaining consent
to a medical intervention might make the difference between the procedure being an
instance of battery rather than negligence. However, from the perspective of the
⁹² For other examples of theorists who claim that false beliefs do not undermine autonomy, see
McKenna, ‘The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency’, 208–9; Arpaly,
‘Responsibility, Applied Ethics, and Complex Autonomy Theories’, 175.
⁹³ Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’. Note that Wilkinson uses this observation to defend the
view that only intentional manipulation undermines autonomy.
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individual’s autonomy alone, my claim is that failing to hold decisionally necessary
true beliefs undermines an individual’s ability to make an autonomous decision, no
matter how they were influenced to fail in this way.
There are various ways in which a physician can either intentionally or uninten-
tionally deceive a patient. Lying, of course is the most obvious method. However,
there are also more subtle means of deception. For instance, as I illustrated with the
example of Maurice above, the physician may not provide the patient with any false
information, but simply be selective about the information that they choose to
divulge to a patient, so that the latter forms an inaccurate impression of their
condition, an impression that means that they do not fully understand the salience
of the choices they face. These observations about deception via omission raise
important questions about how we should understand the standards of information
disclosure that valid consent requires in a medical context. I shall postpone this
discussion until Chapter 6. To conclude this chapter though, I want to reconsider the
role of intentionality in controlling influence, and the further interpersonal sense of
voluntariness it connotes.
6. The Role of Intentions and Interpersonal
Voluntariness
I have so far defended a view of controlling influences that downplays the necessity of
third-party intentional agency in determining whether a particular form of influence
undermines decisional autonomy. As I mentioned above, my approach in this regard
is a corollary of the fact that I have endorsed (i) a rationalist authenticity condition on
decisional autonomy and (ii) the possibility of decisionally necessary beliefs.
However, I do not mean to claim that the interference of intentional agents on
another’s autonomous decision-making is therefore morally equivalent to non-
intentional or non-agential interference. There are clearly some important differ-
ences between the two that are not primarily grounded in their implications for the
sense of autonomy that I am outlining here. First, in the former case, the interfering
agent violates the Kantian imperative that enjoins one to act in such a way that one
treats other rational agents never merely as a means, whilst the same need not be true
in the latter. Second, whether or not one agent intentionally interfered with another
may be significant with regards to assessments of culpability for the harm caused
through one’s interference. In many cases, I believe that our concern with the
intentions of those who exert influence over us is primarily grounded in moral
concerns that are largely orthogonal to the question of the target’s autonomy per
se. Moreover, the ambivalence that some authors claim to have about whether a
certain form of influence (such as manipulation)⁹⁴ necessarily requires intentional
agency, may be attributable to the fact that we may be invoking the concept of the
influence at stake to answer quite different moral questions.
Nonetheless, there does seem to be some intuitive plausibility to the claim that
intentional interference is somehow worse from the point of view of the agent’s
⁹⁴ Barnhill, ‘What Is Manipulation?’
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autonomy. The agent who is intentionally deceived seems to have experienced a
greater affront to her autonomy than the agent who is unintentionally deceived.
Despite the claims that I have so far advanced in this chapter, I believe that this
intuition captures an important truth. Crucially though, and contrary to what some
theorists have implicitly claimed, it is not the only truth about autonomy.
The Aristotelian distinction between two types of non-voluntary action (those
performed from reasons of ignorance and those that take place by force) captures
aspects that are central to our understanding of decisional autonomy, at least in the
biomedical sphere. In this concluding section though, I want to consider the possi-
bility that when an agent’s deficit in decisional autonomy is attributable to inten-
tional third-party agency, this can be understood to undermine a separate kind of
‘freedom from domination’ that undergirds a sense of voluntariness that the
Aristotelian distinction fails to acknowledge. I also suspect that this further form of
voluntariness also adds further fuel to the fire regarding our ambivalence about the
necessity of intention to our concepts of different forms of controlling influence.
The conception of freedom I have in mind here might be understood to denote a
particular kind of negative freedom, namely the absence of positive constraints that
have been intentionally imposed by another agent. This freedom is a specific kind of
the broadly libertarian type of freedom that stresses the importance of the absence of
constraints. However, freedom from domination has historically been understood in
a broader sense within the republican tradition.⁹⁵ In this tradition, it is noted that
dominance over another can be exerted even if it does not involve the actual
imposition of constraints. For example, if another agent has the mere capacity to
arbitrarily interfere with another’s choices, they may be said to dominate the other in
a sense that undermines the latter’s freedom from domination.⁹⁶
Accordingly, on the republican understanding, this freedom is violated if another
has the mere capacity to interfere with one’s choices. In contrast, on the libertarian
understanding of freedom from domination as a particular kind of positive con-
straint, this freedom is only undermined if the dominating party does in fact exercise
that capacity and actively interferes with the agent’s decision. The sense that I mean
to invoke here is the libertarian conception, although this is not the place to try and
settle the debate as to whether it is more plausible than the republican conception.
Although very little of what I shall claim turns on the fact that I endorse the
libertarian rather than republican understanding of this freedom, it is important to
acknowledge that the libertarian conception of this freedom is more robust. In order
to undermine it, one must actually interfere with another’s choices; it is not sufficient
to merely have the capacity to do so.
⁹⁵ Pettit, Republicanism; Pettit, ‘Freedom as Antipower’; Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism. For a
discussion of the concept of domination itself, see Lovett, ‘Domination’.
⁹⁶ This republican understanding of freedom can thus be invoked by those who claim that Savulescu
and Persson’s famous God Machine example involves the violation of individual freedom, even for those
law-abiding individuals whom the machine does not directly act upon. See Savulescu and Persson, ‘Moral
Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine’; Sparrow, ‘Better Living Through Chemistry?’ for a
republican response.
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The key element of freedom from domination for my purpose here is that it is an
interpersonal form of freedom; a lack of this freedom amounts to the subjugation of
one’s own will to another’s authority. It may thus plausibly be construed as referring
to a different sense of voluntariness than the one that is captured by the cognitive or
reflective elements of decisional autonomy. The sense of voluntariness that reflective
autonomy captures is the sense that is grounded by the thought that voluntary
choices must reflect the agent’s own character. The sense of voluntariness that the
cognitive element captures is the sense that is grounded by the thought that ignor-
ance can preclude us from acting effectively in pursuit of our ends, by rupturing the
connection between our beliefs about our choices and our values. In contrast, the
sense of voluntariness that freedom from domination captures is the sense that is
grounded by the claim that it must be the agent herself, rather than other parties, who
is in control of her decision-making if she is to be autonomous. This is the thought
that Robert Wolff seeks to capture in his claim that ‘The autonomous man, insofar as
he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another’.⁹⁷
Why should we suppose that freedom from domination matters? Part of the
explanation might be phenomenological; perhaps it is simply the case that third-
party interference feels like more of an affront to our autonomy.⁹⁸ Elinor Mason,
however, goes deeper than this phenomenological point in her discussion of this
difference:
What agents do to us is different to what non-agents do to us . . . when there is another agent,
that agent takes the place of ‘self ’ in self-determination. Other agents are qualified to do that
because they themselves have wills and are self-determining – the blind forces of nature cannot
take over in the same way.⁹⁹
A claim that seems implicit in Mason’s comment here is that there is a difference in
the nature of the lack of control of an agent whose decision-making is subjected to
intentional interference, and an agent whose decisional autonomy is undermined by
forces of hazard.
The difference can be helpfully illustrated by way of analogy. The sense of
voluntariness captured by the two elements of decisional autonomy I have discussed
prior to this point may be understood as pertaining to the strength of a ship captain’s
grip on her vessel’s helm, and her ability to navigate to her destination. The captain
has the relevant control to the extent that she (i) has true beliefs about where to go,
and (ii) is able to dictate the ship’s movements through her own influence on the
helm. She may lack control because she is lost, or because the wheel is simply left
spinning, and the course of the ship is left to the uncontrolled dictates of the sea and
wind. In contrast, the interpersonal sense of voluntariness may be understood as
pertaining to whether it is the captain, or a usurper who has taken control of the
helm; there is an important difference between the course of one’s ship being left to
the vagaries of the elements, which have little interest in your destination, and your
⁹⁷ Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism. ⁹⁸ Wertheimer, ‘Voluntary Consent’, 244–5.
⁹⁹ Mason, ‘Coercion and Integrity’, 196. Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby similarly denies the moral equiva-
lence of environmental and agential influences on autonomy in Blumenthal-Barby, ‘A Framework for
Assessing the Moral Status of “Manipulation” ’, 125–6.
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course being decided upon by an intentional agent who takes great interest in where
you end up.
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, some theorists claim that only
intentional forms of controlling influence undermine autonomy. Such theorists
place a great deal of stock in the sense of voluntariness that I am outlining here. In
contrast, on the account of autonomy and controlling influence that I am outlining
here, this sense of voluntariness supplements those outlined in the Aristotelian
distinction. Decisional autonomy can be undermined by either non-agential pro-
cesses (such as psychiatric disease) or the intentional interference of third parties.
However, in the latter case, the influence exerted may serve to nullify an additional
interpersonal sense of voluntariness. Crucially though, on the account of decisional
autonomy that I have developed, one can lack decisional autonomy even if one’s
freedom from domination has not been violated. This distinguishes my account from
those theories that claim that only intentional agents can undermine another’s
autonomy.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, I suggest that in order for one’s will to have been dominated
by intentional manipulation or deception, it must be the case that the interference in
question has undermined the reflective or cognitive element of one’s decisional
autonomy. If the intentional deception or manipulation does not succeed in under-
mining one’s decisional autonomy in a particular instance, it is difficult to make sense
of the claim that one’s will has been dominated in any significant sense by those
exerting the influence.
One of the trends in the philosophical literature has been to understand the senses
of voluntariness incorporated into decisional autonomy as being a matter of solely
reflective autonomy, or solely freedom from domination. Both of these views, how-
ever, are mistaken. Our beliefs matter for decisional autonomy, and both agential and
non-agential influences on our behaviour can undermine our autonomy. To return
to the above analogy, one can fail to be in control of one’s ship either because one
does not have a strong enough grip on the helm, or because another has usurped
one’s position at the helm. Yet the former, which we may term non-autonomy, is not
equivalent to the latter, which we may term heteronomy; this is not just so from the
perspective of morality all things considered. It is also true from the perspective of
interpersonal voluntariness.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined an approach to understanding different forms of
manipulation and deception in light of the rationalist conception of autonomy that
I developed in Chapter 2. In doing so, I also highlighted the significance of an
interpersonal form of voluntariness not captured by the Aristotelian distinction.
I did not, however, address a salient form of controlling interference in this
chapter, namely coercion. The reason for this is that coercion admits of greater
¹⁰⁰ Bublitz and Merkel, ‘Autonomy and Authenticity of Enhanced Personality Traits’; Taylor, Practical
Autonomy and Bioethics.
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theoretical complexity than deception and manipulation. Moreover, as I shall explore
in the next chapter, acknowledging the sense of freedom from domination that
I explored in the second half of this chapter is crucial to providing a plausible
theoretical basis for the ambiguous effects that coercion seems to have with respect
to the voluntariness of the choices made in coercive situations.




Consider the following as a paradigm case of coercion:
Terry is targeted by an armed thief. The thief tells Terry to hand over his wallet.
Terry refuses to cooperate. The thief then tells Terry that he will shoot him
unless he cooperates. Terry agrees to hand over his wallet.
In accordance with the standard account of autonomy in bioethics, I assume that it is
uncontroversial to claim that Terry is not autonomous with respect to his decision to
hand over his wallet. Yet, despite the strength of our intuitions in this regard,
coercion raises a number of puzzles, two of which in particular shall be my focus
in this chapter. First, in what sense does coercion undermine voluntariness, and
second, can offers as well as threats be coercive?
I shall begin this chapter by explaining my motivation for exploring these par-
ticular questions in more detail, before going on to explore two prominent streams in
the literature on coercion that seeks to address these questions. I shall go on to argue
for an account of coercion that accommodates the possibility of some coercive offers,
and suggest that the answers to the two questions are interrelated. That is, I shall
suggest that the way in which we should distinguish threats from offers (in respond-
ing to the second question) should draw on considerations that are closely linked to
one’s understanding of the way in which coercion undermines the interpersonal
sense of voluntariness that I introduced in the previous chapter.
First though, since coercion is a term that is subject to a number of different
interpretations in bioethical contexts, it is prudent to begin by delimiting the
understanding that I shall invoke in my discussion. Although coercion is most
often associated with the use of threats, some theorists adopt a broader understand-
ing of the concept, according to which physically forcing an agent to do something
(or to have something done to them) against their will can also amount to coercion.¹
For example, the term ‘coerced treatment’ is sometimes used in psychiatry to refer to
treatment that has been forced in this sense. However, this use of the term conflates
an important moral distinction between interventions in which an agent is forced to
act, and interventions in which an agent is acted upon, potentially in the absence of
their assent and even despite their dissent.²
¹ For instance, Wood claims that an agent can be said to be coerced when they do not choose to perform
some action. Wood, ‘Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation’, 21.
² See Bayles, ‘A Concept of Coercion’; Lamond, ‘Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail’.
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In order to avoid this conflation, I shall understand coercion to refer to a form of
interference that necessarily involves the use of conditional proposals that render
certain options ineligible for rational choice.³ However, unlike the standard account
of autonomy’s approach to understanding coercion I shall not assume at the outset that
the kinds of conditional proposals involved in coercion must, by necessity, be threats.⁴
1. Two Questions Facing an Adequate Account
of Coercion in Bioethics
With this in mind, I can now turn to the two broadly interrelated questions with
which I shall be concerned in this chapter. The first is why we should understand
coercion to amount to a form of controlling interference of the sort that undermines
voluntariness at all.
Coercion represents something of a problem for authenticity-based approaches to
decisional autonomy because, although we want to be able to say that victims of
coercion do not decide autonomously, these individuals will often meet the authenti-
city conditions set out by the accounts I have so far considered in this book. As Irving
Thalberg notes, most persons who are subjected to coercion ‘ . . . would, at the time and
later, give second-order endorsement to their cautious [and compliant] motives’.⁵
With regards to the theory that I have defended in the previous chapters, the motiv-
ating desire that an individual forms following a coercive threat could very plausibly be
one that they rationally endorse with a preference that coheres with their character
system. For instance, in the above example, Terry may endorse his desire to hand over
his wallet, because the content of hismotivating desire can be understood to include the
outcome of staying alive, and he understands this to be a more valuable outcome than
safeguarding his money.Wemay also note that victims of coercion also normally have
adequate understanding of their situation.
Explaining how and why coercion undermines the voluntariness of the victim’s
decision is a considerable challenge for any authenticity-based conception of auton-
omy. However, in view of my claims in the previous chapter, it is perhaps a
particularly acute challenge for the view that I am developing here. Recall that in
the previous chapter, I claimed that deception and manipulation are forms of
controlling influence that can undermine decisional autonomy without being inten-
tional. This raises an important question for my theory because it appears that the
same is not true of coercion; coercion must be intentional if it is to undermine
decisional autonomy of the sort that undergirds the doctrine of informed consent. To
see why, consider the following two cases:
Alan is told by his doctor that if he refuses to start taking painkillers that will
cause him to suffer from alopecia as a side-effect, he will start to experience
significant pain as a result of an underlying medical condition. Although Alan
agrees to take the pills, he would strongly prefer to be in a situation in which his
³ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 191.
⁴ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 138.
⁵ Thalberg, ‘Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action’, 126.
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not experiencing pain was not also attended by the consequence of losing
his hair.
Bernie is in fine health, but someone threatens to cause him similarly significant
pain if he does not agree to take a drug that causes alopecia. Although Bernie
agrees to take the pills, he would strongly prefer to be in a situation in which he
does not experience pain, and where his not experiencing pain is not also
attended by the consequence of losing his hair.
It seems that Alan can be autonomous with respect to his decision to take the drug,
despite the limited choices available to him: Valid consent must be possible in the
light of limited treatment options.⁶ On the other hand, it is highly counter-intuitive
to claim that Bernie is autonomous with respect to his decision to take the drug; like
Terry, it seems that Bernie has plausibly been subjected to controlling influence of
the sort that might be said to undermine the voluntariness of his decision. However,
the only difference between the two cases is that Bernie’s available options have been
influenced by an intentional agent, whilst Alan’s have been engineered by forces of
hazard. The question is why should this matter for coercion, but not for deception or
manipulation?
Aristotle recognized the nature of the theoretical challenge that coercion raises in
his discussion of voluntariness, when he suggests that our actions following such
threats are ‘mixed’ with regards to voluntariness. He writes:
If a tyrant, for example, had one’s parents and children in his power and ordered one to do
something shameful, on the condition that one’s doing it would save them, while one’s not
doing it would result in their death – there is some dispute about whether they are involuntary
or voluntary. The same sort of thing happens also in the case of people throwing cargo
overboard in storms at sea. Without qualification, no one jettisons cargo voluntarily; but for
his own safety and that of others any sensible person will do it. Such actions, then, are mixed,
though they seem more like voluntary ones, because at the time they are done they are worthy
of choice, and the end of an action depends on the circumstances. So both voluntariness and
involuntariness are to be ascribed at the time of the action.⁷
Despite claiming that these kinds of action are ‘mixed’ with regards to voluntariness,
Aristotle himself eventually concludes that coerced actions should in fact be under-
stood to be voluntary, in so far as the moving principle of the coerced agent’s
action lies in the agent herself.⁸ Notice though that Aristotle here does not draw a
moral distinction between coercion manufactured by an intentional agent (i.e. the
⁶ A number of authors have raised this sort of counterexample to accounts of coercion discussed in the
bioethics literature. See Wertheimer, ‘Voluntary Consent’; Richards, The Ethics of Transplants; Pugh,
‘Coercion and the Neurocorrective Offer’.
⁷ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a 4–12.
⁸ Ibid., 11110b 5–7. Notably, in her discussion, Meyer suggests that Aristotle believes such acts are
mixed with regards to voluntariness because they are voluntary with respect to the sense pertaining to
ignorance, but involuntary with respect to the sense pertaining to choice. See Meyer, ‘Aristotle on the
Voluntary’, 141–2. However, this interpretation seems to miss out on the nuance of Aristotle’s discussion
quoted above, since the mixed nature of voluntaries here makes no reference to understanding; instead, the
belief that coerced acts could be voluntary is grounded by the claim that no one would perform the act in
question without the qualifications provided by the context of the choice.
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tyrant example) and coercion manufactured by forces of hazard (i.e. the cargo
example). Similarly, one could adopt an Aristotelian approach and simply claim
that both Alan and Bernie make voluntary decisions in the above example, in so far as
the moving principle of action in both cases is in some sense ‘internal’ to the agent.
However, such an interpretation would run contrary to the widely held view in
bioethics that coercion does undermine the voluntariness of the victim’s decision to
comply.⁹ As such, I suggest that we instead need an account of why this is so, which is
compatible both with an authenticity-based understanding of autonomy, and the
claim that neither deception nor manipulation need be intentional to undermine
decisional autonomy.
The second question I shall consider in this chapter is whether offers as well as
threats can be coercive. For some, this question might seem misguided—it has been
claimed that offers are just categorically different from threats for reasons that I shall
consider below. Moreover, the view that only threats can be coercive is commonly
assumed in bioethics; it is endorsed by advocates of the standard view in their
discussion of coercion,¹⁰ and it is also enshrined in the Belmont Report, which states
that ‘coercion occurs when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by
one person to another to obtain compliance’.¹¹ However, although this position has
been highly influential we should be careful not to simply assume that it is true,
particularly when invoking the concept of coercion in the context of contemporary
bioethics. The reason that we should take particular care in this context is that
coercion-related concerns are commonly raised not with respect to the use of explicit
threats, but rather by the use of incentives.
To further illustrate this, consider the following three cases in which bioethicists
have argued that offers can be coercive. To be clear, the charge of coercion is not the
only moral criticism that has been raised in the debates surrounding the issues
outlined below. However, this moral criticism is particularly significant. Given the
salient value that we attribute to personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics,
establishing that a practice amounts to controlling interference that invalidates
consent is a particularly powerful moral criticism.
(i) Paying Research Subjects
In 2006, eight healthy subjects were offered £2000 to participate in a phase I trial of a
novel monoclonal antibody agent, TGN1412. As part of the informed consent form,
participants were told that they were free to leave the trial at any time without giving
a reason. However, they were also told that if they chose to withdraw and exercise
their right not to give a reason, or if they were required to leave the study for
non-compliance, then they would forfeit their entitlement to payment.¹² Having
⁹ Interestingly, drawing on some comments in Arthur Caplan’s Am IMy Brother’s Keeper?Wertheimer
notes (but does not endorse) the possibility that one could adopt the complete opposite view and claim that
examples like Alan and Bernie above suggests that terminally ill patients cannot provide valid consent to
treatment. Wertheimer, ‘Voluntary Consent’.
¹⁰ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 138. See also Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of
Voluntary Consent’, 7.
¹¹ The Belmont Report. ¹² ‘TGN1412 Trial Consent Form’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
 
previously tested the drug in animals, researchers gave six of the subjects in this first
in-human trial 1/500th of the highest dose used in animal testing (the remaining
subjects received a placebo). However, the six who received a dose of the drug quickly
developed serious adverse reactions to the experimental agent, as result of a cytokine
storm.¹³
Although regulatory reports on the trial suggested that it fulfilled all ethical
requirements for clinical research (including the criteria of social value, scientific
validity, favourable risk/benefit ration, informed consent, independent review, and
respect for participants),¹⁴ some bioethicists raised concerns about the quality of
the participants’ consent, with one commentator arguing that the language used in
the consent process was ‘very coercive’.¹⁵ This sparked a number of commentaries on
the trial discussing whether the payment offered for participation in the trial
amounted to coercion.¹⁶
(ii) Reduced Sentences for Sexual Offenders Who Agree to Undergo Chemical
Castration
Chemical castration refers to the use of an anti-libidinal agent to significantly
reduce the recipient’s sex drive. Although the anti-libidinal effects of the drugs
that are typically used for this purpose are generally reversible, there are con-
cerns about the long-term safety of chemical castration.¹⁷ Despite both this and
the scarcity of robust data about the effectiveness of chemical castration in
preventing recidivism,¹⁸ the procedure is sometimes performed on convicted
sex offenders. Whilst chemical castration is compulsory for sex offenders in
some jurisdictions, in others, sex offenders who would otherwise face a long
prison sentence may be offered a significantly reduced sentence on the condition
that they agree to undergo chemical castration.¹⁹ Supporters of this ‘offer’ model
argue that this benefits the offenders by giving them the chance to avoid a long
prison sentence, whilst also respecting their autonomy by leaving the choice in
the offender’s hands. However, opponents have objected that the offer is inher-
ently coercive. Here is a typical example:
The convicted rapist is faced with two options – a lengthy prison sentence or even death on the
one hand and . . . castration on the other. Freedom of choice is impossible because the convict’s
¹³ Suntharalingam et al., ‘Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial of the Anti-CD28 Monoclonal Antibody
TGN1412’.
¹⁴ For an overview of such principles, see World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
¹⁵ Evans, ‘Parexel Misled Subjects Sickened in London Study, Ethicists Say’.
¹⁶ Wertheimer and Miller, ‘Payment for Research Participation’; Emanuel and Miller, ‘Money and
Distorted Ethical Judgments about Research’; Schonfeld et al., ‘Money Matters’.
¹⁷ Garcia and Thibaut, ‘Current Concepts in the Pharmacotherapy of Paraphilias’.
¹⁸ Thibaut et al., ‘The World Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry (WFSBP) Guidelines for
the Biological Treatment of Paraphilias’.
¹⁹ Forsberg and Douglas, ‘Anti-Libidinal Interventions in Sex Offenders’; Douglas et al., ‘Coercion,
Incarceration, and Chemical Castration’. For discussion of the neurocorrective offer and coercion, see
Pugh, ‘Coercion and the Neurocorrective Offer’.
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loss of liberty constitutes a deprivation of such a magnitude that he cannot choose freely and
voluntarily, but he is forced to give consent to an alternative he would not otherwise have
chosen.²⁰
(iii) Markets for Organs
In light of the global shortage of kidneys for transplantation, a number of bioethicists
have suggested that we ought to permit a regulated market in which individuals are
free to sell one of their kidneys.²¹ Effectively, on such a model, individuals would be
offered a sum of money in return for their kidney. A common objection to such a
market is that it would coerce the poorest members of the global community into
selling their kidney. Michael Jaycox captures this objection as follows:
From the perspective of the poorest and most vulnerable persons in this world, the market of
human organs is not something in which all persons choose to participate as equally free and
self-determining individuals. For the poorest and most vulnerable members of the world
community effectively have no or little choice but to participate in this market as vendors.²²
In order to ascertain whether the charge of coercion may appropriately be raised in
these three examples, we need to have a sound understanding of the nature of
coercion, how it undermines voluntariness, and how offers differ from threats. In
short, we need to provide an answer to the two questions that I have raised in this
section; however, as I shall now explain, our responses to these questions are likely to
be importantly interrelated, since the way in which one might distinguish threats
from offers (in responding to the second question) might plausibly draw on consid-
erations that are closely linked to one’s understanding of how coercion undermines
voluntariness.
With these framing remarks in mind, I shall proceed as follows. In the next section,
I shall introduce a highly influential ‘content-based’ view of the distinction between
threats and offers, and the normative and non-normative accounts of coercion that
are grounded by this view. Having outlined problems facing normative accounts,
I shall, in section 3 consider non-normative accounts in more detail. Although I shall
suggest that these accounts get closer to the truth about coercion, I shall argue that
they offer inadequate accounts of why coercion undermines voluntariness. The
reason for this is that they do not adequately emphasize the importance of interper-
sonal voluntariness in this context. In section 4, I shall argue that the significance of
this sense of voluntariness can be better captured if we adopt a structural rather than
content-based understanding of the distinction between threats and offers. This
understanding accommodates the possibility of some coercive offers. In the final
section, I shall consider the practical implications of my approach for the cases
delineated above.
²⁰ Green, ‘Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders’. More recently, Wood has
defended an account of coercion according to which an agent is coerced to do something when they have
no acceptable alternative. Wood, ‘Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation’.
²¹ Richards, The Ethics of Transplants; Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys; Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale.
²² Jaycox, ‘Coercion, Autonomy, and the Preferential Option for the Poor in the Ethics of Organ
Transplantation’. See also Rippon, ‘Imposing Options on People in Poverty’; Annas, ‘Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Organ Sales’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
 
2. The Content-Based View of Threats: Normative
and Non-Normative Accounts of Coercion
On one prominent approach to coercion, one that is endorsed by the standard
account of autonomy in bioethics, it is claimed that coercion necessarily involves
the use of threats. Of course, the appeal of this understanding of coercion depends in
large part on our understanding of threats. Although I shall refine this terminology
over the course of this section, we may say, at this stage roughly, that a proposal
constitutes a threat if it announces a conditional intention to make the recipient
worse off if she does not perform some action that the coercer wants her to perform.
The first thing to acknowledge with regards to the ‘threat-based’ understanding of
coercion is that even if only threats can be coercive, clearly not all threats are. For
instance, suppose the thief from my previous example had instead threatened to
verbally insult Terry if he refused to hand over his wallet. It does not seem plausible
to describe this as an instance of coercion. Accordingly, advocates of the threat-based
understanding of coercion must offer an account of why some threats are coercive
and some are not.
I shall not be concerned primarily with such conditions here; my interest in this
section is rather to explore the way in which the threat-based understanding of
coercion seeks to distinguish threats and offers, and the implications of this view for
our understanding of the implications for voluntariness in each case. Nonetheless it
will be useful to have a broad understanding of some commonly accepted necessary
conditions of coercive threats for my discussion below. Broadly, we may say that in
order for P’s threat to have coerced Q into doing A, it must, inter alia, be the
case that:
(1) Prior to the threat being made, Q believes he has a decisive reason to not A.
(2) Q has sufficient reason to believe that P’s threat is credible.
(3) The fact that the non-performance of A will lead to the consequence that
P threatens to bring about if Q does not A is the operative reason in Q’s
decision to A; the consequences render the non-performance of A for
Q ‘ineligible’ for rational choice.²³
And
(4) Q does A.
These conditions essentially state that for P’s threat to be coercive, it must not only be
successful in getting Q to A, it must also be the case that Q came to be motivated to
do A because she believed P’s threat, and wanted to avoid the consequences that
P has credibly threatened to bring about.²⁴
I do not mean to claim that these conditions are sufficient for a threat to be
coercive; one might wish to add further conditions in order to distinguish coercive
²³ I have adopted the terminology of eligibility for rational choice from Feinberg’s useful discussion. See
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 192. However, this terminology (and this condition
generally) is compatible with the various accounts of coercion that I shall consider here.
²⁴ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 198; Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 149; Nozick,
‘Coercion’.
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threats from warnings, for example.²⁵Moreover, as I suggested above, the example of
Alan and Bernie might be taken to suggest that we should incorporate a condition of
intentionality here, according to which, the coercing party must intend to coerce
their victim if their threat is to be truly coercive.²⁶ Nonetheless, such a condition has
been contested, as I shall discuss. In the interests of brevity, and to focus my
discussion, I shall simply accept the above four conditions as broadly accepted
necessary conditions of coercive threats without further discussion.
With this in mind, why should we accept the claim that coercion necessarily
involves the use of threats? Arguably, our intuitions may speak in favour of this
view. In addition to the fact that paradigmatic cases of coercion (such as Terry above)
pre-theoretically seem to involve threats, we also commonly get people to do things
that they would otherwise not do by offering them inducements, and it seems clear
that this does not usually involve coercion. If Terry had been offered a million
pounds to hand over his wallet to an eccentric collector (rather than being threatened
with death), it perhaps seems more plausible that he could have been autonomous
with respect to his decision to hand over his wallet (assuming it contained far less
than a million pounds).
However, one problem with relying on these sorts of intuitions to ground the
threat-based understanding of autonomy is that it is not at all clear how we should
philosophically distinguish threats and offers. As Scott Anderson points out in his
introduction to the concept of coercion:
. . . offers may also be made with the same general intention as coercive threats: that is, to make
some actions more attractive, others less so.²⁷
Anderson goes on to point out that both threats and offers share the same basic
structure; in both cases, the proposing agent, P, claims that she will bring about
consequence C if and only if (iff) the proposed-to agent, Q, does some action A.²⁸
I shall suggest below that Anderson’s structural analysis here is subtly incorrect.
However, the claim that threats and offers are structurally similar has led both
defenders and opponents of the threat-based understanding of coercion to adopt
what I shall call a ‘content-based’ view of the difference between the two types of
proposal.
The content-based view claims that threats can be distinguished from offers by
appealing to the difference in the nature of the consequences that the proposer
announces a conditional intention to bring about in each case. Advocating such a
view in his seminal account of coercion, Robert Nozick claims that threats announce
a conditional intention to bring about a consequence that would make the recipient
worse off in comparison to the baseline of the ‘normally expected course of events’.²⁹
Recall the original example of Terry. On this account, the thief ’s proposal amounts to
a threat because it announces a conditional intention to bring about a consequence
that would make Terry worse off than he might normally expect to be if he refrained
from handing over his wallet to a stranger. In contrast, on this approach, offers
announce a conditional intention to bring about a consequence that would make the
²⁵ Nozick, ‘Coercion’, 453–8. ²⁶ Ibid. ²⁷ Anderson, ‘Coercion’. ²⁸ Ibid.
²⁹ Nozick, ‘Coercion’, 447.
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recipient better off in comparison to the baseline of the ‘normally expected course
of events’.
The ambiguity of the concept of ‘the normally expected course of events’ has led to
two different accounts of coercion grounded by this way of distinguishing threats and
offers, one non-normative, one normative. The ambiguity of the concept is attribut-
able to the fact that there are different norms of expectability that might govern our
understanding of the baseline ‘normal expected course of events’.³⁰More specifically,
the ‘normal’ expected course of events can be understood in a merely descriptive
sense, to refer to what one might reasonably expect to happen, given one’s prior
knowledge concerning descriptive facts about the world. However, it is also possible
to understand the baseline in a normatively laden sense, to refer to how the world
ought to be. To illustrate this point, consider the following example from Nozick’s
discussion:
Suppose that usually a slave owner beats his slave each morning, for no reason connected with
the slave’s behaviour. Today he says to his slave, ‘Tomorrow I will not beat you if and only if
you now do A.³¹
In relation to a descriptive understanding of the normal course of events, the slave-
owner’s proposal qualifies as an offer, since the slave-owner proposes to make the
slave better off than he could normally expect to be (given his previous experience of
being a slave of this owner) if he performs the task that the slave-owner asks him to
perform.
This raises something of a problem, because it seems highly plausible to claim that
the slave is nonetheless coerced in this case. Accordingly, theorists who claim that
only threats can be coercive must argue that it is possible to recast the slave-owner’s
proposal as a threat if they are to accommodate this intuition. One way in which it is
possible to do this is to consider the proposal against a normative baseline that
incorporates what the agent might morally expect:
Morally Expected Course of Events: The baseline comparison course of events
that incorporates what is minimally morally required of others in their actions
towards the recipient in the pre-proposal situation.
In comparison to this normative baseline, the slave-owner’s proposal can be under-
stood as a threat, since the proposal does not make the slave better off in comparison
to the course of events in which others meet their moral obligations towards the
slave. After all, in this course of events, the agent would not be a slave who is beaten
every day, but rather a free man.³² Other normative accounts of coercion parse the
normative baseline in terms of circumstances in which the individual’s rights are
respected, and in which others meet their obligations towards the individual.³³
Rights-based normative accounts also claim that we should always invoke a norma-
tive baseline when distinguishing coercive proposals from non-coercive proposals. In
contrast, in his original theory, Nozick suggests that when the normative and
³⁰ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 219–27. ³¹ Nozick, ‘Coercion’, 450.
³² Ibid. ³³ Wertheimer, Coercion, 217–21.
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non-normative baselines diverge, it should be up to the agent which baseline should
be invoked.³⁴
This normative approach is also understood to provide a theoretical foundation
for an account of why coercion undermines voluntariness. Due to the different
content of threats and offers on this approach, Nozick suggests that a rational
agent would be willing to move from their pre-proposal ‘baseline’ situation to the
post-proposal choice situation.With respect to offers, they would be willing to do this
because the nature of the consequence that the third party announces an intention to
bring about is such that it would make the recipient better off than they would have
been in comparison to the baseline of the normal expected course of events. The
same cannot be said in the case of threats; after all, in the case of a threat, the recipient
is in a position in which their rights will be violated if they fail to comply, or they will
not be treated in the manner that morality demands.³⁵ Accordingly, the reason that
coercive threats undermine voluntariness on this account is that they involve moving
the recipient into a post-proposal choice situation unwillingly.
This normative account of coercion captures the Aristotelian insight that a coerced
act is ‘mixed’ with regards to voluntariness. Even though the coerced agent may
willingly comply with the coercer’s demands, they have unwillingly been placed into
the post-proposal choice situation. Nonetheless, there are significant problems with
this understanding of coercion. Some of these problems pertain to the content-based
view of the distinction between threats and offers that partly grounds the account.
Naturally, these problems are also shared by other (non-normative) accounts of
coercion that are also based on this distinction; I shall consider such accounts in
the following sections. However, to conclude my discussion of normative accounts,
I shall outline those problems that are uniquely faced by normative accounts of
coercion.
First, if coercion only occurs when one agent proposes to violate another’s rights,
or if they fail to meet some other sort of moral obligation, it makes the definition of
coercion, and more importantly its moral wrongness, parasitic on these prior moral
wrongs.³⁶ Yet this is to divorce the moral wrongness of coercion from the implica-
tions that it has on the voluntariness of the target’s choice. This is problematic
because it seems that these implications are fundamental to our understanding of
why coercion is wrong, particularly in a bioethical context. Indeed, the normative
account of coercion seems to jar with our intuitions in this regard. For instance,
consider the following case:
S is a justly imprisoned prisoner who would strongly prefer not to be imprisoned. The warden
tells S that if he is caught attempting to escape, he will be liable to have his entertainment
privileges withdrawn. Assume that S does not have any right to leave prison, and that prison
authorities would not be violating S’ rights if they withdrew certain entertainment privileges
from him following an escape attempt. Suppose that these privileges are highly valuable for S in
³⁴ Nozick, ‘Coercion’, 451. Notably though, Nozick himself came to endorse a rights-based understand-
ing of the normative baseline in later work .See Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia.
³⁵ Nozick, ‘Coercion’, 459–60. ³⁶ Zimmerman, ‘Coercive Wage Offers’, 123.
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prison, and, because he believes that he cannot risk losing them, he decides not to try and
escape.³⁷
On the normative account, S’s deciding not to escape because of the warden’s threat
of withdrawing these privileges would not qualify as coerced, and we would have no
reason to claim that his decision to not try and escape here was non-voluntary. After
all, the warden has not threatened to violate S’s rights in any way. Yet this seems
implausible; given that S takes himself to have very strong reasons to escape, but even
stronger reasons to avoid the threatened consequence, it is not clear why the mere
fact that the latter consequence would not violate S’s rights should have any bearing
on the effect of these threatened consequences on the voluntariness of S’s choice.
More broadly, it is not clear that the normative account can make sense of morally
legitimate instances of coercion that plausibly serve to undermine voluntariness,
despite the fact that they are morally legitimate. In addition to the above example,
we might also note the quite common example of parents legitimately shaping their
children’s behaviour through the use of coercive threats. It seems that we might want
to say that parents can coerce their children (perhaps by telling them to eat their
vegetables or they will not get dessert) without necessarily threatening to treat them
in ways that violate their rights, or failing to treat them as morality demands.
Another reason that the normative account of threats and offers is jarring is that it
is somewhat unnatural to describe the slave-owner’s proposal in Nozick’s case as a
threat rather than an offer. In section 4, I shall provide a structural explanation of the
proposal in question that explains why the normative interpretation is counter-
intuitive. Of course, the point that the normative account of coercion can jar with
our common understanding of threats and offers is not, by itself, a knock-down
objection. Philosophers commonly invoke conceptions of everyday terms that do not
map neatly on to our common usage of those terms. However, this point at least
speaks against the normative account, particularly if there is an understanding of
coercion that incorporates a construal of threats and offers that is congruous with the
common understanding of these terms, and which can accommodate morally legit-
imate coercion that nonetheless undermines voluntariness.
3. Non-Normative Approaches, Coercive Offers, and
Interpersonal Voluntariness
As I explained in the previous section, non-normative accounts of coercion can also
be grounded by a content-based understanding of the distinction between threats
and offers. Unlike normative theories, non-normative accounts appeal to a descrip-
tive baseline of the normal expected course of events in drawing this distinction. This
allows non-normative approaches to classify the slave-owner’s proposal in Nozick’s
example as an offer, rather than a threat.
I believe that non-normative theories reach the right conclusion in this regard,
although I shall argue that they do so for the wrong reasons. Notwithstanding this
point though, presuming that a plausible theory of coercion ought to claim that the
³⁷ This is a modified version of an example given by Olsaretti, ‘Freedom, Force and Choice’, 59.
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slave-owner’s proposal is coercive, then plausible non-normative accounts must deny
that only threats can be coercive. They must allow for the conceptual possibility of
coercive offers. Accordingly, a key challenge that such accounts face is explicating
which offers should qualify as coercive. In this section, I shall delineate what we
might term the ‘preference-based’ view of coercive offers.³⁸
Recall that on a non-normative approach, offers will announce a conditional
intention to make the recipient better off than they would normally expect to be
given descriptive facts about the world. According to the preference-based view, this
feature of offers is significant because it means that recipients will typically prefer to
receive offers. The reason for this is that they would strongly prefer to move from the
normally expected course of events (in their pre-proposal situation) to the post-
proposal situation (laid out in the terms of the offer).
However, an offer may nonetheless qualify as coercive on the preference-based
view if two conditions are met. First, it must be the case that the recipient would even
more strongly prefer to move from their actual pre-proposal situation to some
alternative feasible pre-proposal situation. Second, the proposer must be actively
preventing the recipient from being in this alternative feasible pre-proposal situ-
ation.³⁹On this view, the slave-owner’s offer is coercive because he can be understood
as actively preventing the slave from being in a feasible alternative pre-proposal
situation that he would strongly prefer to be in; namely one in which he is not a slave
who receives daily beatings.
In the case of coercive offers, the preference-based view holds that an offer will be
coercive if the offering party is frustrating the recipient’s desire to be in some other
feasible alternative pre-proposal situation. In turn, this feature of coercion is central
to its prima facie moral wrongness on the preference-based view; coercion renders
the victim unfree by frustrating their preference to be in some other pre-proposal
situation. The preference view can further cash out the wrongness of frustrating an
agent’s desire in this way in both broadly utilitarian and broadly Kantian terms. On
the utilitarian approach, rendering another unfree in this manner is wrong because
desire frustration per se is prima facie wrong, whilst on the Kantian approach,
frustrating another’s desires is wrong because it fails to acknowledge the victim’s
full status as a rational being.⁴⁰
I shall return to the utilitarian and Kantian approaches to the wrongness of
coercion on the non-normative preference-based account below. Prior to doing so
though, we may notice that both the normative account of coercion and the non-
normative preference-based account answer the first question outlined at the begin-
ning of this chapter in broadly the same way. They both endorse the general picture
that coercion undermines voluntariness because coercive proposals serve to frustrate
a certain set of the victims’ preferences (namely, to be in a different set of
³⁸ Zimmerman, ‘Coercive Wage Offers’. Notice that Zimmerman’s use of the term ‘preferences’ differs
from Ekstom’s understanding (which I have been invoking), since Zimmerman does not claim that
preferences presuppose the existence of higher order mental states in the way that Ekstrom does.
³⁹ Zimmerman, ‘Coercive Wage Offers’, 132. ⁴⁰ Ibid., 129.
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circumstances).⁴¹ They simply disagree on their understanding of how we ought to
define and correspondingly distinguish threats and offers.
There are three reasons for thinking that the non-normative approach is at least
more plausible than the normative approach. First, on the former approach, the
wrongness of coercion is not parasitic on other normative violations. Second, it is
more compatible with our intuitions regarding the effect of morally legitimate threats
on voluntariness; the prisoner’s decision not to escape in the example in the previous
section qualifies as having been coerced, even if the warden is not threatening to
violate his rights in any way. Third, the non-normative account classifies the slave-
owner’s proposal in Nozick’s case as an offer rather than a threat in a manner that
corresponds with natural use of the term ‘offer’.
However, I believe that that we ought to reject both the normative and non-
normative approaches that I have so far outlined, due to their reliance on the
content-based approach to the distinction between threats and offers. Their reliance
on this view leads them to obscure a feature of coercion that is indispensable to an
adequate understanding of its implications for voluntariness, namely the significance
of intention.
To see why, recall the examples of Alan and Bernie from section 1. I suggested that
it is plausible to claim that Alan can consent to treatment but that Bernie has been
coerced in a manner that undermines the voluntariness of his decision. If this
intuition is correct, it cannot simply be the case that coercion undermines voluntari-
ness just because it frustrates a preference, or because it involves the recipient moving
unwillingly from one choice circumstance to another less preferable one. The reason
for this is that this occurs in both Alan and Bernie’s cases.
It might be argued that I am being slightly uncharitable in suggesting that these
cases raise problems for the normative and non-normative preference-based
approaches to coercion. After all, at least some advocates from both camps explicitly
stress that coercion is an interpersonal, intentional phenomenon.⁴² Zimmerman, in
particular stresses this by stipulating a prevention condition in his account of
coercive offers. Recall that an offer will only qualify as coercive on his account if
the proposer is actively preventing the recipient from being in a pre-proposal
situation that they would strongly prefer to be in.
Whilst this is true, by cashing out the wrongness of coercion by appealing to the
fact that it involves the frustration of preferences, these accounts obscure the role that
intentional agency plays in the wrongness of coercion. This failure is clearest in the
utilitarian approach to cashing out the wrongness of the frustration of preferences
that coercion involves. According to the utilitarian interpretation, coercion is wrong
because the frustration of desires per se is prima facie wrong. Yet, even if this is true,
⁴¹ Zimmerman phrases the moral wrongness of coercion in terms of its effects on freedom rather than
voluntariness. However, since Nozick (and others) believe that the effects of coercion on freedom have
implications for voluntariness, and in so far as it seems plausible to claim that a desideratum of a theory of
coercion is that it is able to capture the thought that coercion undermines voluntariness, I shall interpret
Zimmerman’s claims about the effects of coercion on freedom to have implications for our understanding
of its implications for voluntariness.
⁴² Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 272.
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it is not clear why the fact that the coercer, rather than forces of hazard, is frustrating
the individual’s preferences is material to the wrongness of coercion on this
approach. The problem with the utilitarian approach then is that it cannot account
for the materiality of having one’s desires frustrated by another agent to the way in
which coercion undermines voluntariness.
In so far as intentional agency is a prerequisite of expressing an attitude of
disrespect, the Kantian approach can claim that forces of hazard do not disrespect
an individual’s rational agency when they diminish her freedom. In this sense the
Kantian interpretation is on stronger ground than the utilitarian approach to under-
standing the wrongness of coercion. I shall argue that the Kantian approach fails for
other reasons that I shall detail in the next section. Here though, we need only
acknowledge the point that the failure of the utilitarian approach in this regard
suggests that in explicating the implications of coercion for decisional autonomy, we
should focus less on the frustration of preferences it involves, and instead on its
interpersonal features. That is, in order to adequately capture the effect of coercion
on voluntariness in a way that is congruous with our intuitions in the Alan and
Bernie cases, we have to focus not so much on the fact that the victim’s preferences
are frustrated, but rather on the fact that they are frustrated by another agent.
This echoes my discussion of the interpersonal sense of voluntariness that
I highlighted at the end of the previous chapter. Coercion does not undermine
voluntariness just because it frustrates the victim’s preference; rather it does so
because it subjugates the victim’s will to the coercer’s, violating the victim’s freedom
from domination.
However, the appeal to freedom from domination in the context of coercion raises
a different problem, at least in view of the arguments I made in the previous chapter.
There, I suggested that forces of hazard can manipulate or deceive an agent in ways
that undermine their decisional autonomy. The question then is why intentional
third-party influence should matter so much more in the case of coercion than it does
in the case of manipulation—is there any relevant sense in which manipulation
differs from coercion with respect to its implications for decisional autonomy?⁴³
Gideon Yaffe has offered one account that denies this sort of difference, but which
purports to explain why intentional third-party influence in particular might matter
for freedom. Yaffe argues that intentional influence can undermine freedom in a way
that forces of hazard do not, because those who exert intentional influence will track
the compliance of their victims.⁴⁴ If an initial threat fails, an intentional coercer is
likely to increase the severity of their threats until their victim agrees to comply. This
matters for Yaffe, because tracking compliance in this manner involves a greater
restriction of the target’s freedom, and forces of hazard will not typically track
compliance in this way.⁴⁵
⁴³ Those who are sceptical of a plausible answer to this question have used this as motivation for
accounts of autonomy that claim that only intentional interpersonal interference can undermine auton-
omy. Bublitz and Merkel, ‘Autonomy and Authenticity of Enhanced Personality Traits’.
⁴⁴ Yaffe, ‘Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will’, 355–6.
⁴⁵ Yaffe acknowledges that there could be cases in which forces of hazard could track compliance, and
that his conclusions would apply to such cases. Ibid., 354.
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I believe that Yaffe is correct to highlight this feature to show how some forms of
interpersonal influence infringe upon the victim’s freedom in a manner that forces
of hazard will typically not. However, I do not believe that this feature of interpersonal
influence is necessary for undermining decisional autonomy. To see why, suppose the
coercer in Bernie’s case issued her initial threat, but privately resolved not to threaten
anythingworse if Bernie failed to complywith the issued threat. OnYaffe’s analysis, the
sort of coercion involved in this permutation of the case would be functionally
equivalent to the restriction of choice by forces of hazard in Alan’s case.⁴⁶ In contrast,
it seems plausible to claim that Bernie may not be autonomous with respect to his
decision, even if his coercer would hypothetically not track compliance in the way that
Yaffe describes. To claim otherwise would be to adopt a highly revisionist understand-
ing of the relationship between coercion and autonomy in bioethics.
However, discussion of Yaffe’s position points towards a solution to the puzzle at
hand. What actually seems to be important about a coercer’s tracking compliance is
that they are reducing another agent’s freedom with the intention of affecting their
victim’s practical decision-making in a manner that will serve the coercer’s own
purposes. In contrast, when our freedoms are reduced by hazard, there is no rhyme or
reason to it; as such, even though we might say that an agent’s freedom can be
diminished by hazard, it does not involve a subjugation of the coerced agent’s will.
But why should this matter so much in the case of coercion? To begin to explain
why, it is useful to compare how coercion and intentional manipulation violate the
victim’s freedom from domination. Compare the case of Terry with Simon. Suppose
that prior to the thief ’s intervention, both Terry and Simon would harbour the
following evaluative ranking of their available conjunctive options:
Best = Option A: (Don’t hand over wallet) + (My money is safe).
Worst = Option B: (Hand over wallet) + (My money is stolen).
Psychological manipulaters might succeed in getting Simon to hand over his wallet
by causing him to change his evaluative ranking of the available options (so that he
now prefers option B to option A) without rationally engaging with his evaluative
beliefs.⁴⁷ Let us suppose that this new preference ranking does not cohere with
Simon’s other core preferences and acceptances, those that led him to develop the
initial preference ranking outlined above. Simon, nonetheless unreflectively acts on
the manipulated preference, despite its conflict with his other preferences and
acceptances; the preference is not responsive to his beliefs about the good.
My arguments in the previous chapter suggest that the violation of Simon’s
freedom from domination here is contingent on the fact that Simon lacks reflective
autonomy with respect to this manipulated preference. Imagine now another thief
targets someone with a different character system, Rupert. Rupert is somewhat
repelled by his own wealth, and thinks that his life would be easier if he gave his
money away; he acquired his wealth through complicity with things that he took to
be immoral, and it deeply conflicts with his overall self-conception, and his positive
⁴⁶ Ibid., 354.
⁴⁷ Yaffe notes that indoctrination can evince a new pattern of taking facts to be reasons for acting in
particular ways amongst its victims. Ibid., 342.
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evaluation of helping others. Although he does not know what to do with his money,
when faced with a would-be thief, he does not feel inclined to hand over his wallet.
Suppose that Rupert is similarly manipulated through hypnosis into changing his
motivating desire. Unlike Simon though, Rupert comes to reflect on his changed
motivation following his hypnosis, and comes to rationally endorse this ranking as
being coherent with other core preferences and acceptances that have been in conflict
with his initial preference not to hand over his wallet (for example, his belief that his
money is morally tainted, that the thief is desperate, and his preference to help those
in need). In Rupert’s case, the account I have outlined in the previous chapters
suggests that this psychological intervention does not violate Rupert’s reflective
autonomy; despite its causal history, his motivating desire is sensitive to his other
pre-existing preferences and acceptances, in particular, his beliefs about the good. In
view of my arguments in the previous chapter, this manipulation also does not violate
his freedom from domination, insofar as it is Rupert himself who comes to rationally
assimilate this manipulated preference into his own coherent self-conception.
In contrast to the cases of Simon and Rupert, when the thief threatens rather than
manipulates Terry, his initial preference ranking is left intact; he still prefers option
A to option B. However, the thief ’s coercive threat serves to take away option A from
Terry’s available choice set, and replaces it with option C which, for Terry, is less
good than B:
Option C: (Don’t hand over wallet) + (My money is safe) + (I am killed).
This analysis elucidates the following point. As Simon and Rupert’s cases suggest,
when manipulation does violate freedom from domination (i.e. in Simon’s case), it
does so by virtue of the fact that the third-party intervention undermines the
reflective autonomy of another. When attempted manipulation fails to undermine
reflective autonomy (i.e. in Rupert’s case) it fails to amount to domination of
the target’s will. The third-party influence is immaterial to the individual’s sustaining
the desire following rational evaluation. Although the intervention caused Rupert to
initially form the desire to hand over his wallet, it was Rupert himself who decided to
rationally sustain the desire in the light of his other preferences and acceptances. In
so far as Rupert sustained the desire on the basis of this sort of reflection, he can aptly
be construed as the driving force underlying his decision to hand over his wallet to
the thief; in hypnotizing Rupert to have this desire, the thief merely planted a seed in
fertile ground.⁴⁸
In contrast to manipulation, in coercion, the coercer must rely on their victim
retaining their reflective autonomy if they are to dominate their victim’s will. The
control exerted in coercion does not function by undermining the victim’s reflective
autonomy; rather, it functions by influencing the practical parameters within which
⁴⁸ Such an interpretation does not commit me to claiming that the thief ’s intervention was therefore
morally neutral. Even if it does not undermine Rupert’s autonomy, we may still plausibly claim that the
thief ’s intervention violated his right to mental integrity for example. For discussion, see Bublitz and
Merkel, ‘Crimes Against Minds’. See also McKenna, ‘Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents’.
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the victim’s reflective autonomy will operate.⁴⁹ The coercer influences their victim to
act in a certain way by taking away their most preferred conjunctive option from
their choice set (option A above), and replacing it with an option (C) that is less
preferable than the option that reflects the coercer’s will (B). Accordingly, although
coercion does not undermine reflective autonomy, it may still plausibly be under-
stood to amount to a domination of its victim by virtue of this interference with the
agent’s practical freedoms, and the imposition on the agent’s choice domain con-
noted by that interference.
This analysis is also compatible with the Aristotelian claim that coercion is ‘mixed’
with regards to voluntariness, without denying that we can draw a morally significant
distinction between the cases of Alan and Bernie above (or Aristotle’s own examples
of the cargo and the tyrant). The reason that we believe that coercion is ‘mixed’ is
that, on the one hand, we must concede that coerced agents would reflectively
endorse their compliant motives; in fact, in order to formulate an effective threat
of the sort that coercion requires, the coercing party must make an accurate assess-
ment of the kinds of preferences and values that are central to their victim’s character
system. In this sense then, we can understand the victim as voluntarily performing
the act, the non-performance of which would lead to consequences that he has
strongly decisive reasons to avoid.
On the other hand though, in so far as it is a third party that is responsible for
changing the parameters of the individual’s choice situation in a manner that serves
to further the coercer’s own ends, coercion involves a subjugation of the victim’s will,
and violates his freedom from domination. Whilst this freedom pertains to a
different sense of voluntariness from the sense related to reflective autonomy, it is
nonetheless central to our assessment of ourselves as autonomous agents. Whilst in
manipulation, the agent’s reflective autonomy and their freedom from domination
stand and fall together, in coercion they can be mixed in the way that Aristotle
describes in his examples, and that I have explicated above.
I shall further support this point in the following section by offering a revised
account of the distinction between threats and offers. To conclude this discussion
though, one might object that my claims here contradict my assessment of the
implications of global manipulation for autonomy in the previous chapter. Recall
that I previously claimed that global manipulation does not undermine autonomy,
but rather amounts to the creation of a psychologically ‘new’ person. I suggested that
this new person could still be autonomous, despite the fact that her ‘creation’ was the
result of another’s agency. This might seem to be in tension with what I am claiming
here, namely that the victim of coercion may lack decisional autonomy even though
she meets the conditions of practical and theoretical rationality discussed in
Chapter 2.
The key to reconciling these two contrasting claims about global manipulation and
coercion is recognizing that in coercion, the central elements of the agent’s character
system are retained. We can sensibly say that the ‘will’ that is subjugated in coercion
⁴⁹ In a similar vein, Yaffe suggests that coercion involves the manipulation of what reasons its victim
has. Yaffe, ‘Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will’, 340.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
- , ,   
existed both prior to the threat and following it. In contrast, in global manipulation,
the will that exists following manipulation is, ex hypothesi, distinct from the will that
existed prior to it. Global manipulation thus does not subjugate an extant will in a
manner that undermines the autonomy of the agent following the intervention;
rather it involves replacing the extant will with another of the manipulator’s own
design. This is an egregious harm; but it is, I suggest, a harm concerning identity,
rather than autonomy. Coercion, in contrast, is a harm concerning autonomy that
relies on the maintenance of the elements of identity that global manipulation
destroys.
4. A Structural Account and Coercive Offers Revisited
In order to adequately understand why coercion undermines autonomy on my
approach, we cannot merely appeal to the fact that coercion frustrates a certain
kind of preference; we must also stress the fact that coercion violates the victim’s
freedom from domination. I shall now argue that we can better capture this aspect of
coercion by abandoning the content-based view of the distinction between threats
and offers, which is adopted by both the normative and non-normative accounts
analysed above, instead adopting a structural account of the distinction between
threats and offers. As well as capturing the moral significance of freedom from
domination and interpersonal voluntariness, such an account is better placed to
respond to Joel Feinberg’s famous lecherous millionaire coercive offer example
(outlined below), and the putative examples of coercive offers in bioethics that
I delineated in section 1.
As I mentioned above, one reason that theorists have been attracted to the content-
based view of the distinction between threats and offers is that these proposals seem
to share the same sort of structure. Broadly, it might be claimed that it is true of both
threats and offers that the proposing agent, P, claims that she will bring about
consequences C if and only if the proposed-to agent, Q, does some action A.⁵⁰ If it
were the case that offers and threats both had this precise structure, then it seems that
the only way in which we could distinguish the proposals would be to appeal to the
content of C, in the ways discussed above.
However, contrary to initial appearances, this analysis of the shared structure of
threats and offers overlooks an important structural difference between the two types
of proposal. In the case of offers, the proposer will bring about a certain consequence
C that otherwise would not have occurred if and only if (iff) the proposed-to party
complies with the proposer’s demand to do A. In the case of offers, C is normally
something that the proposer believes will make the recipient of the proposal better
off; however, this is not a necessary feature, as the content-based view implies.⁵¹ In
contrast, in the case of threats, the proposer will bring about a certain consequence
C that would not have otherwise occurred iff the proposed-to party refuses to comply
with the proposer’s demands to do A. Again, we might note that in the case of
⁵⁰ Anderson, ‘Coercion’.
⁵¹ For examples illustrating this point, see Sachs, ‘Why Coercion Is Wrong When It’s Wrong’.
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threats, C is normally something that the proposer believes will make the recipient
worse off, although this is not a necessary feature on the account that I am
outlining here.
Accordingly, contrary to Anderson’s analysis, there is a structural difference that
we can appeal to in order to distinguish threats and offers. On this structural
approach, the slave-owner’s proposal in Nozick’s example qualifies as an offer. As
I illustrated above, non-normative approaches that endorse the content-based view
of the distinction between threats and offers get the correct result here. However,
they do so for the wrong reasons; the proposal is not an offer just because C is a
‘good’ consequence for the slave. Rather, the reason that the proposal is most
appropriately understood as an offer is by virtue of the structural feature that the
slave-owner will refrain from beating the slave iff the slave complies with his owner’s
demand to do A.
Compare this to a case in which the slave-owner will bring about a very bad
consequence iff the slave complies with his demand to do A, say an even worse
beating than usual. Such a proposal would be quite bizarre, and would be highly
unlikely to be successful in motivating the slave to do A. Regardless of the bizarre
nature of the proposal though, the badness of the consequence does not render the
proposal a threat, as the content-based view would imply. Rather, such a proposal
would most plausibly be understood to constitute a very unattractive offer, by virtue
of its structural features.⁵² By appealing to the nature of the consequences that the
proposer announces a conditional intention to bring about in each case, the content-
based account is focusing on something that is only contingently true of most threats
and offers.
This structural understanding of threats and offers serves to elucidate the salience
of interpersonal interference to the way in which coercion undermines voluntariness,
as I began to describe at the end of the previous section. When P makes a threat, they
make it the case that Q can no longer act in a way that is entirely independent of P’s
interference. Recall the options available to Terry (the original thief target), as
I described them above, options B and C.
Option B: (Hand over wallet) + (My money is stolen).
Option C: (Don’t hand over wallet) + (My money is safe) + (I am killed).
Notice that regardless of which option Terry chooses, the thief ’s influence will be
apparent, either because Terry will suffer the consequences that the thief will bring
about if he refuses to comply (in option C), or because he will comply with the thief ’s
demands (in option B).
Contrast this with the case of an offer. On the structural account, an offer
announces a conditional intention to bring about a certain consequence C if and
only if Q complies with P’s demands. In the case of an offer then, P’s influence does
not infect every option available to Q; P has only influenced Q’s choice set by adding
a further option of Q’s performing some act for an inducement (i.e. consequence C).
However, unlike the case of a threat, there will be no consequences for Q if she refuses
⁵² Sachs calls such a proposal a ‘ridiculously bad offer’.
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to comply with the demand. As such, Q’s pre-proposal status quo option remains
intact in the post-proposal situation; in contrast, in the case of a threat, P’s proposal
takes away Q’s freedom to maintain her pre-proposal status quo situation without
further consequence.
Accordingly, we may say that in issuing an offer, the offering party influences the
recipient’s choice domain, but that this influence does not amount to the exertion of
controlling influence. The reason for this is that offers leave open an option that is
free from P’s influence, namely Q’s pre-proposal status quo option. If Q chooses to
accept the offer, it is because she believes that compliance with what is demanded by
the offering party in return for certain consequences is better than her extant
circumstances, over which P will typically not exert influence.
However, the situation is different in the case of a threat. In issuing a threat, the
threatening party exerts their influence through the terms of their proposal over all of
their recipient’s available options, in order to further their own ends. If Q refuses,
P will intrude upon Q’s sphere of autonomy by bringing about some consequence
C that would otherwise not have occurred, and that P will typically not want to obtain
(at least in most cases). If Q chooses to comply, it is only on the basis that acting in
accordance with P’s demands is better than this alternative way in which P would
otherwise intrude into the sphere of Q’s autonomy.
Whilst both successful offers and threats involve a third party creating the reason
that is operative in the recipient’s post-proposal decision about how to act, it is only
in the case of a threat that the creation of this operative reason requires an intrusion
into all of the recipient’s available options in that context, robbing the recipient of the
freedom to maintain their status quo situation. In so far as this is true, the terms of a
threat involve the directed domination of one party’s choice domain in the interests
of another, in a way that offers do not.
To conclude this part of the discussion, recall that proponents of the content-
based view explicate the moral wrongness of coercion and its effects on voluntariness
by appealing to the fact that coercion involves a certain kind of preference frustra-
tion; furthermore, they note that individuals are willing to receive (non-coercive)
offers, and that this represents the key difference between threats and offers with
respect to voluntariness. The above discussion of the structural account illuminates
the fact that there are in fact two dimensions underlying the rational agent’s
unwillingness to receive a coercive threat. On the one hand, such threats tend to
(but need not) announce a conditional intention to bring about bad consequences.
This is what the content-based view emphasizes. However, coercive threats also
involve the frustration of a different kind of preference, one that is grounded by a
desire to be free from domination. The reason for this is that threats involve the
exertion of third-party influence over every available option in the recipient’s choice
set in a particular context. By emphasizing this supplementary feature of threats, the
structural account makes salient the interpersonal aspect of coercion’s moral
wrongness.
Similarly, there is often a dual basis for why rational agents would be willing to
receive offers. First, offers tend to (but need not) announce a conditional intention to
bring about a consequence that would be good for the recipient if she complies with
the demand. However, the recipient might also be willing to receive an offer insofar
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as it is often (though not always) advantageous to have more options available
to one.⁵³
This structural account of the distinction of threats and offers has important
implications for our understanding of coercive offers. To see why, consider first the
following example:
Lecherous millionaire: B is in an otherwise hopeless condition from which A can
rescue her if she gives him what he wants. He will pay for the expensive surgery
that alone can save her child’s life provided that she becomes for a period his
mistress.⁵⁴
On all of the accounts that I have surveyed in the first sections of this chapter, the
proposal in this example uncontroversially qualifies as an offer. The key area of
contention is whether we should understand it to constitute a coercive offer that
undermines voluntariness. On the preference-based non-normative account, the
question turns on whether we can construe the millionaire as preventing the
woman from being in a feasible alternative pre-proposal situation. It might it be
claimed that the millionaire is preventing the woman from being in this situation by
omission. Yet, Zimmerman rules out this interpretation: he claims that an offer is
only genuinely coercive if the offering party actively prevents the recipient from being
in their preferred feasible alternative pre-proposal situation.⁵⁵ Merely omitting to
provide Q with the means to be in an alternative preferable situation is not sufficient
for genuine coercion. As such, the non-normative account denies that the lecherous
millionaire’s proposal is a coercive offer.
Joel Feinberg, who originally posed the example, claims that the offer is coercive.
In contrast to the preference-based approach, Feinberg endorses what he terms a
‘compatibilist approach’, according to which offers can be coercive even if they
enhance freedom overall. On the compatibilist approach, an offer is coercive if it
meets three conditions. First, the offer must have been made with coercive intent;
that is, the offering party P must have made the offer with the intention of getting the
recipient Q to do what P wants her to do. Second, the offer must have a coercive
effect; that is, the offer must succeed in getting Q to do what P wanted her to do.⁵⁶
Feinberg goes on to suggest that in order for an offer to be coercive in effect it must
impose a sufficient degree of ‘differential coercive pressure’, where differential coer-
cive pressure is understood to refer to ‘the gap between the value tag of what is
offered and the price tag of what is required’;⁵⁷ the greater the gap, the more coercive
the proposal.⁵⁸ Finally, in addition to imposing a sufficient degree of differential
coercive pressure, in order to qualify as a coercive offer, the proposal in question
⁵³ This is not to say that this is always advantageous; see Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of
Autonomy, ch. 6, and my discussion in Chapter 5.
⁵⁴ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 229.
⁵⁵ Zimmerman, ‘Coercive Wage Offers’, 132.
⁵⁶ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 233–5. ⁵⁷ Ibid., 234.
⁵⁸ Feinberg lists a number of other measurements of coercive pressure and their effects on voluntariness,
including what he calls ‘coercive force’, ‘total coercive burden’, ‘the coercive minimum’. However, in
discussing coercive offers, he suggests that if our ultimate concern is to decide whether a recipient’s consent
was valid, the relevant measure is differential coercive pressure. Ibid., 254.
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must offer a ‘prospect that is not simply much preferred, but one which is an
exclusive alternative to an intolerable evil’.⁵⁹
The compatibilist approach adopts the broadly Aristotelian position, which claims
that forces of hazard can exert coercive pressure just as intentional agents can; on the
compatibilist approach, the woman in the lecherous millionaire case is understood to
have essentially been coerced by her circumstances. I rejected this Aristotelian view
of coercion above following my discussion of the examples of Alan and Bernie; it is
highly revisionist to claim that non-agential forces can coerce in a way that invali-
dates consent in bioethics. Feinberg too seems to recognize this, and goes on to
amend the compatibilist position in a manner that seems to bring it broadly into line
with the preference-based view. He goes on to claim that on the compatibilist view,
not all coercive offers undermine voluntariness to the extent of invalidating the
recipient’s consent: rather they will tend to do so if P’s coercive offer is made after
P has already created Q’s circumstances of vulnerability. However, P’s coercive offer
frequently will not invalidate Q’s consent when he was not responsible for creating
those circumstances.⁶⁰
The preference-based view and the amended compatibilist view are thus in broad
agreement about a crucial necessary condition of what it is for an offer to be coercive
in a manner that invalidates consent; the preference-based view’s active prevention
condition and the amended compatibilist’s condition about the creation of the
victim’s circumstances of vulnerability seem to identify a very similar feature of
coercive offers. The main difference between the two is that the compatibilist view
holds that some offers can be coercive without diminishing voluntariness to the
extent that is sufficient to invalidate consent.
In their defence of these accounts, Zimmerman and Feinberg both say little to
defend their respective conditions, instead relying on their intuitive appeal. Yet, as
I mentioned in the previous section, it is difficult to see how the utilitarian approach
to cashing out the wrongness of coercion on the preference view can accommodate
the significance of this. I am now also in a position to further explicate the problems
with the Kantian approach. Recall that the Kantian approach claims that the wrong-
ness of the way in which coercion frustrates the victim’s desires lies in the fact that it
fails to acknowledge the victim’s full status as a rational being. The problem is that
even if this claim is plausible, it does not explain why an offer will only invalidate
consent if the offering party is actively preventing the recipient from being in their
preferred feasible situation. The reason that this is problematic is that offers can
plausibly fail to acknowledge the victim’s status as a rational being without meeting
the aforementioned necessary condition of coercive offers that invalidate consent.
Indeed, the lecherous millionaire’s proposal is a striking example of this. The
proposal plausibly fails to acknowledge the recipient’s full status as a rational
being; however, as both the preference view and the amended compatibilist view
hold, we may plausibly deny that the lecherous millionaire’s offer invalidates the
recipient’s consent. The Kantian approach to understanding the wrongness of
coercion on the preference view fails because it leaves us with the question of why
⁵⁹ Ibid., 234. ⁶⁰ Ibid., 244.
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offers that fail to acknowledge the recipient’s full moral status only invalidate consent
in some cases but not others.
In contrast, the new structural account of the distinction between offers and
threats, and my discussion of freedom from domination, can help to elucidate the
importance of the conditions that the preference view and the compatibilist view
each adopt to accommodate valid consent in cases like the lecherous millionaire.
To phrase this using the terminology of the compatibilist approach, when the
offering party creates the recipient’s circumstance of vulnerability, their proposal is
similar to a coercive threat, insofar as the proposing party can then be said to have
exerted influence over all of the options in the recipient’s choice set in this context. In
the case of normal non-coercive offers, I suggested that P’s influence need not infect
every option available to Q, since Q can simply choose to maintain her pre-proposal
status quo situation, free from Q’s influence, and without further consequence. This
is not possible in the case of a threat. Moreover, it is also not possible in cases in
which P makes an offer to Q having already placed Q into circumstances of
vulnerability. In such a case, although the recipient may choose to remain in her
pre-proposal status quo situation following the offer, this situation is one in which
her will is already subjugated to her coercer’s, by virtue of the fact that the coercer has
created her current vulnerable circumstances. This is the situation in which the slave
finds himself in Nozick’s example.
One might object to the account that I have outlined here by suggesting that it gets
the wrong conclusion in the lecherous millionaire case; contrary to the analysis that
I have offered here, perhaps it might be claimed that the voluntariness of the victim
in the lecherous millionaire case has been diminished in a manner that is sufficient to
invalidate her consent. In support of this alternative interpretation, we might note
that we would be reluctant to enforce a contract based on this kind of exploitative
offer.
In response, the first thing to note is that there can be reasons for not enforcing a
contract that have nothing to do with voluntariness of an individual’s decision to
accept its terms. My claim that the victim in the lecherous millionaire case provides
valid consent thus does not commit me to the claim that we ought to enforce the
terms of the contract. Morality might require that the millionaire simply saves
the child without making any other demands. The woman might also claim that
the contract is unduly exploitative. Yet this concerns a different set of issues about
fairness that are distinct to those concerning whether the woman can autonomously
agree to the terms of the millionaire’s offer at the time that it was made.
More broadly, I am prepared to bite the bullet in maintaining this interpretation of
Feinberg’s example because of the importance of allowing for the possibility that
people can make voluntary decisions in very poor circumstances. Indeed, to claim
otherwise is to raise a grave threat to the autonomy of vulnerable individuals.
Consider this permutation of the lecherous millionaire case: Suppose the woman is
about to agree to the millionaire’s offer in return for saving the life of her child.
Suppose that we intervened and stopped this contract from being signed, citing the
woman’s lack of voluntariness. We surely could not congratulate ourselves for
safeguarding the woman’s autonomy as she now watches her child perish. The lesson
here is that we should allow for the possibility that people can make autonomous
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decisions in desperate circumstances, and that our moral obligation in such cases is
to alleviate these circumstances of vulnerability. If we fail in that obligation, this does
not mean that we have the right to prevent the vulnerable individual from exercising
a right to determine how to manage the terrible situation she finds herself in, and
which we have failed to alleviate.
I suggest that we are now in a position to answer the questions delineated at the
beginning of this chapter as follows: First, whilst acknowledging Aristotle’s observa-
tion that coercion is mixed with regards to voluntariness, we can understand it to
undermine decisional autonomy by virtue of the fact that the coercing party dom-
inates their victim’s will. The coerced agent may thus be understood to choose
voluntarily in the sense that they retain reflective autonomy with respect to their
choice, but they lack the sort of interpersonal voluntariness that is connoted by
retaining freedom from domination. Second, on an adequate, structural understand-
ing of the distinction between threats and offers, both kinds of proposal can be
coercive. We should reject the claim that coercion necessarily involves the use of
threats. Although offers typically enhance the recipient’s freedom, some offers can be
coercive if the offering party is actively preventing the recipient from being in a
preferable alternative pre-proposal situation, or by creating their circumstances of
vulnerability; this interference with the recipient’s circumstances is necessary to
ensure that the offer serves to dominate the recipient’s will, even if it can be
understood to enhance their freedoms in their post-interference circumstances.
This conclusion echoes the conclusions of both the preference view and the compa-
tibilist view; however, I have provided a new explanation of why this is the right
conclusion to draw, that links our understanding of threats and offers to an account
of the relationship between coercion and voluntariness that is absent in the prefer-
ence and compatibilist views. In the final section, I shall explain how this theoretical
analysis can help us in practical discussions of apparently coercive offers, with
reference to the cases delineated in section 1.
5. Practical Applications
The first thing that should be clear from my above analysis is that the quoted
justifications for claiming that the offers outlined in section 1 are coercive are
unconvincing. Offers are not coercive just because they are made against the back-
ground of a substantial loss of freedom; to claim otherwise would jeopardize the
possibility of informed consent in various medical contexts. However, there are a
number of things we can learn from considering the practical application of theor-
etical accounts of coercion and autonomy.
First, the terminology of coercion in practical debates does not always follow the
philosophical use, or map on to the kind of wrong that the philosophical use aims to
capture. Consider for instance the case of the TGN1412 trial. On the philosophical
analysis I have provided, the proposal to withhold the incentive of payment following
withdrawal from the study can be understood as the negative expression of an offer.
The initial offer amounted to a proposal to provide payment (which would otherwise
not have been provided) iff the proposed-to party complies with the proposer’s
demand to fully participate in the study. Proposing to withhold the incentive if the
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proposed-to party does not comply is to restate the proposal in negative terms.
Having established that the proposal in question is an offer, one can then ask whether
it is coercive. On the account I have explored above, for this to be so, the body
running the study would have had to have been responsible for ensuring that the
participants were in a circumstance of vulnerability prior to the offer being made.
Some of the ethicists who made the claim that the participants of the trial were
coerced focused on the large amount of money that had been offered to partici-
pants.⁶¹ As my discussion of the nature of offers above should make clear, the
problem with claiming that it is coercive to offer individuals large amounts of
money in return for some service is that we often offer people inducements to
perform tasks, and the recipients of these offers can clearly consent to these trans-
actions. Indeed, in some cases, it may be irrational for them not to; I might plausibly
be described as irrational if I refused the offer of £1million to give a lecture, say.⁶²
Naturally, the amount of money offered is relevant to our understanding of whether
an offer is going to be sufficiently attractive to succeed in changing the recipient’s
beliefs about what they have most reason to do. However, such an offer can only be
said to amount to a domination of the will of the sort that coercion entails if it is
considered as part of a larger scheme in which the offering party has already placed
the recipient in a circumstance of vulnerability.⁶³
A plausible explanation of why ethicists might be concerned with the amount of
money offered in these cases is that they are concerned about a different moral
phenomenon. It might be suggested that being offered a large amount of money may
lead the recipients of the offer to fail to adequately attend to other material infor-
mation about the trial (such as the degree of risk to which they will be exposed); on
this understanding, the offered amount may have overwhelmed the recipients into
accepting the offer, no matter the cost.⁶⁴ Whether or not this was the case in the
TGN1412 case is an empirical matter that I cannot address here. However, the point
that I want to make is that this sort of interference with autonomous decision-
making bears more resemblance to informational manipulation than the coercive
interventions with which I have been concerned in this chapter. On this understand-
ing, the offer serves to negatively affect the salience attributed to certain kinds of
reasons, namely those associated with the risks of the trial. This may undermine
autonomy; but it is, I suggest, obfuscatory to describe this intervention as coercive.⁶⁵
Second, determining the involvement of third-party agency is central in claims
regarding coercive offers, and this can be difficult to determine in practical contexts.
⁶¹ Schonfeld et al., ‘Money Matters’.
⁶² On this point, see also Wilkinson, ‘Biomedical Research and the Commercial Exploitation of Human
Tissue’.
⁶³ Emanuel and Miller agree with this broad conclusion that the offer in the TGN1412 trial was not
coercive, but do so by appealing to a normative approach to coercion. Emanuel and Miller, ‘Money and
Distorted Ethical Judgments about Research’.
⁶⁴ Wilkinson calls such cases ‘enormous offer’ cases. Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale. Both Macklin and
Nelson et al. seem to implicitly support the view that such offers can be coercive. See Macklin, ‘The
Paradoxical Case of Payment as Benefit to Research Subjects’; Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of Voluntary
Consent’.
⁶⁵ On a similar point from a normative theorist of voluntariness generally, see Wertheimer, ‘Voluntary
Consent’, 248–9. See also Largent et al., ‘Misconceptions about Coercion and Undue Influence’.
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Determining agency is central to claims regarding coercion because a key aspect of
coercive offers (at least those that invalidate consent) on the account that I have
developed in this chapter is that the offering party is actively preventing the recipient
from being in a preferable pre-proposal situation, or has intentionally created their
circumstances of vulnerability. Only then can such offers amount to the sort of
domination that undermines interpersonal voluntariness. When the recipient’s less
preferable pre-proposal situation has been created by forces of hazard, offers made to
them cannot coerce in a manner that would invalidate their consent.
In the philosophical thought experiments I have been considering, it is easy to
ascertain whether the proposing party was engaged in such active prevention.
However, coercive offers in practice raise far more difficult questions in this regard.
To illustrate, it is easy to imagine a clean philosophical thought experiment in which
Jones offers poverty-stricken Smith £10,000 for one of his kidneys; and we can say
that this offer would only be coercive on the account I have developed if Jones had
already somehow actively made it the case that Smith were financially destitute, and
thus in a position in which refusing the offer was not eligible for choice given his
circumstances. Part of the reason that this case seems so artificial is that it would
rarely be the case that one individual would be responsible for another’s poverty in
this way. However, when we broaden the scope of our consideration in the context of
real world markets for human organs, it might be claimed that structural injustices in
the global economy mean that rich nations can appropriately be construed as actively
preventing people in poor nations from escaping poverty.⁶⁶ Similarly, in the context
of medical trials, even if the team organizing the study were themselves not respon-
sible for creating the financial situation of those who signed up to the study, the
research may have been funded by a governmental body that may at least be
complicit in creating the circumstances of vulnerability that lead individuals to
agree to participate in risky trials.
This of course is a far more complex question that I cannot hope to address here,
and much will depend on the details of particular cases. However, in the light of my
analysis of coercion, defining the scope of what constitutes the ‘offering party’ in
these transactions (at an individual, organizational, or national level), and their role
in intentionally creating the underlying circumstances of vulnerability amongst
recipients of certain kinds of offers, is central to understanding whether we should
construe these practices as coercive. It is also central to distinguishing the wrongs
that coercion involves, from the wrongs involved in manipulation and exploitation.
The less direct, and the less intentional the offering party’s contribution to their
target’s underlying circumstances of vulnerability, the less appropriate the charge of
coercion becomes, and the more likely it is that the wrong involved in making an
offer does not primarily concern autonomy. Instead, if such offers are wrong, it is
likely for the reason that by omitting to remedy their target’s circumstances of
vulnerability without further cost to themselves, the offering party fails to fulfil a
⁶⁶ See, for example Rippon, ‘Imposing Options on People in Poverty’; Annas, ‘Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Organ Sales’. For a response to arguments of this sort, see Wilkinson andMoore, ‘Inducement in
Research’.
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moral duty of easy rescue.⁶⁷ In any case, contrary to what is widely claimed, it is these
issues regarding the relationship between the offering party and their recipient’s
circumstances of vulnerability which are where the real questions about autonomy lie
for coercive offers, rather than the size of the inducement per se.
We may also notice that those who endorse normative accounts of coercion have
to answer a different question in this context. Rather than ascertaining whether such
markets are coercive by asking whether rich nations are actively preventing individ-
uals in poor countries from escaping poverty, they have to ask whether rich nations
are morally failing these individuals by failing to alleviate their poverty. Although
I have suggested that we ought to reject normative accounts, this shows how different
theories of coercion can lead to different normative interpretations of pressing issues
in practical ethics.
Similar issues concerning the role of the offering party in creating circumstances of
vulnerability also arise in the context of offering incarcerated criminals chemical
castration in return for a reduced sentence. Normative accounts can easily deny that
the offer is coercive, presuming that the offender has been legitimately incarcerated
in an establishment that respects the fundamental rights of prisoners; in such
circumstances, the recipient’s rights are not being illegitimately violated in his
baseline state of affairs, against which the offer is made to him. However, on non-
normative accounts, in order to determine whether the offer is coercive, we have to
ascertain whether the proposing party created the prisoner’s circumstances of vul-
nerability (or whether they are ‘actively preventing the recipient from being in a
preferable alternative situation’ to use the framing of the preference view). This seems
implausible when we understand the proposing party as the individual psychiatrist
who makes the offer to the offender; however, it seems more plausible if we
understand the criminal justice system as a collective to constitute the proposing
party. Contrary to Green’s analysis quoted at the beginning of the chapter, the key
issue in considering the coerciveness of this sort of offer is thus not the offender’s
deprivation of liberty per se; the key issue is whether the proposing party should be
construed as the same party that is actively preventing the prisoner from being
released.
A further interesting aspect of this example that my account helps to elucidate is
the relevance of the state’s intentions. John McMillan has argued that the coercive-
ness of the chemical castration offer partly depends on the intention underlying it:
Does the proposing party make the offer with the intention that the recipient will
accept it? If not, then it is hard to see how the offer is coercive.⁶⁸ I agree that the
proposing party’s intentions are important here, since it seems plausible that intend-
ing one’s offer to be accepted may be necessary for that offer to constitute domination
of the recipient’s will. As I have claimed, this is central to understanding the moral
wrongness of coercion. If, on the other hand, the proposing party does not care
whether or not their offer is accepted, it is difficult to see how they are dominating the
recipient’s will, in so far as domination implies directing another to a particular end.
⁶⁷ For more on this duty, see Rulli and Millum, ‘Rescuing the Duty to Rescue’.
⁶⁸ McMillan, ‘The Kindest Cut?’ See also Shaw, ‘Offering Castration to Sex Offenders’.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have mapped out some of the theoretical complexity surrounding
the concept of coercion and its relationship to voluntariness. In doing so, I have
developed a structural account of threats and offers that accords with our common
understanding of these kinds of proposal. Moreover, this account can naturally be
incorporated into a plausible explanation of why coercion undermines decisional
autonomy, in a manner that makes salient its implications for interpersonal volun-
tariness. In turn, this has important implications for our understanding of putative
coercive offers, a concept that has been widely invoked in a number of bioethical
debates. In order for such offers to be coercive in a manner that invalidates consent,
they must involve a violation of the target’s freedom from domination. I have
suggested that offers can involve such a violation if they are made to an individual
who has been placed into a circumstance of vulnerability by the offering party.





So far in this book, I have been primarily concerned with the decisional dimension of
autonomy. In this chapter though, I shall move away from considerations pertaining
to the decisional dimension of autonomy, towards what I described in the introduc-
tion as the ‘practical’ dimension of autonomy. This dimension pertains to an agent’s
ability to act in pursuit of their chosen ends. My aim in this chapter is to explain both
what it is for an agent to be practically autonomous in this way, and how this
dimension of autonomy relates to the cognitive and reflective elements of the
decisional dimension of autonomy (pertaining respectively to the kinds of beliefs
and reflection on one’s motivating desires that decisional autonomy requires). In
particular, I shall suggest that the boundaries of the cognitive element of decisional
autonomy, and of what it is for a belief to be decisionally necessary, are elucidated by
considerations pertaining to the practical dimension of autonomy.
I shall begin by defending the claim that an adequate theory of autonomy should
incorporate conditions pertaining to the practical dimension of autonomy. In section
2, I shall consider some prominent understandings of the nature of freedom, before
going on to suggest, in section 3, how much freedom an agent must have in order to
be minimally practically autonomous. In section 4, I shall argue that practical
autonomy requires holding certain true beliefs; in doing so, I shall suggest that this
informs how we should draw the boundaries of the cognitive element of decisional
dimension of autonomy, a claim that that I shall consider further in my discussion of
informed consent in Chapter 6. In section 5, I shall explain the relationship between
the reflective and practical dimensions of autonomy, and argue that an agent’s beliefs
about what they are free to do importantly influences their decisions. Finally, in
section 6, I shall consider the implications of my arguments for the enhancement and
development of autonomy.
1. Introducing the Practical Dimension of Autonomy
The bioethical principle of respect for autonomy incorporates a negative obligation
that enjoins us to not restrain the autonomous actions of others. As Dan Brock
points out:
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. . . interference with self-determination can involve interference with people’s deciding for
themselves, but also interference with their acting as they have decided they want to act.¹
This negative obligation suggests that there is a practical dimension to the concept of
autonomy as we understand it in bioethical discussion, a dimension that pertains to
the agent’s ability to act in pursuit of their ends.
This understanding of the practical dimension of autonomy overlaps to some
extent with well-known conceptions of freedom in political philosophy. Isaiah Berlin
famously outlined a conception of negative liberty that we use in attempting to
answer the question ‘What is the area within which the subject—a person or group
of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without
interference by other persons?’ For Berlin, negative liberty contrasts with a positive
sense of liberty, a sense that pertains to the kind of freedom required for what I have
called decisional autonomy, or what Berlin suggests is the sense of freedom involved
in being ‘the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or
be, this rather than that’.
Whilst Berlin’s conception of negative freedom has been highly influential, the
conception of the practical dimension of autonomy that I shall outline departs from it
in some important ways, as I shall explain below. Briefly here, rather than being
concerned with what or who is preventing the agent from acting, I shall suggest that
the practical dimension pertains to an individual’s ability to act effectively in pursuit
of their ends. Some initial clarifications of how we ought to understand this claim are
immediately necessary. First, in claiming that autonomy requires that agents are able
to act effectively in pursuit of their ends, I do not mean to claim that they must be
successful in their endeavours; one can of course fail to achieve one’s ends and yet still
be autonomous. Rather, the point undergirding the practical dimension of autonomy
is that being unable to act effectively in pursuit of one’s ends is inimical to one’s
autonomy all things considered, if we understand ‘being able to act effectively’ to
simply mean that an agent (or an authorized proxy for that agent)² is not precluded
from achieving the goal that she autonomously wants to achieve by the absence of
certain kinds of freedom. I shall say more about this below.
Second, the decisional dimension of autonomy is theoretically prior to the prac-
tical dimension with regards to our understanding of an agent’s all things considered
autonomy. If an agent lacks autonomy with respect to their decision about what to
do, then they still lack autonomy all things considered, even if they have the freedom
to act effectively on the basis of that non-autonomous decision. For instance, one
would not be autonomous if one performed an act motivated by a manipulated
desire, even if one was not hindered in successfully performing that act. Accordingly,
although we might agree with the philosopher Thomas Hobbes that irrational beings
may appropriately be described as free in the physical sense that he famously
describes,³ they may not appropriately be described as autonomous on the approach
that I am defending, in so far as they lack decisional autonomy. For the purposes of
¹ Brock, Life and Death, 29. Emphasis added.
² In the interests of brevity I shall henceforth omit this qualification. ³ Hobbes, Leviathan, 139.
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this chapter, unless otherwise stated, I shall henceforth assume that the agents under
discussion are autonomous with respect to their decisions.
Philosophers are sometimes sceptical of the claim that a theory of autonomy
should incorporate conditions pertaining to what I am calling the practical dimen-
sion of autonomy. For instance, John Christman writes:
The ability to act – successfully and as planned – cannot be (a necessary condition of
autonomy). I am often prevented from acting or completing my plans . . . . Such circumstances
make me less free (in a certain sense of freedom), but they do not make me less autonomous, at
least if this latter term is to retain any of its conceptual distinctiveness.⁴
Christman is certainly correct to deny that autonomy cannot require that we are
successful in achieving our goals. However, dismissing considerations pertaining to
the agent’s ability to act from one’s theory of autonomy on this basis is to discount an
important aspect of autonomy due to the inadequacies of an implausibly strong
understanding of it. It is entirely plausible to deny that autonomy requires the ability
to act successfully, whilst maintaining that it may yet require some lower threshold
ability to act in pursuit of one’s goals. This is the kind of condition that I shall defend
in this chapter.
In fact, the failure to accommodate a practical dimension into one’s theory of
autonomy leads to an impoverished discussion of autonomy in bioethics. Three
points speak in favour of this view. The first follows on from my above discussion
of the principle of respect for autonomy; the way in which we use the concept of
autonomy in bioethical contexts suggests that we implicitly understand it to incorp-
orate a practical dimension. For example, we can coherently say that the fact that
euthanasia is illegal severely undermines the autonomy of terminally ill individuals
with decision-making capacity who wish to end their suffering. If we believe that a
theory of autonomy for use in contemporary bioethics should be congruous with our
widespread use of the concept in that context, then it seems that our theory of
autonomy should accommodate a dimension of the concept that it is implicitly
understood to incorporate in our bioethical discussions.
The second point in favour of this view is that acknowledging the practical
dimension of autonomy seems to be necessary if we are to account for the high
prudential value that we afford to autonomy. I shall consider the value of autonomy
in greater detail in Chapter 9; at this point though we might observe that there would
seem to be little prudential value in being autonomous with respect to one’s decisions
if one was perpetually frustrated in one’s attempts to pursue one’s autonomously
chosen ends. If we believe that autonomy bears high prudential value because we
⁴ Christman, The Politics of Persons, 154. Some philosophers are more explicit than others in this regard.
For instance, Taylor rejects the claim that autonomy incorporates a practical dimension, and instead claims
that being able to act effectively in pursuit of one’s ends may increase the value of autonomy (Taylor,
Practical Autonomy and Bioethics). Coggon andMiola explicitly draw a distinction between autonomy and
what I call the practical dimension of autonomy in Coggon and Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty, and Medical
Decision-Making’. However, this tendency is also apparent in the more subtle way in which philosophical
discussions of autonomy typically concern only what I have termed the reflective element of decisional
autonomy. See Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, 83–6, for an analysis of this tendency in the
philosophical literature.
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have a fundamental interest in ‘living a life that is our own’ (as I shall claim in
Chapter 9), then it seems that we should be able to act on the basis of our decisions, as
well as making those decisions in an autonomous manner. John Harris puts the point
in the following, typically forceful, way:
Agents are quintessentially actors; to be an agent is to be capable of action. Without agency, in
this sense, decision-making is . . . both morally and practically barren.⁵
The third and perhaps strongest point in favour of the view that autonomy incorp-
orates a practical dimension is one that I shall develop over the course of this chapter.
To put it simply here though, if we fail to acknowledge the practical dimension of
autonomy in our overall theory of autonomy, it is not clear that we can adequately
account for considerations that are important for cashing out elements of decisional
autonomy. In the previous chapter, I noted that coercion serves to undermine
decisional autonomy because the coercing agent subjugates her victim’s will by
controlling their practically available alternatives. In this chapter, I shall also argue
that considerations pertaining to our practical freedoms should play an important
role in understanding the boundaries of the cognitive element of decisional auton-
omy, and the way in which our beliefs about what we are free to do can have crucial
effects on our choices. In this regard, whilst we should acknowledge Berlin’s insight
that considerations of decisional autonomy (or what he calls positive liberty) often
conflict with considerations of practical autonomy (or what he calls negative liberty),
we should not overlook the ways in which there can be other positive interactions
between these two dimensions of autonomy.
The fundamental point that grounds this view is that, we make our choices, and
sustain our motivating desires in the light of our beliefs about what is practically
realizable. Indeed, the significant implications of these beliefs for motivation, agency,
and choice have been empirically demonstrated in the literature of self-efficacy.⁶ If
one is to account for this crucial theoretical point, one cannot ignore considerations
pertaining to the practical dimension of autonomy in one’s overall theory. Moreover,
a theory of autonomy that incorporates this feature will be better able to accommo-
date key insights of relational autonomy. Our ability and freedom to act, and our
beliefs in our self-efficacy are not just a function of our own capabilities; they are also
mediated by our social circumstances and relationships, as I shall explore below.⁷
This last feature suggests that in investigating the relationship between freedom
and autonomy, we must distinguish the implications of one’s freedom at the point of
action from one’s freedom at the point of decision. I return to this distinction below;
first though, I shall explain two different senses of freedom that might be employed in
this discussion.
⁵ Harris, ‘ “ . . . How Narrow the Strait!” ’, 249.
⁶ Bandura et al., ‘Self-Efficacy Beliefs as Shapers of Children’s Aspirations and Career Trajectories’;
Axelrod and Lehman, ‘Responding to Environmental Concerns’; Krueger and Dickson, ‘How Believing in
Ourselves Increases Risk Taking’; Bandura, ‘Perceived Self-Efficacy in the Exercise of Personal Agency’.
Further, for a discussion of how medical therapy can alter self-perceptions of authenticity and autonomy
by enhancing agency, see Haan et al., ‘Becoming More Oneself?’
⁷ Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, 95.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
     
2. Positive and Negative Freedom
If an agent is to be able to act effectively in pursuit of their ends, they will need to have
certain sorts of freedoms. As such, a natural starting point for an investigation into
the practical dimension of autonomy is to carry out a consideration of different
understandings of liberty or freedom (like Berlin I shall use the terms
interchangeably).⁸
As I outlined in the previous section, it is commonly claimed that there are two
separate understandings of freedom. First, freedom understood as the absence of
constraint represents a negative conception of freedom; negative freedom may
broadly be construed as freedom from interfering debilitating forces that prevent
the agent from acting. This description of negative freedom represents the first way in
which my conception of practical autonomy departs from Berlin’s conception of
negative freedom; unlike Berlin, I do not claim that the freedom in question here can
only be negated by agential forces. On the conception that I am developing here,
forces of hazard, such as disease or disability,⁹ can be understood to restrict an agent’s
practical autonomy in the sense that they can impede agents from being able to act
effectively in pursuit of their ends. In this sense, the conception of practical auton-
omy that I am developing is apolitical; I have noted the relevance of agential
intentional influences on decisional autonomy in previous chapters.
There is a second sense in which my conception of practical autonomy is broader
than negative freedom as it is commonly construed. On some occasions, we may have
the requisite negative freedoms to pursue our goals, but still be unable to do so
because we lack certain abilities.
Such cases suggest that we also have a positive conception of practical freedom, in
which freedom is constituted not by the absence of restraint, but rather by the
presence of capacities or conditions that enable the agent to be effective in the pursuit
of their ends.¹⁰ Again, I shall depart from Berlin’s terminology and follow others in
using the term ‘positive freedom’ to refer to this element of practical autonomy,
rather than to considerations pertaining to the control required for decisional
autonomy.
Bernard Berofsky aims to capture the essence of this alternative conception of
positive freedom by claiming that this sense of freedom is constituted by those
personal traits that are ‘ . . . essential or highly useful to the satisfaction of a wide
range of activities and decisions’.¹¹ However, this conception of positive freedom is
too broad. Whilst it is true that many abilities are generally useful for the pursuit of a
wide range of goals, an agent’s ability to pursue her ends may require very specific
⁸ Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 34. See Pitkin, ‘Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?’ for a discussion of
ways in which one might distinguish between the two terms.
⁹ For a discussion of how mental disorder can undermine practical (and also decisional) autonomy, see
Bolton and Banner, ‘Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy?’
¹⁰ Of course, Berlin famously understood positive freedom in a broader sense; however, as Miller points
out, Berlin’s concept of positive freedom incorporates ‘a number of quite different doctrines’ (Miller,
‘Introduction’, 10). In order to avoid a lengthy exegesis of Berlin’s essay here, I shall instead consider
Berofsky’s narrower conception of positive freedom.
¹¹ Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 16.
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freedoms that are not essential to widely pursued activities. For instance, although
having 20/20 unaided vision is not useful for the pursuit of a wide range of goals
(assuming that we have easy access to visual aids such as spectacles and contact
lenses), a person with slightly impaired vision who wants to become a military fighter
pilot nonetheless lacks a physical capability that is necessary for them to achieve their
goal. Agents can thus lack positive freedoms that are important for the pursuit of
their goals, but that are not essential for the pursuit of a wide range of activities.
Conversely, agents might lack freedoms that are important for the pursuit of a
wide range of goals, and yet still have the positive freedom to act in pursuit of what it
is that they want to do. To illustrate consider the case of the slave-philosopher
Epictetus. In view of the fact that he was born a slave, Epictetus clearly lacked
negative freedom of the sort that is necessary for the effective pursuit of the vast
majority of life-plans. Yet, even supposing this, Epictetus was nonetheless free, in
both the negative and positive sense, to pursue his goal of living a life of philosophical
reflection. Pace Berofsky, positive freedom of the sort that is central to an agent’s
practical autonomy is constituted by those traits and capacities that she requires in
order to pursue an end that she herself is motivated to achieve.
Although the distinction between positive and negative freedom is widely adopted,
it is somewhat problematic. In some cases, it may be unclear whether some factor is
an element of positive or negative freedom; for example, it may not be clear whether
we should understand intelligence as a constituent of positive freedom, or a lack of
intelligence as a barrier to negative freedom.¹² In questioning the utility of the
distinction, Joel Feinberg argues that we can have a comprehensive understanding
of freedom as being constituted by freedom from preventative causes, given a
sufficiently nuanced analysis of such causes, and the constraints to which they give
rise. He suggests that we should analyse preventative causes as giving rise to the
following two sorts of constraint:
(1) A negative constraint = A preventative cause constituted by the absence of
some enabling factor.
(2) A positive constraint = A preventative cause constituted by the presence of
some debilitating factor.¹³
Once these distinctions are made, it seems that we might obviate the need for a
distinction between positive and negative freedom; freedom is just constituted by
freedoms from different sorts of constraints.¹⁴
I am sympathetic to this view. Nevertheless, since I lack the space to further defend
this alternative conception, and given the prevalent use of the vocabulary of positive
and negative freedom, I believe that the clarity of the following discussion will be best
served by adhering to an understanding that employs this distinction. However,
I shall use the language of positive and negative freedom in the attenuated sense that
Feinberg suggests is harmless, whereby positive freedom is characterized as the
¹² Ibid., 42. See also MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’.
¹³ See Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 5–6.
¹⁴ This sentiment is shared by MacCallum’s account in MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’.
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absence of a negative constraint, and negative freedom is characterized as the absence
of a positive constraint.¹⁵
The conception of the practical dimension of autonomy is thus broader than
Berlin’s conception of negative freedom. It can be impeded by non-agential forces,
and it incorporates elements of a sense of ‘positive freedom’ which is quite distinct
from Berlin’s understanding of that term. To conclude this part of the discussion, we
can observe that a better historical precedent for the element of autonomy that I am
seeking to identify here is Hobbes’ understanding of physical freedom rather than
Berlin’s conception of liberty, where ‘physical freedom’ is defined in the
following way:
a Free-man is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not
hindered to do what he has a will to.¹⁶
3. Autonomy, Freedom at the Point of Action, and the
Modal Test
The question of how much freedom autonomy requires is a complex one, not least
because of the difference between the two conceptions of freedom identified in the
previous section. A further difficulty arises due to the fact that the question can be
raised at two salient points.¹⁷ First, we might raise it at what we may term ‘the point
of action’, when the agent has already decided to act in some way. Raised at this
point, the question of freedom is primarily relevant to the practical dimension of
autonomy. However, the question may be raised prior to the point of action, at what
we might term the ‘point of decision’, that is, prior to when the agent has decided
what it is she will do. Raised at this point, an agent’s beliefs about what she is free to
do may also impinge on the decisional dimension of their autonomy, as I shall go on
to explain.
As such, in order to answer the question of how much freedom autonomy
requires, we must carry out two separate investigations. In this section, I shall
begin by considering how much freedom an agent requires at the point of action in
order to be able to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I shall consider how much
freedom may be required at the point of decision in section 5.
We can begin by observing that practical autonomy cannot require absolute
negative freedom (at the point of action), that is, the absence of all possible positive
constraints on action, since we can be positively constrained from doing something
without that constraint being inimical to our ability to achieve our ends. For instance,
consider this example:
Harry has been asked by Jane to look after her dog. Suppose that Harry would instead like to
visit the nearby pub. However, Harry decides to stay and look after the dog because he wants to
prove his dependability to Jane. Now, suppose that Jane locks Harry in the house with the dog,
¹⁵ Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 7. ¹⁶ Hobbes, Leviathan, 139.
¹⁷ This distinction maps onto Berofsky’s distinction between freedom of action and freedom of decision.
Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 26–7.
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because she is aware that Harry will have spotted the pub on his way in. However, Harry does
not realize he is locked in, having already resolved to stay in the room looking after the dog.¹⁸
In this example, Harry is positively constrained from leaving the room. However,
although he seems to lack a significant negative freedom, Harry still has the negative
freedom to do what he is motivated to do; he is not positively constrained from
looking after the dog. Now, although it might be correct to claim that Harry would
enjoy greater freedom if he were not locked into the room, it is not the case that
having this freedom would render him more able to effectively pursue his end.
Assuming, as is the case in the above example, that prior knowledge of a lack of
negative freedom is not impinging on Harry’s decision about what to do, his lacking
the freedom to leave the room does not seem to reduce his autonomy in any
significant way.
The contrast between freedom at the point of action and autonomy is also
highlighted by cases in which agents sacrifice certain negative freedoms as an
expression of their autonomy. To illustrate this, consider the case of Odysseus and
the Sirens:
Not wanting to be lured onto the rocks by the sirens, (Odysseus) commands his men to tie him
to the mast and refuse all later orders he will give to be set free. He wants to have his freedom
limited so that he can survive.¹⁹
Here, if the crew removed the positive constraints preventing Odysseus from leaving
the ship, this would hinder his ability to pursue his goal of hearing the sirens’ song
without being lured from his ship. We can interpret this case as one in which the
agent autonomously decides to limit their own negative freedom to do certain things,
on the basis that having such freedoms would hinder their effective pursuit of their
chosen goal. Far from enhancing his practical autonomy, removing the positive
constraint on Odysseus’ action whilst the ship sailed past the sirens would have
been inimical to his practical autonomy, and allowed him to act instead on a
compelled desire to swim to his death, a desire with respect to which he would not
be autonomous. Similarly, in order to participate in civilized society, we may also
have to sacrifice a number of freedoms as part of our social lives. However, we may be
understood to implicitly consent to the sacrifice of certain freedoms (such as the
freedom to commit acts of violence), on the basis that our doing so is a condition of
the social contract that affords us a number of strong and important protections that
better enable us to pursue our own independent goals.
These cases suggest that what is important with regards to the negative freedom
that practical autonomy requires at the point of action is not the number of options
that one has the negative freedom to pursue, but rather whether one has the
particular negative freedom to pursue the end that one has decided to pursue. In
order to be able to act effectively in pursuit of their end, an agent cannot be positively
constrained from doing so.
¹⁸ This is a Lockean variant of a so-called Frankfurt example. See Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and
Moral Responsibility’ and Locke, An Essay on Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXI.
¹⁹ Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 14–15.
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There are perhaps some limits to this; for instance, we might claim that we should
not allow an agent the negative freedom to completely abandon their future negative
freedom, by selling herself into slavery say. However, we should be clear about why
this matters for autonomy. On the account that I am defending, the reason that
selling oneself into slavery is problematic is that in doing so, the agent abdicates their
negative freedom to act in accordance with a future desire that they might develop to
not live as a slave.²⁰ Whilst respecting the agent’s locally autonomous decision here
requires that we do not positively constrain her from becoming a slave, we might still
positively constrain her from doing this in the name of her global autonomy. This,
I suggest, is a case in which respecting local and global autonomy might require
different things of us; I shall consider other such cases in Chapter 9. However, the
mere fact that the slave desires to subjugate herself to another’s authority for the rest
of her life is not necessarily incompatible with her global autonomy on the view I am
defending in this book, as some theorists have maintained.²¹
As is the case with negative freedom, lacking certain positive freedoms need not
always be inimical to our practical autonomy. After all, we all lack certain capabilities,
but this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of our practical autonomy. Most
obviously, some freedoms are just irrelevant to our ability to pursue our ends. For
example, if I do not enjoy listening to or playing music, the fact that I lack perfect
pitch does not seem to prevent me from being practically autonomous. My above
discussion of positive freedom also suggests that different agents might require
different positive freedoms to act in pursuit of their goals. Whilst there may be
certain abilities that most agents require to do this, it seems that an agent with
suitably esoteric goals could require very different sorts of positive freedoms from
other agents.
With these reflections in mind, and being mindful of the fact that a plausible
theory of autonomy cannot require that agents are always successful in achieving
their ends, I am now in a position to explain what it means for an agent to be able to
act effectively in pursuit of their ends in the sense that I invoked when introducing
the practical dimension of autonomy. In some cases, positive constraints that take
away an agent’s negative freedom will preclude the agent from pursuing a certain
goal in any sense; for example. The question of whether an agent has the requisite
negative freedom for practical autonomy may thus seem to be a binary question; it is
either the case that a debilitating factor that precludes the pursuit of a goal is present,
or it is not.
An analogous claim could be made with regards to some positive freedoms; if an
agent lacks certain enabling factors, they may be precluded from acting effectively in
pursuit of their goals in any sense. For instance, I shall argue below that an agent may
lack practical autonomy if they are informationally cut-off from achieving their goals
by virtue of holding certain false beliefs. Call these sorts of freedoms discrete
²⁰ This is how Dworkin explains the wrongness of selling oneself into slavery. See Dworkin,
‘Paternalism’.
²¹ See Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, 86–9; Waller, ‘Natural Autonomy and Alternative
Possibilities’. For a similar reply to the one given above, see Sneddon, ‘What’s Wrong with Selling Yourself
Into Slavery?’
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freedoms. With regards to discrete freedoms, we may say that an agent is only able to
act effectively in pursuit of a goal whose achievement requires certain discrete
freedoms, if they actually have those freedoms.
However, many of our freedoms admit of degrees. For instance, it seems plausible
to claim that the pursuit of different goals might require different degrees of
intelligence. Scalar freedoms such as intelligence present something of a theoretical
problem with regards to practical autonomy, since it cannot be the case that an agent
must have the maximum degree of some particular scalar positive freedom in order
for it to be appropriate to claim that they are able to act effectively in pursuit of their
ends; this would make the standards of autonomy far too demanding. Therefore, in
cases in which the pursuit of some goal requires a scalar freedom x, it seems that we
must stipulate that there is some threshold level of x that the agent must reach in
order to be practically autonomous. However, as I pre-empted above, in stipulating
the relevant threshold here, we must also allow for the possibility that an autonomous
agent could have the threshold level of this scalar positive freedom and yet fail to
achieve their goal. If practical autonomy is not to be too demanding, it cannot require
that the practically autonomous agent must always succeed in their endeavours.
One plausible way of cashing out the notion of ‘having the necessary positive
freedom to be able to act effectively in pursuit of some goal’ in a way that meets these
criteria is to apply a modal test. First, we may appropriately be said to have such
freedom, if there is some nearby possible world in which we have the same degree of
positive freedom, and in which we do successfully achieve our goal. However, if there
is no nearby possible world in which the agent has the same degree of freedom under
consideration, and in which they successfully achieve their goal, it is plausible to
claim that their failure to achieve their goal in the real world may be attributable to
their lacking this freedom.²² We may say that lacking the degree of freedom in
question is thus sufficient (although perhaps not necessary)²³ for establishing that
the agent lacks practical autonomy; they are modally precluded from successfully
achieving their goal by the lack of this particular freedom. This formulation gives
substance to what it means to have the necessary scalar positive freedom to be able to
act effectively in pursuit of some goal, without committing us to the view that being
practically autonomous requires that the agent must succeed in the pursuit of her
goals, or that she has the maximum degree of a particular scalar positive freedom.
Accordingly, at the point of action, the freedom (in both the positive and negative
sense) that is required for practical autonomy is the freedom to act effectively in
pursuit of one’s own ends in the manner that I have delineated above.²⁴ This view
²² For a seminal discussion of the role of possible worlds in the logic of counterfactual conditional
statements, see Stalnaker, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’.
²³ I am leaving open the possibility that agents who are not modally precluded from success could
nonetheless lack practical autonomy for other reasons.
²⁴ One potential objection to this account is that it might be understood to entail that agents who have a
preference to achieve an outcome that cannot possibly be achieved (say of flying unaided) can be said to
lack practical autonomy. I am prepared to accept this point, but only because it has limited force. The
reason for this is that on the account of autonomy that I developed in Chapter 2, agents will not be
autonomous with respect to such preferences, in so far as preferences are understood to be action-guiding.
Recall that on the theory that I developed in Chapter 2, preferences are understood to be rational desires for
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resonates with relational and embodied approaches to understanding autonomy. We
act in the world as embodied agents, and this unavoidably shapes the boundaries of
our freedoms in quite obvious ways; consider the example of a patient suffering from
locked-in syndrome.²⁵ Furthermore, many of the resources and freedoms that we
require to live in accordance with our autonomous desires are socially mediated.²⁶
Whilst it is true that we all need social resources such as education to enable us to
pursue our goals, as Anderson and Honneth point out, vulnerable individuals may be
particularly reliant on social conditions for their practical autonomy, as this discus-
sion makes clear:
Consider, for example, the autonomy of people with mobility-limiting disabilities. Unless
physical accommodations are made for such persons—wheelchair ramps, accessible vehicles,
and so on—their ability to exercise their basic capabilities will be restricted in a way that
constitutes a loss of autonomy. In general, the argument here is that the commitment to
fostering autonomy—especially of the vulnerable—leads to a commitment, as a matter of social
justice, to guaranteeing what one might call the material and institutional circumstances of
autonomy.
It is important to acknowledge the exact extent of the claim that practical autonomy
requires the freedom to act effectively in pursuit of one’s ends. First, this claim
pertains only to the freedom required at the point of action, and only to ends that
the agent decides to pursue in accordance with the conditions of decisional
autonomy.
Second, in making the above claim, I am seeking only to give an account of the
freedom required for practical autonomy, and not an account of the nature of
freedom itself. This is important, since defining freedom itself as relative to an agent’s
desires or motives seems to involve a conceptual confusion. To see why, consider the
example of Tom Pinch discussed by Joel Feinberg.²⁷ Tom Pinch is gifted with the
freedom to do everything but act effectively in pursuit of the one end that truly
matters to him. Feinberg points out that Tom Pinch does not lack freedom per se;
after all, ex hypothesi, Tom Pinch enjoys almost every conceivable freedom. Rather,
Feinberg claims that Tom Pinch lacks only contentment.²⁸ In view of my arguments
above, whilst we should agree that Pinch is free, we should also note that Feinberg
conflates contentment and the practical dimension of autonomy in claiming that
Pinch lacks only contentment. In addition to my arguments regarding the practical
dimension above, two further points speak against Feinberg’s interpretation of the
a certain motivating desire to be effective in moving one to act. I also argued in Chapter 2 that an agent’s
preferences must cohere with their non-irrational acceptances. The problem then with the preferences that
I am considering here is that they will fail to cohere with an important set of the agent’s acceptances;
namely, their beliefs concerning their freedom at the point of decision. I shall discuss this in section 5.
Notice that this view is compatible both with the claim that agents may autonomously harbour ‘pipe-
dreams’ in a non-action-guiding sense, and the claim that they can be autonomous in pursuing these goals
if they (non-irrationally) believe that they can be achieved.
²⁵ For further discussion of the significance of embodiment to autonomy, see Christman, The Politics of
Persons, 10.
²⁶ Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’; Anderson and Honneth, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability,
Recognition, and Justice’; Young, Personal Autonomy.
²⁷ Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 38. ²⁸ Ibid., 38–9.
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example. First, one can fail to achieve one’s goal despite having the freedoms
necessary to its effective pursuit; thus, having the requisite freedom does not entail
contentment in the way that Feinberg’s interpretation seems to suggest. Second, one
may be mistaken in thinking that achieving a certain goal will bring contentment;
having the freedom to do what one most wants to do is thus not guaranteed to bring
contentment.
The problem for Tom Pinch is that he lacks a freedom that is necessary, at the
point of action, for his practical autonomy. This is not to say that the freedom that
autonomy requires at the point of action exhausts the concept of freedom; the nature
of freedom goes beyond the freedoms that are necessary for practical autonomy.
Although we may say that Tom Pinch is generally free, he is not practically autono-
mous because he lacks the freedom to act effectively in pursuit of the one end that he
actually wants to achieve. If this conclusion is correct, then we might observe one of
its corollaries, namely the implication that our freedoms can be increased in ways
that are inconsequential to our practical autonomy at the point of action. For
example, recall the example of Harry above. Suppose that Jane returned to her
room after half an hour and, again unbeknownst to Harry, unlocked the room that
Harry was in. This would increase Harry’s freedom, but it is far from clear that it
would increase his autonomy in staying in the room.
This suggests something interesting about the relationship between practical
autonomy and freedom. If, as the above discussion suggests, all that matters at the
point of action is whether the agent has the freedom to act effectively in pursuit of the
ends that they have decided to achieve, then the agent’s freedom to do otherwise is
inconsequential to their practical autonomy at the point of action. One might worry
that this claim is in tension with another popular view, namely the view that
autonomy requires freedom of choice. For example, Hurka assumes that ‘autonomy
involves choice from a wide range of options’,²⁹ and Raz claims that an autonomous
person must have ‘adequate options available for him to choose from’.³⁰ Although
I shall suggest that Raz and Hurka are not entirely correct here (for reasons that
I shall explain in section 5), their claims above are not in tension with my conclusion
that the agent’s freedom to do otherwise is inconsequential to their autonomy at the
point of action. Indeed, Raz and Hurka might agree with this conclusion; instead,
they would claim that freedom of choice is crucial for autonomy at the point of
decision.
Before considering the relationship between autonomy and choice at the point of
decision, it is prudent to address the way in which holding certain true beliefs seems
to be necessary for the effective pursuit of many of our ends. In doing so, I shall
consider one way in which considerations pertaining to the practical dimension of
autonomy have implications for our understanding of decisionally necessary beliefs
that play a central role in the cognitive element of decisional autonomy.
²⁹ Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’, 362.
³⁰ Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 373. See also Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’.
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4. True Beliefs, Autonomy, and Modality
An agent’s beliefs play an important role in decisional autonomy. In order for an
agent to regard an outcome x as good in a reason-implying sense in the manner that
reflective autonomy requires, she must hold certain beliefs about the descriptive
features of x, and about the good. In Chapter 2, I argued that an agent must meet a
minimum threshold of theoretical rationality in holding these beliefs if she is to
qualify as being autonomous with respect to the motivating desires that she sustains
on their basis.
However, in the introductory chapter, I suggested that decisional autonomy also
incorporates a cognitive element pertaining to the agent’s understanding of their
action or decision. This element reflects the Aristotelian claim that actions performed
from reasons of ignorance are non-voluntary; the thought here is that decisional
autonomy requires that agents hold certain true, and not merely theoretically
rational beliefs.
In bioethical contexts, it is natural for theorists to suppose that there is some
important relationship between autonomy and true beliefs, by virtue of the com-
monplace assumption that autonomy is closely related to the doctrine of informed
consent, and the criterion of understanding incorporated into the standard account
of autonomy in bioethics. However, the claim that there is an important relationship
between autonomy and true beliefs is not universally endorsed in the recent philo-
sophical literature.³¹ Wilkinson captures a common sentiment when he writes:
A person may have false beliefs about his or her options without his or her autonomy being
affected; who has true beliefs about all their options?³²
Wilkinson uses this observation to motivate his claim that an agent’s lack of
autonomy may only be attributable to their holding false beliefs if they have been
intentionally deceived into holding them. What matters for Wilkinson is how the
agent comes to hold these beliefs, and not the content of the beliefs themselves.³³
I argued against this view in Chapter 3. Here though, I wish to reiterate the point that
the quoted observation provides insufficient support for Wilkinson’s own position.
The mere fact that autonomy is compatible with some false beliefs does not entail
(and provides little support for) the claim that decisional autonomy is compatible
with all and any false beliefs.
What is needed then is a nuanced account of the different sorts of beliefs that can
affect our decisional autonomy. Aristotle also recognized this in his discussion of the
sense of voluntariness that is undermined by ignorance. Aristotle does not make the
mistake of over-generalizing this claim, taking care to note that not all forms of
ignorance undermine voluntariness. First, he notes that ignorance does not under-
mine voluntariness if the agent herself is responsible for her state of ignorance; this
³¹ For two examples of theorists who claim that false beliefs do not undermine autonomy, see McKenna,
‘The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency’, 208–9; Arpaly, ‘Responsibility,
Applied Ethics, and Complex Autonomy Theories’, 175; Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’.
³² Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’, 345. ³³ Ibid.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
 , ,   
amounts to acting in ignorance, rather than acting from ignorance.³⁴ More pertin-
ently for my purposes here though, on the Aristotelian conception, only ignorance of
particulars, that is, of ‘the circumstances of action and the objects with which it is
concerned’³⁵ can undermine voluntariness. This is to be contrasted with ignorance of
proharesis, which has been translated by some commentators as ‘moral purpose’, and
ignorance of universal truths, neither of which undermine voluntariness for
Aristotle.³⁶
Instead, Aristotle lists a number of examples of particulars, an agent’s ignorance of
which would undermine the voluntariness of their action; these include ignorance of
who one is, of what one is doing, of the sphere in which or to what one is doing it,
what it is that one is doing it with, of what it is for, and of the way in which one is
doing it.³⁷ However, he does not provide a principled basis for including these
particulars but not others. Yet, it is clear that voluntary decisions can be made
from ignorance concerning some particulars of one’s decision; Wilkinson is abso-
lutely correct on this point. For instance, we can clearly make voluntary decisions
despite our ignorance of what future states will actually obtain. The fact that I do not
know whether a coin will land heads or tails does not preclude the possibility that
I may voluntarily make a bet that it will land heads.
We thus need to provide an account of the limitations to the scope of forms of
ignorance that can undermine voluntariness. The claim I want to make in this section
is that there is a principled way in which we can appropriately delimit this scope,
grounded in considerations of practical autonomy. I shall claim that ignorance of
particulars is sufficient to undermine voluntariness if the particulars in question are
such that the agent must hold true beliefs about them if her action is to be appro-
priately connected to the pursuit of her intended end. Such a claim, if true, shows that
there is an important relationship between the decisional and practical dimensions of
autonomy, and thus that an adequate theory of autonomy in toto should incorporate
at least some considerations pertaining to practical autonomy.
In order for an agent to be able to act effectively in pursuit of the end that she is
motivated to achieve, it is clear that she must have certain true beliefs about how to
go about achieving that end. Indeed, if an agent acts in a manner that she is incorrect
in believing will serve as a means to achieving her chosen end, her action will be
importantly disconnected from that motive, and the values underlying it. Thus, as
Suzy Killmister observes in discussing the significance of false beliefs to autonomy:
Nomatter how autonomous an agent’s motivations are, the action itself cannot be autonomous
unless it is appropriately connected to the motivation behind it.³⁸
Since our decisions are made partly on the basis of our descriptive beliefs about the
world, if these beliefs are false they can serve to sever the connection between our
actions and our underlying motivations and values. Alfred Mele also captures this
sort of thought when he suggests that being ‘informationally cut-off ’ precludes one
from autonomous agency. He writes:
³⁴ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110b 25–9. ³⁵ Ibid., 1110b 34–1111a.
³⁶ Ibid., 1110b 30–1111a. ³⁷ Ibid., 1111a 3–6.
³⁸ Killmister, ‘Autonomy and False Beliefs’, 521.
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[A] sufficient condition of S’s being informationally cut-off from autonomous action in a
domain in which S has intrinsic pro-attitudes is that S has no control over the success of his
efforts to achieve his end, owing to his informational condition.³⁹
To illustrate this thought, consider the following example, which I considered in an
earlier chapter (but for a different purpose this time). Suppose that Sheila wants to
quench her thirst, and pours a clear liquid from her kitchen tap into her glass.
Accordingly, let us assume that Sheila has decisive apparent epistemic reason to
believe that the glass contains water, and that the water will quench her thirst.
However, suppose that she is mistaken in her belief; the liquid is, in fact,
contaminated.
In view of my arguments in the previous chapter, Shelia meets the conditions of
reflective autonomy with respect to her motivating desire here: She does what she
believes she has strong self-interested reason to do. She is also theoretically rational
with respect to the beliefs that ground this desire. However, her (theoretically
rational) false belief undermines her ability to act effectively in pursuit of her
intended end, by severing the connection between her chosen end, namely to
alleviate her thirst, and how she actually attempts to achieve it.⁴⁰ She is not wholly
self-governing in her conduct because we can plausibility attribute her failure to
achieve her desired end to the fact that she held that particular false belief.
Some theorists are critical of informational conditions on autonomy because they
take them to entail that one must be successful in one’s actions in order to be
autonomous with respect to them.⁴¹ This of course would make the standards of
autonomy far too demanding. However, the claim that I am advancing here is
compatible with the claim that an agent can be autonomous when she fails to achieve
her end. The point is that the agent’s poor informational condition should not thwart
the possibility of her being successful in achieving her end, by virtue of disconnecting
her act from her intention. Successful action can be thwarted by false beliefs, and a
failure to hold certain key true beliefs.
To illustrate why this is not problematic, consider Suzy Killmister’s example of a
woman, Jill, who attempts to intentionally kill a man, Jack, by hitting him over the
head with a crowbar.⁴² Although Jill fails, Killmister claims that she is nonetheless
autonomous, because her failure to achieve her end is not due to her poor informa-
tional condition. Killmister herself does not elaborate further on how Jill differs from
someone like Sheila in my earlier example with regards to her poor informational
condition, and why Jill is autonomous when Sheila is not. On the approach that I am
advocating here though, this is a crucial point; in order to ascertain when ignorance
³⁹ Mele, Autonomous Agents, 181, emphasis added.
⁴⁰ One can describe Shelia’s actions in ways that make it appear that she is practically autonomous. If we
describe the end that Shelia is hoping to achieve as ‘getting the liquid in the glass to her mouth’, then her act
of picking up the glass and putting it to her mouth is clearly connected to her motive in an appropriate way.
However, to the extent that we identify the end that ‘getting the liquid in the glass to her mouth’ itself serves
as a means to (i.e. alleviating her thirst), we see that this act is not appropriately connected to her motive,
given that the glass contains contaminated liquid. This illustrates the importance of precision in how we
individuate the agent’s acts when we are assessing her autonomy.
⁴¹ See McKenna, ‘The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency’.
⁴² Killmister, ‘Autonomy and False Beliefs’, 525.
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undermines voluntariness, we need to have some way of establishing that the agent’s
failure to achieve her end is due to her poor informational condition, and when it
is not.
Here, I suggest that we can militate the sort of modal test that I described above
regarding positive freedom. We may say that Jill’s failure is not attributable to her
false beliefs if there is a nearby possible world in which Jill holds the same set of
beliefs in the relevant circumstances, and in which she successfully achieves her end.
Whilst this is true of Jill, it is not true of Sheila. The modal test thus allows us to
identify the sorts of beliefs that can preclude autonomy by severing the vital con-
nection between the actions we take to realize the ends that we value.
False beliefs about future states of affairs that we nonetheless previously had strong
epistemic reasons to think would obtain, do not pass this modal test. To illustrate,
suppose that I rationally believe that some bad future outcome of very low probability
will not occur, say an extremely adverse side-effect of a medical treatment with a <1
per cent chance of occurring. On the basis of this belief, I consent to the treatment
because I believe that it will be effective, and that it is necessary for safeguarding my
health. Let us suppose that, unfortunately for me, the improbable negative side-effect
does in fact occur; my belief that it would not occur turned out to be false. The point
about the modal test is that this is not the sort of false belief that precludes my
decisional autonomy in consenting to the procedure. The reason for this is that there
are a large number of nearby possible worlds in which I held the same belief (that the
side-effect would not occur), and in which I was successful in achieving the goal I had
chosen to pursue by initiating this course of action.⁴³
We can use the modal test to identify other particulars that the agent must hold
true beliefs about if her action is to be appropriately connected to the pursuit of her
intended end. If there is a nearby possible world in which the agent either holds false
beliefs about some particular (or is simply ignorant of true information about that
particular in the relevant circumstances), but is nonetheless successful in achieving
her desired end, then her ignorance about this particular in reality does not provide
sufficient grounds for her failure to achieve her end. If, however, there is no nearby
possible world in which this is the case, then ignorance about that particular is
sufficient to undermine voluntariness. The particular in question can then be said to
be the object of a decisionally necessary belief.
Two further things are worth noting. First, autonomy may plausibly be under-
mined even when an agent is not completely ignorant of some decisionally relevant
particular. An agent may be aware of some relevant piece of information, but fail to
adequately grasp its implications for their decision. This is particularly salient in the
medical context; the understanding that autonomy requires is not the mere aware-
ness of material information about one’s condition or proposed treatment, but also
the appreciation that this information applies to oneself. Accordingly, we might
⁴³ There may be some cases in which a very rare side-effect is a guaranteed product of some extremely
abnormal unknown feature of one’s physiology (such that it would obtain in every world in which one’s
physiology remains the same). Would a failure to believe that the side-effect will occur in one’s circum-
stances amount to being modally precluded in the sense I have outlined? I believe not, on the basis that
there are very nearby possible worlds in which this abnormal physiological feature does not obtain.
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further suggest the understanding that autonomous decision-making involves might
require the ‘vivid imagination’ of what future states of affairs that may be brought
about by our choices will be like for us.⁴⁴
Second, we may also note that instances of theoretical irrationality can similarly
modally preclude agents from achieving their ends. Theoretical irrationality can also
rupture the connection between the agent’s decision and the values that are operative
in their particular choice context. I explored how such irrationality can undermine
decisional autonomy in Chapter 2 in my discussion of Rebecca Walker’s illuminating
examples. Failures of theoretical rationality can undermine one’s ability to accurately
assess the extent to which a particular belief coheres with one’s other beliefs about
both descriptive and evaluative features of the world; this too can preclude one from
acting effectively in the sense that I have been outlining here.
I noted at the beginning of this section that contemporary philosophers and
bioethicists are divided over the question of whether holding false beliefs undermines
autonomy. The framework that I have adopted in this book may help to explain why
this is the case. I have explained that holding false beliefs can render an agent
ineffectual in pursuing the ends that she is motivated to achieve. I have also claimed
that this phenomenon can offer us insights into the forms of ignorance that may
appropriately be described as undermining one sense of voluntariness, as identified
in the Aristotelian distinction. However, whilst such false beliefs affect the cognitive
element of decisional autonomy, they need not affect the reflective element of her
decisional autonomy.
As such, it seems that the diverging intuitions concerning cases of false beliefs can
be explained as follows. If one believes that the reflective element of decisional
autonomy can tell the whole story of autonomous agency, then having epistemically
rational false beliefs concerning the means that are necessary to achieving one’s
desired end need not undermine one’s autonomy. On the other hand, if we claim that
an adequate theory of autonomy also includes a cognitive element of decisional
autonomy, whose boundaries should be informed by considerations pertaining to a
practical dimension of autonomy (as I have argued here), then it is clear why even
epistemically rational false beliefs can undermine autonomy; they will do so when
they render the agent ineffectual in her pursuit of the ends that she is motivated to
achieve, in the way that I have described in this section.
To conclude this discussion, it is important to be clear about the scope of the
claims that I am making here. The modal test that I have outlined here is intended to
identify a sufficiency condition for when ignorance about a particular undermines
voluntariness. It does not identify a necessary condition. In other words, it leaves
open the possibility that there may be forms of ignorance that would not entail an
agent’s failure to achieve her end in all nearby possible worlds, but which we may still
find it plausible to claim undermine voluntariness.⁴⁵ For instance, ignorance of risks
⁴⁴ Recall that Savulescu stipulates vivid imagination as a condition of autonomous choice. See Savulescu,
‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life Sustaining Treatment’.
⁴⁵ It might be further argued that there are some beliefs concerning which the following two statements
can be true. First, an agent can be autonomous with respect to a decision without holding the belief in
question (i.e. the belief is not decisionally necessary). However, it may also be the case that being
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attending a medical procedure might plausibly fall into this category. I shall take up
this question when I turn to the cognitive element of decisional autonomy and
informed consent in Chapter 6. In the remainder of this chapter though, having
established one relationship between decisional and practical autonomy, I shall
return to the question of the freedom that autonomy requires at the point of decision,
and describe another important relationship between these two dimensions of
autonomy.
5. Freedom at the Point of Decision
At the end of section 3, I suggested that practical autonomy requires that the agent
has, at the point of action, the positive and negatives freedoms that are necessary for
them to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. In this section, I shall consider the
freedom that autonomy requires at the point of decision. In considering the agent’s
freedom at the point of decision, we are considering the freedom that she believes
herself to have prior to making a decision about what to do; as I shall explain, it is
important to consider the agent’s freedom at this point, because an agent’s beliefs
about their freedoms can impinge on their decisional autonomy.
Let me begin by again stressing the observation that we make our decisions about
what to do in the light of what we believe to be practically realizable.⁴⁶ James Griffin
puts this point as follows:
We do not, as a matter of fact, form our plans of life as if they were, in effect, choices from a
Good Fairy’s List – ‘whatever you want, just say the word’. Our desires are shaped by our
expectations, which are shaped by our circumstances.⁴⁷
When we are in the process of deciding what to do, our decision is informed by what
we believe we are free and able to do. For example, when a person considers which
career path they want to pursue, they will make their decision having assessed the
capacities that constitute their positive freedom to pursue certain careers, and having
considered any positive constraints on their negative freedom to pursue others.
It may be the case that their beliefs about what they are and are not free to do are
false; however, it is not the freedom that one actually has that one takes into
intentionally deceived to not hold the belief in question may nonetheless undermine autonomy. Some
theorists seem to hold the view that this is true of all beliefs. See Wilkinson, ‘Nudging and Manipulation’,
345. For the reasons discussed here, I deny this claim, but the modal test suggests a reason for why this
might be true of some set of beliefs. In some cases, when we fail to hold a particular true belief, there will be
some nearby possible worlds in which we do come to hold it, by virtue of refining our beliefs in accordance
with the requirements of theoretical rationality, or by discovering new evidence. However, intentional
deception serves to narrow the scope of the possible worlds in which this will be the case; intentional
deceivers will often make efforts to ensure that we do not come to hold the relevant beliefs. This is similar
to the point that Yaffe makes with regards to intentional coercers and manipulators tracking compliance in
their targets as discussed in the previous chapter. Yaffe, ‘Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will’.
The point here is that intentional deception may modally preclude agents from achieving their ends in a
manner that mere ignorance does not.
⁴⁶ This is a point that Aristotle acknowledges in his assertion that prohairesis is a deliberate desire for
things in our power. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a 9–10.
⁴⁷ Griffin, Well-Being, 47.
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consideration in one’s practical deliberations. Rather, it is one’s beliefs about the
freedoms that one has.
This point is familiar from the empirical literature concerning self-efficacy beliefs.
The phenomenon explained above has also been referred to as ‘conscious character
planning’ in the philosophical literature.⁴⁸ Unless we are wholly sceptical of the
possibility of autonomy, it seems that we must claim that conscious character
planning does not undermine autonomy.⁴⁹ The fact that normal humans have
limited freedoms and tailor their preferences in accordance with them cannot be
inimical to their autonomy with respect to those preferences, if autonomy is to
be possible. To claim otherwise would be to rule out the possibility of autonomy at
the very outset, given the nature of the world we live in, in which environmental
forces contribute to the shape and limits of our freedoms. The absence of certain
freedoms at the point of decision merely shapes the contours of our choice domains.
In conscious character planning, an agent’s awareness of the limitations of their
freedoms informs their decisions about what to do, but it does not preclude their
decisional autonomy. However, an agent’s beliefs about their freedom can threaten
their decisional autonomy if they believe themselves to have extremely limited
freedoms. To see how, it is illustrative to contrast the case of Tom Pinch (considered
above) with the example of Martin Chuzzlewit:
Suppose that Martin Chuzzlewit finds himself on a trunk line with all of its switches closed and
locked, and with other ‘trains’ moving in the same direction on the same track at his rear, so
that he has no choice at all but to continue moving straight ahead to destination D . . . But now
let us suppose that getting to D is Chuzzlewit’s highest ambition in life and his most intensely
felt desire. In that case, he is sure to get the thing in life he wants most.⁵⁰
Whether or not Chuzzlewit is autonomous here depends on the extent to which his
lack of freedom is the reason that he came to sustain his motive to go to D. For
Chuzzlewit to be reflectively autonomous with respect to his motive to get to D, he
must have come to adopt it on the basis of a (non-irrational) belief that his getting to
D would be good in a reason-implying sense. However, our disposition to adopt
motivating desires on the basis that their content is good in a reason-implying sense
can be compromised in situations in which we believe that our freedoms (at the point
of decision) are severely restricted. If we believe that only one course of action is
available to us, our lack of alternative possibilities may dissuade us from engaging in
any sort of reflection about the value of the available outcome; rather, we may adopt
the motive to pursue that outcome on no other basis than the fact that it is the only
option available to us.
In contrast to conscious character planning, this phenomenon is known as adap-
tive preference formation.⁵¹ Adaptive preference formation may be defined as the
‘unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options that we have
⁴⁸ Elster, Sour Grapes, 117–19. ⁴⁹ See ibid., and Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 25.
⁵⁰ Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 38.
⁵¹ Elster, Sour Grapes; see also Sen, Development as Freedom; Nussbaum, Women and Human
Development.
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available’.⁵² To illustrate the phenomenon of adaptive preference formation, let us
alter the case of Harry the dog-sitter above so that Harry forms an adaptive
preference:
Suppose that Harry forms the desire to leave the house and go to the pub upon Jane’s
departure. However, he then hears Jane lock him into the house. Upon hearing this, Harry
resigns himself to staying in to look after the dog, but convinces himself that this was really his
preference all along.
Unlike conscious character planning, adaptive preference formation does seem
inimical to autonomy.⁵³ On the theory that I have developed over the course of the
preceding chapters, the reason for this is that in cases of adaptive preference
formation, the agent no longer endorses their motivating desire on the basis of a
belief that the outcome of the desire is good in a reason-implying sense; rather they
sustain this desire because the outcome it concerns is the only option available to
them. However, the fact that an outcome is the only one available does not make that
outcome good in a reason-implying sense. Moreover, the self-deceptive nature of the
way in which this preference is formed may preclude later critical reflection on the
value of the outcome.
Although lacking freedom at the point of decision is an obvious causal factor
underlying adaptive preference formation, it is not clear that lacking such freedoms
must necessarily lead to adaptive preference formation. After all, the fact that only
one option is available to an agent does not make it impossible for them to endorse
that option on the basis of its reason-giving content (rather than its mere availabil-
ity). For example, it is (to all intents and purposes) practically impossible for a
passenger to jump out of a commercial airplane in mid-flight. Yet, even if Smith
believes that he has no alternative to staying in a plane for the duration of a flight, this
does mean that he cannot regard the outcome of staying in the plane as good in a
reason-giving sense. As long as Smith (non-irrationally) believes that the content of
his motivating desire to stay in the plane is good in a reason-implying sense, then he
can be reflectively autonomous with respect to that desire, even if he also believes that
he lacks the freedom to do otherwise. However, Smith will lack autonomy in this
situation if he adopts the motivating desire to do something, just because he believes
he lacks the freedom to do anything else.
This has implications beyond this somewhat contrived thought experiment. Each
of us has a number of attachments and commitments that it would be extremely
costly for us to give up. We are in a meaningful sense not free to abandon them.
However, as Christman highlights, it would be a mistake to deny that we can be
autonomous with respect to these commitments on the basis that we are not free to
⁵² Colburn, ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences’, 52. Note that an agent’s options can be restricted by
virtue of social oppression. For this reason, adaptive preference formation has been of particular interest to
theorists who are concerned with autonomy as a social ideal. See Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of
Autonomy’, 30.
⁵³ See also Elster, Sour Grapes, 20; and Colburn, ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences’, 61–71.
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give them up.⁵⁴ On the contrary, these commitments can represent our deepest
values and strongest reasons. Similarly, in bioethical contexts, we are often consid-
ering whether people are making autonomous decisions in desperate circumstances,
where they have severely restricted choice sets. Again, the fact that an individual is
facing restricted choices, does not entail that they cannot decide rationally in that
context. Nonetheless, when we believe we have no choices available to us (not even
unattractive ones), we may find it difficult to summon the motivation to engage in
somewhat otiose rational deliberation about what to do.
With this understanding of adaptive preference formation in mind, let us return to
the question of Martin Chuzzlewit’s autonomy. The way in which Feinberg phrases
the example makes it ambiguous as to whether it is best to interpret Chuzzlewit’s
being motivated to get to D as an instance of adaptive preference formation. The fact
that Chuzzlewit ‘finds himself ’ on the particular trunk line does not tell us whether
he regarded getting to D as being good in a reason-implying sense prior to finding
himself on the track, or whether he forms the motive to get to D on the basis that he
has found himself on the particular trunk line that leads to D. In the latter case,
Chuzzlewit lacks autonomy because he does not adopt his motive on the basis of its
reason-giving content, but rather on its mere availability; he has thus formed an
autonomy undermining adaptive preference. However, if Chuzzlewit had formed a
preference for D prior to finding himself in this curious position, and his lack of
freedom had not otherwise impaired his reflective autonomy with respect to his
motivating desire, Chuzzlewit could be reflectively and practically autonomous.
Of course, if we believe that we have more freedoms at the point of decision, then
in many cases the extent to which we direct our choices through rational deliberative
processes will be enhanced. Although it is possible for Chuzzlewit to view D as good
in a reason-implying sense without having further freedoms, the absence of other
freedoms may jeopardize the likelihood that he will rationally deliberate on the value
of D in this way. In contrast, if other alternatives (E, F, and G) are eligible for choice,
then the agents are more likely to be drawn to a justificatory evaluative stance. It is
not just that the agent will choose D because there are reason-giving facts about D;
rather she will choose D because she believes that it is better than the other available
alternatives, and this is a choice for which she is responsible.⁵⁵
There are of course limits to this, since having too many available choices can
impede rational decision-making processes. I shall discuss this point further below.
Whilst recognizing this limitation, it is nonetheless plausible to postulate that giving
people choices can sometimes serve to increase the scope and power of their rational
deliberation about what to do. In allowing individuals to choose from a greater
number of alternatives, we can sometimes increase the extent to which their choice
is a reflection of their values rather than their circumstances.
This represents a further important way in which autonomy is an inherently
relational phenomenon, as the choices that are available to us at the point of decision
⁵⁴ Christman, The Politics of Persons, 160. As such, I believe that there are limitations to the extent to
which Friedman is correct to claim that autonomy requires that we are able to envisage alternative possible
courses of action, or to imagining oneself otherwise. Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 9.
⁵⁵ Hurka, Perfectionism, 150.
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will typically be socially mediated. Most obviously, the societies in which we live may
provide us with more or less available options to choose from. For instance, women
in Saudi Arabia have a far more restricted choice set regarding potential professions
than their counterparts in the United Kingdom, due to the former’s restrictive
labour laws.
In the bioethical context, we may also note that physicians can exert a considerable
degree of control over their patients’ autonomy by virtue of the control they can
exercise over the treatment options that are made available to a particular patient.
Of course, considerations of justice and beneficence may considerably dictate these
decisions; physicians will only offer treatment options that are in a patient’s interests,
and which can be provided in accordance with the constraints of a just allocation of
scarce medical resources. Nonetheless, there are some cases in which medical
professionals may limit autonomy with less convincing justifications. Consider, for
instance, the fact there is evidence to suggest that young childless men with decision-
making capacity are more likely to be accepted for sterilization surgery than young
childless women with decision-making capacity.⁵⁶ Here it seems that broader social
attitudes and expectations about women may be serving to influence medical pro-
fessionals with regards to what sorts of medical treatments options are and are not
appropriate for a particular demographic.
In this example, women’s choice is restricted in a quite direct sense, in so far as
certain women cannot access a medical procedure. However, social forces can shape
an individual’s available options in perhaps more insidious ways. They can serve to
undermine an individual’s self-esteem, and their capacity to view certain desired
options as valuable in their social context. For example, Anderson and Honneth
point out that in societies where being a ‘stay at home dad’ is regarded as a
euphemism for ‘unemployment’, it is difficult for male members of that society to
regard full time parenting as a valuable option that is eligible for choice.⁵⁷
Another way in which a lack of freedom can negatively affect decisional autonomy
is that restricting another’s freedom can serve as a method for undermining forms of
social recognition that play a key role in capacities that are plausibly necessary for
autonomous decision-making.⁵⁸ For instance, in addition to self-esteem, Honneth
and Anderson emphasize the importance of ‘self-respect’ and ‘self-trust’ for auton-
omy. The former concerns an agent’s capacity to understand herself as an agent
capable of rational deliberation and whose choices deserve moral consideration. The
latter pertains to the agent’s capacity to place trust in her own affectively mediated
commitments, and to view these commitments as authentically her own.⁵⁹ Both self-
trust and self-respect are acquired and maintained in the context of interpersonal
relationships. Indeed, amongst the many ills of societal inequality, oppression, and
discrimination, these features of society amount to failures to engage in forms of
⁵⁶ See McQueen, ‘Autonomy, Age and Sterilisation Requests’. For further discussion of this phenom-
enon, see Mertes, ‘The Role of Anticipated Decision Regret and the Patient’s Best Interest in Sterilisation
and Medically Assisted Reproduction’; Pugh, ‘Legally Competent, But Too Young To Choose To Be
Sterilized? Practical Ethics’.
⁵⁷ Anderson and Honneth, ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice’, 136.
⁵⁸ Ibid., 132–5. ⁵⁹ Ibid.
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social recognition that allow individuals to regard themselves as people whose
choices matter, whose choices are their own, and whose choices deserve respect.⁶⁰
The above interpersonal influences have been highlighted by those theorists who
are particularly interested in how autonomy can be impeded in and by society in
general. There are of course lessons for the role of autonomy in bioethics here;⁶¹ as
the example of voluntary female sterilization suggests, medicine can be susceptible to
social forces that influence the opportunities for choice afforded to individuals. We
may also note that the way in which we seek to safeguard autonomy in bioethics may
already implicitly incorporate considerations of relational autonomy. For instance,
when it functions correctly, the institution of informed consent may serve to facilitate
the forms of social recognition stressed by Honneth and Anderson. It can serve as a
formal recommendation that the patient is someone whose views about treatment
matter, who is competent to make those decisions, and whose decisions warrant
respect.
However, as I mentioned in the introduction, we need to take care not to simply
assume that all of the conclusions regarding the nature and value of autonomy in
broader social contexts transfer straightforwardly to the bioethical context. In par-
ticular, we might plausibly deny that a minimum threshold of autonomy for local
decision-making in the bioethical context must require the same variety of choices
stressed by social theorists of autonomy with regards to individuals’ global autonomy
in liberal societies.⁶² We might agree with the latter that those in power have a duty to
organize societies in a manner that enables their citizens to (equally) enjoy broad
spheres of autonomy, with a variety of alternative options available to pursue
different conceptions of the good. However, when we are talking about autonomy
in the bioethical context, a plausible account must allow for the possibility that
people can make locally autonomous decisions when they face very limited choice
sets. For instance, recall the example or Alan from the previous chapter. More
broadly, if we claim that agents can only make autonomous decisions if they have
a variety of options available to them, then we may be committed to the view that a
patient who will die unless they receive a life-saving medical intervention cannot
autonomously consent to it; after all, even if the patient in such a case could choose to
forgo treatment, if anybody lacks an adequate variety of options, surely this
individual does.
6. The Enhancement and Development of Autonomy
In this chapter, I have argued that an adequate theory of autonomy in bioethics
should incorporate a practical dimension pertaining to the agent’s ability to act
⁶⁰ Mackenzie and Sherwin, ‘Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are
Oppressed’.
⁶¹ For a broader discussion of extending the discussion of autonomy in bioethics to consider broader
social and relational patterns, see Dodds, ‘Choice and Control in Feminist Bioethics’; Jennings,
‘Reconceptualizing Autonomy’; Sherwin and Stockdale, ‘Whither Bioethics Now?’
⁶² Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’; Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and
Society’.
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effectively in pursuit of their ends. In particular, I claimed that having certain sorts of
true beliefs will often be necessary for practical autonomy. In turn, this illuminated
an important relationship between practical autonomy and the cognitive element of
decisional autonomy; the sorts of ignorance that undermine voluntariness are partly
defined by considerations pertaining to the agent’s ability to act effectively in pursuit
of her ends.
I also claimed that there is an important relationship between decisional autonomy
and the practical dimensions of autonomy, in so far as agents decide to sustain their
motivating desires in the light of their beliefs about what is practically realizable for
them. Taken together, these discussions suggest an important reason why an
adequate theory of autonomy in bioethics should incorporate a practical dimension.
A theory that does not incorporate a practical dimension may lack a principled basis
for delimiting the forms of ignorance that undermine voluntariness, and such a
theory cannot adequately explain the effect that our beliefs about what we are free to
do can have on our decision-making. Below, I shall explain how this discussion also
has important implications for considerations of how we can increase autonomy
through increasing agents’ freedoms.
This concludes my purely theoretical discussion of autonomy. I can now outline
the following supplementary rationalist conditions on decisional autonomy and
practical autonomy that I have developed over the course of the previous chapters.
I have suggested that the two elements of the decisional dimension of autonomy
should incorporate the following conditions:
Cognitive: An agent must not be modally precluded from acting in pursuit of her
ends by her informational condition, by virtue of theoretical irrationality or a
failure to hold decisionally necessary beliefs.
Reflective: The autonomous agent’s motivating desires must be rational in the
following sense:
They must:
(a) Be endorsed by preferences that are sustained on the basis of the agent’s holding (non-
irrational) beliefs that, if true, would give the agent reason to pursue the object of the
desire.
And
(b) These preferences must cohere with other elements of the agent’s character system.
I also suggested the following condition for the practical dimension of autonomy:
Practical Dimension: An agent must have both the positive and negative free-
dom to act effectively in pursuit of the end that she is motivated to achieve.
To conclude, I shall offer some brief reflections on the extent to which we might seek
to enhance autonomy beyond these thresholds by increasing freedom.
It may appear to be straightforwardly true that increasing an agent’s freedoms will
always serve to enhance their autonomy. In the bioethical context, this sort of
assumption is often made by supporters of using biotechnologies for the purposes
of human enhancement. For instance, Nick Bostrom claims that an individual who
used enhancement technologies would ‘ . . . enjoy more choice and autonomy in her
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life, if the modifications were such as to expand her basic capability set’ since such
blessings ‘tend to open more life-plans than they block’.⁶³ However, there are reasons
to doubt this apparently plausible claim.
(i) Increasing Freedom and Enhancing Autonomy
Prima facie, the question of how to enhance the practical dimension of autonomy
seems quite straightforward; if we increase an agent’s positive and negative freedoms
so that they are able to actmore effectively in pursuit of their ends, then this will serve
to enhance their practical autonomy. Furthermore, since agents often come to change
their preferences over time, they may come to require different sorts of freedoms in
order to act effectively in pursuit of ends that they later decide they want to achieve.
Accordingly, enjoying a diverse range of freedoms promotes practical autonomy, in
so far as having such freedoms accommodates the possibility that agents may come
to change their goals.
However, giving an agent additional freedoms or options can in some cases hinder
their pursuit of their goals. Most obviously, providing an agent with additional
extraneous freedoms may involve replacing their freedom to do what they want.
For example, suppose that I have decided that I want to enjoy a particular brand of
beer, but my local pub has stopped serving that brand in favour of serving fifty other
beers that I do not like; here, increasing my overall positive freedom by increasing the
number of beers that I can drink at this pub has failed to enhance my practical
autonomy, since doing so has taken away my freedom to enjoy the beer that I actually
want to have. Similarly, as I pointed out above, agents sometimes limit their own
freedoms in order to enable them to effectively pursue certain goals. This was the
point of the example of Odysseus and the Sirens; removing the positive constraints
preventing Odysseus from leaving the ship would serve to hinder his ability to pursue
his goal of hearing the sirens’ song without being lured from his ship. Increasing a
freedom that the agent herself has herself chosen to limit (in order to facilitate her
pursuit of some goal) would then undermine, rather than enhance her practical
autonomy.
Increasing an agent’s general freedoms can also affect their freedom to pursue their
preferred option without strictly making that option unavailable. The addition of
new freedoms may bring with it the cost of a new responsibility, such that the failure
to choose the newly available option may now count against the chooser when
previously it did not.⁶⁴ In such cases, agents may feel unable to pursue their preferred
option because of this burden of responsibility. Some have claimed that this sort of
phenomenon might arise if voluntary active euthanasia were legalized; the thought
here is that giving people the choice to undergo voluntary euthanasia would serve to
undermine the practical autonomy of individuals whose preference is to stay alive as
a default option.⁶⁵
Increasing an agent’s freedom to pursue one goal more effectively might also have
a negative effect on their ability to pursue other goals. To illustrate, suppose that one
⁶³ Bostrom, ‘In Defense of Posthuman Dignity’, 212. See also Malmqvist, ‘Reprogenetics and the
“Parents Have Always Done It” Argument’.
⁶⁴ Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 67. ⁶⁵ Velleman, ‘Against the Right to Die’.
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valued having a successful career in business, and that one would be able to pursue
this goal more effectively if one were more ruthless. In this case, whilst becoming
more ruthless might enable one to pursue a career goal more effectively, it might also
be detrimental to one’s pursuit of another valued goal, like being a good parent for
example. Accordingly, if increasing an agent’s freedom to pursue some goal x is to
enhance their practical autonomy, this enhanced freedom must either not diminish
their efficacy with respect to their pursuit of another of their goals, y, or, if it would
diminish their pursuit of y, then the agent must believe that they have a sufficiently
strong reason to pursue x more effectively, at the cost to their efficacy in pursuing y
that this might entail.
Perhaps it might be claimed that increasing an agent’s freedom will more plausibly
serve to increase her decisional autonomy, by virtue of the fact that this will serve to
increase the number of competing reasons that they consider in their practical
deliberations. In many cases, the more alternatives we entertain when we make a
choice, the more that our choice becomes a reflection of our own will, rather than of
our restricted circumstances. Susan Wolf puts the point succinctly when she writes:
The more options and the more reasons for them that one is capable of seeing and under-
standing, the more fully one can claim one’s choices to be one’s own.⁶⁶
Of course, one way in which we could increase an agent’s decisional autonomy in this
sense is by enhancing their ability to compute a greater number of the possible
courses of action open to them. Whilst bioethicists are typically interested in the use
of biomedical cognitive enhancements to achieve this,⁶⁷ we might also do so in far
more mundane and familiar ways through the use of traditional forms of education,
interpersonal dialogue, and the use of external decision aids.⁶⁸ Indeed, in the next
chapter, I shall note that one of the challenges we face in the context of informed
consent is that human decision-makers are prone to error, irrational biases, and
simply being overwhelmed by information. Naturally, if it were possible to reduce
these obstacles, then it would be possible for individuals to attend to the reason-
giving facts associated with a greater number of alternative options.
Another way in which we could plausibly increase the number of alternatives that
an agent considers in their practical deliberations becomes clear when we attend to
the relationship between the practical and reflective elements of autonomy. Since
agents form their desires in the light of their beliefs about what is practically
realizable, and since considering more competing reasons will often increase one’s
decisional autonomy, we might also seek to enhance an agent’s autonomy simply by
making more options practically realizable for them; this I take it is the main thrust of
Bostrom’s point, outlined above. Increasing an agent’s freedoms might be under-
stood to indirectly increase an agent’s reflective autonomy in so far as it leads them to
consider more competing reasons in their deliberations. This is a key mechanism via
⁶⁶ Wolf, Freedom within Reason, 144.
⁶⁷ Maslen, Faulmüller, and Savulescu, ‘Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement—How Neuroscientific
Research Could Advance Ethical Debate’; Zohny, ‘The Myth of Cognitive Enhancement Drugs’; Bostrom
and Sandberg, ‘Cognitive Enhancement’.
⁶⁸ O’Connor et al., ‘Decision Aids for Patients Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions’.
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which society can shape the limits and contours of individual autonomy, and it is one
that is often overlooked in bioethical discussions of the potential impact of biomed-
ical enhancements.⁶⁹
However, it is implausible to claim that increasing an agent’s freedoms will always
serve to enhance an individual’s decisional autonomy in this straightforward way.
As I shall explore further in the next chapter, agents are often unable to process the
large amount of information that is necessary to making rational choices amongst a
vast number of options. Agents faced with a large number of options may simply be
overwhelmed by their available choices, and thus become unable to make an autono-
mous decision;⁷⁰ this is the so-called paradox of choice.⁷¹
Furthermore, the additional choices that are made available will only serve to
enhance an agent’s autonomy if they are relevant to a choice domain of which the
agent is part. For example, if a vegetarian is choosing between two different restaur-
ants, the fact that one restaurant has a wider variety of meat dishes than the other has
no direct bearing on which restaurant will offer the vegetarian more autonomy with
regards to her decision about what to order. If greater freedom is to meaningfully
enhance autonomy, it must make available choices that will enter into her deliber-
ation as plausible alternatives. For that to be the case, they must thus concern
outcomes that are good in a reason-implying sense for the agent in question.
Finally, having certain choices may undermine reflective autonomy in so far as
they may invite social pressure to conform in a manner that threatens the voluntari-
ness of one’s choice.⁷² To illustrate this, Gerald Dworkin provides the example of
giving university students the option to live in mixed-sex dorms. Whilst it might be
claimed that students who do not wish to live in mixed sex dorms could simply
choose not to, this fails to acknowledge the point that this new option introduces a
social pressure on those who do not want to live in mixed dorms to conform to the
social expectation of their peers. Accordingly, having the freedom to choose some
alternative may undermine the voluntariness of one’s choice, if having that option
leaves one open to social pressure that can serve to exert controlling influence over
one’s decisions. This is importantly related to the way in which changing an
individual’s option set can take away their preferred status quo default option,
since social pressure can often be introduced as a result of that default position
being altered (as in the dormitory case).⁷³
(ii) Freedom and the Development of Autonomy
Freedom may be understood to play a particularly salient role in the development of
autonomy in children. Many of the preferences and acceptances that come to
constitute our character systems as adults were initially developed unreflectively in
⁶⁹ We might also note that increasing an agent’s freedoms may serve as a guard against adaptive
preference formation.
⁷⁰ Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 66. ⁷¹ Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice.
⁷² Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 68. For a discussion of this issue in the context of
human enhancement, see Vincent, Enhancing Responsibility; Chandler, ‘Autonomy and the Unintended
Legal Consequences of Emerging Neurotherapies’; Goold and Maslen, ‘Must the Surgeon Take the Pill?’;
Juth, ‘Enhancement, Autonomy, and Authenticity’.
⁷³ Velleman, ‘Against the Right to Die’.
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childhood. However, in accordance with my discussion in Chapter 2, we can none-
theless become autonomous with respect to these features of our characters if we later
reflectively choose to sustain them as part of a coherent character system. Of course,
it is highly unlikely that this decision will constitute a single, discrete epiphany.
Rather, making these kinds of choices is best construed as a continuous (and integral)
part of the developmental process. Joel Feinberg captures a similar idea when he
writes:
The child can contribute towards the making of his own self and circumstances in ever-
increasing degree. Always the self that contributes to the making of the new self is itself the
product of both outside influences and an earlier self that was not quite fully formed.⁷⁴
Beyond aiding the development of the child’s general cognitive abilities, parents may
cultivate their child’s autonomy in a number of other ways. For instance, advocates of
the self-determination theory of motivation in psychology have suggested that key
aspects of autonomy support include, inter alia, providing explanations and ration-
ales for behavioural requests, demonstrating interest in the child’s own feelings, and
offering children structured choices that reflect their feelings.⁷⁵ Furthermore, whilst
children clearly lack the capacity to make autonomous decisions in a number of
important domains (for reasons I shall explore in Chapter 7) part of respecting the
child’s autonomy is to recognize that they may deserve some limited domain of
autonomy, and to seek to facilitate the exercise of their autonomy when appropriate.
However, one of the most important influences that parents can exert over the
development of their child’s autonomy is by shaping their freedoms and options.
Whilst wemay have some autonomy-based reasons to respect some of a child’s current
choices, respect for a child’s autonomy often requires that we do not prematurely
foreclose their options. This is the insight underlying Feinberg’s claim that children
have a ‘right to an open future’.⁷⁶The right to an open future is a kind of ‘right in trust’;
it is a general right that safeguards sophisticated autonomy rights for the child that they
cannot currently take advantage of due to a lack of sufficient capacity, but which are to
be ‘saved’ for the child, until she is capable of exercising them later in life. Nonetheless,
the right to an open future can be violated before this time if the child’s future options
are prematurely closed. For instance, although a young child cannot physically exercise
the right to reproduce, he will be able to exercise that right in the future, so it would be
possible to violate his right in trust to do so by sterilizing him.⁷⁷
One sense in which observing a right to an open future safeguards an individual’s
autonomy is that it protects freedoms that they may require to pursue autonomously
chosen goals at a later point. However, the right has a deeper role for the development of
autonomy. One of the key themes of my discussion in this chapter has been that we
form and sustain our preferences in the light of what is practically realizable;
⁷⁴ Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 96.
⁷⁵ Joussemet, Landry, and Koestner, ‘A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Parenting’; Mullin,
‘Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy’.
⁷⁶ Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, ch. 3; see also Davis, ‘Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to
an Open Future’.
⁷⁷ I take this example from Davis, ‘Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future’, 9.
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accordingly, options that are foreclosed in childhood will not feature in the individual’s
later reflections on what sort of things to pursue in life. Furthermore, whilst I have
suggested that autonomous choice is possible in the face of extremely limited option
sets, I also noted that such limited option sets leave individuals vulnerable to adaptive
preference formation, andmake it less likely that they will come to reflect on the reasons
they have to pursue what they are motivated to pursue. Accordingly, even if we agree
that adult individuals canmake locally autonomous decisions from a restricted range of
option, this is quite compatible with claiming that having a wide range of options is
crucial to the development of an individual’s autonomy, in so far as it is necessary for
prompting the development of the capacity to reflect on what one has reason to do, and
to make a choice based on one’s own reasons. If we are to later take ownership of the
motivations and preferences that we develop uncritically in childhood, we must have
the freedoms that prompt us to later consider ‘why this, and not that’?
Despite its central role in the development of autonomy, the right to an open
future should also be understood to be subject to the caveats that I have outlined
above; too open a future may in fact be detrimental to the future adult’s autonomy,
for the reasons I have identified. Indeed, it is unrealistic to suppose that we can
safeguard an entirely open future for any child.⁷⁸ The reason for this is that main-
taining certain options will normally have the opportunity cost of foreclosing others;
for instance, as a child progresses further through their education, they will usually
drop certain school subjects (say in the arts) in order to specialize in others (say, in
the sciences), thereby foreclosing certain future options. Maintaining some options
requires a degree of time and commitment that necessitates ceding other options.
Moreover, we might note that parents will quite naturally and perhaps even inad-
vertently restrict the availability of certain options by virtue of transmitting certain
values to their child through their parenting style.
But how should parents make choices about how to shape the contours of a future
that we might describe as ‘reasonably’ open? Above, I noted that individuals may
decide to delimit their own future opportunities in this way as an expression of their
autonomy. Yet, in the case of children, we must make such choices without knowing
what the child will grow up to value. In light of this epistemic obstacle, one might be
tempted to capture the spirit of an appeal to the individual’s autonomy by invoking the
notion of presumed consent. For instance, as part of a larger argument for the claim
that prenatal genetic enhancements threaten the child’s autonomy, Jürgen Habermas
argues that there is a crucial moral difference between genetic therapies and genetic
enhancements, on the basis that parents can presume consent for therapies that seek to
avoid profound evils which are ‘unquestionably extreme, and likely to be rejected by
all’,⁷⁹ but not genetic enhancements. We might similarly invoke the concept of
presumed consent in order to determine the boundaries of how we may permissibly
shape and delimit our children’s future opportunities and capacities.
Notwithstanding other elements of Habermas’ wide-ranging critique of prenatal
genetic enhancements and their significance for autonomy,⁸⁰ let me conclude by
⁷⁸ Mills, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future?’ ⁷⁹ Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 43.
⁸⁰ For a fuller discussion see Pugh, ‘Autonomy, Natality and Freedom’.
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explaining why this appeal to presumed consent fails to capture the spirit of auton-
omy in the manner that its adherents might think. When Habermas’ considers
whether we can presume consent for a genetic therapy, he asks us to consider
whether ‘all others’ would be likely to consent to the intervention. However, if the
concept of presumed consent is to capture the spirit of autonomy’s value, then this is
simply the wrong question to ask. If we are interested in facilitating the future child’s
autonomy, then we must consider not what ‘all others’ would think about the
intervention, but rather whether the future child herself would consent. Yet, once
we recognize this, it becomes clear that a presumed consent approach for interven-
tions that delimit or expand the individual’s sphere of freedom will almost inevitably
prove both too much and too little. The reason for this is that the values that the child
develops, and which would undergird her later retrospective endorsement of the
intervention (for which we are now presuming consent), in some cases may depend
on whether or not the intervention in question was carried out in the first place. That
is, the performance and non-performance of the intervention in question may
generate different future values, which in turn might respectively undergird a pre-
sumption of retrospective endorsement or repudiation.
The problem of invoking presumed consent to justify the manner in which we
shape our children’s freedoms is not merely the epistemic issue that we do not know
what the child will come to value. Rather, the problem with using this theoretical
apparatus to justify an intervention that will significantly affect the future child’s
freedom, is that whether or not the intervention is performed will likely have a
significant influence on the values that the child will come to develop and her view of
the intervention itself. Yet these are both things that we must ascertain if we are to be
serious about ‘presuming consent’ on behalf of the future child. The theoretical
apparatus of presumed consent is thus simply the wrong tool for the job. It can
only serve as a useful guide for how to treat children once the child has developed
some settled dispositions upon which we might base our presumption; the less
developed the child, the less useful the apparatus of presumed consent. In the case
of presuming consent on behalf of future children who are currently at an embryonic
stage, I suggest that the apparatus of presumed consent can really tell us very little.
In light of this problem with the apparatus of presumed consent, I suggest that the
most plausible strategy to adopt in shaping the child’s freedoms is to prioritize a
child’s options to pursue goods that they will have impersonal reason to pursue when
they have the capacity to exercise meaningful choice.⁸¹ To safeguard an impersonal
good x is not to presume that ‘x is what the future adult will come to want, all things
considered’ or to presume consent per se, Instead, it is to presume that the future
adult will have some defeasible reason to pursue x, and that we have reasons to retain
that option in the individual’s choice set over options associated with outcomes that
the future adult may or may not understand to be reason-giving, depending on
features of their future selves that are not yet evident to us.
⁸¹ For defence of a broadly similar approach, see Maslen et al., ‘Brain Stimulation for Treatment and
Enhancement in Children’.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi




Over the course of the next three chapters, I shall explicate the implications that my
rationalist account of autonomy has for informed consent. Informed consent
requirements are ubiquitous in health care, and they are regarded as a cornerstone
of ethical medical practice. It is also often treated as a truism that these requirements
are to be justified by the principle of respect for autonomy. However, whilst this view
is still widely accepted, it has recently been brought into question, with critics
suggesting that informed consent requirements are neither necessary nor sufficient
for safeguarding individual autonomy in the biomedical sphere.
In the first part of this chapter, I shall suggest that this objection is misplaced,
though I shall claim that it suggests that we should revise our understanding of what
informed consent requires. In doing so, I shall extend my previous discussion of the
relationship between beliefs and autonomous decision-making. This will provide the
foundation for the final part of the chapter in which I shall outline a rationalist test of
materiality. I suggest that this ought to undergird an adequate standard of informa-
tion disclosure for informed consent, drawing on the recent hybrid account evi-
denced in the 2015 Montgomery judgement in the UK.
1. The Structure, Definition, and Limits of Informed
Consent
As Gerald Dworkin points out, the doctrine of informed consent is a ‘creature of
law’;¹ it has been developed in various legal domains in which one party sanctions
another to perform ‘ . . . some course of action to which the consented to party would
otherwise have no moral right’.² The fundamental idea that we aim to capture when
we claim that ‘Amorally ought to obtain B’s informed consent to A’s doing x to B’, is
that the moral permissibility of A’s doing x to B, is at least partly dependent on the
following conditions being met:
(i) B must be sufficiently informed with regards to the relevant facts concerning
x to understand what x is (and what consequences are likely to occur as a
result of x).
¹ Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 101.
² Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’, 8. See also Miller and Wertheimer, The Ethics of Consent, for
examples of the domains in which informed consent can be invoked.
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(ii) On the basis of this information, B herselfmakes the decision to allow A to do
x.³
One reason that the moral permissibility of A’s doing x to B can be at least partly
dependent on whether B has provided informed consent to x, is that B may bear a
right against A performing an interference of the sort involved in x. For example, B
could have a right to bodily integrity that affords her protection against A performing
an injection on her. However, many rights that incorporate these sorts of claims of
protection also incorporate a second-order power to waive the claim in question.⁴ To
authorize a medical treatment in accordance with the requirements of informed
consent is to waive the rights of protection that might otherwise preclude the moral
permissibility of the intervention. In providing informed consent to an injection, one
waives one’s claim right against the bodily interference that the injection involves.
However, when A does x without B’s informed consent, B’s extant claim rights have
not been waived, and are still ‘in play’. In such cases, if A does x, A will have infringed
(and perhaps violated) B’s right, and failed in her own duty to refrain from doing x to
B (in the absence of B’s waiving that claim). We may also note that in some contexts,
A may have a positive obligation to facilitate B’s ability to make an autonomous
decision about whether to consent to x.
For reasons I shall further explain in my discussion of the value of autonomy in
Chapter 9, we should not understand the requirements of informed consent to
generate or impose a positive obligation to provide x to B. Consent can involve the
waiver of moral protections that would otherwise render a medical intervention
impermissible, but there may yet be other moral reasons that can outweigh the
autonomy-based reasons we might have to provide x to B. This is clearest in cases
where doing x to B will have harmful implications for others, or when x cannot be
provided within a just framework of resource allocation.
However, harm to others is arguably not necessary for the moral or legal imper-
missibility of doing certain things to B to which she has consented. Indeed, in the
legal context, even when a person provides valid consent, anything that causes that
person actual bodily harm constitutes a criminal offence ‘ . . . unless it can be shown
that the act falls into one of the exceptional circumstances in which consent can
provide a defence’.⁵ Naturally, ‘proper medical treatment’⁶ is one such kind of act;
however, consent may not provide a legal defence (and perhaps not a moral defence)
of certain kinds of harmful action, such as acts of violence within a sado-masochistic
context,⁷ killing, or medical procedures that fall outside the boundaries of ‘proper
medical treatment’.⁸ In adopting this view, the law appears to accept that we either (i)
hold certain claim rights that do not incorporate the corresponding power to waive
³ There is a considerable debate about whether consent involves only a psychological state, or whether it
also requires a behavioural expression. I lack the space to engage with this debate here, but note that
medical law on informed consent and mental capacity implicitly reflects a behavioural understanding of
consent. For discussion, see Hurd, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’; Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’.
⁴ Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’. ⁵ Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 150.
⁶ For definition of this, see ibid.
⁷ Athanassoulis, ‘The Role of Consent in Sado-Masochistic Practices’.
⁸ Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 204–5.
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the claim in question, or (ii) that we have overriding reasons in non-ideal contexts to
avoid false positive assessments of decision-making capacity to waive claims against
particularly significant harms.⁹ However, as I shall suggest in Chapters 7 and 9, there
are philosophical grounds for objecting to this understanding of the claim rights we
enjoy.
Accordingly, Bmay not have a powerful positive right to medical intervention x in
many cases, but she may hold a number of negative claim rights that generate a
powerful duty for A to refrain from doing x to B, in the absence of B’s consent.¹⁰ Since
rights are typically understood to provide trumping¹¹ or exclusionary moral
reasons,¹² it will typically take far stronger moral reasons (corresponding to compet-
ing rights) to justify overriding the negative obligation to refrain from performing
non-consensual treatment on an individual, than it takes to justify overriding the
moral reasons we have to provide treatment to which they have consented.¹³ That
said, even this negative obligation to refrain from non-consensual treatment can
plausibly be overridden in certain contexts. For instance, in public health, there may
be cases in which this negative obligation can be overridden by the competing rights
of others.
I shall consider the strength of these obligations in greater detail in Chapter 9. Here
though, I want to turn to a second aspect of informed consent. The moral and legal
requirement to obtain A’s consent does not apply if A lacks the capacities that are
necessary for providing valid consent.¹⁴ To give a clear example, there cannot be any
meaningful requirement to obtain informed consent to a medical intervention from a
patient who is in a coma. Instead, the decision about whether to perform the
intervention must instead be guided by alternative approaches, drawing on advance
directives and proxy decision-makers (where applicable), and/or an assessment of
what is in the patient’s best interests.¹⁵ Accordingly, our understanding of the
conditions of decision-making capacity will have a considerable bearing on the
scope of the requirement to obtain informed consent and to respect individual
treatment decisions. I shall consider this aspect of informed consent in the next
chapter.
With these limitations in mind, let us reconsider the constitutive conditions
of informed consent. The conditions outlined at the beginning of this section
can be understood to broadly map onto the two senses of voluntariness that are
identified in the Aristotelian distinction outlined in the introductory chapter.
⁹ Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 89.
¹⁰ We may also note that an individual’s positive rights are typically understood to be weaker than her
negative rights. See Foot, Virtues and Vices.
¹¹ Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’. ¹² Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 35–48.
¹³ This partly explains Foster’s observation that ‘[a]utonomy in the medico-legal arena is (rightly) much
more concerned with preventing unwanted violations than in guaranteeing a right to positive benefits’.
Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 28.
¹⁴ This is compatible with the claim that there is nonetheless a requirement to first take measures to
enable the individual to attain decision-making capacity.
¹⁵ In the legal context in England and Wales, these approaches are outlined in Mental Capacity Act
2005. For philosophical and legal discussions of these approaches, see Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for
Others; Hope, Savulescu, and Hendrick, Medical Ethics and Law, 82; Herring, Medical Law and Ethics,
171–87.
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Although my account of decisional autonomy departs from the standard
account of autonomy in bioethics, the Aristotelian distinction can also be
broadly understood to implicitly frame the latter. As I explained in the intro-
ductory chapter, on the standard view, an agent is autonomous with respect to a




(3) Without controlling influences that determine their action.¹⁶
Importantly for my purposes in this chapter, Faden and Beauchamp suggest that this
account of autonomy can be used to undergird a theory of informed consent
understood as a form of autonomous authorization.¹⁷ On this view, to give informed
consent is to perform a specific kind of autonomous action, one that ‘ . . . authorises a
professional to initiate a medical plan for the patient’.¹⁸ A corollary of this is that in
order to give informed consent, patients must have certain abilities (such as those
required for understanding material information) that are causally necessary for
meeting the above constitutive conditions of informed consent.¹⁹ To have the
abilities in question is to have decision-making capacity, or competence (I shall
distinguish the two in the next chapter).
If a patient agrees to a medical procedure without sufficient understanding,
unintentionally, or as a result of controlling influence, then their consent may be
described as invalid. There is some debate as to whether the concept of invalid
consent is morally meaningful. For instance, writing about coerced consent, John
Kleinig claims:
. . . invalid consent no more counts as consent than an invalid vote counts as a vote. It has form
but no substance. It is, I believe, more accurate to say that although A gave his assent, this did
not amount to consent.²⁰
I believe that Kleinig is correct to say this of coerced consent; the assent of the victim
of coercion lacks moral substance because their assent reflects the coercer’s authority
over them, rather than their own autonomous authorization. However, it would be a
mistake to assume that all kinds of invalid consent lack any moral substance. In some
cases, mere assent can make some moral difference, even if it does not amount to the
¹⁶ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 238.
¹⁷ Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics defends a similar view. I consider Faden
and Beauchamp’s A History and Theory of Informed Consent in this chapter rather than Beauchamp and
Childress’ view for two reasons. First, Faden and Beauchamp’s work is solely on the nature of informed
consent, and so represents a more focused discussion of the concept. Second, the views on informed
consent that Beauchamp and Childress have espoused in The Principles of Biomedical Ethics have
undergone significant revisions over the numerous editions of the book. However, as Walker acknow-
ledges, Faden and Beauchamp’s account is very similar to the view that is apparent in editions of The
Principles of Biomedical Ethics that followed it. Walker, ‘Respect for Rational Autonomy’, fn. 3.
¹⁸ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 278.
¹⁹ Some accounts include competence itself as a condition of informed consent; however, I prefer to
avoid this conflation of constitutive and causal conditions.
²⁰ Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’, 15.
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moral significance denoted by the full-blown authorization of valid consent. To
illustrate, there is a stronger moral justification for treating a patient who lacks
capacity if they assent to the treatment, than if they dissent to it.²¹ One reason for
this is that a treatment to which a patient has dissented is likely to be far more
distressing for the patient. Furthermore, a process of assent can be important because
it allows a patient who lacks capacity to have at least some sort of an input into a
decision that affects them, an input that is commensurate with the capacities that
they do have.²²
Faden and Beauchamp distinguish informed consent as autonomous authoriza-
tion from a second institutional sense of informed consent, which pertains to the
rules and policies that actually govern informed consent in institutional contexts.
What qualifies as an informed consent in this second sense, may or may not amount
to the sort of act of autonomous authorization that the first sense means to identify.²³
For instance, there may be cases in which minors may have the capacity to autono-
mously authorize a medical procedure (and thus provide valid consent in accordance
with the first sense), and yet this decision will not be legally recognized as a token of
valid consent (in the second sense).²⁴
The institutional sense can incorporate a wide range of conceptions of what
‘informed consent’ might require. For the purposes of my discussion in the second
half of this chapter, it is important to be clear about two different institutional senses
of ‘informed’ consent, which are required to provide sufficient protection against
different kinds of torts in medical law, namely battery and negligence.²⁵ First, a
physician can be liable to be charged with battery if she touches a patient without
their valid consent. As I have discussed in the first part of this book, the voluntariness
of a patient’s decision can be undermined in a manner that may serve to invalidate
their consent by controlling influences such as coercion, deception, and manipulation.
This much is straightforward; the more complex question is what degree of under-
standing a patient must have in order to provide valid consent in this institutional
sense. Following the case of Chatterton v Gerson (1981), the answer to this question
in England and Wales is that the patient must be ‘informed in broad terms of the
nature of the procedure’.²⁶ As Maclean points out, it is relatively easy for physicians
²¹ This is recognized in the law in various ways. In determining what is in the best interests of a patient
who lacks capacity, physicians have to take into account the person’s current views and feelings. Herring,
Medical Law and Ethics, 177; Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 4. It is also particularly salient in the
Scottish law regarding electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) for patients who lack capacity and who have been
diagnosed with a mental disorder. Scottish Government, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland)
Act 2003 (2003), s. 237–9. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2003/13/contents.
²² Sibley, Sheehan, and Pollard, ‘Assent Is Not Consent’.
²³ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 276–7.
²⁴ This puts a somewhat simplistic gloss on the hugely complex question of when minors can provide
valid consent to medical treatment. For further discussion, see Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 187–94;
Hope, Savulescu, and Hendrick, Medical Ethics and Law, ch. 10.
²⁵ It would be possible for a physician to be charged with the criminal offence of battery in extreme
cases, where they have acted maliciously. However, most cases of battery in the medical context are civil
rather than criminal cases. Hope, Savulescu, and Hendrick, Medical Ethics and Law, 71; Herring, Medical
Law and Ethics, 150–2.
²⁶ Chatterton v Gerson at 265.
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to satisfy this informational requirement in disclosure, and the law allows for
considerable leeway in its interpretation of the ‘broad nature’ of medical
interventions.²⁷
However, whilst consent grounded by this minimal degree of understanding can
be legally valid, and thus invoked to avoid liability to a charge of battery, it is not
sufficient to avoid liability to medical negligence. A claim of medical negligence can
be raised against a physician if (i) she has failed in her duty of care to the patient and
(ii) this failure resulted in the patient suffering a harm. In most cases, actions of
battery and negligence can often be distinguished quite easily, because considerations
of whether a patient has provided valid consent are often quite distinct from whether
the physician harmed a patient by failing to observe her duty of care. However, this
distinction can be somewhat muddied by the fact that the physician’s duty of care is
understood to incorporate a duty to inform her patient of features of the treatment
that go beyond its ‘broad nature’. For instance, a claim of negligence may be
grounded by the fact that the physician neglected to inform the patient of certain
risks of a medical procedure, or alternative treatment options. Such information goes
beyond that which is required for understanding the treatment in ‘broad terms’.
There are interesting questions about these different requirements of information
disclosure across these two institutional senses of informed consent, and how they
might relate to our understanding of autonomous decision-making. I shall consider
these questions in the second half of this chapter. At this point though, we may
acknowledge that it is possible to draw a distinction between the ‘valid consent’ that is
grounded by the minimal understanding of the broad nature of a proposed treatment
and (ii) the ‘substantially informed consent’ that can be absent in this case, and which
may provide partial grounds for a claim of medical negligence.²⁸
This distinction is not always recognized in bioethical discussions of informed
consent.²⁹ However, it is important to clarify it here, as it represents a source of
potential confusion given the different ways in which scholars use the language of
consent. Following the judge in Chatterton v Gerson, some scholars use the term ‘real
consent’ to refer to what I have termed ‘valid consent’, and the term ‘informed
consent’ to refer to the sort of consent that must be obtained in order to forestall
claims of medical negligence.³⁰ This later terminology is somewhat unfortunate, as it
may be thought to have the implication that valid or ‘real’ consent is not ‘informed’.
As I have explained above though this is a mistake; valid consent must be informed to
some (albeit lesser) degree.
As such, when I need to refer specifically to the institutional sense of informed
consent in my discussion below, I shall instead distinguish the two forms of consent
that are operative in discussions of battery and negligence as ‘valid consent’ and
‘substantially informed consent’ respectively. Crucially though, in England and
²⁷ Maclean, ‘The Doctrine of Informed Consent’, 392–3. ²⁸ Ibid.
²⁹ For one notable exception, see Walker, ‘Informed Consent and the Requirement to Ensure
Understanding’.
³⁰ Maclean, ‘The Doctrine of Informed Consent’.
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Wales, consent can be valid without being what I have called ‘substantially
informed’.³¹
2. Autonomy-Based Justifications of Informed Consent
The above discussion indicates that it is important to be clear about the sense of
consent that one means to invoke, when seeking to justify a particular criterion of
informed consent by appealing to the principle of respect for autonomy. In defining
the provision of consent as a specific kind of autonomous action in the first sense,
Faden and Beauchamp draw an inextricable link between consent and the principle
of respect for autonomy. However, this sense is not co-extensive with the second
institutional sense of informed consent, and we should not assume that they share the
same justification.
Indeed, the development of the institutional sense of informed consent in the legal
context raises significant challenges for any philosophical investigation into the topic.
As Richard Ashcroft notes, we should not expect to find elusive, abstract philosoph-
ical concepts such as autonomy in the law, as the law requires more concrete
concepts that can be tested and consistently applied in litigation.³² We might also
add to Ashcroft’s claims that the philosophical bioethicist has something of an easy
way out of complex debates in medical law; upon finding that the law fails to reflect a
philosophical principle upon which it purports to be based, they can simply say ‘so
much the worse for the law’. However, this is not a particularly useful practical
avenue for the medical lawyer who has to address these issues whilst working within
this framework, which is shaped by a number of competing and conflicting justifi-
cations beyond philosophically pure abstract principles. In particular, the institu-
tional sense of informed consent may need to serve a wide range of purposes whilst
being constrained by the practical realities of the clinical encounter. In turn, this may
legitimize employing lower thresholds for understanding, disclosure, and capacity
than might be required for a decision to qualify as an autonomous authorization.³³
However, whilst acknowledging this, the concept of autonomy can still coherently
play some, perhaps non-exhaustive role in its justification. It can serve as a guiding
value that we may invoke to shape the contours of the institutional requirements of
informed consent, so that they better serve the autonomy of patients, amongst the
other purposes that they are intended to fulfil.
With that said, I shall begin by framing my discussion by considering the rela-
tionship between autonomy and the first sense of informed consent as a form of
autonomous authorization. On this first sense, the relationship between informed
consent and autonomy is straightforward; to provide informed consent is just to
make a certain kind of autonomous decision, a decision to authorize a particular
medical treatment. The positive obligation imposed by the requirement to obtain
informed consent can be understood to amount to an obligation to help facilitate
³¹ As such, this jurisdiction does not observe the so called ‘doctrine of informed consent’. Herring,
Medical Law and Ethics, 158.
³² Ashcroft, ‘Law and the Perils of Philosophical Grafts’.
³³ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 123.
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autonomous decision-making, and the negative obligation to ensure that medical
interventions do not involve the infringement of rights that have not been waived by
their holders.
The rationalist account of autonomy that I have developed is meant to supplement
the standard account of autonomy. Indeed, one of the strengths of the rationalist
approach that I have developed over the course of the preceding chapters is that it
can add further explanatory depth to the conditions laid out in the standard account.
For instance, in the previous chapters, I have explained how my rationalist approach
can provide a principled account of how the different forms of controlling influence
captured by condition (3) above undermine voluntariness. Consider also condition
(1). Faden and Beauchamp claim that an action must be intentional in order for it to
be autonomous, and that ‘ . . . an intentional action is action willed in accordance with
a plan’.³⁴ Among the category of non-intentional acts, they include:
. . . things that persons do inadvertently, certain habitual behaviours, and instances of so called
occurrent coercion in which a person is physically forced by another to do something.³⁵
Intentional action understood in this way can also be interpreted as a necessary
condition of autonomy on the account that I have defended. To will an action in
accordance with a plan, can be understood as willing action in accordance with one’s
beliefs about what one has reason to pursue; moreover, the non-intentional actions
delineated in the above quotation are also inimical to acting on the basis of this sort
of rational deliberation.
The criterion of understanding is also congruous with the account that I developed
in the first half of the book. To recap, I have argued that there can be decisionally
necessary beliefs, in the sense that one must hold certain true beliefs about central
features of one’s choice in order to make an autonomous decision in that context.
Furthermore, I have argued that failing to abide by norms of theoretical rationality
can undermine the sort of understanding that autonomy requires, in the sense that it
jeopardizes one’s ability to assess the extent to which a particular belief coheres with
one’s other beliefs about both descriptive and evaluative features of the world.
One of my aims in this chapter is to provide more details about the implications of
my theory for the scope of the criterion of understanding. Here though, we may
simply acknowledge that Beauchamp and Childress claim that in order to autono-
mously authorize a medical procedure, the patient must have substantial, but not full
understanding. They note that the patient’s understanding of ‘diagnoses, prognoses,
the nature and purpose of the intervention, alternatives, risks and benefits, and
recommendations’ is ‘typically essential’ for such understanding.³⁶ Notice then that
the criterion of understanding employed by Beauchamp and Childress for autono-
mous authorization goes beyond that required by ‘valid consent’ in the institutional
sense. Instead, it bears a resemblance to that which is required by the doctrine of
informed consent in the institutional sense, or what I have called ‘substantially
informed consent’. I shall return to this point below.
³⁴ Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 187–94. ³⁵ Ibid.
³⁶ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 132.
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Despite this significant degree of congruence with the standard account, my
rationalist theory of autonomy departs from this view by advocating that we should
supplement the standard account with rationality conditions of the sort set out in
Chapter 2. Thus, I suggest that the following ought to be understood as a necessary
condition of the voluntariness element of informed consent:
Rationality Condition: If an agent is to provide informed consent to some
intervention, then they must also endorse their desire to undergo that interven-
tion with a personally authorized preference.
The condition has significant implications for what we should want the informed
consent process to achieve, if it is to facilitate autonomous decision-making. Merely
ensuring the sufficient understanding of material information is not enough to
facilitate autonomous decision-making, if that understanding remains unconnected
to the patient’s values. The condition thus speaks against viewing the patient as a
passive recipient of disclosure who is ‘to be informed’; instead, it speaks in favour of
the patient actively contributing to the process, so that physicians can tailor disclos-
ure to what matters to the patient, given her values. Of course, by adding this
condition, I am implicitly widening the gap between what informed consent as an
autonomous authorization should look like, and what informed consent in the
institutional sense currently requires.
Informed consent in this first sense can thus facilitate autonomous decision-
making, in so far as the process of informed consent helps to enable individuals to
decide to authorize medical procedures in accordance with the above sorts of
conditions. However, it also has an important role to play in respecting the agent’s
autonomous preferences. It has this role by virtue of the negative obligation the
requirement to obtain consent imposes on others to refrain from certain kinds of
action, in the absence of consent. In this chapter, I shall be interested primarily in the
justification of informed consent in the context of medical practice, when that is
understood to refer only to the provision of medical therapy but not the performance
of non-therapeutic research.³⁷ However, by distinguishing the ways in which indi-
viduals can face both internal and external impediments to autonomy, and by
stressing the importance of the rational endorsement of one’s preferences to auton-
omy, the account that I have delineated serves to highlight an illuminating contrast
between the justification of informed consent requirements in the context of non-
therapeutic medical research, and the justification of informed consent requirements
in medical practice.
It is commonly claimed that there is an important distinction between medical
research and therapy due to the primary aims of each activity.³⁸ For instance, the
³⁷ The research context raises different questions about appropriate standards of understanding and
disclosure. For analysis, see Sreenivasan, ‘Does Informed Consent to Research Require Comprehension?’;
Bromwich, ‘Understanding, Interests and Informed Consent’; Bromwich and Millum, ‘Disclosure and
Consent to Medical Research Participation’.
³⁸ See Miller and Brody, ‘Clinical Equipoise and the Incoherence of Research Ethics’ for a discussion of
the different ethical norms governing medical research and therapy. However, see Beauchamp, ‘Viewpoint’
for an argument against drawing a hard and fast distinction between research and therapy.
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Belmont Report defines medical therapies (in part) as ‘interventions . . . designed
solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient . . . ’ whilst it defines medical
research (in part) as ‘an activity designed to test a hypothesis, permit conclusions to
be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge’.³⁹
The prioritization of generalizable knowledge in scientific research suggests that
the intended primary beneficiaries of an individual’s participation in a research study
are the third parties who stand to benefit from this knowledge. The value of
‘generalizable knowledge’ in this context may be understood as a proxy for the
interests of society at large, and future patients. Accordingly, it seems that one of
the primary purposes of informed consent in the research context, is that it affords
some protection to potential subjects from being put at risk of harm (broadly
construed), or having their rights violated on the basis of broadly consequentialist
justifications of research.
This is clearest in Phase I trials of a novel medical intervention, in which healthy
volunteers are provided with sub-therapeutic doses of an intervention in order to
establish its safety. Participants in such trials are put at risk of harm without any real
possibility of benefiting from the intervention itself, although they may be benefited
indirectly by payment for their participation.⁴⁰ In this way, informed consent
requirements can be understood as safeguarding autonomy, in so far as they help
to ensure that it is the individual herself who determines whether she wants to waive
her claim rights against bodily interference (amongst others), and thereby put herself
at risk of the harm that the research might entail for the benefit of others (or, if
payment is offered, for indirect benefit). When the individual subject’s autonomy
conflicts with the interests of future patients, the former trumps the latter.⁴¹
Informed consent in the context of medical practice partly plays a similar role, in
so far as it serves to protect patients from being forced into receiving treatments that
might serve another party’s interests rather than their own.⁴² However, informed
consent also plays a further role in medical practice that is not applicable in the
context of non-therapeutic medical research, in so far as the interventions for which
consent is being solicited in the former context are primarily intended to directly
benefit the patient herself. Indeed, we may notice that the definition of medical
practice quoted above stresses that the aim of a therapeutic intervention is to enhance
the recipient’s own well-being. Part of the reason that respecting autonomy is
important in this context is that it gives the patient a say in the matter of what is
really in their own interests, in the light of their own desires and values.
The importance of this is made clear once it is observed that patients can differ
from their physicians in their conclusions about what they have strongest self-
interested reason to do, even in view of the same relevant descriptive facts. To
illustrate, consider this example:
³⁹ The Belmont Report.
⁴⁰ As I explored in Chapter 4, such payment can raise the spectre of coercion; see Emanuel and Miller,
‘Money and Distorted Ethical Judgments about Research’.
⁴¹ World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
⁴² For a relevant legal example of this, see Appleton v Garrett – Case Summary.
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Suppose that Joe is undergoing an operation to remove a tumour from his diaphragm. An
anaesthetist consults him regarding his post-operative analgesia. The efficiency of analgesia in
Joe’s case is crucial, since if the analgesia is not effective, it is likely that Joe’s lung will collapse
and lead to the development of a potentially fatal pneumonia. Joe is given the choice between
an analgesic that poses a very small risk of spinal cord damage (such as a thoracic epidural),
and one that is considerably less effective but which poses no such risk (such as an intravenous
narcotic infusion).⁴³
Here, the thoracic epidural is medically indicated; however, Joe might still rationally
choose to receive an intravenous narcotic infusion instead, if he places sufficient
weight on the value of pursuits that involve physical activity. For example, suppose
that Joe is a professional athlete, and believes that his life would not be worth living if
he became paralysed. In such a case, the possibility that the more effective analgesia
could paralyse Joe might give him reason to believe that the less effective analgesia,
which did not pose this risk of paralysis, was the preferable treatment option.
This case suggests that the role of informed consent requirements in medical
practice is not merely to protect the patient from competing third-party interests,
but also to ensure that the treatment that the patient receives is in accordance with
what they want for themselves; and this may or may not coincide with what the
physician believes is in the patient’s best interests. Even if rational agents agree that
they have some reason to purse an outcome, this does not entail that they will agree
on the strength of that reason, relative to their reasons to pursue other outcomes.⁴⁴
This observation goes some way towards explaining the intuitive pull of the claim
that informed consent in medical practice can be justified in large part by an appeal
to the principle of respect for autonomy, at least on the broadly Millian understand-
ing that I have been developing in this book. Informed consent requirements can be
understood as facilitating the patient’s self-governance, not just because they protect
the patient from controlling forces, or from their being exploited in the interests of
others. They also give the patient the power to make their own treatment decisions, in
accordance with their assessment of the strength of the reasons that they have to
pursue different outcomes. At least part of the importance we attribute to informed
consent can thus be construed as a reflection of the Millian thought that I highlighted
in the introduction of this book, namely that we value laying out our own mode of
our existence, even if our way of doing so is not prudentially optimific by third-party
standards.
The view that the moral significance of informed consent is to be justified by an
appeal to the value of patient autonomy has often been treated almost as a truism in
bioethics. Indeed, as I illustrated above, Faden and Beauchamp simply define
informed consent as a type of autonomous authorization, whilst autonomy has
elsewhere been described as the ‘ultimate moral foundation’⁴⁵ of informed consent.
However, it is important to be clear about the extent of this claim, at least as I shall
understand it in this chapter. As I suggested above, the moral significance of
⁴³ Savulescu, ‘Rational Non-Interventional Paternalism’, 327.
⁴⁴ For a discussion of how this point featured in the justification of the Montgomery judgement
discussed below, see Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’, 8–9.
⁴⁵ Young, ‘Informed Consent and Autonomy’, 441.
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informed consent in this sense can be grounded in large part by the broadly Millian
conception of autonomy that I have been developing in this book. Yet, there are two
important mistakes that we must avoid here.
First, it would be a mistake to assume that the Millian conception of autonomy
provides the only justification for the first sense of informed consent that I have
primarily been considering so far. There is a considerable literature that seeks to
explore the ways in which Kantian conceptions of autonomy can also ground
informed consent requirements. These approaches particularly focus on the role
that such requirements play in ensuring that individuals are respected as ends in
themselves, in a manner that is consummate with their human dignity.⁴⁶ The
Kantian approach thus focuses on the role that informed consent plays in respecting
the supreme moral status of rational agents; in contrast, the Millian approach places
emphasis on the manner in which informed consent facilitates the agent’s pursuit of
their own conception of the good life. Nonetheless, these different forms of justifi-
cation can both plausibly lend support to informed consent in its non-institutional
sense.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it would also be a mistake to claim that
either (or indeed both) of these conceptions of autonomy can provide the sole
justification of informed consent in its second institutional sense. Autonomy-based
justifications of informed consent have sometimes been criticized on this score, with
philosophers pointing to examples in which it appears that our reasons to abide by
informed consent requirements are not best understood as being grounded by
considerations of autonomy.⁴⁷ For example, one clear legal function of informed
consent in the medical context is that it serves to provide physicians with a record of
what has occurred in the course of providing treatment, a resource to which they can
appeal to in cases of litigation.⁴⁸ It has also been suggested that informed consent
procedures are integral to establishing a relationship of trust between doctors and
patients,⁴⁹ or safeguarding a personal sphere of self-ownership that is not best
understood in terms of autonomy.⁵⁰
Although there is a great deal of truth in this general criticism, it is somewhat
perplexing as an objection to autonomy-based justifications of informed consent.
The fact that there may also be non-autonomy based justifications of informed
consent in the institutional sense, speaks little against the claim that it may none-
theless derive an integral part of its justification from the fact that it does facilitate and
enable us to abide by the principle of respect for individual autonomy, in a consid-
erable number of cases.
To illustrate this point, consider David Archard’s criticism of the relationship
between autonomy and informed consent. Archard offers the example of ‘inserting a
⁴⁶ Donagan, ‘Informed Consent in Therapy and Experimentation’.
⁴⁷ See Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics, 133; Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy,
103; Archard, ‘Informed Consent’.
⁴⁸ Brock, Life and Death, 47–8.
⁴⁹ O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 145; see also Bok, Lying, 11, 26–7, and 63; Jackson, ‘Telling
the Truth’, 491. For recent challenges to this view, see Eyal, ‘Using Informed Consent to Save Trust’.
⁵⁰ Archard, ‘Informed Consent’.
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swab into someone’s mouth without her agreement, yet harmlessly, painlessly, and
without coercion or deception’.⁵¹ He suggests that a Millian conception of autonomy
cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the wrong involved in this failure to
observe the requirements of informed consent because ‘the value of autonomy is to
be found in the leading of lives’.⁵² As such, we only have autonomy-based reasons
to respect decisions regarding ‘critical life-choices’. Accordingly, we must thus appeal
to a right against bodily trespass to cash out the wrong involved in the swab example.
I am somewhat sceptical of Archard’s suggestion that a putative right to bodily
trespass can be entirely divorced from such an autonomy-based justification. This
might be true of some rights, particularly those that incorporate the Hohfeldian
incident of a claim but not the power to waive that claim.⁵³ The thought underlying
such putative unwaivable rights is that both autonomous and non-autonomous
individuals have a very strong interest against certain kinds of interference that
might justify affording them this unwaivable claim to protection. However, many
rights (including the right against bodily trespass) incorporate both a claim to
protection and the second-order power to waive that claim, at least in so far as the
right is held by an autonomous individual.⁵⁴ Crucially though, it is difficult to see
how the powers incorporated in these rights can be justified without some appeal to
the value of autonomy (even if the claims themselves might be so justified). Indeed, it
seems that the power to waive one’s claim should only be granted authority if the
right-bearer has decided to waive their claim in a locally autonomous fashion. In this
way, considerations of local autonomy seem highly relevant to our understanding of
aspects of these rights and their justification.⁵⁵
Notwithstanding this point about the relationship between rights and autonomy,
even if we agree with Archard that the wrong involved in cases of minor bodily
trespass is entirely divorced from considerations of autonomy, it is clear that the
requirement to obtain informed consent can be, and indeed is invoked in many
critical life-choices that do generate strong autonomy-based reasons. The example of
Joe above is just one case in point, in which the value of respecting Joe’s choice is
integral to the value of his leading his own life.
Accordingly, we should qualify the autonomy-based justification of informed
consent with the caveat that autonomy is not the only justification of the informed
consent in its institutional sense, even if it does provide a strong justification for it in
many cases. Yet, even when the view is qualified with this caveat, some philosophers
have further objected that informed consent in the institutional sense cannot be
justified by an appeal to respect for autonomy, because it is not and cannot be
sufficient for that purpose. For instance, Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill have
argued that this is a decisive problem with justifying informed consent procedures
by appealing to the principle of respect for autonomy. The problem is that such
requirements fail to ensure that patients will choose autonomously; they only require
that physicians respect the choices that the patient actually makes, whether or not
⁵¹ Ibid., 19. ⁵² Ibid., 21. ⁵³ Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’. ⁵⁴ Ibid.
⁵⁵ One explanation of this might be that the power incorporated into the right is grounded by
considerations of agential authority, whilst the claim itself is justified by considerations of interest. For
discussion of the basis of rights, see ibid.
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this choice is autonomous or rational.⁵⁶ Not only that, but Manson and O’Neill also
claim that if informed consent requirements were reformulated so that they would
protect only rational, autonomous choices, then they would become too demanding
for the vast majority of patients.⁵⁷
Manson and O’Neill invoke a broad understanding of ‘rational choice’ here,
claiming that theories of autonomy can understand rational choice as ‘reflectively
evaluated, or endorsed by second order desires’;⁵⁸ we may note that this understand-
ing is compatible with many of the theories that I surveyed (and rejected) in
Chapter 2. However, it is clear that the standard view of autonomy, which is the
primary target of their attack, does not incorporate conditions pertaining to the
rationality of the patient’s choice, even on this broad understanding. Indeed, advo-
cates of the standard view of autonomy explicitly reject the suggestion that a theory of
autonomy should incorporate a condition that requires that the patient’s choice be
consistent with their reflectively accepted values, because such a condition would,
they claim, make autonomy too demanding.⁵⁹
As the preceding chapters of this book should make clear, I believe that Manson
and O’Neill are correct to claim that the standard view of autonomy and informed
consent is inadequate. If we are to claim that a primary purpose of informed consent
requirements is to safeguard patient autonomy, then we should incorporate condi-
tions pertaining to the rationality of the patient’s choice into our theory of informed
consent. In view of the fact that Manson and O’Neill reject this solution (because it
would, they claim, make the standards of informed consent too demanding), two
strategies are possible. First, we could abandon the project of justifying informed
consent requirements by an appeal to the principle of respect for autonomy. This is
the strategy that Manson and O’Neill adopt; they argue that we ought to view an
agent’s provision of consent to a procedure as a waiver of an ethical and/or legal
norm against performing the act in question, in limited ways in a particular context.⁶⁰
On the other hand, we might maintain that informed consent requirements are to be
justified by an appeal to the principle of respect for autonomy, and supplement
informed consent requirements with conditions that will facilitate rational choice,
but which will not render informed consent requirements too demanding.
Over the course of the next two chapters, I shall adopt the latter strategy.⁶¹ Again,
it is important to be clear about the scope of what I shall attempt to claim. Contra
⁵⁶ Manson and O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, 21. More recently, in a similar vein,
Shlomo Cohen has claimed that ‘conceptions of autonomy cannot provide practical ethical guidelines
generally or specifically for informed consent’. Cohen, ‘A Philosophical Misunderstanding at the Basis of
Opposition to Nudging’, 39.
⁵⁷ Manson and O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, 21. ⁵⁸ Ibid.
⁵⁹ Faden and Beauchamp, AHistory and Theory of Informed Consent, 262–4; Beauchamp and Childress,
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 103.
⁶⁰ Manson and O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, 72. See also 69–84.
⁶¹ Though I cannot argue fully for why I reject Manson and O’Neill’s strategy here, I shall sketch my
main points of disagreement. First, it is not clear that their theory really divorces autonomy from informed
consent in the way that they claim; after all, if consent transactions are meant to signify the patient’s
waiving a significant legal or ethical norm, it must surely be the case that the patient should still be
autonomous with respect to their decision to waive that norm. Manson and O’Neill do warn against the
possibility of bogus consent, in which consent is solicited in ways that violate ethical norms; they give the
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Manson and O’Neill, requiring that an adequate conception of informed consent
must ensure that patients make autonomous choices is an unreasonably high bar.
Such a view overlooks the fact that the individual herself has an indispensable role to
play in their own autonomy; disclosure, and the absence of controlling influences on
choice means nothing for the patient’s autonomy, if she herself is either unwilling or
unable to contribute to the decision-making process. It is thus unfeasible to demand
that informed consent in the institutional sense must alone ensure that patients make
autonomous decisions; the best that we can hope for is that it will facilitate the
patient’s making an autonomous decision, and ensure that the autonomous decisions
that she does make are respected.
As I suggested above, the main source of objection to the sort of rationality
condition that I have proposed is that it would make the conditions of informed
consent too demanding. This is a serious objection that the account must answer.
However, it is an objection concerning the causal conditions of autonomy and the
standards of capacity that they imply, rather than an objection to the rationality
condition itself as a constitutive condition of autonomy and informed consent.
As such, I shall postpone my consideration of it until I am in a position to discuss
the issue of capacity in the following chapter. In the next section, I shall turn to
further consider the role of autonomy in justifying informed consent in the institu-
tional sense, by considering its relationship to ‘valid consent’ and ‘substantially
informed consent’, as they are distinguished in the context of medical law governing
claims of battery and negligence.
3. Battery, Negligence, Beliefs, and Decisional
Autonomy
In the legal domain, questions pertaining to informed consent have been framed not
so much in terms of what patients need to understand in order to be autonomous
with respect to their treatment decision, but rather in terms of what physicians need
to disclose.⁶² Whilst it is easier to enforce a legal requirement to disclose information
than it is to enforce a requirement to ensure understanding, the former receives only
limited justification from considerations of autonomy. First, disclosing information
to a patient may not be necessary for safeguarding autonomous decision-making in
some cases. Most obviously, this can be so if the patient is already aware of
that information. For example, it seems that I could provide valid consent to a
physician’s application of a bandage to my wound, without their having disclosed
to me that I am bleeding profusely, and that applying a bandage to a wound will help
to stop the bleeding.
examples of consent following coercion, force, and duress as examples of bogus consent. See ibid., 92.
However, what, we might ask is the basis for these ethical norms? Whilst Manson and O’Neill appeal to a
principled Kantian sense of autonomy to ground such norms, an alternative plausible explanation would
be that coercion, force, and duress are wrong because they violate the patient’s autonomy in the Millian
sense that I have outlined (see also O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, ch. 4, especially 83–6).
⁶² See Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2nd edition, 67.
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This example suggests that the sort of understanding that is required for patients
to make autonomous decisions can sometimes be implicitly assumed with some
justification, and patients can in some cases provide tacit consent that authorizes a
procedure, without going through the rigmarole of institutional procedures of
informed consent. Of course, given the expertise gap between physicians and their
patients, and since physicians cannot be certain about their patients’ prior know-
ledge, patients will often need to have information disclosed to them. However, it
would also be a mistake to assume that disclosure of relevant information is sufficient
to ensure the degree of understanding that is necessary for autonomous decision-
making. Even competent patients may struggle to process the information presented
to them if it is not adequately explained to them. Indeed, this speaks to a considerable
tension in informed consent with which I shall be concerned in this chapter. The
disclosure of information that may be material to a patient’s decision may also serve
to undermine the patient’s ability to make an autonomous decision in that same
context, for reasons I shall explain.
Disclosure, then, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of ensuring the
degree of understanding that is required for autonomous decision-making. That said,
it is perhaps the most powerful tool at our disposal when thinking about how best to
facilitate autonomous decision-making in the institutional context. This is particu-
larly so in the context of medicine, in which there is a significant expertise gap
between the parties soliciting and providing consent.
As I explained above, informed consent in the institutional sense draws a distinc-
tion between the amount of information that must be disclosed (and understood) in
order for a patient to provide ‘valid consent’, and that which must be disclosed (and
understood) in order for the patient to provide ‘substantially informed consent’ to
the intervention. Recall that a physician’s receipt of the patient’s ‘valid consent’ to an
intervention can be invoked as a defence against battery, whilst a physician must have
obtained ‘substantially informed consent’ in order to defend themselves from claims
of negligence.
The torts of battery and negligence can cover quite separate kinds of action, and
I do not have space to list the various differences between the two here.⁶³ However,
these two legal categories somewhat overlap when it comes to the question of
information disclosure in the medical context.⁶⁴ Indeed, the kind of information of
which the patient is ignorant when they agree to undergo a procedure, can make all
the difference between whether the patient has given valid consent or not. The
question I want to consider in the remainder of this section is whether there are
any autonomy-based reasons to support the way in which the law stipulates the lower
threshold of understanding required for valid consent, in comparison to the standard
deployed for claims of negligence.
Without discounting the possibility of other justifications, I want to suggest that
considerations of autonomy do lend support to the distinction between what I have
called ‘valid consent’ and ‘substantially informed consent’. To recap some arguments
⁶³ For discussion, see Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 152–3.
⁶⁴ For an argument that the Montgomery judgement represents a way in which the legal distinction
between risk disclosure and consent is breaking down, see Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’
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I made in the preceding chapters, I have argued that there is a cognitive element of
decisional autonomy; if an agent holds certain false beliefs, or fails to hold certain
true beliefs, they may be precluded from making certain decisions voluntarily in that
context. This will be so if the beliefs in question are decisionally necessary; I also
suggested a modal test that may be employed to identify some of these beliefs.
The individual’s failure to hold such beliefs undermines their decisional auton-
omy, regardless of how this came to be the case, be it through intentional third-party
deception, or the non-intentional omission of true information. Accordingly, on the
account that I have developed, if a physician performs a medical procedure on the
basis of a token of consent that is grounded by a lack of understanding of this key
information, it can be plausible to say that the physician has not only failed to act in
accordance with their duty of care; they have also performed a medical procedure on
the basis of a non-voluntary, and thus invalid token of consent.
Crucially though, I argued that the absence of many true beliefs is compatible with
decisional autonomy. Our decisional autonomy is not undermined by our lack of
true beliefs about future states of affairs, or the actual, rather than predicted,
consequences of our choices. Of course, our practical autonomy may be enhanced
by holding such beliefs; we will be more likely to achieve our goals if our beliefs about
these matters are true. However, our ignorance of these matters does not render our
decisions at the point of choice non-voluntary.
In light of the above recap, the key question for my purposes here is whether the
legal distinction between valid consent and substantially informed consent maps
onto the distinction between beliefs that are decisionally necessary, and those that are
not. I believe that it does. To see why, recall that in order for a patient to provide valid
consent to a medical procedure, the law states that they must be informed ‘in broad
terms of the nature of the procedure’. On my view, the reason that such ignorance
can be said to be incompatible with valid consent, is that it modally precludes the
patient from achieving their ends, by divorcing the decision they make from the
values that are actually operative in their particular choice context. A patient who
agrees to undergo a vasectomy without understanding that it will render him infertile
does not provide valid consent to the procedure, because their understanding of the
intervention is so poor that their informational condition precludes them from
choosing what to do in accordance with their own values.⁶⁵
In contrast, the sort of further information that is required for ‘substantially
informed consent’ (but not merely ‘valid consent’) is not captured by this modal
test. In previous chapters, I have argued that the concept of valid consent must be
compatible with the fact that many patients must make treatment decisions in the
light of severely restricted choices. As such, it seems that ignorance about alternative
treatment options can be compatible with valid consent, even if not substantially
informed consent. Furthermore, most information pertaining to risk will not be
captured by the modal test that we can use to identify decisionally necessary beliefs,
since there is typically a close relationship between modal possibility and probability.
⁶⁵ This also accounts for why the therapeutic misconception is such a problem for consent in medical
research. See Henderson et al., ‘Clinical Trials and Medical Care’.
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This means that ignorance about risk cannot be understood to modally preclude an
individual from acting effectively in pursuit of their ends, as I defined this in the
previous chapter. Even though the risk-event that actually occurs in this world might
have precluded the individual from achieving their ends in this world, there is
another nearby possible world in which this risk-event does not eventuate. Indeed,
Duncan Pritchard argues that very low-probability events can nonetheless be
modally close.⁶⁶ Thus, one is not modally precluded from achieving one’s ends by
ignorance about the degree of risk attending different courses of action.
That said, in discussing how beliefs about risk can affect the voluntariness of our
decisions, it is important to be clear that ‘ignorance about risk’ can cover two
importantly different types of ignorance. First, it can relate to ignorance that one is
assuming any risk by engaging in an activity; alternatively, it can relate to ignorance
about the particular degree of risk that one is assuming. The first sense outlined
above is incompatible with decisional autonomy. The reason for this is that in
consenting to a medical procedure, a patient is not simply being asked to consent
to the procedure itself; they are also being asked to consent to the assumption of risk.
If we agree with the Aristotelian claim that ignorance of particulars can undermine
voluntariness, then it seems that ignorance that there are risks associated with a
medical procedure can undermine the voluntariness of a patient’s consent to that
procedure, simply by virtue of the fact that this form of ignorance means that they do
not understand a significant part of what it is they are consenting to, namely,
assuming a risk. However, this does not entail that ignorance about the degree of
risk you are taking on, or indeed ignorance about future states of affairs, similarly
precludes decisional autonomy.
Accordingly, I believe that the distinction between valid consent and substantially
informed consent can be philosophically grounded by considerations of autonomy,
by virtue of the fact that some beliefs are decisionally necessary, whilst others are not.
Notice though that this is quite compatible with the claim that holding these further
true beliefs may nonetheless serve to enhance an agent’s autonomy. Indeed, it would
be a mistake to conclude from the above discussion that questions pertaining to the
disclosure required for ‘substantially informed consent’ are divorced from consider-
ations of autonomy. Such a conclusion might seem tempting, since the law treats a
failure to secure substantially informed consent as a breach in the doctor’s duty of
care, rather than an issue with the patient’s autonomy per se. Yet, even if this is so,
one must still account for why this amounts to such a breach in the doctor’s duty of
care. To my mind the most plausible answer is that the doctor has a positive duty to
facilitate their patient’s ability to make autonomous decisions. This includes facili-
tating autonomy beyond that which is required for the minimum threshold of
understanding that is necessary for consent to be valid. In addition to enhancing
the agent’s decisional autonomy by increasing their understanding of their options,
and indeed the number of options available to them, such disclosure can serve to
facilitate the patient’s autonomy by facilitating their own self-trust.
⁶⁶ Indeed, Pritchard argues that very low-probability events can nonetheless be modally close. See
Pritchard, ‘Risk’.
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However, deciding on how one can best act in accordance with the positive
obligation to increase decisional autonomy beyond that which is minimally required
for valid consent is complex. Physicians cannot be expected to disclose all the
available information about the risks attending a medical treatment, and patients
cannot be expected to understand it. Medical conditions, procedures, and their
attendant risks often admit of exceedingly complex descriptions, which, however
accurate they might be, are unlikely to aid the patient in their decision-making.
This has important implications for disclosure. If physicians understood the
obligation to facilitate autonomy to require that they aim for full understanding
amongst their patients, they would be likely to overwhelm them with an excess of
information that they could not reasonably be expected to compute, especially given
that many patients will be less able to deal with complex information because of their
illness. There is thus an important balance to be struck between (i) providing patients
with the information that can enable them to identify the values at stake in their
decision, and to form an impression of the strength of their apparent reasons, and (ii)
refraining from providing so much information that the patient is unable to utilize it
in a process of rational deliberation.
The theoretical apparatus we may appeal to in seeking to strike this balance is the
concept of materiality; to adequately facilitate substantially informed consent, and to
thus discharge their duty of care to their patient, we may say physicians must only
disclose information that is material to the patient’s decision. I shall conclude this
chapter by considering how we should understand this concept of materiality, and
the relationship between different standards of disclosure and autonomy.
4. Standards of Disclosure
According to a physician-oriented view of materiality, it should be solely up to the
physician, in their professional capacity, to decide which information is material to
their patient’s decision. In turn, the physician’s decision here is understood to be
governed by a standard of disclosure endorsed by the professional community,
according to which information ought to be disclosed if the majority of physicians
within that community would customarily make such a disclosure. Until recently,
this view was enshrined in the law in England and Wales in the form of the so-called
‘Bolam test’, named after the judge’s assessment in Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee (1957) that ‘a doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has
acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art’.⁶⁷ This test was then deemed to determine
the boundaries of the physician’s duty to disclose information to their patient in a
later case.⁶⁸
⁶⁷ Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee at 1 WLR 583.
⁶⁸ Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985]. For discussion, see Miola, ‘On the
Materiality of Risk’. In the US, see Robinson v. Bleicher (559 N.W.2d 473) 1997.
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The Bolam test has been widely criticized as a paternalistic standard of informa-
tion disclosure.⁶⁹ Part of the problem with the test is that a ‘responsible body of
medical men’might find it proper to omit information on the basis of considerations
of beneficence alone, rather than patient autonomy. That is, the professional body
could plausibly seek to justify the omission of certain information disclosure on the
basis that such disclosure would lead patients to refuse treatments that are in their
best interests. Indeed, on this justification, a physician could even refrain from
disclosing information that the patient explicitly requested.
Extending the Bolam judgement to the context of risk disclosure was to leave the
door open to this kind of paternalism. The natural rebuke to doing so was that this
sort of paternalism runs contrary to the underlying autonomy-based justification of
informed consent; part of the purpose of the informed consent requirements is to
empower patients to make their own decisions about what happens to them, and to
avoid paternalistic interference.⁷⁰ Partly on this basis, other patient-centric standards
of materiality, which purport to emphasize patient autonomy over the paternalism of
the physician-oriented approach, have been mooted.
In their philosophically grounded approach to substantially informed consent,
Faden and Beauchamp explicitly advocate a purely subjective account of materiality.
They claim that:
. . . a person must understand those propositions about (some medical intervention) R and
about authorizing R that are germane to the person’s evaluation of whether R is an intervention
the person should authorize. This criterion is entirely subjective.⁷¹
Call this the subjective patient-oriented account of materiality.
The justification for adopting a subjective approach is that different patients are
likely to regard different information to be pertinent to their treatment decision. Yet,
one problem with the subjective account is that it fails to explain precisely how
patients are to subjectively assess whether or not certain information is pertinent;
Faden and Beauchamp simply point out that a person’s long term goals and values
can affect how individuals value various act descriptions.⁷² However, it seems that in
order for information to qualify as material to a patient’s decision, even if only
subjectively, there must be some plausible basis upon which the individual under-
stands the information to be pertinent to her decision. Call this the subjective
assessment problem.
One way in which the subjective assessment problem raises a difficulty for the
subjective account arises when we recall that understanding some information is
decisionally necessary. That is, certain information is so fundamental to the nature of
a decision that one cannot make that decision voluntarily if one remains ignorant of
it. Crucially, this is so regardless of whether an individual deems the information to
be material or not. For instance, suppose Jerry feels ill and continually takes anti-
biotics because she believes that they are the only thing that will cure her; she does
⁶⁹ Brazier, ‘Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment’; Jones, ‘Informed Consent and Other Fairy
Stories’; Miola, ‘On the Materiality of Risk’; Brazier and Miola, ‘Bye-Bye Bolam’.
⁷⁰ Indeed, this anti-paternalistic argument can be found in the judgement in Chester v Afshar at 18.
⁷¹ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 302. ⁷² Ibid.
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not believe that the fact that she is suffering from a viral rather than a bacterial
infection is material to her decision. Irrespective of her own views regarding the
materiality of this information, Jerry’s failure to appreciate the significance of this
precludes her from receiving an effective treatment. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine
how a patient could be autonomous with respect to their decision to undergo an
anaesthetic if they failed to understand that undergoing an anaesthetic will render
them unconscious.
One might defend the subjective standard on this score by saying that the standard
is only meant to apply to information disclosure beyond that which is necessary to
secure valid consent. However, the subjective assessment problem raises its head in
other ways. In view of the fact that patients are normally not experts in medicine, and
may be in a vulnerable state owing to the nature of their condition, they may make
mistakes about what information is and is not material to their treatment decision.
Indeed, as I shall explain below, empirical evidence suggests that patients are subject
to a number of cognitive biases that can distort their understanding of their condition
and treatment options. A second problem then with the subjective account, is that a
particular patient may attach significance to information, but not in a manner that
bespeaks an adequate understanding and processing of that information in rational
deliberation.
Finally, it is not clear that a purely subjective account of materiality is practically
realizable; first, it will often be difficult for practitioners to know what information a
patient believes to be relevant to their decision, and it is the physician who has to
decide what information to disclose to their patient. Crucially, since physicians are
liable to negligence if they fail to disclose information deemed to be material by the
standard invoked in medical law, a requirement that doctors must disclose any and
all information that a patient could deem to be material would leave doctors highly
vulnerable to litigation. Moreover, we might also be concerned that requiring phys-
icians to disclose any risks a patient deems to be material, is to overlook the
potentially detrimental effect that informational overload can have on the individ-
ual’s ability to make autonomous decisions, and potentially overestimating patients’
ability to process that kind of information.⁷³
The failings of the subjective account in this regard might be claimed to lend
support to a purely objective patient-centric account, which appeals not to what the
particular patient deems material, but rather to what a hypothetical reasonable
person would deem to be material. The way in which we ought to understand what
constitutes such a hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ has been the subject of consider-
able debate. Briefly though, we may note two prominent interpretations outlined by
⁷³ It has also been claimed that the subjective element of the Montgomery ruling (discussed below) will
encourage defensive medicine, by requiring doctors to disclose more information (to ensure their legal
protection) than will actually facilitate their patient’s decision-making. Chan et al., ‘Montgomery and
Informed Consent’, are correct to point out that here the Montgomery ruling simply brings medical law
into line with the GMC recommendations regarding the importance of communication. However, this
simply means that a similar charge may be raised against these recommendations.
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Dunn et al.⁷⁴ They note that one might interpret the reasonable person standard to
mean that information ought to be disclosed simply if the majority of people think it
ought to be disclosed in a specified set circumstances. However, as the authors note,
there is little support for this interpretation in medical law. Not only do judges lack
empirical support for what most people think about the significance of different
kinds of risks, but a significant reason for invoking the concept of reasonableness in
one’s criterion of materiality is to avoid reliance on capricious, and potentially
unreasonable opinions held by the population at large.⁷⁵ Accordingly, Dunn et al.
favour an interpretation of the ‘reasonable person’ as invoking a concept of ‘reason-
ableness as normatively justifiable’.⁷⁶ On this interpretation, information ought to be
disclosed if it concerns information that warrants weighting in a rational agent’s
decision-making process, by virtue of its significance for individual well-being.
I agree with these authors that the ‘normatively justifiable’ interpretation of
reasonableness in the ‘reasonable person’ standard is the most convincing; indeed
it is congruous with the concept of impersonal reason-giving facts that I discussed in
Chapters 1 and 2. But the reasonable person standard, so construed, cannot alone
provide a standard of disclosure that is sufficient for adequately facilitating patient
autonomy. The problem with such a proposed standard is that a particular patient’s
preferences may seldom be exhausted by what is normatively justifiable in this way.
Even if we assume that there are certain impersonal goods that all rational agents
have reasons to pursue, to presume that material information is wholly constituted
by information that a reasonable patient (in this sense) would want to know
presumes that our self-interested reasons are exhausted by a certain set of our
impersonal reasons. As I explored in Chapter 2, this sort of claim seems to implicitly
assume an overly objective conception of well-being. Rational individuals can and do
disagree about the weight of the reasons that they have to pursue different goods, and
individuals can have personal self-interested reasons to instrumentally value certain
goods which may not be shared by a hypothetical rational patient.
There are thus significant gaps in both the subjective and objective patient-centric
standards of disclosure that suggest that they are each insufficient for adequately
facilitating patient autonomy. Of course, an obvious answer to this problem is to
combine the two approaches in a hybrid approach. This is just the approach taken by
⁷⁴ Dunn et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular’. For other detailed discussions, see Miller
and Perry, ‘The Reasonable Person’; Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’; Kennedy, ‘The
Patient on the Clapham Omnibus’.
⁷⁵ Dunn et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular’, 8. The authors also consider an interpretation
of the reasonable person criterion according to which ‘it is reasonable to inform a patient of risk when there is
logical coherence between the patient’s values concerning risk and the patient’s beliefs about the significance
of the risk in these circumstances’. Their reason for dismissing this interpretation is that on this interpret-
ation, the reasonable person criterion would simply serve as a constraint on the exercise of the ‘particular
patient’ limb; yet, since the reasonable person criterion represents a separate limb to the Montgomery test of
materiality, the authors conclude that this interpretation is not what the judges had in mind. Nonetheless,
this interpretation could potentially serve as an objective standard in its own right.
⁷⁶ Dunn et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular’.
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the UK Supreme Court judgement on Montgomery v Lanarkshire.⁷⁷ Paragraph 87 of
the judgement states that physicians are:
. . . under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks
involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treat-
ments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk,
or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to
attach significance to it.⁷⁸
The Montgomery judgement thus offers a two-pronged disjunctive test of materiality
that incorporates both objective and subjective patient-centric elements. The benefit
of this hybrid approach is that it allows the judgement to overcome the respective
insufficiencies of the purely subjective and purely objective patient-centric
approaches noted above. Furthermore, we may notice that by appealing to what
‘the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be
likely to attach significance to’, the subjective limb of this test avoids concerns about
the practicalities of Faden and Beauchamp’s subjective condition of materiality. On
the Montgomery standard, physicians can only be charged with negligence if they are
aware, or could reasonably be aware, that a patient would attach significance to the
information in question.
The Montgomery judgement has been described as a triumph of autonomy over
paternalism, in that it epitomizes a shift of the balance in medical law regarding
disclosure away from the paternalism of the Bolam approach, towards the protection
of patient values.⁷⁹However, in the remainder of this chapter, I want to suggest, from
a philosophical perspective, that the manner in which the Montgomery ruling frames
both the subjective and objective elements of its test of materiality is somewhat
problematic, at least if the goal of the ruling is to facilitate patient autonomy.⁸⁰ This is
not intended to be a criticism of the judgement as a legal ruling. Such rulings have to
strike a careful balance between ethics, jurisprudence, and practical realities; in
particular, it has to set the boundaries of the physician’s liability to negligence.
However, I shall argue that it might be possible to better capture the spirit of
Montgomery, of prioritizing patient values, by reconceptualizing its two-pronged
test of materiality.
⁷⁷ In the following I shall be interested in the Montgomery judgement’s implications for risk disclosure.
For a more general overview see Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’
⁷⁸ Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland), paragraph 87.
Emphasis added.
⁷⁹ Bolton, ‘The Montgomery Ruling Extends Patient Autonomy’; Heywood, ‘R.I.P. Sidaway’; Edozien,
‘UK Law on Consent Finally Embraces the Prudent Patient Standard’; Farrell and Brazier, ‘Not so New
Directions in the Law of Consent?’
⁸⁰ Interestingly, Dunn et al. point out ways in which elements of the Montgomery judgement cannot be
adequately grounded by an autonomy-based justification, and argue that its justification is better under-
stood in terms of the value of patient-centric care. Dunn et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular’.
Whilst I agree with these authors that parts of the Montgomery judgement do not optimally facilitate
autonomy, I believe that standards of disclosure have greater significance for patient autonomy (as opposed
to patient-centric care alone) than these authors envisage, for reasons that I have outlined over the course
of the last two chapters.
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As I suggested at the end of the previous section, any standard of disclosure has to
strike a delicate balance between providing too little information to adequately
facilitate patients’ autonomous decision-making, and providing too much for that
purpose. At the same time, the standard also has to establish practically realistic
boundaries of the doctor’s duty of care. This is a tall order, and I suggested that the
purely objective and subjective patient-centric accounts erred in the first way; they
risk providing patients with insufficient information for autonomous decision-
making. In order to avoid this error, a hybrid approach incorporating both objective
and subjective elements is necessary. In the final section, I shall suggest that the
manner in which the Montgomery phrases the subjective element of its hybrid
approach means that it is in danger of erring in the second sense, of providing
patients with too much information.⁸¹
5. Rational Materiality
The problem with the subjective limb of the Montgomery test is that it does not avoid
the subjective assessment problem. True, it does stipulate some basis upon which the
subjective assessment must be made; the patient must ‘attach significance’ to the
information. However, it is far from clear that this is a suitable basis for identifying
information that is material to the kind of rational decision-making that autonomy
requires.
I shall explain this point in the remainder of this chapter. At the outset of this
discussion though, I want to suggest an alternative test of materiality grounded in the
theory that I have developed over the course of the book, one that draws an explicit
link between the materiality of information, and rationality.
Rational Materiality:Information is material to a particular patient’s treatment
decision if the physician is, or should reasonably be aware that:
(i) the patient’s understanding of that information is necessary for adequately appreciating
facts that are likely to give that patient considerable reasons to choose or reject a certain
treatment option;
and
(ii) average human decision-makers would not be incapable of understanding and incorp-
orating that information in a rational deliberative process.
Even before elaborating on this account of materiality in more detail, it should be
clear that this account departs from the subjective account of materiality in two ways.
First, by virtue of (i), certain information will be material to the patient’s decision,
regardless of the patient’s own assessment of the materiality of that information.
Furthermore, information that a patient mistakenly believes to be relevant to their
treatment decision will not be material if it does not concern reason-implying facts.
Criterion (ii) acknowledges that some information disclosure may be detrimental
to autonomous decision-making, even if the information in question meets other
⁸¹ I shall follow Dunn et al. in interpreting ‘reasonableness’ to mean ‘normatively justifiable’ in the
objective limb of the Montgomery judgement. Dunn et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular’.
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conditions of materiality. I shall explore this further below. Here though we may note
that this criterion of materiality links my account to considerations of decision-
making capacity, in so far as the latter requires the ability to understand, use, and
weigh material information. My suggestion here, to be fleshed out below, is that an
adequate test of materiality should acknowledge that the degree of capacity required
to make a decision can be influenced by the nature and degree of the information that
is deemed to be material to it.
First though, let us consider criterion (i). In so far as reason-giving facts can
pertain to our impersonal reasons, the above test of materiality can also be under-
stood to incorporate the objective limb of the Montgomery test, if reasonableness in
that context is interpreted in terms of normative justifiability. However, by explicitly
focusing on the rational content of the information to be disclosed, rather than the
rationality of a hypothetical subject of that disclosure (as per Montgomery), the
objective element of my account avoids some important ambiguities with the rea-
sonable person criterion. For instance, even when we agree that the ‘reasonableness’
criterion in the objective limb of Montgomery should be interpreted in terms of
normative justifiability, it remains ambiguous as to how we should understand the
nature of the individual for whom the information must be normatively justifiable.
Must it be normatively justifiable to a patient who is able to rationally process all and
any relevant information relevant to well-being, or should we interpret it to mean a
patient who is able to engage in rational deliberation, but who is nonetheless limited
in their capacity to process such information? On the latter understanding, must the
information be normatively justifiable to one who is aware of the limitation to their
capacity to rationally process such information? My approach avoids these ambigu-
ities by appealing to the reason-giving content of the information itself, whilst
acknowledging (in the second criterion) ways in which disclosure can threaten an
agent’s rational decision-making.
I will begin by exploring how this aspect of my test of materiality would apply in
medical contexts, before explaining the manner in which it departs from the
Montgomery judgement in further detail. On my proposed test of materiality, infor-
mation pertaining to two broad aspects of a patient’s treatment decision will concern
reason-implying facts. First, information pertaining to the nature of the proposed
intervention will be material. For instance, the fact that an intervention will be painful
or invasive provides patients with reasons not to choose that treatment (although these
reasons will often not be decisive). This sort of information is also captured by the
modal test that I outlined in previous chapters; patients must understand the nature of
what they are consenting to if they are not to be modally precluded from acting
effectively in pursuit of their ends when making treatment decisions. Second, facts
pertaining to the probability of an intervention’s bringing about some outcome will
also be reason-implying. Such facts will include not only those pertaining to the risks
attending the intervention and possible side-effects, but also those pertaining to the
probability of an intervention’s ameliorating the patient’s condition.⁸²
⁸² In their discussion, Herring et al. note that a positive aspect of the Montgomery judgement is that it
emphasizes the disclosure of benefits as well as risks. Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’
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I have thus far identified different types of information that will be material to a
patient’s decision. Consider now the extent to which patients should be made aware of
these different aspects of their treatment.Whilst some information about the nature of
the treatment might concern reason-implying facts (for instance, the fact that the
intervention is painful), a great deal of information about the treatment will not. For
example, information concerning the exact biological mechanism that explains why an
antibiotic helps to destroy a bacterial infection will normally not be material to a
patient’s decision to choose to take antibiotics; such information does not itself concern
facts that provide agents with self-interested reasons. However, corollaries of that
information may; for instance, in Jerry’s case above, the fact that antibiotics are not
an effective treatment for viral infections is material to her decision.
Although a great deal of specific information about the nature of a patient’s
condition or treatment options is unlikely to be material to their decision, it might
be claimed that information concerning the foreseeable outcomes of their treatment
options and their attendant possibilities is always likely to be material to a patient’s
decision. The Montgomery ruling comes close to making this sort of claim when it
states that physicians need to make patients aware of any material risks of the
proposed procedure, and that:
. . . the assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be reduced to percentages. The
significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its magnitude: for
example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the life of the
patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment,
the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. The assessment is
therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient.
I argued above that in order to provide valid consent to x, the patient must
understand that they are assuming some risk in agreeing to undergo x. That you
are assuming a risk in performing some action can be a reason-giving fact. However,
the strength of the reason it connotes depends on the gravity of the risk in question;
very low risks generate very weak reasons.
The problem that this raises is that autonomous decision-making in a medical
context can sometimes be threatened by the disclosure of such risks, even if they
generate (weak) reasons. The disclosure of the nature andmagnitude of very small risks
can serve to hinder, rather than promote the patient’s autonomy, because it feeds into
well-known cognitive biases that serve to distort the agent’s perception of the strength
of the reason that they have. It is for this reason that I suggest that the rationalist
account of materiality must incorporate criterion (ii) above, as I shall now explain.
If it were the case that patients were always able to understand the nature of small
risks, and to incorporate them into a rational decision-making process that facilitated
the pursuit of their own goals, then perhaps we should endorse the Montgomery
ruling’s implicit suggestion that physicians ought to disclose even minute risks, in
order to increase the patient’s autonomy with respect to their treatment decisions.
However, research on cognitive biases suggests that patients are not able to compute
information about risks in such an unbiased manner.⁸³ As Cass Sunstein points out,
⁸³ See Ingelfinger, ‘Informed (but Uneducated) Consent’. See also Levy, ‘Forced to Be Free?’, and
Sunstein, Risk and Reason for analyses of relevant empirical evidence.
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when people have to make a decision in an emotionally charged context such as
health care, they:
. . . tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood. That is, they are not closely
attuned to the probability that harm will occur.⁸⁴
This is particularly problematic when patients are being asked to choose two poten-
tial means of achieving the same valuable end. To illustrate, consider the following:
Being fit or active has been associated with a greater than 50% reduction in risk of all-cause
mortality.⁸⁵ However, vigorous exercise has also been associated with a very small acute risk of
suffering a cardiac event during exercise; one study reported one such event per 2,897,057
person-hours of physical activity amongst healthy adults.⁸⁶
This is the so-called paradox of exercise.
Suppose a patient visits his doctor, and reports that he is petrified of suffering a heart attack
after a friend recently died following one. The patient also has young children, and is terrified
of not being able to see them grow up. The physician consults with the patient, and observes
that he is at moderate risk of a heart attack. The patient is scared and says he will do anything
to reduce his risk. The doctor could suggest that the patient modifies his diet; however, she
notes that the patient’s diet is not particularly bad, and modifying it is unlikely to lead to great
improvement for this patient. The doctor could prescribe statins; however, she notes that these
drugs may have some unpleasant side-effects.
She believes that the best way in which the patient can reduce his risk is to engage in an exercise
program. However, she is also aware of the ‘paradox of exercise’, and that engaging in vigorous
exercise will transiently cause an extremely small increase in the patient’s acute risk of a heart
attack, even though the long-term benefits to the patient’s cardiac health far outweigh this
small increase in their transient risk. Nonetheless, she prescribes an exercise plan without
mentioning this risk, and tells the patient to take things slowly.⁸⁷
In this case, the doctor has grounds for believing that the patient would attach
significance to the information about the small acute risk associated with bouts of
vigorous exercise. The patient has stated that he will do anything to reduce his risk of
a heart attack, and the information in question pertains to the transient risk of a
cardiac event associated with the doctor’s recommended course of action. The
Montgomery standard thus seems to speak in favour of disclosure of this risk. The
problem with this is that it is far from clear that the patient would take such
information to be significant because of the strength of the reason it implies.
Rather, the information is significant for the patient because of the particular
emotional salience he attributes to the (highly unlikely) adverse outcome.
To exacerbate matters, the patient is likely to attribute even greater (yet unwar-
ranted) salience to this risk simply by virtue of the fact that it has been disclosed to
⁸⁴ Sunstein, ‘Probability Neglect’, 62.
⁸⁵ Warburton, Nicol, and Bredin, ‘Health Benefits of Physical Activity’.
⁸⁶ Malinow, McGarry, and Kuehl, ‘Is Exercise Testing Indicated for Asymptomatic Active People?’;
Thompson et al., ‘Exercise and Acute Cardiovascular Events’.
⁸⁷ Maron, ‘The Paradox of Exercise’; I discuss ethical implications of this paradox and exercise
prescription in Pugh, Pugh, and Savulescu, ‘Exercise Prescription and the Doctor’s Duty of Non-
Maleficence’.
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them by an expert authority; ‘if the doctor is telling me this, she must think it’s
important!’ This may serve to radically distort the patient’s perception of the strength
of the reasons that the information is intended to convey, and instead lead the patient
to make their decisions on an emotional response to that information that is not
adequately grounded in the reality of their situation. The reality of the situation is
that adhering to an exercise programme that slowly progresses towards more vigor-
ous forms of exercise will significantly reduce their long-term risk of a heart attack,
despite the small increase in the patient’s acute risk that attends vigorous exercise for
previously sedentary individuals.
Crucially, the doctor’s reluctance to disclose in this case need not be born from a
paternalistic motive of the sort that the Bolam approach enabled, and for which that
standard was criticized. The doctor’s concern about disclosure here may be grounded
in doubts about whether the patient will use the information in a process of rational
deliberation, and not simply in a concern that disclosure will lead the patient to
choose contrary to what she believes to be medically indicated. Her concern may be
that disclosing this information will not help the patient to make a decision that will
help them best pursue their own goals and values. Instead, it might result in him
forgoing exercise that will facilitate his pursuit of the goal he wants to achieve,
in order to avoid a minute, but emotionally salient risk of the outcome that he
wants to avoid.
The problem that this example raises is not simply that disclosing information
about low levels of risk will harm patients by causing them psychological distress. If
that were the case, the omission of this information could plausibly be justified by an
appeal to the so-called therapeutic exception, an exception typically grounded by
considerations of non-maleficence.⁸⁸ Rather the point that this example raises is that
the provision of this information, and the unwarranted alarm it causes the patient,
may actually be detrimental to their autonomy, their ability to make a rationally
grounded decision, and to choose in accordance with what they actually value,
regardless of whether or not the disclosure significantly harms the patient.
Accordingly, when thinking about disclosure and facilitating autonomous
decision-making beyond the standard of voluntariness required for valid consent,
we are faced with a significant tension. Extending the scope of disclosure require-
ments in accordance with the subjective limb of the Montgomery judgement will
mean that patients are given more opportunities to make decisions about the risks
they are and are not willing to take. However, increasing the opportunity for such
decisions will only serve to increase patient autonomy if patients are able to make
those decisions in an autonomous manner. This may sound almost trivially true, but
it contains an important truth that the subjective limb of the Montgomery judgement
overlooks: whilst our understanding of risks is sometimes crucial to making decisions
about what we have most reason to do, the disclosure of precise details about risks
can also play into the hands of our irrational biases. These biases can lead us to make
⁸⁸ The Montgomery judgement does include a clause allowing for the therapeutic exception, but notes
that this is only justified if disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health. Montgomery
(Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland), paragraph 88.
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decisions that run contrary to what we believe we have reasons to pursue, and to
acting in pursuit of our long-term plans.
How can we resolve this tension? It might be argued that we could seek to resolve it
without adding further criteria of materiality to criterion (i) in the rational materi-
ality test. For instance, perhaps we could take measures to partly mitigate some of the
cognitive biases to which patients are subject. Perhaps if disclosure about a particular
risk is to be worthwhile, patients should be helped to contextualize that risk to the
kinds of risk they take in their day-to-day life.⁸⁹ Physicians should also be informed
of the various cognitive biases that they and their patients are prone to exhibit, and
should seek to mitigate their influence; this lends support to the dialogical approach
that the Montgomery judgement endorses.⁹⁰ We might also advocate the introduc-
tion of ‘informed consent specialists’ who have received specialist training in human
rationality, to act as ‘middle-men’ between the physician and their patient in complex
cases.⁹¹
Each of these proposals has merit, but they are unlikely to act as a panacea solution
for the types or irrationality that I have discussed here. Even where it is possible to try
to mitigate the influence of these biases, it is not clear that such efforts will always be
successful.⁹² Accordingly, rather than appeal to what patients (actual or hypothetical)
attach significance to, as the Montgomery ruling implies, or even appealing to the
rational content of the information alone, the test of materiality I have suggested
maintains that we should acknowledge this tension and seek to resolve it by appeal-
ing to the underlying purpose of information disclosure in our test of materiality.
If the purpose of information disclosure is to facilitate an individual’s ability to make
decisions that are an accurate reflection of their evaluative judgements rather than
their irrational biases, our decisions about what to disclose should be sensitive to the
kinds of abilities that typical humans have.
Let me pre-empt to two potential objections to the objective phrasing of criterion
(ii) above, which seeks to capture this thought. First, it might be argued that it is the
individual patient’s ability to understand, weigh and use, information that is relevant
in this context, rather than what standard human decision-makers are able to do.
However, phrasing the criterion in subjective terms would entail a problematic
circularity between definitions of materiality and decision-making capacity. The
reason for this is that assessments of decision-making capacity are typically partly
grounded by the individual’s ability to understand material information; accordingly,
our definition of the latter cannot incorporate considerations of subjective capacity
without circularity. An objective phrasing of criterion (ii) avoids this circularity;
moreover, as I shall explain in response to the second objection, an objective phrasing
captures a key element of the relationship between capacity and information
disclosure.
A second objection to the objective phrasing is that it appears to contradict my
earlier rejection of interpreting the reasonable person standard of disclosure as
appealing to claims about what the majority of people think. However, there is no
⁸⁹ Sunstein, ‘Probability Neglect’, 92. ⁹⁰ Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’.
⁹¹ Levy, ‘Forced to Be Free?’, 299. ⁹² Ibid., 297.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
  
contradiction here; my criterion concerns what the majority of people are able to do,
not what they value. The claim that I am making is that the information that we
decide to disclose to patients should be information that most people are able to
understand, weigh, and use; I am not claiming that our decision should be deter-
mined by what most people value.
In fact, the claim that I am making simply extends a point that is implicitly
accepted by anyone who accepts the need for an account of materiality to limit the
scope of disclosure requirements. There is a tight connection between the informa-
tion that we deem to be material for making a decision, and the standard of decision-
making capacity that will be relevant to that decision, since decision-making capacity
requires the ability to understand, weigh, and use material information. It is for this
reason that full understanding is not deemed to be necessary for decisional auton-
omy; to claim otherwise would be to preclude individuals from having decision-
making capacity, since we humans are not capable of processing all of this informa-
tion. This then, forms part of the motivation for a theory of materiality; we want to
strike a balance between ensuring informed choice, and ensuring that most patients
will be capable of understanding the information that we stipulate as being necessary
for providing an autonomous authorization to treatment.
The point I am making here is that similar considerations arise with respect to
information concerning very low risks; declaring this information material threatens
to raise the standard of capacity required to make a decision beyond that which
standard human decision-makers are capable.
Criterion (ii) broadly concurs with one professional standard of disclosure accord-
ing to which decisions about disclosure should give consideration to features of the
‘man on the Clapham omnibus’. However, it departs from this (flawed) standard by
stressing that the relevant consideration here is what the man on the bus is capable of,
and not what he values. Let me now turn to consider the implications of this
criterion. How can we tell whether average human decision-makers are capable of
understanding, weighing, and using a particular piece of information? This is ultim-
ately an empirical question; however, a rough plausible heuristic here may be that we
should tailor our disclosure about risk to the strength of the reason it connotes, on
the basis of the assumption that cognitive biases may plausibly have less of a hold on
us when we are weighing considerations that we take to have considerable reason-
giving force. Explicitly attending to strong reasons is one way in which we can reduce
the influence of these biases.
The strength of a reason associated with information pertaining to a particular
outcome of a medical procedure is a function of the (dis)value of the outcome it
concerns, and its likelihood. The higher the (dis)value, and the more likely it is to
occur, the stronger the reason. However, since risk is a comparative concept,⁹³ when
we are thinking about the strength of an all things considered reason to assume a
certain risk in undergoing a medical procedure, we must weigh both the disvalue and
probability of the risked outcome, against the probability and value of the hoped-for
⁹³ Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’, 10.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
  , ,  
outcome of the procedure which provides the rational justification for the assump-
tion of risk.
Indeed, the Montgomery judgement implicitly reflects this in stressing that the
material benefits of alternative procedures must be disclosed in addition to the
material risks.⁹⁴ To illustrate, the strength of your reason provided by a 2 per cent
mortality risk of a medical intervention depends on what you stand to benefit by
assuming that risk in undergoing the intervention. This risk might give Patient A a
comparatively weak reason not to undergo surgery, if the risk is posed by a surgery
that is necessary for saving her life. In contrast, the same degree of risk might give
patient B a much stronger comparative reason to not undergo the surgery, if the
surgery is an elective procedure that is less valuable for that patient, such as the
alleviation of considerable, but tolerable pain. Finally, Patient C might have very
strong comparative reasons not to expose themselves to even small risks of cata-
strophic outcomes in order to undergo cosmetic surgery.
For this reason, my proposal does not entail that physicians should never disclose
information about low risks, or that patients cannot incorporate such information
into a rational decision-making process. The point is that risks of the same prob-
ability can imply reasons of different comparative strength in different contexts, and
decisions about information disclosure should be sensitive to this point. We may also
notice that although the likelihood with which an outcome will occur is an objective
matter, the strength of some of the reasons represented by facts about aspects of
particular treatments will depend significantly on the patient’s values. More specif-
ically, it will depend on the weight that the patient assigns to the reasons they have to
pursue different goods. In order to determine whether information about a low
degree of risk represents a reason that is sufficiently strong to be deemed material
to the patient’s decision, physicians must thus be aware of the patient’s own values,
and their own general attitudes towards risk. This does not imply that the respon-
sibility for facilitating the patient’s autonomous decision-making lies solely with the
physician. On the contrary, the patient is in a far better epistemic position with
regards to her own values; she has an important role to play in facilitating her own
ability to make autonomous decisions by engaging with the physician about the
values that are central to how she wants to live her life over the course of the clinical
encounter, enabling the physician to tailor the information they disclose. Patients
thus share in the responsibility to facilitate their own autonomy; as I argued in the
previous chapter, this includes a degree of doxastic responsibility.⁹⁵
The disclosure of material information pertaining to impersonal reasons should
thus serve as a starting point of the physician’s disclosure; patients should be made
aware of the salient aspects about the nature of their procedure, and also reminded
that medical procedures, like many other activities in life, unavoidably involve the
assumption of some low risks. However, disclosure concerning the precise nature
and degree of risks that connote very weak reasons can serve to hinder rather than
facilitate the patient’s autonomy.
⁹⁴ Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland); Herring et al., ‘Elbow
Room for Best Practice?’, 5.
⁹⁵ Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 104; Kukla, ‘How Do Patients Know?’
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As such, an adequate informed consent procedure requires that the physician and
patient engage with each other to establish the patient’s values and their attitudes
towards risk, and in doing so conjointly establish the threshold level of strength of
reason that a risk would have to connote, in order to warrant full disclosure. Further
disclosure of risk should be justified by the decision reached following such a
dialogue. For this reason, it makes little sense to stipulate that risks of a certain
percentage probability must always (or never) be disclosed; decisions about disclos-
ure of risk have to be sensitive not just to the nature of the outcome to which they
pertain, but also to how and in what way that outcome matters for the particular
patient in question.
In the exercise case above, because the doctor is aware that the overall goal that the
patient places value on is avoiding a heart attack in order to be there for his young
family, it is clear that the transient minuscule increase in acute risk of a cardiac event
associated with exercise connotes an extremely weak reason for that patient. It is a
risk that is clearly outweighed by the fact that the exercise programme will signifi-
cantly decrease their long-term risk of such an event. Of course, as the degree of risk
associated with a procedure under consideration increases, so too will the strength of
the corresponding reason; in such cases, physicians may be required to engage
further with their patient about the kinds of risk that they are willing to accept to
achieve certain outcomes. Rational agents can come to different conclusions with
regards to the appropriate attitude to take towards risk. Notwithstanding this point,
discussions about attitudes towards risk need to be placed in the context of the kinds
of risk to which the patient is already exposed, by virtue of her medical condition, and
also those that she encounters simply by carrying out everyday activities.
The Montgomery ruling also advocates the importance of dialogue, in claiming
that the doctor should act in an advisory role, and that this involves engaging in a
dialogue with the patient that aims to:
. . . ensure that the patient understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated
benefits and risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is then
in a position to make an informed decision.⁹⁶
However, the account of autonomy that I have defended supports a stronger
approach to this dialogue before the disclosure of risk. In order for informed consent
to become a truly two-way informational transaction, the physician should not be
limited to merely facilitating understanding. Rather, facilitating the individual’s
autonomy requires the elicitation and defence of the patient’s values, and the
physician advocating their own view, drawing on their own professional experience,
about the kinds of risk disclosure that will facilitate the patient’s autonomous
decision-making.⁹⁷
In abandoning the Bolam test, the Montgomery ruling denied the significance of
the medical professional body’s expertise in delimiting the scope of material
⁹⁶ Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland), at paragraph 90.
⁹⁷ Savulescu, ‘Liberal Rationalism andMedical Decision-Making’. Decision aids can be a valuable tool in
this model of the doctor–patient relationship. See O’Connor et al., ‘Decision Aids for Patients Facing
Health Treatment or Screening Decisions’.
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information.⁹⁸ However, obviating any reference to medical opinion in thinking
about disclosure fails to acknowledge that the medical profession does have some-
thing significant to offer to the facilitation of autonomous decision-making. Medical
professionals have a great deal of experience in helping patients in medical contexts,
and are aware of the effects that information disclosure can have on patient decision-
making. The rationalist approach to materiality that I have developed here allows for
this experience to be brought to bear on disclosure decisions by establishing a
threshold strength of reason that is appropriate for a particular patient, without the
professional body determining the boundaries of materiality in the overly objective
manner of the Bolam test.
It might be objected that the approach I have advocated here is impractical, given
the lack of resources available to health services. As I acknowledged at the outset of
this discussion, my intention here has not been to criticize the Montgomery judge-
ment as a legal instrument that has to balance a plethora of ethical, jurisprudential,
and practical considerations. Rather, my aim here has been to use the Montgomery
judgement as a legal model of disclosure that serves as the best starting point to think
about the effects of disclosure for autonomous decision-making. The approach that
I have outlined is naturally somewhat divorced from practical realities in a way that
the Montgomery judgement cannot afford to be. The model outlined in the
Montgomery judgement requires more time and resources than simply giving the
patient a consent form to read and sign, and my proposed model arguably goes
further still.
If resources do not permit this approach, this gives us strong reason to refrain from
treating my approach as necessary to informed consent in the institutional sense
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Moreover, doctors should clearly not face
sanction for failing to meet this standard if the resources do not allow them to spend
the sort of time with their patient that this approach requires. However, this concern
does not speak against my approach as the standard to be met in order for consent to
play an operative role in facilitating autonomous authorization of treatment. Existing
mechanisms are notoriously poor at ensuring adequate levels of understanding
amongst patients,⁹⁹ and facilitating rational decision-making. We have reasons to
try to improve upon this, and one step on the path to doing so is to think about how
we could meet the challenges of facilitating autonomous decision-making without
considerations of restrained resources. This is not to say that there are not other
morally relevant considerations in play when we think about whether it would be
justifiable to spend more scarce resources in order to better facilitate autonomous
decision-making in the patient population, over other worthy goods.¹⁰⁰ These are
important and difficult questions. However, these are questions about the weight we
should attribute to different values in health care, and not simply a discussion about
the nature of autonomy per se.
⁹⁸ Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice?’, 4.
⁹⁹ Flory and Emanuel, ‘Interventions to Improve Research Participants’ Understanding in Informed
Consent for Research’.
¹⁰⁰ Chan et al., ‘Montgomery and Informed Consent’.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have begun to situate my rationalist account of autonomy in our
understanding of the structure and justification of informed consent requirements.
Having considered the cognitive element of decisional autonomy and its implications
for understanding, and standards of materiality and disclosure, I shall in the follow-
ing chapter continue my investigation of rationalist informed consent by considering
the question of decision-making capacity. In doing so, I shall seek to respond to the
demandingness objection that I highlighted in section 2 of this chapter.
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In his judgement on a famous case concerning an adult refusal of treatment, Lord
Donaldson of Lymington made the following observation:
An adult patient who . . . suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose
whether to consent to medical treatment . . . This right of choice is not limited to decisions
which others might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.¹
This oft-cited judgement champions patient autonomy over medical paternalism;
patients with decision-making capacity are afforded the right to make ‘unwise’
decisions with regards to their own health.
There are two notable features of this judgement. First, it implicitly acknowledges
that the ‘right of choice’ is only afforded to those who do not suffer from mental
incapacity. If mental capacity is closely related to considerations of autonomy
(a claim I shall further defend below), then this suggests that the extent to which
an individual is able to make an autonomous treatment decision has a considerable
bearing on whether that decision should be respected. Second, this judgement also
seems contrary to one of the central claims that I have advanced in this book, namely,
that autonomous decision-making requires deciding on the basis of what one believes
one has reason to do. The Donaldson judgement implicitly objects to this sort of
account on the basis of an anti-paternalist concern: the worry that rationalist
conceptions of autonomy will allow physicians to ignore a patient’s wishes if they
run contrary to medical opinion, on the basis that the decision is not rational and
therefore not autonomous. According to this objection, rationalist autonomy pays
mere lip service to the idea of individual self-government, and in fact simply amounts
to indirect paternalism.
Part of my aim in this chapter is to respond to this anti-paternalist objection.
I shall argue that we should reject the claim that a rationalist conception of autonomy
(and a fortiori decision-making capacity) must have this sort of substantive conno-
tation. In the next section, I shall begin by providing a brief general overview of
capacity and competence, and outlining two prominent accounts. I shall then
¹ Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment), my emphasis. For a philosophical approach to capacity that
endorses this sentiment, see Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging
Therapy’, 125–6.
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introduce and critique a prominent view of the relationship between decision-
making capacity and risk. In the second half of the chapter, I shall delineate and
respond to two different versions of the anti-paternalist objection to a rationalist
conception of decision-making capacity.
1. Competence, Capacity, and Competing Values in
Their Assessment
The terms ‘competence’ and ‘capacity’ are sometimes used interchangeably in the
bioethical literature. This is perhaps understandable, since in common usage, both
concepts are used to broadly denote the ability to perform a certain task. For instance,
outside of the bioethical context, we might describe someone as a competent driver if
they are able to drive a car well; similarly, we might say that an Olympic sprinter has
the capacity to run 100 m in under ten seconds.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the two terms can be used to mean
somewhat different things in bioethics. For instance, in England and Wales, the
concept of capacity is typically treated as a legal concept that is defined by the specific
criteria set out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In contrast, ‘competence’ is
understood to refer to a clinical concept, which may take into account a broader
set of considerations than the legal conception of capacity.² Somewhat confusingly
though, in the US context, the meanings of these terms are reversed. For instance,
Beauchamp and Childress observe:
Several commentators distinguish judgments of capacity from judgments of competence on
the grounds that health professionals assess capacity and incapacity, whereas courts determine
incompetence.³
This disagreement on the use of terminology is unfortunate. In the absence of any
other convincing justification for adopting one use over the other, I shall follow the
use employed in the English and Welsh context, which treats decision-making
capacity rather than competence as the operative concept in the legal domain
(of which I shall say more below).
Whilst the distinction between competence and decision-making capacity thus has
some importance, it is important not to overstate this difference. First, as I shall
explain, there is often a considerable degree of overlap between the two. Second,
whilst only the courts have the authority to determine whether patients have
decision-making capacity, they will typically defer to professional judgements. As
such, the practical implications of the clinician’s assessment of competence will
typically be similar to a legal determination of decision-making capacity.⁴ That
said, the two are separate, and judges do not always follow the professional assess-
ment.⁵ Whilst acknowledging this distinction between competence and decision-
making capacity, I shall phrase the remainder of my discussion in terms of the latter
² Tan and Elphick, ‘Competency and Use of the Mental Health Act—a Matrix to Aid Decision-Making’.
³ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 114.
⁴ Grisso and Appelbaum, Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 11.
⁵ Re SB; for discussion, see Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 164.
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(which I shall abbreviate to ‘DMC’) alone. However, my claims should also be
understood to extend to competence unless explicitly stated otherwise.
DMC can be understood as a range property in that it is a binary property that
does not itself admit of degrees, even though we assign it on the basis of an
individual’s possession of certain abilities that do admit of degree.⁶ As such, in
considering whether a patient has DMC we are asking whether they have the
requisite degree of the relevant abilities that are necessary to perform a certain
task. The task in question in most discussions of DMC in the medical context is
that of providing valid informed consent to (or refusal of) medical treatment.⁷
In understanding the relevant task for DMC in this manner, I am adopting a
straightforward understanding of the relationship between DMC and local auton-
omy.⁸ The reason that we limit the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment to
those who have DMC, is that these individuals alone have the capacity to make an
autonomous decision about this matter. This is important in cases of treatment
refusal because only if a patient has DMC to refuse treatment will there be an
autonomy-based justification for omitting to provide a treatment that could serve
to outweigh considerations of beneficence that speak in favour of providing it. In the
case of consent to treatment, DMC is significant in so far as we should only recognize
the normative authority of waivers of rights that would otherwise preclude the
permissibility of treatment, if the decision to waive the right (by so consenting)
was autonomous. We may note that a significant virtue of this approach to under-
standing the relationship between autonomy and DMC is that it allows for a
straightforward explanation of what the conditions of DMC are, and why DMC
matters morally.
Of course, in light of the differences between the institutional and non-
institutional senses of informed consent, we should also acknowledge that what it
means to have DMC to give informed consent in the institutional sense may differ
from what it means to have DMC to give informed consent in the sense of an
autonomous authorization. In any case, though, one of the primary aims of an
account of DMC is to outline the causally necessary conditions for an individual to
make a decision to consent in accordance with the constitutive conditions of valid
consent. If one holds that the conditions of autonomous decision-making map on to
the requirements of informed consent, then there will be a close connection between
the concepts of DMC, informed consent, and autonomy.
⁶ McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, 250. For an exploration of why the possession of rationality conceived
as a range property of agents is a sufficient basis of moral equality, see Carter, ‘Respect and the Basis of
Equality’.
⁷ Buchanan, ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’. It is also possible to talk
about capacity in the more generalized sense of what capacities an individual requires in order to be a
globally autonomous agent, as opposed to an individual who has the capacity to make an autonomous local
decision. See Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the Demented Self ’, 10. Dworkin notes that global autonomy
might require further diachronic evaluative capacities, and that it might also be understood to ground the
general right to autonomy.
⁸ I briefly consider and reject two alternative approaches to understanding the relationship between
autonomy and DMC in the next chapter.
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The fact that DMC is treated as a range property implies that in order to assess
whether a patient has it, we must set a threshold level for the abilities associated with
providing valid consent, such that an individual qualifies as having DMC to make a
particular decision once they have passed that threshold for all the necessary abilities.
Naturally, this raises the question of where we should set these thresholds. It is
possible to ask this question in an abstract idealized sense, where the only relevant
consideration is whether a particular ability is necessary for providing either an
autonomous authorization or institutionally valid consent, depending on the sense
of consent that we mean to invoke. However, this question is most typically asked in
non-ideal contexts. An important implication of this is that non-ideal theories of
DMC have a further aim of resolving a conflict between competing moral values that
arise in light of the epistemic obstacles that arise in non-ideal contexts. To under-
stand why this so, it is important to be clear about the moral values in question.
One of the most significant reasons underlying the claim that patients should be
allowed to make their own treatment decision is that we attribute significant value to
personal autonomy: following a long liberal tradition, it is widely held that individ-
uals with DMC should be free to decide to act in ways that are not conducive to their
well-being.⁹ Indeed, we typically afford such individuals what has been termed ‘legal
capacity’ in the medical context, in that we afford these individuals certain rights
(and responsibilities), including the right to refuse beneficial medical treatment.¹⁰
However, this right is often understood to be conditional on DMC. As I wrote above,
one justification for limiting this right to patients with DMC is that only in such cases
will there be an autonomy-based justification of omitting to provide a treatment that
could serve to outweigh considerations of beneficence. Moreover, we might claim
that the power to waive certain claims is also conditional on DMC, in so far as we
should only recognize the normative authority of autonomous decisions to waive
one’s rights.
Although this link between DMC and legal capacity is widely endorsed, it is by no
means universal; it has recently been challenged by the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).¹¹ Whether we should accept the link between legal
capacity and DMC, or agree with the CRPD that legal capacity should be afforded on
other bases is beyond the scope of my discussion here. I shall confine myself to the
narrower question of the relationship between autonomy and DMC. However, my
discussion concerning the role of autonomy and well-being in this chapter lends
some indirect support to maintaining a relationship between DMC and legal
capacity.
Returning to the role of the values of autonomy and well-being in the context of
DMC, we may note that an ideal system of assessing DMC would be one that
identified all and only those people who are able to provide valid consent as having
DMC. However, there are a number of obstacles to employing such an ideal system of
⁹ Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’.
¹⁰ Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment); Craigie and Davies, ‘Problems of Control’; Blumenthal, ‘The
Default Legal Person’.
¹¹ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); for discussion, see Bartlett, ‘The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’.
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assessing DMC. One reason for this is that there is considerable disagreement about
the nature of autonomy; this much should be clear from the first half of the book. As
such, there is bound to be controversy in determining the abilities that our assess-
ment of DMC should be aiming to identify. The second and perhaps more significant
barrier though is that many of the abilities that we might plausibly agree are
necessary for providing valid consent are mental abilities that do not admit of
straightforward external assessment. We are thus likely to make mistakes in our
assessments of these abilities with the relatively crude tools at our disposal.
In the light of these epistemic barriers and the errors that they make likely, our
decision about where to set the relevant threshold for DMC in the non-ideal context
must unavoidably make a moral judgement about how to balance the value of patient
autonomy, against the moral reasons grounded in the duties of beneficence and non-
maleficence. The benefit of setting a low threshold for DMC is that our assessment is
likely to be more sensitive, in the sense that it will more reliably identify true positive
cases; that is, on a low threshold approach, individuals who are able to make
autonomous decisions will typically qualify as having DMC.
However, the cost of employing a low threshold is that our assessment is thereby
unlikely to be particularly specific. Employing a low threshold increases the chance
that our test of DMC will lead to false positive assessments; there is a higher chance
that individuals will qualify as having the DMC to make a treatment decision, when
they are not in fact capable of making the decision autonomously. The cost of such
false positive assessments is that allowing such patients to make decisions that put
them at risk of harm cannot be justified by an appeal to the value of their autonomy;
we may be understood as harming them by allowing them to make their own
decisions. Low threshold approaches to the assessment of DMC thus place greater
emphasis on defending patients’ decision-making authority, at the expense of pro-
tecting non-autonomous patients from harm.
In contrast, the benefit of setting a high threshold for DMC is that our assessments
will be much more specific, in the sense that they will more reliably pick out true
negative cases; that is, on a high threshold approach, individuals who are not able to
make autonomous decisions will typically not qualify as having DMC. The cost of
employing a high threshold is that our assessment is thereby unlikely to be particu-
larly sensitive, in the sense that employing a high threshold increases the chance that
our test of DMC will lead to false negative assessments; on such an approach, there is
a greater chance that individuals will qualify as lacking DMC, when they are in fact
capable of making a decision in an autonomous fashion. The moral cost of such false
negatives is that prohibiting a person from making an autonomous decision about
their treatment when they are capable of doing so runs contrary to the liberal
tradition that affords greater weight to the duty to respect autonomy than to the
duty of beneficence.¹² High threshold approaches to the assessment of DMC thus
place greater emphasis on protecting non-autonomous patients from harm, at the
expense of jeopardizing the decision-making authority of some patients.
¹² For a discussion of how this philosophical view is reflected in the Common Law regarding adult
refusals of treatment, see Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 35. See also Clarke, ‘The Neuroscience of
Decision Making and Our Standards for Assessing Competence to Consent’.
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With this discussion in mind, we may observe that in outlining criteria of DMC in
non-idealized contexts, we have to answer three questions. First, is the criterion
plausibly a necessary condition of autonomous decision-making or providing con-
sent in its institutional sense? Of course, this question is also relevant when we are
thinking about DMC in ideal contexts. Second, do we have the methods to reliably
assess the abilities in question? Third, what are the implications of our criteria for the
balance that we are aiming to strike between the competing moral reasons we face in
making assessments of DMC in non-ideal contexts? Over the course of this chapter,
I shall outline different permutations of the anti-paternalist objection to rationalist
theories that place different emphases on these questions.
2. Two Cognitivist Accounts of DMC
Grisso and Appelbaum developed a particularly influential account of DMC which is
largely echoed in the Mental Capacity Act in England and Wales. According to
Grisso and Appelbaum, DMC requires the ability to:
1. Communicate a choice
2. Understand relevant information
3. Appreciate the situation and its consequences
and
4. Manipulate information rationally¹³
These conditions bear a striking resemblance to those that are adopted in the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 (henceforth MCA). A necessary (but not sufficient condition) for
an individual’s lacking DMC on the MCA is that she lacks any of the following
abilities, as outlined in section 3(1) of the Act:
(a) The ability to understand the information relevant to the decision.
(b) The ability to retain the information for long enough to be able to make a
decision.
(c) The ability to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making
the decision.
(d) The ability to communicate their decision.¹⁴
Grisso and Appelbaum’s theory and the approach evidenced in the MCA are similar
in that they both emphasize cognitive capacities. However, it is worth highlighting
three striking differences. First, the MCA does not adopt a criterion relating to the
ability to appreciate information; appreciation goes beyond mere understanding of
material information in requiring that individuals are cognizant of the fact that
material information applies to them and their situation.¹⁵ Second, although the
MCA adverts to the need to weigh and use information, it makes no reference to the
need to do so rationally, unlike the counterpart criterion in Grisso and Appelbaum’s
¹³ Appelbaum and Grisso, ‘Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment’; Grisso and
Appelbaum, Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment.
¹⁴ Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2(1), 3(1).
¹⁵ Appelbaum and Grisso, ‘Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment’.
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approach. Third, the MCA supplements Grisso and Appelbaum’s functional
approach with a further diagnostic criterion. According to the MCA, the fact that a
patient lacks one of the above abilities is not sufficient for establishing that she lacks
DMC. For that to be the case, the patient’s lacking the ability in question must also be
attributable to ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or
brain’.¹⁶ The MCA thus incorporates both a functional and diagnostic test of DMC.¹⁷
I shall discuss whether these differences are philosophically warranted over the
course of this chapter. Here though, we may note that the cognitive approach
endorsed by both accounts is broadly compatible with the procedural analysis of
autonomy that I have offered so far in this book. Indeed, section 1(4) of the MCA
explicitly states that: ‘A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision
merely because he makes an unwise decision’. In this regard, it echoes both Lord
Donaldson’s remarks quoted at the beginning of this chapter, as well as Buchanan
and Brock’s claim that standards of DMC should focus ‘ . . . not on the content of the
patient’s decision but on the process of the reasoning that leads up to that decision’.¹⁸
The abilities outlined above are also all plausible candidates for abilities that are
causally necessary for autonomous decision-making on my account. As I argued in
the previous chapter, patients must be able to understand certain information about
their decision in order to be autonomous with respect to it. Furthermore, being able
to retain information is central to one’s ability to make a decision on the basis of that
information, and a criterion referring to the practical element of communication is
also congruous with the practical orientation of my account of autonomy. Finally, my
account also lends theoretical support to the criteria of appreciation and weighing
and using information rationally; I shall make the case for this claim in section 3
where I shall also critically engage more broadly with these cognitivist approaches.
Here though, I shall conclude my discussion of these two prominent approaches by
highlighting two further general and widely accepted features of DMC.
The first is that DMC is typically understood to be contextually dependent.¹⁹
Different local decisions will require different degrees of aptitude in the particular
abilities relevant to DMC. Accordingly, although a patient may lack DMC to make
certain sorts of decisions, this does not entail that they lack DMC to make any
decisions for themselves. For example, whilst an agent may be able to understand
material information pertaining to a decision about relatively simple treatments, such
as whether she ought to have surgery on a broken bone, she may not be able to
understand material information pertaining to more complex treatment options
which could lead to various possible outcomes, such as in the treatment of cancer.
Similarly, the fact that an individual is globally autonomous does not entail that they
will make a locally autonomous decision.
The threshold level of DMC required to make a certain decision will depend upon
the complexity of the information that is material to the patient. This is particularly
relevant when we consider DMC in children. The majority of the provisions in the
¹⁶ Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2(1). ¹⁷ Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 157.
¹⁸ Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, 50.
¹⁹ See also Brock, Life and Death; Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 157.
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MCA apply to children who are 16 and over;²⁰ once a person has reached this age,
they are thus presumed to have DMC unless proven otherwise.
It would be a mistake to make the overly general claim that children simply lack
the capacity for decisional autonomy, even though the law denies children the
authority to make certain decisions for themselves. It is clearly the case that some
children below 16 can hold and exercise the sorts of abilities discussed above with
respect to at least some decisions. Indeed this is recognized in the legal concept of
Gillick competence, according to which a child ‘ . . . has a right to make their own
decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of
making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision’.²¹ Accordingly, in
England and Wales, children who are under 16 but who are ‘Gillick competent’
can provide valid consent to some medical procedures; however, their refusal to
consent to treatment that is deemed to be in their best interests may be overridden by
someone with parental responsibility, by virtue of the Family Law Reform Act.²²
Notably, the latter is also true of children under 18.
This coheres neatly with a rationalist approach, since it seems plausible to claim
that children are perfectly capable of recognizing and appreciating certain kinds of
reasons. To give a simple example, consider the reasons grounded by an individual’s
hedonic likings and dislikings. Even very young children can recognize that they have
stronger reasons to choose, for example, an ice-cream flavour that they have enjoyed
previously (say chocolate) over one that they have disliked previously (say coffee).
Ceteris paribus, it seems plausible to say that we ought to allow even a young child to
make a choice between alternative ice-cream flavours, because doing so simply
requires weighing two of the same kind of reasons (concerning the child’s hedonic
liking of a certain taste), reasons to which the child is well-equipped to respond. The
child can thus make an autonomous choice in this circumscribed choice domain.
However, there are some reasons that children are not well-equipped to recognize
and appreciate—even if it seems plausible to allow a five-year-old a degree of
autonomy about which flavour ice-cream to have, we would be reluctant to allow
her to make her own decisions about how often ice-cream should feature in her diet.
The reason for this is that whilst a child of this age is able to recognize her reasons to
eat ice-cream (namely, that she enjoys the taste), she is less able to appreciate and
weigh facts that give her reasons to refrain from eating ice-cream, namely, that
frequent consumption of ice-cream would be bad for her health. However, as a
child’s general cognitive capacities develop, so too will their ability to recognize and
weigh more complex kinds of reason-giving facts.
A second notable general feature of capacity is that it has often been the case that
the gravity of a decision has been understood to influence the relevant threshold of
²⁰ However, some provisions, such as those pertaining to advance directives, making a lasting power of
attorney, and deprivation of liberty safeguards (amongst others), only apply to those who have reached the
age of 18.
²¹ Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Department of Health and Social
Security, HL 17 Oct. 1985.
²² Family Law Reform Act. For a useful overview of the law in this area, see Hope, Savulescu, and
Hendrick, Medical Ethics and Law, ch. 10.
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DMC that is necessary for making that decision: The more serious the consequences
of a decision, the higher the threshold for DMC.²³ For instance, in the case of Re T,
the Court of Appeal stated:
What matters is that the doctors should consider whether at that time he had a capacity which
was commensurate with the gravity of the decision. The more serious the decision, the greater
the capacity required.²⁴
Call this the ‘sliding-scale view’ of DMC.²⁵
It should be noted that the sliding-scale view is often understood to operate only
within certain thresholds. If an individual exhibits the abilities that contribute to
DMC to a particularly high degree, then she should be understood to have the DMC
to make her own medical decisions, no matter how detrimental the consequences of
her decision are for her individual well-being. This reflects the liberal view that
considerations of autonomy should trump those of beneficence.
More generally though, the sliding-scale view has somewhat puzzling implications.
For instance, Culver and Gert note that in some situations, a choice to refuse
treatment may have very serious consequences, whilst consenting to treatment may
not. They note that the sliding-scale view thus has the somewhat puzzling implica-
tion that a patient might have sufficient DMC to choose option B (because it
concerns a low-risk medical intervention and thus implies a relatively lower thresh-
old for DMC), but lack capacity to choose option A (because the gravity of refusing
consent implies a higher standard of DMC on the sliding-scale view). However, in
making this choice between A and B, she has to understand and weigh the same
information about her alternative options.²⁶
Partly on the basis of this implication, Culver and Gert claim that the sliding-scale
view conflates the distinct concepts of DMC and rationality, conceived in a substan-
tive sense; patients only qualify as having DMC if they make decisions that are
rational in the view of the medical profession.²⁷One reason that this is problematic is
that it unhelpfully conflates two separate concepts. Whilst this is Culver and Gert’s
particular worry,²⁸ it might be argued that this conflation is particularly concerning
for those who endorse the anti-paternalist objection, because of the paternalistic
connotations of conflating DMC with rationality (in this substantive sense). In the
next section, I shall outline some ways in which the sliding-scale view might be
defended, and consider whether these defences might be used to deflect this charge of
indirect paternalism. I shall argue that the prominent justifications offered for
standard interpretations of the view fail in this regard, but that we should not wholly
disregard a revised version of the sliding-scale view. In section 4, I shall argue that,
²³ Buchanan, ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’.
²⁴ Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).
²⁵ For support of the sliding-scale view, see Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others; Buchanan,
‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’; Eastman and Hope, ‘The Ethics of
Enforced Medical Treatment’; Drane, ‘The Many Faces of Competency’.
²⁶ Culver and Gert, ‘The Inadequacy of Incompetence’, 636. ²⁷ Ibid., 632.
²⁸ Culver and Gert do not themselves subscribe to this view, as they believe that it is permissible to
overrule irrational decisions. Their complaint though is that the concepts of capacity and rationality should
not be conflated.
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contrary to Culver and Gert, the concepts of DMC and rationality do in fact overlap
in some sense, but not in the manner that undergirds this particular criticism of the
sliding-scale view.
3. Sliding-Scale, Risk, and Value
It might be argued that the sliding-scale view can be justified in both ideal and non-
ideal contexts by considerations of autonomy alone. One such justification might
claim that there is a positive linear relationship between the degree of risk that a
decision concerns, and the degree of the requisite abilities it takes to make that
decision autonomously.²⁹ Call this ‘the linear justification’ of the sliding-scale view.
The linear justification may seem appealing, because we can think of some
examples that fit this picture of the relationship between risk and autonomous
decision-making. The reason for this is that in some cases, decisions with more
serious consequences can involve more complex information, and the weighing of a
greater number of considerations and options. To illustrate, trivial decisions, such as
deciding what to eat for lunch, typically do not require understanding the sort of
complex information that might be involved in decision-making regarding a range of
different cancer treatments.
Yet, this justification of the sliding-scale view is overly simplistic. There is not
always a straightforward linear relationship of the sort it appeals to between appro-
priate requirements of DMC and the risks the decision concerns. In some cases,
decisions can plausibly have grave consequences without necessarily requiring the
individual to understand highly complex information, or to compute a large number
of options. Choosing to refuse a blood transfusion when one is bleeding profusely has
grave consequences, but it is not particularly difficult to understand why that might
be the case. In stark contrast, one can also think of extremely low-risk decisions that
might require understanding much more complex information and weighing of
options; for example, those involved in playing a strategic board game.
As such, it is incorrect to assume that DMC to provide an autonomous author-
ization in an idealized sense will always vary in accordance with the risks associated
with the outcome of a decision.³⁰ Although it might be plausible to endorse an
attenuated version of the sliding-scale view on this basis (which calls for increased
DMC for risky decisions when they concern more complex information and weigh-
ing of alternatives),³¹ a full-blown version of the sliding-scale that forgoes this caveat
cannot be defended by appeal to considerations of autonomy in this way.
An alternative plausible justification of the sliding-scale view appeals to claims
about the value of the decisions in question, rather than claims about the nature of
DMC they require. On what we may call the ‘balancing justification of sliding-
²⁹ Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, 52–5.
³⁰ Beauchamp and Childress also object to what I call the linear justification view. See Beauchamp and
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 76.
³¹ As Craigie points out, although this full-blown sliding-scale view was previously endorsed in the
Common Law in England and Wales, since the enactment of the MCA, it has only been adopted in this
attenuated sense. Craigie and Davies, ‘Problems of Control’, 13.
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scale’,³² our decision about setting relevant thresholds of DMC should seek to balance
the values of autonomy and well-being.³³ On this approach, the degree to which an
individual exhibits the abilities associated with DMC is understood as a proxy not
only for their degree of autonomy, but also for the value that should be attached to
respecting that autonomy. Accordingly, in order to justify respecting the individual’s
decision to expose herself to a significant risk of harm, that individual must exhibit
the abilities associated with DMC to a high degree, since only then will the value of
her autonomy be sufficient to outweigh the disvalue of the potential harm at stake.
This justification is problematic for different reasons. As Buchanan notes, the
balancing approach runs contrary to the liberal principle that a person’s autonomy is
paramount, and cannot and should not be traded off against considerations of well-
being; indeed, this view lies at the heart of the anti-paternalistic concern raised by
Culver and Gert, which I consider below.³⁴ However, notwithstanding the problem-
atic assumption that the value of autonomy can be measured against considerations
of well-being in the straightforward manner that the balancing approach implies, the
degree to which an individual manifests the abilities required for DMC is not a
plausible proxy for the value of respecting their autonomy. It is far from clear that an
increase in DMC can serve to increase the value of respecting the decision in
question.
To see why, consider a decision that is not central to most individuals’ conception
of the good, such as one’s decision about what to eat for lunch on a particular day. It
is absurd to claim that increasing an individual’s capacity to make that decision
beyond the low threshold of DMC that it requires would increase the value of
respecting that decision. The value of autonomy is more plausibly grounded by the
importance of the decision to the individual’s conception of the good, and living a life
of their own. This is a quite separate question from the question of the extent to
which the individual is capable of making that decision autonomously.
I suggest that both the ‘linear justification’ and the ‘balancing justification’ fail to
provide a plausible justification for the sliding-scale view, let alone one that can help
to explain how it can avoid the conflation raised by Culver and Gert. I shall conclude
by considering an epistemic justification of the view that appeals to the greater need
for certainty about DMC for making risky decisions in non-ideal contexts. Although
I shall argue that typical understandings of this justification fail to adequately counter
Culver and Gert’s criticism, I conclude that epistemic considerations might yet lend
support to either a repurposed sliding-scale view, or a version of the view with wider
scope.
As I explained above, in non-ideal contexts, we face a number of epistemic barriers
to assessing DMC. A corollary of this is that the lower the threshold of DMC we
employ, the more likely it is that our test of DMC will be prone to false positive
assessments. Moreover, we may note that as the risks associated with making a
decision increase, so too does the harm of a false positive assessment. On the basis
³² Buchanan, ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’.
³³ Eastman and Hope, ‘The Ethics of Enforced Medical Treatment’.
³⁴ For detailed discussion of issues facing the balancing account, see Wicclair, ‘Patient Decision-Making
Capacity and Risk’.
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of these considerations, the epistemic justification of the sliding-scale view proceeds
by pointing out that we should increase the threshold of DMC for risky decisions
because we have stronger moral reasons to reduce false positive assessments in these
cases, given the greater harms associated with them.³⁵
Prima facie, it seems that the epistemic justification can allow the sliding-scale
view to avoid conflating DMC with considerations of substantive rationality. The
reason that we allow a patient to consent to but not to refuse a treatment that it would
be very risky to refuse, is not because only the former decision is rational; rather, the
justification is that we have moral reasons to require greater certainty in our
assessments as the stakes of the decision rise.
Unfortunately for supporters of the sliding-scale view, whilst this epistemic justi-
fication avoids a direct conflation of DMC and substantive rationality, this conflation
and its paternalistic connotations are nonetheless implicitly incorporated into the
justification. The justification correctly acknowledges that epistemic barriers render
our tests of DMC prone to false positive assessments, and that we can reduce these
findings by raising the threshold for DMC. However, it overlooks the fact that these
epistemic barriers also make our assessments of DMC prone to false negative
findings.³⁶ This oversight is crucial, as it means the epistemic defence of the
sliding-scale view does not sufficiently acknowledge that raising the threshold for
DMC for risky decisions will serve to increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of
false negative findings.
Once we attend to this overlooked feature, it becomes clear that even if increases in
the disvalue of false positive assessments of DMC plausibly track the increasing
degree of risk involved in different decisions, this is not a sufficient basis for an
epistemic justification of the sliding-scale view. The view can only be justified on
epistemic grounds if there is not a similarly close relationship between the increasing
degree of risk and the disvalue of the false negative assessments that are more likely
when we raise the threshold of DMC for riskier decisions. However, if there is a close
relationship between these degrees of risk and the disvalue of false negative assess-
ments, then increasing the likelihood of the latter might plausibly offset the gain to be
had by reducing false positive rates. If that is the case, simply increasing the threshold
of DMC for riskier decisions would not unequivocally serve to increase our certainty
about all of the morally relevant factors in this context.
One natural response to this worry is to appeal to the implications of each of
these kinds of assessment for the individual’s well-being. It might be claimed that
individuals who are incorrectly denied the authority to make their own risky treat-
ment decision (i.e. false negatives) may be benefited by this (in so far as they are
protected from the risk of harm to which they would otherwise expose themselves),
whilst those who are incorrectly given the authority to make such a decision (i.e.
³⁵ Buchanan, ‘Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment’, 417.
³⁶ Buchanan recognizes the implication that raising the threshold of capacity ‘also increases the number
of instances in which people are incorrectly assessed as not legally competent’. Ibid., 417. He suggests that
advocates of the epistemic justification must simply assume that the severity of the harm of false positives
does not increase with the severity of the harm at stake. My argument below is that this assumption is
unjustified.
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false positives) are quite likely to be harmed by their decision. On this approach, it
might be argued that the increasing disvalue of false positives for riskier decisions is
likely to outstrip the increase in the corresponding disvalue of false negative assess-
ments for the same types of decisions.
However, such an argument moves far too quickly. Like the balancing justification,
it implicitly assumes that considerations of well-being can be traded off against
considerations of autonomy. Yet even if such trade-offs can be coherent, this defence
of the epistemic justification of the sliding-scale view neglects the fact that in many
cases, the value of an individual’s exercising their autonomy plausibly increases in
accordance with increasing degrees of risk that the decision may concern. That is, it
may matter more for our autonomy that we make our own decisions concerning
higher degrees of risk, because such decisions may have a far greater bearing on the
extent to which our lives proceed in accordance with our own values. Risk is a
function both of the probability of a certain event, but also the degree of its disvalue.
Accordingly, a low-risk decision about what to have for lunch may concern outcomes
with little disvalue (e.g. not enjoying a sandwich), or more dis-valuable outcomes
with low probability (e.g. food poisoning). Such outcomes have little bearing on
whether our lives proceed in accordance with our values. However, my decision to
choose a very risky treatment for a non-life-threatening ailment may.
Accordingly, the sliding-scale view cannot be justified in epistemic terms merely
by the fact that (i) we face epistemic barriers in assessing DMC, and (ii) the disvalue
of false positive assessments increases as the risks associated with the decision
increase. The simple reply to this is that the disvalue of false negative assessments
of DMC may similarly increase as the risks associated with the decision increase. In
neglecting this point, the epistemic justification of the sliding-scale view implicitly
prioritizes the avoidance of false positive assessments of DMC over false negatives. It
presume that it is more important to avoid harms that are not justified by appeal to
the individual’s autonomy, than it is to avoid preventing individuals from being
wrongfully being denied the opportunity to exercise their ability to make autono-
mous decisions.
In this regard, the sliding-scale view somewhat bucks the anti-paternalistic tide,
since we typically place greater emphasis on protecting patients’ decision-making
authority than considerations of beneficence and non-maleficence. Of course, one
may raise a host of moral arguments about why we should emphasize one set of
values over the over in seeking to resolve uncertainty in making decisions about
setting the threshold of DMC. The point here though is that we lack justification for
why our weighting of these moral values should be shifted by considerations of risk
alone. In the absence of such a justification, we should reject the epistemic justifica-
tion for the sliding-scale view as it stands.
However, this does not entail that we should wholly dispense with the epistemic
justification of the sliding-scale view. It could be rendered more convincing by
broadening the scope of what contributes to our understanding of proportionality
in this context. The risk of harm associated with the consequence of a decision is
only one relevant consideration; the importance to the particular patient of having
the authority to make that risky decision is another. Taking into account both of
these elements, and establishing that they do not offset each other is a necessary
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(although perhaps not sufficient) condition of having an epistemic justification for
altering the threshold of DMC on the basis of the consequence of the decision
concerned. Only then will our decision to resolve uncertainty about DMC by altering
the threshold of DMC on the basis of risk be sensitive to both of the salient values in
this context, rather than considerations of non-maleficence alone.
Whilst one might resurrect the epistemic justification of the sliding-scale view in
this way, I suggest that the above considerations instead provide support for an
alternative approach to our understanding of proportionality in this context, and the
role the sliding-scale view should play. Recall that the epistemic justification of the
view is grounded in the desire for greater certainty in our assessments of DMC for
riskier decisions. This is an admirable sentiment; however, our desire for greater
certainty can only be satisfied in a dangerously attenuated sense by raising the
threshold degree of DMC required for risky decisions, for the reasons outlined
above. It is misleading to say that raising the threshold of DMC leads to ‘greater
certainty’; rather, it leads to greater certainty about one morally relevant feature by
raising doubt in another.
However, we have a strong moral justification for increasing our degree of
certainty in assessments of DMC for risky decisions, when that is understood to
refer to certainty tout court. The problem is that altering the threshold of DMC for
making a risky decision is a poor mechanism for acquiring greater certainty in this
sense. Increases in certainty about true positives evinced by raising the threshold
alone will correspond to decreases in certainty about true negatives; vice versa when
we lower the standards of DMC. However, it might be possible to acquire greater tout
court certainty in this context by increasing the level of evidence required in making
our judgement of DMC, rather than increasing the threshold of DMC per se.³⁷ Such
an understanding would avoid the problems outlined above, on the assumption that
we can rely on forms of evidence for DMC that would allow us to decrease the rate of
false positive assessments, without correspondingly increasing the rates of false
negative rates. Whether or not it is feasible to gather such evidence, it is clear that
simply raising the threshold of DMC cannot serve this sort of purpose. I turn to the
epistemic challenges of assessing DMC in section 5.
4. Rationalist DMC in the Ideal Context, and the
Anti-Paternalist Objection
In the previous section, I considered the extent to which the widely accepted sliding-
scale view of DMC has paternalistic connotations. I now want to consider whether
similar charges could be raised against the implications that my rationalist concep-
tion of autonomy has for our understanding of DMC. In this section, I consider the
implications that the theory has in the idealized context, where the only question we
have to consider is whether the rationality criterion sets out a plausible necessary
condition of DMC. I shall consider its implications in the non-ideal context in the
following section. To begin this discussion, I shall explain the implications that my
³⁷ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 76–7.
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theory has for the discrepancies between the two accounts of DMC that I outlined
above.
The first discrepancy was that Grisso and Appelbaum’s approach incorporates a
criterion of ‘appreciation’ that is absent in the MCA test. Such a criterion is a highly
plausible addition to an adequate set of criteria for DMC by the lights of the theory
that I have outlined in this book.³⁸ Appreciation can clearly be a necessary ability for
autonomous decision-making, since the failure to appreciate information in this way
can clearly be inimical to an individual’s holding decisionally necessary beliefs. For
instance, if a patient fails to believe that they are seriously ill and will die without
medical intervention when that is in fact the case, then they lack a belief that is crucial
for making an autonomous decision in that context; in such an epistemic situation,
they will be unable to perceive an important set of reasons, namely those in favour of
undergoing medical treatment.³⁹
In accordance with my earlier discussions in this book, we may also note that in
addition to the ability to appreciate information in this sense, the ability to meet
minimal standards of theoretical rationality will also be necessary for individuals to
avoid some of the false beliefs that are inimical to their decision-making, and to use
and weigh information in the manner that connotes autonomous decision-making.
The criterion of appreciation also represents a way in which the patient’s evalu-
ations feature in DMC criteria, since appreciation involves ‘assigning values to
information’.⁴⁰ This feature is also relevant to the second discrepancy between the
two accounts, namely that Grisso and Appelbaummake explicit reference to the need
to manipulate information rationally in one’s deliberative process, whilst the MCA
does not. Naturally, my view lends support to the former approach, and provides a
theoretical basis for adding further content to this requirement.
Grisso and Appelbaum are predominantly concerned with the theoretical ration-
ality that decision-making capacity requires, suggesting that this criterion requires
that patients are able to ‘ . . . reach conclusions that are consistent with their starting
premises’.⁴¹ Whilst I agree that this is an important part of DMC, I claim that we
ought to understand this ability (and the ability to ‘use and weigh’ information to
which the MCA refers) in a manner that reflects the rationality condition defended in
the previous chapter. To have the ability to ‘weigh and use’ information in one’s
decision-making process is to have the ability to make a decision in accordance with
what one values, that is, with one’s personally authorized preferences. To weigh
information in the manner that autonomy requires is to consider the bearing that
material information has on ends that agents value (and their pursuit thereof), and to
consider the strength of the relevant competing reasons. To do this, a patient must be
³⁸ Beauchamp and Childress take their criterion of understanding to incorporate appreciation. Ibid.,
88–93 and fn. 32.
³⁹ Note that a patient can perceive these reasons, even if she only rejects the negative connotations of her
illness. For instance, a patient who accepts the descriptive claim that she is not ‘healthy’ in a biostatistical
sense, but who also denies that she has strong reasons to be healthy in this sense, may still be able to
understand that she has very weak reasons to undergo medical treatment. For a detailed discussion of
insight into mental disorder and implications for capacity, see Holroyd, ‘Clarifying Capacity’.
⁴⁰ Appelbaum and Grisso, ‘Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment’.
⁴¹ Appelbaum and Grisso, 1636.
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able to recognize that they have self-interested reasons to want certain things, and
they must be able to use the information provided to them to decide what course of
action to pursue, in the light of both descriptive facts and their own values. In short,
DMC should incorporate considerations of practical, as well as theoretical rationality.
To further clarify the importance of values to DMC criteria, consider the
following case:
Apathetic Andrea: Andrea suffers from clinical depression. Her physician explains to her that
there are a number of treatment options available (including various anti-depressants, and
forms of psychiatric counselling), and provides her with extensive information about each
option and their possible outcomes. Andrea understands this information, retains it, and can
compare how medically effective each option is against the other. However, Andrea is
pathologically apathetic, and does not care at all what happens to her; she is convinced that
everyone despises her, despite clear evidence to the contrary. Nothing can persuade her that
her life is in any way worthwhile. Although she considers the information about each of her
treatment options, she believes that this information is simply irrelevant. She simply does not
care.⁴²
In evidencing the ability to compare the relative effectiveness of each intervention,
Andrea can plausibly be described as having the ability to ‘weigh information’.
However, if Andrea were to make a treatment choice in this scenario, it seems
problematic to claim that her decision was autonomous, despite the fact that she
meets the MCA criteria. The reason for this, I suggest, is that Andrea is unable to
engage in rational deliberation about what to do, because she is unable to regard
herself as having self-interested reasons to pursue her own well-being.⁴³ We might
say that she is, in some sense, ‘value-impaired’.⁴⁴
Furthermore, Andrea’s apathy is grounded by a theoretically irrational belief in her
own lack of worth; she has what we might describe as an evaluative delusion.⁴⁵ To
repeat claims I made in Chapter 2, this is not a claim about the truth or falsity of the
content of the belief. Rather, there are grounds for claiming that Andrea holds this
evaluative belief in a theoretically irrational sense, in so far as she holds it unshake-
ably in a manner that is immune to evidence. It is a form of an evaluative delusion,
which, as I argued in previous chapters, can serve to undermine decisional
autonomy.⁴⁶
⁴² I base this case on Appelbaum et al.’s observation that depressed patients may have decreased
motivation to protect their interests, perhaps associated with feelings of hopelessness that may alter the
nature of patients’ treatment decisions. Appelbaum et al., ‘Competence of Depressed Patients for Consent
to Research’, 1380. See also Rudnick, ‘Depression and Competence to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment’.
⁴³ For discussion of similar cases and the MCA see Rudnick, ‘Depression and Competence to Refuse
Psychiatric Treatment’.
⁴⁴ Brock, ‘Patient Competence and Surrogate Decision-Making’, 130. In describing the depressed
person as value-impaired, he notes that ‘[t]here may be no failure in their understanding or reasoning
about this outcome’; he argues that ‘mental illness that distorts what they value from what it would
otherwise be can result in incompetence to decide about treatment’.
⁴⁵ Fulford, ‘Evaluative Delusions’.
⁴⁶ It may also be understood as a particularly damaging form of evaluative delusion, in so far as it
encapsulates a paradoxical identification with what one loathes rather than what one values. See Radoilska,
‘Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy’.
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Grisso and Appelbaum’s approach might partly capture Andrea’s lack of DMC by
adverting to the necessity of appreciation to DMC, and the importance of being able
to assign value to information in the process of appreciation. However, as I have
explored previously in the book, agents who are not value-impaired in this way can
still fail to make autonomous decisions, because of the role their values are playing in
their decision-making process. In some cases, an individual’s decisions may reflect
the force of a motivating desire that the individual does not rationally endorse. In
others, we may be concerned that the values that ground the agent’s decision are not
authentic to her, and are thus not a suitable ground for her autonomy.⁴⁷ The problem
in such cases is not that agents fail to assign value to information; it is that the values
they assign do not really reflect what they want.
Such cases represent arguably the most challenging cases for any procedural
theory of autonomy, as well as raising questions about how we should delimit the
scope of the clinical category of evaluative delusions. This deserves its own discus-
sion, which I shall postpone until the following chapter. Here though, I want to begin
considering the anti-paternalist objection to incorporating considerations of theor-
etical and practical rationality into criteria of DMC even in ideal contexts.
The general thrust of this objection is that incorporating such considerations
would render standards of DMC too demanding, and would lead to physicians
being able to overrule patient choice. The anti-paternalist objection is arguably the
most pressing objection facing the rationalist account to autonomy I have defended
in this book. I have noted that it is implicitly incorporated within Lord Donaldson’s
judgement quoted at the beginning of the chapter. However, the objection as I have
just phrased it captures two distinct but related concerns. Here, I shall consider the
objection in its purest form, as an objection to rationalist criteria as elitist even in
ideal contexts. In the next section, I shall consider an epistemic version of the
objection that can be raised against rationalist criteria in non-ideal contexts, accord-
ing to which such criteria make it more likely that physicians will be able to overrule
patient choice because of limits to our ability to accurately identify rational decision-
making.
The elitist version of the anti-paternalist objection has been raised explicitly by a
number of philosophers. For instance, in defending the standard account, Faden and
Beauchamp write:
If conscious, reflective identification with one’s motivation were made a necessary condition of
autonomous action, a great many intentional, understood, uncontrolled actions that are
autonomous in our theory would be rendered non-autonomous.⁴⁸
Nelson et al. go further, arguing that to claim that authenticity of any stripe is a
condition of voluntariness is ‘ . . . both conceptually unsatisfactory and morally
dangerous’.⁴⁹
⁴⁷ This issue with cognitivist tests of capacity has sometimes been parsed as a failure to incorporate
considerations of volitional control. Craigie and Davies, ‘Problems of Control’, 2. I shall consider this
framing in my discussion of anorexia nervosa in the next chapter.
⁴⁸ Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 264.
⁴⁹ Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of Voluntary Consent’.
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The first thing to acknowledge about this objection is that it is understood to
pertain to all of the procedural theories of reflective autonomy that I surveyed in the
first two chapters. This observation alone might seem to render the objection
implausible. To see why, reconsider Frankfurt’s view of autonomy; on Frankfurt’s
view, autonomy requires that one identify with one’s first-order motivating desire
with a second-order volition. Crucially for Frankfurt, human beings can be distin-
guished from other creatures by virtue of the fact that they alone are able to form
second-order desires.⁵⁰Accordingly, far from being elitist, Frankfurt might claim that
the standards set in his theory of reflective autonomy are simply the standards for
how we assess personhood.
However, it might be claimed that rationalist theories of autonomy of the sort that
I have defended are particularly vulnerable to this objection.⁵¹ For instance, John
Christman writes that:
. . . the property of autonomy must not collapse into the property of ‘reasonable person’, where
the idea of being self-governing is indistinguishable from the idea of being, simply, smart.⁵²
There are several things to say in response to this objection.⁵³ First, phrased in this
way, the objection appears to assimilate rationality and ‘smartness’; yet, one need not
be ‘smart’ in order to be rational. On the theory that I have developed here, agents
need only be able to pursue the outcome of their desire on the basis of their belief that
the outcome is something that they have reason to pursue. It is not at all clear why
this should be intellectually demanding; to suppose otherwise is to conflate the
separate concepts of rationality and intelligence.⁵⁴
One might instead interpret Christman’s concern here to be that a rationalist
approach to autonomy entails that it will be reserved only for those who think through
their choices. I struggle to see why we should find it problematic to claim that an
individual will only be able to make a locally autonomous choice if they think through
it in basic ways. Indeed, this is just why we reserve the right to make one’s ownmedical
decisions for those who qualify as having decision-making capacity. In my view, the
most plausible way of cashing out this concern is that we have reasons to be sceptical of
a theory of autonomy that entails that individuals will only qualify as being globally
⁵⁰ Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’.
⁵¹ Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 14; Hyun, ‘Authentic Values and Individual Autonomy’;
Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 49. Notably, Ploug and Holm, ‘Doctors, Patients, and Nudging in the
Clinical Context—Four Views on Nudging and Informed Consent’ suggest that Christman’s criticism can
also be weighed against the form of rationality implied by the standard account.
⁵² Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 14.
⁵³ A closely related objection in this context is that rationalist conditions rule out the autonomy of
individuals who prefer a life of non-reflection or spontaneity. Hyun, ‘Authentic Values and Individual
Autonomy’, 199; Double, ‘Two Types of Autonomy Accounts’, 73; Blumenthal-Barby and Naik, ‘In
Defense of Nudge–Autonomy Compatibility’. However, this objection misconstrues the nature of proced-
urally rationalist theories by raising what is essentially a substantive complaint. The rationalist theory can
quite easily accommodate the thought that an individual can autonomously live a life of non-reflection or
spontaneity, as long as they do so because they believe that way of life is valuable—this is a procedural
rather than substantive matter. For a similar reply to this objection, see Ploug and Holm, ‘Informed
Consent, Libertarian Paternalism, and Nudging’.
⁵⁴ See Baron, Rationality and Intelligence for an account of how the two differ.
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autonomous if they think through every single one of their choices andmake them in a
maximally autonomous way. Yet a rationalist account does not require this—as long as
one does not understand global autonomy as the aggregative accumulation of various
locally autonomous choices (a suggestion I rejected in the introduction to the book),
then it is quite compatible with an individual’s making a considerable number of
choices over their lives that are not locally autonomous.
That said, as I explored in Chapters 1 and 2, on a rationalist account, autonomy
does require rational reflection in a way that other accounts do not, even if such
reflection can be unconscious or dispositionally produced. I have suggested in
previous chapters that accounts that do not appeal to actual reflection of this sort
fail to accommodate paradigm cases of individuals who lack autonomy (i.e. the
standard account), and that accounts appealing to hypothetical reflection (such as
Christman’s account) also face other challenges concerning their operationalization
in bioethical contexts. Ultimately though, even if the rationalist has to bite the bullet
and accept that autonomy is more challenging on his account than it is on others, this
does not entail that it is beyond the capacity of most human beings. On the contrary,
like Frankfurt, advocates of rationalist theories can suggest that having the abilities
associated with rational decision-making is just part of what it is to be a person.
Indeed, in the very first sentence of On What Matters, Parfit claims that humans are
‘ . . . the type of animal that can both understand and respond to reasons’.⁵⁵ Similarly,
in his defence against a similar objection, Joseph Raz points out that ‘[t]o want to be
rational is to want to be a person’.⁵⁶
Rationality conditions of decisional autonomy do not entail that autonomy-based
protections will only be afforded to those who think through their choice with
intellectual precision and accuracy, nor does it unduly preclude individuals from
having decision-making authority. However, it might be argued that the rationalist
account is elitist in a different sense, in that it places too much emphasis on cognitive
elements of decision-making capacity and fails to acknowledge the importance of
affective attitudes and emotional experience to DMC.⁵⁷ However, the rationalist
account can be understood to incorporate affective elements of DMC in so far as
many of our affective attitudes and emotional experiences can give rise to values, and
ground certain sorts of reasons. Consider for example the experience of love;
although the experience of love is not itself typically the output of rational deliber-
ation (we ‘fall in’ love, rather than rationally deliberate ourselves into it), it can clearly
give rise to other evaluative judgements that we come to reflectively endorse, and
reasons to act in certain ways towards others. Moreover, as Nomy Arpaly has
persuasively argued, emotions might plausibly be a source of reasons which may
not be accessible at the time of deliberation, but which may nonetheless ground
rational behaviour on a broadly coherentist approach.⁵⁸
⁵⁵ Parfit, On What Matters, 31. ⁵⁶ Raz, Engaging Reason, 18.
⁵⁷ Charland, ‘Anorexia and the MacCAT-T Test for Mental Competence’; Vollmann, ‘ “But I Don’t Feel
It” ’; Christman, The Politics of Persons, 144; Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy’, 31; Kong,
‘Beyond the Balancing Scales’, 234–5.
⁵⁸ Arpaly, ‘On Acting Rationally against One’s Best Judgment’. Marilyn Friedman also recognizes that
features of emotion and character can constitute reasons. See Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 9.
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The rationalist account does speak against unreflective emotional states grounding
autonomous decision-making and action, but this seems quite plausible; a person
who acts in a fit of rage and later decides that this did not reflect their evaluative
judgements is not appropriately described as having acted autonomously. This
suggests that we need to have a nuanced understanding of the role of emotions in
autonomous agency; it is neither the case that they alone can ground autonomous
decision-making, nor that their mere influence impedes it. The issue turns on
whether our emotional states are connected in the right way to our evaluative
judgements.⁵⁹
Similar remarks apply to relational influences on decisional autonomy. Cognitive
tests of DMC have been criticized on the basis that they overlook relational (as well as
emotional) influences on autonomous decision-making.⁶⁰ However, the approach to
DMC that I am outlining here is quite compatible with relational influences. First, as
I discussed in Chapter 5, many of the abilities that are necessary for decisional
autonomy are socially mediated; accordingly, in claiming that decisional autonomy
requires practical and theoretical rationality, I am implicitly accepting that the
relational and social conditions that are necessary for individual rationality will
also be necessary for DMC. We may also observe that relationships can be central
to the content of our values. Nonetheless, whilst acknowledging these important
points, it is best to maintain some conceptual distance between relational influences
and DMC. The reason for this is that there are many interpersonal effects on the
voluntariness of decision-making that do not adversely affect DMC, even if they
undermine decisional autonomy in other ways. For example, I suggested that
deceived agents and coerced agents may lack autonomy with respect to their deci-
sions, but it can still make sense to describe them as retaining the abilities that are
causally necessary for (counterfactually) making that decision autonomously. Indeed,
as I explained in Chapter 5, it is only by virtue of the fact that the victim of coercion
retains their rational capacities that coercion is able to dominate the victim’s will.
Perhaps part of the explanation for why rationalist theories of autonomy are
deemed elitist is that critics assume that these theories are substantively rational
rather than procedurally rational.⁶¹ This is one plausible way of reading Lord
Donaldson’s judgement; he seems to understand rational decisions as being
co-extensive with decisions that others regard as rational, or with those that accord
with impersonal reasons, ranked in a certain objective way.⁶² However, on the theory
that I have defended, agents may act on the basis of their beliefs about facts that
⁵⁹ For a nuanced discussion of how emotions can help us perceive practical reasons, see Tappolet,
‘Emotions, Reasons, and Autonomy’. In cases in which an agent does not reflectively endorse their
emotional states, then altering these emotional states may serve to enhance their autonomy. For example,
see Douglas et al., ‘Coercion, Incarceration, and Chemical Castration’.
⁶⁰ See Camillia Kong’s recent defence of a relational approach to mental capacity in Kong, Mental
Capacity in Relationship.
⁶¹ Culver and Gert seem to understand rationality in this sense in disputing the role of DMC. Culver
and Gert, ‘The Inadequacy of Incompetence’.
⁶² Similarly, when Draper calls for a distinction between incompetence and irrationality, she provides
examples of decisions that appear irrational, but does not offer an account of irrationality per se. Yet, she
endorses an account of competence that requires the ability to ‘weigh information in a balance to arrive
at a choice’. Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy’, 126. As
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provide them with either personal or impersonal self-interested reasons. This is
crucial, since there is scope for considerable intersubjective variability in what agents
have personal self-interested reason to do; moreover, rational agents may differ with
regards to the weight that they place on different impersonal reasons. The upshot of
this is that whilst we may agree with Lord Donaldson that patients should be free to
make decisions that are irrational from the impersonal perspective, we should reject
his claim that patients should be free to act in accordance with decisions that have no
rational basis.
In a slightly different vein, Nelson et al. partly ground their criticism of
authenticity-based accounts of voluntariness on the basis that we often make volun-
tary choices that are inauthentic. They write:
Anomalous actions sometimes arise from choices that are out of character as a result of
surrounding events that are unprecedented in the actor’s experience, such as serious disease.⁶³
To illustrate further, they appeal to the following example:
A patient might request a highly invasive treatment at the end of life against his previous
judgment about his best interests because he has come to a conclusion that surprises him.⁶⁴
Whether or not this is a compelling objection to the accounts of authenticity that the
authors have in mind, this example is not particularly problematic for the account
that I have developed here. The reason for this is that the objection assumes that
authenticity must require a far greater degree of stability than is necessary. It is true
that autonomy requires a degree of stability in our overall evaluative nexus; we will be
unable to adequately pursue the long-term plans that undergird our global autonomy
if we frequently abandon the values that provide their basis. However, this is quite
compatible with the claim that our local autonomous choices can run contrary to
some of the evaluative judgements that we have long held dear. Such departures from
a pre-existing value can be authentic if the change is intelligible to the agent, by virtue
of its coherence in the overall nexus of her other acceptances and preferences; in
short, her character. However, such choices may undermine autonomy if they are not
a response to the agent’s own judgements about what is good for her, but produced
by other irrational drives (such as fear) that can disconnect the agent’s motivation
from her evaluative judgements. The crucial question is thus not whether or not the
agent can autonomously choose contrary to a previously held evaluative judgement,
but rather why the agent in question has chosen contrary to that judgement.
In contrast to the terms in which the objection above has been stated, we have little
reason to believe that the patient in the above case, who changes her judgement about
what is in her best interests, is acting contrary to her values generally, even if she is
now deciding contrary to a particularly long-standing evaluative judgement. In fact,
such, it appears that she accepts the claim that competence is incompatible with some sorts of practical
irrationality.
⁶³ Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of Voluntary Consent’. See also Beauchamp and Childress, Principles in
Biomedical Ethics, 103.
⁶⁴ Nelson et al., ‘The Concept of Voluntary Consent’. The authors draw this example from Jaworska,
‘Caring, Minimal Autonomy, and the Limits of Liberalism’, 82.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
      
we have good reasons to suppose that facing a serious medical condition will tend to
prompt individuals to reconsider the values that undergird the reasons for their
practical choices. Not only that, such agents will be carrying out this reflection at the
same time as acquiring epistemic access to vital reason-giving facts about the precise
nature of the situation that they now find themselves in. For instance, they may now
be acutely aware of the fact that illness can drain a person of their reserves of
determination.⁶⁵
In contrast, the evaluative judgements that they had previously made about such
situations were made without such awareness. In Nelson et al.’s case, the patient’s
understanding of the comparative strength of their reasons to avoid severe pain on
the one hand, and to avoid death on the other, will naturally be sharpened and altered
by being placed in a situation in which they are confronted with the reality of having
to choose to act on the basis of one of these reasons. As such, the fact that the patient
in question is now making a request that is in conflict with her previous evaluative
judgement does not entail that it qualifies as non-autonomous on the rationalist view
I have defended; it can instead be a rationally intelligible adaption to one’s radically
different circumstances.⁶⁶
So, in phrasing their spin on the anti-paternalist objection, Faden and Beauchamp
are quite right to claim that ‘many intentional, understood, uncontrolled actions that
are autonomous in our theory would be rendered non-autonomous’ on a rationalist
theory. But the reason for this is that many intentional, understood, and uncontrolled
actions are not autonomous. The main remaining worry undergirding the elitist
objection in the context of biomedical ethics is that incorporating the rationality
condition I have suggested into a conception of DMC will serve to increase the
number of patients who will lack DMC. I have in mind here patients such as those
who suffer from conditions that render them unable to make treatment decisions in
accordance with what they believe they have reason to do in light of their own
evaluative judgements. Whilst such patients would lack DMC on the approach that
I advocate, I do not take this to be a flaw of the theory. On the contrary, it is a flaw of
the standard view that it finds such patients competent to make their treatment
decisions, and regards their choices as autonomous. Whilst these patients are able to
express a ‘choice’, it is one that is unconnected to what they themselves believe they
have reason to do in light of their own values.
In fact, the standard theory itself comes very close to advocating a similar
viewpoint in its stipulation that psychiatric disorders can represent internal forms
of controlling influence that undermine autonomy. However, as I argued in previous
chapters, in the absence of something like an account of authenticity, the standard
account lacks a unified explanation of what it is that makes these disorders control-
ling in the sense that undermines decisional autonomy. As I shall discuss in the next
chapter, my account allows for a far more nuanced understanding of the ways in
which certain psychiatric disorders can, but need not, undermine autonomous
decision-making.
⁶⁵ Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 249.
⁶⁶ See also Meynen, ‘Depression, Possibilities, and Competence’; Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’,
246–9.
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Strikingly, despite these philosophical objections to rationalist criteria of DMC,
there is evidence to suggest that prominent accounts of DMC (including those
invoked by the courts) seem to incorporate either a rationality constraint, or some-
thing similar in order to acknowledge ways in which volitional deficiencies can
undermine DMC.⁶⁷ However, as I shall begin to explain in considering a different
permutation of the anti-paternalist objection grounded by epistemic considerations,
some versions of this view appear to place undue emphasis on unreliable proxies for
procedurally rational decision-making.
5. Rationalist DMC in Non-Ideal Contexts and the
Epistemic Anti-Paternalist Objection
Dispensing with the elitist conception of the anti-paternalist objection may suffice for
justifying the adoption of a rationalist approach to DMC in ideal contexts. However,
in accordance with my analysis above, in the non-ideal context we must consider two
further questions about the application of a rationalist conception of DMC. First, do
we have reliable methods to assess the supplementary abilities that I have considered
so far? With regards to appreciation and theoretical rationality, it seems that the
answer to this question is ‘yes’. It is true that assessing these abilities requires going
beyond the mere assessment of the individual’s ability to understand information.
However, these abilities plausibly admit of empirical assessment using similar
methods to those that we use to assess understanding. Indeed, clinical tests for
competence such as the Macarthur Competence Assessment Tool already use
semi-structured interviews to assess appreciation.⁶⁸
Whilst clinical assessment tools might plausibly assess appreciation and theoretical
rationality, it is less clear that they will be able help physicians ascertain whether their
patient is making their treatment decision in accordance with the requirements of
practical rationality that I have outlined. It is one thing to establish that a patient can
meet requirements of theoretical rationality in their deliberations in the manner that
the MCA test and Grisso and Appelbaum’s approach seems to imply. It is quite
another to claim that they are weighing information rationally in accordance with
their evaluative judgements, and making their decision in accordance with that
weighting. In turn, this raises a further question about incorporating a rationality
condition into our understanding of DMC in non-idealized contexts. Given that we
are likely to make errors in our assessment of this ability, what implications might
this criterion have for the balance that we are aiming to strike between the competing
moral reasons at stake in setting thresholds of DMC? Is it justifiable to heighten the
⁶⁷ Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and What a Patient Values’; Craigie and Davies,
‘Problems of Control’; Brock, ‘Patient Competence and Surrogate Decision-Making’; Buchanan and
Brock, Deciding for Others.
⁶⁸ Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi, ‘The MacCAT-T’. For criticisms, see Baergen, ‘Assessing the
Competence Assessment Tool’; Kim, ‘When Does Decisional Impairment Become Decisional
Incompetence?’; Banner and Szmukler, ‘ “Radical Interpretation” and the Assessment of Decision-
Making Capacity’.
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epistemic obstacles we face in making assessments of DMC by adding requirements
of practical rationality?
One particular concern we might have in this regard is that medical professionals
might exploit our epistemic limitations about the practical rationality of others to
unjustifiably revoke patients’ decision-making authority, in order to prioritize con-
siderations of beneficence. The thought here is that in view of our epistemic limita-
tions in this regard, adopting a rationalist criterion of DMC would most likely lead
physicians to make judgements about the rationality of a patient’s decision based on
the content of the patient’s decision, or their disease status.⁶⁹ Even if we agree that
DMC should not be defined by appeal to such substantive considerations, perhaps
the epistemic barriers we face in assessing rational DMC may leave us with little
choice but to adopt a substantive approach to assessing capacity, inevitably increas-
ing false negative assessments. This is in tension with both the proceduralist spirit of
the MCA and the account of autonomy that I have defended, and it is precisely what
Lord Donaldson was seeking to defend against in his judgement outlined at the
outset of this chapter.
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that this sort of problem is already
arising with respect to the manner in which the MCA is interpreted. Although the
MCA does not make explicit reference to requirements of rationality or authenticity
in its ‘use and weigh’ criterion, the manner in which the law has been interpreted in
the context of refusals of treatment from patients suffering from anorexia nervosa
suggests that the criterion has been understood to preclude individuals from quali-
fying as having DMC if their decisions are grounded by apparently ‘compulsive
motivations’. For instance, the MCA code of practice suggests that patients suffering
from anorexia nervosa may lack DMC, not because of any deficiency in their ability
to understand material information, but rather because ‘their compulsion not to eat
may be too strong for them to ignore’.⁷⁰ Furthermore, Jillian Craigie and Alisa Davies
have highlighted a number of legal judgements that suggest that courts in England
and Wales tend to view the desires that are symptomatic of anorexia nervosa as
amounting to compulsions that are incompatible with DMC.⁷¹
The claim that compulsions undermine decisional autonomy is broadly compat-
ible with my procedural account of autonomy, although I shall say more about this in
the next chapter. In practice though, assessments of what constitutes a ‘compulsion’
in these contexts may be grounded by non-procedural considerations. As Camillia
Kong has argued, the assessment of a compulsion can treat ‘compulsion’ as a thick
concept;⁷² it may incorporate substantive considerations either directly or indirectly
through an appeal to the patient’s diagnostic status. The concern here is that this
interpretation of the MCA test coupled with our epistemic limitations threatens to
unjustifiably collapse the ostensibly procedural test of capacity into a diagnostic
status-based test, whereby anorexic patients are simply assumed to lack capacity
because they are assumed to be subjects of compulsion in their decision-making.⁷³
⁶⁹ Banner and Szmukler, ‘ “Radical Interpretation” and the Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity’.
⁷⁰ Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice, 4.22. ⁷¹ Craigie and Davies, ‘Problems of Control’.
⁷² Kong, ‘Beyond the Balancing Scales’. ⁷³ Ibid.
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I am sympathetic to Kong’s concern about this in the specific context of anorexia
nervosa, and I shall consider the issue in more detail in a case discussion in the next
chapter. To conclude this chapter though, I want to consider this epistemic form of
the anti-paternalist objection in a more abstract sense outside of this specific context.
Do our epistemic limitations give us decisive reasons not to incorporate consider-
ations of rationality into non-ideal assessments of DMC?
If Kong’s critical analysis of the current interpretation of DMC is correct, then the
flaw in this interpretation seems to lie in the fact that the courts are relying on
individuals’ disease-status, and perhaps even the content of the patients’ decision, as
an exhaustive and reliable proxy for procedurally rational decision-making. Before
considering whether this mistake must be inevitable, it is important to note that the
use of proxies to enable one to overcome epistemic barriers to accurate assessments
of DMC is not problematic per se. It is quite coherent to claim that the content of an
individual’s decision can provide evidential support for an assessment of DMC,
whilst denying that it can provide a sufficient ground for a judgement that an
individual lacks DMC. To use Colin Gavagahn’s memorable phrase the content of
a decision can serve as a ‘warning flag rather than a stop sign’ in assessments of
DMC.⁷⁴ Indeed, although the above discussion suggests that the MCA is not always
interpreted correctly on the following point, the Act nonetheless implicitly endorses
the view that substantive considerations can play a non-exhaustive role in assess-
ments of DMC. Recall that the MCA stipulates that ‘A person is not to be treated as
unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’. As Herring
notes, the use of the word ‘merely’ here suggests that the fact that a decision is unwise
can factor in one’s assessment of DMC; it just cannot be the only factor.⁷⁵
The account of autonomy that I have defended can help to elucidate why this
approach to evidential proxies can be justified. When a patient has made their
treatment decision autonomously, they should be able to justify that decision by
appeal to what they understand to be the reason-implying facts about their treatment
options, and its coherence with their other evaluative judgements. In many cases, the
reasoning behind a decision will be quite transparent to third parties. In some cases
though, the rationale for the content of a patient’s decision may be opaque to others.
If, in such cases, the content of a particular decision is contrary to what the patient
has impersonal reason to do, or if it appears incongruous with other elements of the
patient’s character system, that gives us reason to investigate the patient’s deliberative
process in a deeper fashion. Crucially though, in such cases, the content of the
decision should not serve as the end-point of an assessment of the patient’s
DMC. Rather, the fact that the rationale for the decision is opaque should act as a
springboard for investigating the individual’s reasons for making that decision, and
also how it relates to her core preferences and acceptance.⁷⁶
Proxies, however, are problematic if they are understood to be wholly sufficient for
assessments of procedural DMC, or if they are in fact unreliable ‘warning flags’ for
that which we are seeking to identify, in this case, procedurally rational decision-
⁷⁴ Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 252. ⁷⁵ Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 165.
⁷⁶ Gavaghan also defends further probing into the internal consistency of the patient’s reasoning
process in such contexts. See Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 247.
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making. However, incorporating a rationalist condition into one’s account of DMC
does not entail that we must rely on unreliable proxies or indeed proxies alone.
This point has an important bearing on the broader epistemic concern that
grounds this permutation of the anti-paternalist objection, namely the concern that
incorporating judgements of rationality into assessments of DMC will unavoidably
lead to more false negative assessments. This concern is only warranted if we accept
that we lack evidential methods for accurately assessing the ability that we are
attempting to capture here. Whilst one may plausibly object that we do not currently
employ such methods, there is some scope for optimism about the possibility that we
might accurately assess rational decision-making. First, there is currently a great deal
of interest in using neuroscientific approaches to assessing the neural underpinnings
of clear deficits in rational decision-making, and there have been calls to use such
evidence in assessments of DMC.⁷⁷ However, this research is at an early stage, and
may not be appropriate for many patients.
Yet there are other alternative methods we might adopt in tackling this epistemic
barrier to assessments of practical rationality that have far greater clinical feasibility.
For instance, Natalie Banner and George Szmukler’s ‘Radical Interpretation’⁷⁸
approach advocates that in assessing DMC, clinicians should focus not on the
content of a belief or decision, but rather upon the relationships between that belief
and decision to other elements of their ‘mental economy’:
The epistemic standards of ‘coherence’ and ‘correspondence’ thus provide a framework within
which decisions and behaviour, whether unusual or not, can be interpreted and understood. It
is only in virtue of the implicit background structure of interconnected beliefs, actions, and so
forth, that individual beliefs (or values) can be picked out as normatively inappropriate, and
therefore potentially indicative of an impairment that could undermine capacity: a note of
discord in an otherwise fairly coherent and harmonious symphony of intentional behaviour.⁷⁹
As such, on the radical interpretation approach, and more generally on the view of
autonomy that I have defended, a clinician’s substantive assessment of a particular
belief or decision should be understood to motivate a broader kind of enquiry into
the agent’s character system, rather than wholly constituting an assessment of DMC;
substantive assessment here does not lend support to a substantive approach to
autonomy or unwarranted paternalism.⁸⁰ The above discussion also suggests that,
in situations in which there is disagreement between the physician and their patient
about the best treatment option, it is not only appropriate for the physician to ask
their patient to explain the reasons underlying their decision, but in fact necessary for
establishing that the decision was made in the right way.
The concern that the manner in which the MCA is interpreted may currently
lead to substantive assessments of capacity must be taken seriously. However, my
suggestion is that this interpretation is a result of over-generalizations and miscon-
ceptions about both the nature of particular disorders and plausible demands of
⁷⁷ Clarke, ‘The Neuroscience of Decision Making and Our Standards for Assessing Competence to
Consent’; Peterson, ‘Should Neuroscience Inform Judgements of Decision-Making Capacity?’
⁷⁸ Banner and Szmukler, ‘ “Radical Interpretation” and the Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity’.
⁷⁹ Ibid., 385. ⁸⁰ Ibid., 389–92.
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rationality, rather than a problem with incorporating considerations of rationality
into assessments of DMC per se. It is possible to assess the extent to which a patient is
making their decision in accordance with the kind of rationality condition I have
outlined, without relying on the patient’s disease status or substantive considerations
alone as crude proxies.
Yet, it might finally be objected that engaging in radical interpretation is highly
burdensome for health care teams, who simply do not have the time to engage in this
sort of detailed discussion with every patient. However, my claim that radical
interpretation is the best way to accurately assess ‘rational DMC’ and to thus facilitate
our ability to afford decision-making authority to patients appropriately, is quite
compatible with there being stronger moral reasons that outweigh those in favour of
its use. Such reasons might include considerations pertaining to the just allocation of
scarce resources in health care, including the medical team’s time and energy.
However, we cannot have our cake and eat it too. If we believe these other moral
reasons are stronger, and therefore advocate an approach to patient decision-making
that does not incorporate deep consideration of the patient’s reasons and values, this
only means that we must acknowledge that we are trading off the value of giving
decision-making authority to the people who actually deserve it (and protecting those
who deserve protection from harm) against other moral values. It does not mean that
the radical interpretation approach does not facilitate our ability to make true
positive and true negative assessments of DMC.
Of course, that is not to say that radical interpretation is a flawless evidential
mechanism in this regard. Even if it is highly accurate, there is still the possibility that
some individuals might unjustifiably be denied decision-making authority on the
basis that they have incorrectly been assessed as lacking practical rationality in their
decision-making. But, this cost has to be weighed against the costs of two features of
the status quo. The first is that the low threshold approach to the DMC in the MCA
means that it is likely that a number of individuals currently qualify as having DMC
when they are not able to make autonomous decisions about treatment. Second, due
to the vague wording of the ‘use and weigh’ criterion, there is scope for widely varying
interpretations for the general applications of this criterion.⁸¹ In addition to the
concerns about how this may open the door to substantive considerations determin-
ing assessments of capacity, considerations of justice speak against leaving the
interpretation of the ‘weigh and use’ criterion to the discretion and intuitions of
different courts. The values of the individual either should or should not matter for
all patients whose DMC is under consideration.
Ultimately, the question must boil down to how important we think rationality is
to autonomy, and whether it is sufficiently important to include it amongst our
criteria of DMC, given the costs of raising the threshold of DMC in a non-ideal
context. My own view is that practical rationality warrants inclusion because of its
centrality to autonomous decision-making. Practical rationality as I outlined it in the
first chapters of this book is not just one ability among several that are relevant to
DMC; it is central to the value of autonomous decision-making in so far as it allows
⁸¹ Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 51.
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us to direct our lives in accordance with our own values. It thus grounds the moral
significance of all the other abilities that we typically accept are necessary to autono-
mous decision-making. Understanding information, retaining it, and ‘weighing’ it
only matters for autonomy if we assume that agents have the ability to link that
information (and how much weight it is given) to their own values; similarly we
should only be concerned about the decision a patient communicates if it is a
communication of a decision grounded by their values.
In the next chapter, I shall bring this theoretical discussion of DMC to bear on
some practical cases that will serve to further elucidate features of my account. In
doing so, I shall consider further the concern that assessments of DMC in the context
of anorexia nervosa are in danger of collapsing the proceduralist test of the MCA into
a status-based test that indirectly incorporates a substantive conception of autonomy.
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8
Rational Decision-Making Capacity
in End of Life Decision-Making
In this chapter I shall consider three cases of end of life decision-making that
illuminate implications that my rationalist approach has for decision-making cap-
acity (DMC). Although end of life decision-making is not the only medical context in
which judgements of DMC can be contentious, the gravity of the consequences of
refusing consent to medical treatment here makes the stakes of this debate
particularly high.
At the outset, it is important to be clear about the scope of the implications of the
claim that a patient lacks DMC in this context. Crucially, the mere fact that a patient
lacks DMC does not entail that it is thereby permissible to treat that patient. First,
there may be ways in which it would be possible to facilitate the patient’s attaining the
requisite DMC to provide valid consent.¹ However, even when it is not possible to
enable a patient to acquire DMC for the material time at which the decision must be
made, it may still not be permissible to initiate treatment in the absence of consent,
because of other salient moral considerations. In particular, since non-consensual
treatment can be a harrowing experience, and since some medical interventions may
have only limited beneficial effects in the end of life context, a decision to refrain
from providing non-consensual medical treatment may sometimes be grounded by
considerations of well-being, rather than respect for autonomy per se.² Furthermore,
patients may plausibly have a number of claim rights against bodily interference that
do not depend on their status as autonomous agents.³ Finally, there may also be
¹ Notably in this regard, one of the guiding principles of the MCA states that a patient should not be
understood to lack capacity ‘unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without
success’. Mental Capacity Act 2005, 1(3). Furthermore, an individual is not to be precluded from DMC on
the basis of inadequate understanding if he is able to understand an explanation of the treatment decision
‘given to him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances’. Mental Capacity Act 2005, 3(2).
² As Draper acknowledges, this is a particularly salient consideration in the context of anorexia nervosa.
See Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy’, 121. See also
Geppert, ‘Futility in Chronic Anorexia Nervosa’.
³ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’ Rebecca Walker
argues that we have moral reasons to abide by irrational choices made by competent individuals on the
basis that a failure to abide by such choices would violate the rights held by these patients. Walker, ‘Respect
for Rational Autonomy’, 356. Whilst I am sympathetic to the idea that unwaived rights claims may speak
against involuntary treatment, I think Walker is mistaken to claim that this gives us a sufficient reason to
abide by irrational choices. Part of the problem here is that, contrary to Walker’s analysis, non-competent
individuals also have a right to avoid unwanted and invasive bodily interference; and yet we believe it can
be permissible to override this right. It is true that the Hohfeldian incidents incorporated into the right
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societal and biopolitical considerations that enter into wise decision-making in this
context.⁴
I shall explore many of these considerations in more detail in the following chapter
when I turn to consider the value of autonomy. Here though, it suffices to note that
the absence of DMC is not a sufficient condition of the permissibility of non-
consensual medical treatment. Nonetheless, the fact that a patient lacks DMC has
important moral implications in this context, since a patient’s right to refuse medical
treatment can be understood to be conditional on their having DMC to make an
autonomous decision to refuse treatment, for reasons that I explored in the previous
chapter.⁵ If a patient has DMC, and exercises their right to refuse treatment, and that
decision does not pose a direct harm to others (as it might in the context of public
health) then it is thought that medical professionals are typically obligated to refrain
from providing treatment.⁶ Accordingly, establishing whether or not a patient has
DMC thus has a crucial bearing on this strong form of protection that many patients
are thought to enjoy.⁷
plausibly differ between competent and non-competent individuals. Whilst both enjoy a claim right against
bodily interference, only the right of competent individuals incorporates the further power to waive that
claim. Why should this be the case? To my mind, the most plausible explanation of the different elements
of the rights of competent individuals is that we believe that waivers should only have normative authority
if the decision to exercise this power is made autonomously. But, if this is right, then we should reject
Walker’s claim that we should abide by irrational choices of otherwise competent individuals on the basis
of the rights we would violate if we failed to do so. Contrary to Walker’s analysis, the fact that we would
override an individual’s rights in failing to abide by their treatment choice is often not sufficient to justify
abiding by that choice. Indeed, we do not always abide by the choices of non-competent patients, despite
their claim rights against bodily interference. In the case of non-competent patients, we abide by their
choices if the benefits of failing to do so are insufficient to outweigh the interest protected by their claim. In
contrast, the reason that we abide by the treatment choices of competent patients (even when the benefits
of failing to do so would outweigh the harms) is that we acknowledge the normative authority of the
individual’s status as a competent individual by affording them the power to decide whether to waive their
claims and to authorize treatment. However, if the authority of this decision to exercise this power is
undermined by a lack of decisional autonomy, then it is unclear to me why this decisionmust be abided by
in a manner that we would not similarly apply in the case of a non-competent individual. Walker herself
implicitly acknowledges that we can have reasons to not abide by some choices of competent individuals,
since she later claims that we should only abide by competent treatment refusals if they are ‘freely made
and informed’. Ibid., 358. But why only these refusals? Why rule out unfree or uninformed refusals if not
because of the fact that they are not made autonomously? If one rules out these threats to autonomy, why
not also rule out the threat posed by irrationality? Why suppose competence can have further moral force
outside of its contribution to autonomy?
⁴ Garasic, Guantanamo and Other Cases of Enforced Medical Treatment; Savulescu and Momeyer,
‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’
⁵ For an alternative view, see footnote 3.
⁶ In England and Wales, the Mental Health Act is a counterexample to this, in so far as it permits the
involuntary treatment of individuals with DMC who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder. UK
Department of Health, Mental Health Act 1983 (Revised 2007). As others have argued, it is far from clear
that this is ethically justified. Szmukler and Holloway, ‘Mental Health Legislation Is Now a Harmful
Anachronism’; Dawson and Szmukler, ‘Fusion of Mental Health and Incapacity Legislation’; Bartlett, ‘The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’.
⁷ Contrary to this analysis, Giordano argues that the moral force of autonomy is weakened in the
specific context of anorexia nervosa, to the extent that we should not necessarily respect refusals of
treatment by anorexic patients with DMC. For Giordano, the explanation for this is that the harms evinced
by anorexia are distinctive, because the condition is reversible, and death from the condition is avoidable.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
    -
To recap the problem we face in this regard when adopting a rationalist concep-
tion of DMC: a plausible procedural account must accommodate the possibility that
patients can make an autonomous treatment decision that others believe to be
unwise. However, contrary to Lord Donaldson’s claims analysed in the previous
chapter, the rationalist approach denies that patients can make autonomous deci-
sions on the basis of ‘irrational reasons’ or no ‘reasons’ at all. Rather, the challenge in
this regard is how we can ascertain whether the patient is using and weighing the
material information in a process of deliberation that is rational.
I shall begin my analysis with a straightforward example of how my rationalist
approach is compatible with the claim that rational patients can make apparently
‘unwise’ choices. In the second half of the chapter, I shall consider the implications of
my approach for more controversial cases concerning the rationality of treatment
refusal on religious grounds, and treatment refusal in the context of anorexia nervosa.
In doing so, I shall suggest that my rationalist approach is broadly compatible with
the widely adopted view that (i) many religious believers who have DMC can refuse
treatment forbidden by their religion and (ii) some anorexic patients can lack DMC
to refuse treatment. However, my analysis shall suggest that we should take a much
more nuanced approach to these cases than this generalized position implies, and
which appears to be apparent in the standard view of autonomy’s understanding of
the implications of psychiatric disorders for decisional autonomy.
1. Rational DMC and ‘Unwise’ Decisions
Isobel is a 60-year-old woman who has developed pneumonia. She lives independently, but,
after her husband died five years ago, has no surviving family or close friends. Isobel’s
physician tells her that pneumonia can be fatal, but that she has luckily been diagnosed very
quickly. As such, her pneumonia can be treated with a short course of antibiotics, and she is
expected to make a full recovery and live for at least another ten years. However, Isobel refuses
consent; she says that she has had a ‘good innings’ but that she is now tired of life, and is ready
to die.⁸
Death, typically, is something that we have a very strong self-interested reason to
avoid, but can it ever be rational to prefer death to continued existence? In some
cases, it seems quite uncontroversial to claim that this can be rational. To see why, we
need to consider further why it is typically rational to prefer one’s continued
existence to death. In one sense, individuals can be understood to have a strong
reason to avoid death, grounded by the fact that, in dying, we forgo any future
Giordano, Understanding Eating Disorders, 249–50. Whilst I agree that reversibility of the condition and
the avoidability of death bear on the degree of harm at stake in treatment refusals in anorexia nervosa, far
more argument is needed to establish that considerations of autonomy can be outweighed by harms that
are worse in this sense. Further, contrary to Giordano’s analysis, I am not convinced that anorexia nervosa
is unique in this regard. As the example of Isobel below suggests, anorexia nervosa is not the only condition
in which we might have to consider treatment refusals where the condition is reversible and death
avoidable.
⁸ For a case raising comparable but more complex issues, see Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment)
2, 449.
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opportunity for well-being:⁹ we will no longer have the opportunity to experience
pleasurable mental states, to attempt to fulfil our desires, or to achieve objective
goods.
Accordingly, we have a self-interested reason to safeguard the possibility of a
future of value. However, if continued existence will only involve irrevocable pain
and suffering, then such reasons may not apply; a person in this situation does not
expect to experience a future of value, but rather one of disvalue. We can thus
recognize, as David Hume did in his famous essay ‘On Suicide’,¹⁰ that, despite our
natural inclination to avoid death, life itself can become a burden of such disvalue,
that our reasons to avoid that burden can outweigh both our natural inclinations and
indeed our reasons to stave off our own non-existence. Indeed, the prospect that
continued survival can become such a burden has been considerably enhanced by the
development of medical technologies that afford us remarkable abilities to artificially
sustain life.¹¹ Furthermore, we may note that we can plausibly value the exercise of
our autonomy in shaping the end of our own existence, given the significant
contribution that the end of life makes to the story of our life as a whole.
The rationality of preferring death to continued existence becomes more contro-
versial as the expected value of one’s future increases.¹² The above considerations
suggest that it can be rational to prefer death to a future of disvalue, but can it be
rational to prefer death to a future of some low, yet positive value? A key element of
the theory that I have developed in this book is that rational agents can disagree
about the relative weight that they attribute to their reasons to pursue different goods.
Accordingly, even if we can construe someone as having a future that incorporates
some valuable aspects, a rational agent can plausibly place greater weight on her
reasons to avoid other aspects of that future that she disvalues.¹³ Moreover, third
parties lack epistemic access to other agents’ own assessment of the comparative
strength of certain reasons, and the truths regarding the comparative strength of our
self-interested reasons are imprecise. Accordingly, whilst physicians may advocate
the value and pursuit of health, and the reasons that patients have to pursue
outcomes related to this good, this does not entail that it is irrational for a patient
to choose otherwise, if that choice is demonstrably grounded in the patient’s own
broad evaluative framework.
Consider the implications that this has for Isobel. It is likely that her medical team
would claim that, by forgoing treatment, Isobel is forgoing a future of value: after all,
she is expected to make a full recovery from her pneumonia, she is living independ-
ently, and she is able to exercise her cognitive capacities in her day-to-day life.
According to the standard account of autonomy and informed consent, in this
⁹ For a developed hedonistic account of this point, see Bradley, Well-Being and Death.
¹⁰ Hume, On Suicide.
¹¹ Garasic, Guantanamo and Other Cases of Enforced Medical Treatment, 11.
¹² Hedonic adaptation can raise a different kind of concern about the rationality of a patient’s
assessment of the expected value of their future. See Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of
Life Sustaining Treatment’.
¹³ This is one way in which the refusal of treatment may differ from voluntary passive euthanasia; the
latter but not the former must be in the patient’s best interests. For further discussion of this point, see
Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy’, 123–5.
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situation, the medical team must ensure that Isobel understands (inter alia) the
implications of forgoing treatment, that her decision is intentional, and that she is
not deciding under controlling influences of the sort discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
The account of rationalist autonomy and DMC that I am offering here demands
something further; the medical team must try to establish that her decision is
grounded by a personally endorsed preference, and that it is not grounded by
irrational beliefs. What does this entail? Simply that the medical team investigates
the reasons underlying her decision, and how these reasons are related to her other
core values and beliefs. Recall that Isobel says she is ‘tired of life’; part of investigating
the rationality of her decision is to consider why this is the case. For instance, perhaps
Isobel highly values social interaction, and her treatment decision might be the result
of her experiencing social isolation following the death of her husband. Yet this is
something that could be remedied in other ways; perhaps she could be entered into a
befriending scheme, or a social group scheme run by local health authorities. Has she
considered this alternative, and imagined what it might be like? If so, does she have
reasons why she doesn’t want to enrol in these schemes? Perhaps such reasons might
be grounded by false beliefs about the schemes that the medical team could remedy.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive illustration of the kind of considerations
that might be required in considering the rationality of Isobel’s decision. The point of
this brief illustration is that far from being elitist, rationalist DMC simply enjoins
medical teams to make enquiries that represent a quite natural, caring response to a
treatment decision of this kind. However, if after such enquiries, Isobel maintains her
decision, and is able to give reasons for why she still wants to forgo treatment,
grounded by her own values, then she should qualify as having DMC for that
decision. Accordingly, respect for autonomy demands that the medical team should
respect her decision to forgo treatment.
2. Religious Views and Psychiatric Disorder: A Justified
Inconsistency in DMC?
Jack is a 32-year-old man who has been in a serious car accident and has lost a lot of blood. Still
conscious, but bleeding heavily, he is rushed to A&E where doctors tell him that he urgently
needs a blood transfusion or he will die. However, Jack refuses; he has been a life-long
Jehovah’s Witness, and he believes that he will not be permitted to enter the afterlife if he
accepts the blood of another person.¹⁴
Keira is 43 years old and is a chronic sufferer of severe and enduring anorexia nervosa;
although she is extremely malnourished, she refuses to eat. Moreover, repeated attempts at
cognitive behavioural therapy have had no success in changing her eating behaviours. Her
condition has deteriorated over time, and she is now at acute risk of organ failure if she does
not receive nourishment soon. Keira is an intelligent and articulate woman, who recognizes
that she is dangerously underweight, and that her refusal to eat is putting her life is at risk.
However, she maintains her refusal to eat.¹⁵
¹⁴ For a case raising comparable issues, see Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).
¹⁵ For a case raising comparable issues, see Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) EWHC 1639 (COP).
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Both of these cases involve choices that are likely to be understood as unwise from a
medical perspective. However, this fact alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that
these patients lack DMC on the approach that I am defending, nor on procedural
approaches more generally.
These cases raise something of a puzzle for any theory of DMC. Jules Holroyd
concisely diagnoses the issue as follows:
As it stands, intuitions seem to pull in different directions: it appears intuitively plausible that
over-valuing food avoidance or under-valuing continued existence thwarts the ability to weigh
information relevant to treatment decisions. On the other hand it is less intuitively compelling
to think that under-valuing the risk of death or disability due to a commitment to religious
doctrine undermines decisional capacity (although anecdotally, intuitions seem to vary sig-
nificantly on this).¹⁶
Contrary to Holroyd’s analysis here, I shall suggest that our intuitions in these
contexts may be influenced by considerations of theoretical as well as practical
rationality. Here though, we may note that the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) to
some extent reflects Holroyd’s assessment of our intuitions in this area. Recall that
an individual who lacks one of the abilities outlined in the functional test of DMC in
the MCA will not qualify as lacking DMC unless their lacking this ability is also
attributable to an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or
brain. Accordingly, from the perspective of the MCA, Jack (or for that matter Isobel
from the previous case) would not be found to lack capacity unless it could be
established that his putative inability to use and weigh material information was
due to an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the functioning of his mind or brain
(rather than merely an upshot of his religious way of life).¹⁷ In contrast, if one could
establish that Keira lacks of one of the functional criteria of DMC due to her anorexia
nervosa, then she could qualify as lacking DMC on the MCA.
It is difficult to see how this supplementary diagnostic criterion of mental capacity
can be justified by philosophical considerations of autonomy. I argued in the
previous chapter that the abilities that constitute DMC are the abilities that are
necessary to making a particular decision autonomously. If an individual lacks one
of these abilities, they cannot make that decision autonomously (or communicate it);
the causal explanation for why the individual lacks the relevant ability thus seems to
matter little for whether or not they are able to make an autonomous decision. This
suggests that the diagnostic criterion requires an alternative justification. I lack the
space to consider this particular issue here.¹⁸ In the remainder of this chapter, I shall
be concerned with the question of whether this discrepancy in widespread intuitions
about these cases can be philosophically justified. I shall begin by focusing on Jack’s
case, and considering whether there may be philosophical grounds for claiming that
Jack lacks DMC, contrary to the view outlined by Holroyd above.
¹⁶ Holroyd, ‘Clarifying Capacity’, 12.
¹⁷ Note that the impairment here need not be one grounded by pathology per se; for instance,
temporary intoxication could disturb the functioning of the mind or brain in the relevant sense.
¹⁸ Mirko Garasic makes some suggestive remarks in this regard in claiming that justifications for
involuntary treatment are partly biopolitical rather than simply ethical. Garasic, Guantanamo and Other
Cases of Enforced Medical Treatment, 12–16.
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3. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Theoretical Rationality, and the
Doxastic Status of Faith
Jack holds true beliefs about the nature of the procedure he is declining, and his
decision in this case is also practically rational; he makes his decision on the basis of a
belief about the consequences which, if true, would give him a strongly decisive
reason to refuse treatment. To see why, consider the belief in question and the values
at stake for Jack. As a Jehovah’s Witness (henceforth JW), Jack accepts the claim that
the Bible prohibits blood transfusions and that accepting one would preclude him
from blissful eternity in the afterlife. This is an outcome that Jack has a strongly
decisive apparent reason to avoid; even if we assume that Jack would live a long
(mortal) life with a high level of well-being following a transfusion, the value of this
pales into comparison with the value of the life of eternal bliss that he would thereby
forgo (or so he thinks).
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that Jack is being practically irrational (although
I shall consider one basis for this claim in my discussion of anorexia nervosa); he is
deciding on the basis of what he believes he has strongly decisive reasons to do.¹⁹ On
this basis, we might claim that it is intuitively compelling that Jack can have
DMC. However, although Jack appears to be practically rational, he might yet lack
DMC on a rationalist conception, on the basis that he lacks theoretical rationality in
holding what appear to be the operative beliefs in his decision-making process.
Indeed, one might provocatively ask if there is anything that distinguishes religious
beliefs from the sorts of delusional beliefs that uncontroversially undermine DMC.²⁰
Savulescu andMomeyer come close to advocating this position; they claim that ‘. . .
being autonomous requires that a person hold rational beliefs’, and they argue that
JWs’ beliefs about blood transfusion and matters eschatological are theoretically
irrational. Crucially, this argument does not rely on the premise that theism is true;
rather, Savulescu and Momeyer argue that the relevant beliefs are theoretically
irrational on the basis that those beliefs are not responsive to evidence, and that
the interpretation of the scripture they imply lacks internal consistency.²¹ Adrienne
Martin has advanced the stronger claim that medical practice is committed to
understanding JWs as lacking capacity on the basis that standard medical practice
assumes these individuals have false (and not merely irrational) beliefs. Her explan-
ation for this is that standard medical practical assumes that blood transfusions do
¹⁹ Savulescu and Momeyer draw the same conclusion on this point at Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should
Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 284.
²⁰ In the absence of a further philosophical argument to distinguish delusions grounded by a mental
impairment and irrational beliefs held on religious grounds, it may be argued that their different treatment
in mental capacity law amounts to discrimination. See Herring,Medical Law and Ethics, 157; Bartlett, ‘The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’. See also
Fulford and Jackson, ‘Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology’ for a discussion of the difficulties in
drawing this distinction.
²¹ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 284.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
’ , ,   
not put patients at risk of eternal damnation, so JWs’ beliefs prevent them from
arriving at ‘an even remotely accurate assessment of the risks of blood transfusion’.²²
Despite these arguments, these authors nonetheless maintain that we should not
treat JWs involuntarily. Savulescu and Momeyer advert to some of the competing
moral considerations I outlined in the introduction to this chapter, whilst Martin
argues that we should divorce considerations of DMC from the value of autonomy,
and instead claim that patients lacking DMC can qualify as autonomous.²³ On such a
view, autonomy has little to do with theoretical rationality, and instead concerns the
consistency and coherence of one’s values.²⁴ Once DMC has been separated from
considerations of autonomy in this way, one can plausibly have autonomy-based
reasons to respect the choices of patients lacking DMC.
It should be clear from my preceding arguments in this book that Martin’s strategy
here is incongruous with the position that I have developed. Theoretical rationality
and the coherence and consistency of one’s values bothmatter for autonomy; indeed,
if the former did not, it is difficult to understand why it should be construed as a
requirement of DMC to provide valid consent, a requirement Martin herself impli-
citly accepts. In contrast, Savulescu and Momeyer’s conclusion that we should not
treat JWs without consent even if their decision is not autonomous (on account of its
theoretical irrationality) is compatible with the account that I have advanced.
In light of the MCA functionalist criterion, and what appear to be widespread
intuitions about the autonomy and DMC of JWs, Savulescu and Momeyer’s theory
calls for a revisionist approach towards our understanding of the autonomy and
DMC of JWs. However, contrary to their analysis, I shall argue that it is possible for a
rationalist theory of autonomy to accommodate the thought that we should respect
treatment refusals of JWs like Jack because they can be made autonomously (and not
just because of the other moral considerations in favour of doing so). To do so,
however, one must also embrace some further views in religious epistemology.
Martin, and Savulescu and Momeyer all accept that JWs believe that they will be
precluded from eternal bliss if they accept a blood transfusion. Once this claim is in
place, it is straightforward to argue that JWs are unable to decide autonomously on a
rationalist approach, since these beliefs fail to meet the same standard of theoretical
rationality to which we hold other beliefs. However, it is overly simplistic to view the
operative cognitive states for many religious individuals simply as beliefs per se.
Instead, they may be items of faith. Although items of faith may be conflated with
beliefs in colloquial discussions, such conflation overlooks an important distinction,
as I shall now explain.
²² Martin, ‘Tales Publicly Allowed’, 36. Contrary to Martin’s analysis, I contend that the fact that
medical professionals act on the (rationally justified) assumption that a belief is false is not a sufficient
epistemic basis for establishing the falsity of the belief in question. Indeed, on one prominent understand-
ing, religious beliefs are unfalsifiable. See Flew, Hare, and Mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification’.
Accordingly, I shall phrase my analysis in the weaker terms of theoretical rationality.
²³ Martin also proposes a second argument that we ought to respect the treatment wishes of religious
believers in order to safeguard the valuable social institution of religion. Martin, ‘Tales Publicly Allowed’,
39–40. For a convincing rebuttal of this instrumentalist view, see Holroyd, ‘Clarifying Capacity’.
²⁴ Martin, ‘Tales Publicly Allowed’, 38.
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Bernard Williams famously argued that belief-formation is not under our volun-
tary control—call this thesis ‘doxastic involuntarism’. Doxastic involuntarism is
widely (though not universally) accepted, and part of one prominent defence of the
thesis appeals to the underlying aim of beliefs. For instance, Williams claims that the
goal of our beliefs it to aim at the truth, and notes that if ‘deciding to believe’ was
under our voluntary control, then this would entail that one could decide to believe a
proposition that one knew to be false. This, according to Williams, would be a
necessarily bizarre state of affairs, given the aforementioned constitutive aim of
beliefs (even if there might conceivably be some cases in which one could have
non-truth based motives for believing such a proposition).²⁵
This defence of doxastic involuntarism has been criticized but the details of this
need not concern us here.²⁶ The important point to acknowledge is that even if we
accept that doxastic involuntarism is true of beliefs in general (given their aims), it
need not be true of all the cognitive states that individuals adopt with respect to items
of faith. The aim of items of faith may not always be the same as beliefs; that is they
may have aims other than that of merely capturing truth in the way that a typical
belief does.
This is not to say that religious faith does not incorporate any beliefs. For instance,
when one has what Robert Audi calls ‘propositional faith’ that P (that is, faith that
some proposition P is true), this often implies that one also believes that P is true.²⁷
But faith can also incorporate a number of non-doxastic states that are not neces-
sarily subject to the same epistemic norms as beliefs. Indeed, Audi explicitly identifies
‘fiducial faith’ as a form of non-doxastic propositional faith that does not connote or
require the corresponding belief (much less a rational belief) that P is true.²⁸
Similarly, Andrei Buckareff suggests that items of religious faith may be understood
as sub-doxastic pragmatic assumptions that an individual adopts in order to achieve
a religious goal, namely forming a relationship with God.²⁹
The thought here is that as well as not being subject to the same epistemic norms,
or sharing the same aims as beliefs, agents can plausibly adopt sub-doxastic assump-
tions as items of faith on the basis of non-epistemic reasons, and as a voluntary act of
will. That is, one can choose to have faith that P, in a way that one cannot choose to
decide to believe P, even when there is little evidence for the truth of P. Moreover, this
can be rational when the assumption of P is necessary to achieving a goal that one
takes to be reason-giving.³⁰
Whilst this is not the place to get into deep debates about religious epistemology,
these somewhat cursory remarks reveal an avenue for understanding how JWs can be
understood to make autonomous treatment decisions, despite the ostensible theor-
etical irrationality of their occurrent beliefs. As long as the operative cognitive states
²⁵ Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’.
²⁶ See Winters, ‘Believing at Will’. For defences of doxastic involuntarism, see Buckareff, ‘Deciding to
Believe Redux’; Alston, Epistemic Justification; Levy and Mandelbaum, ‘The Powers That Bind’.
²⁷ Audi, ‘Belief, Faith, and Acceptance’. For defences of doxastic voluntarism, see Steup, ‘Doxastic
Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology’; Weatherson, ‘Deontology and Descartes’s Demon’.
²⁸ Audi, ‘Belief, Faith, and Acceptance’. ²⁹ Buckareff, ‘Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture?’
³⁰ Ibid.
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here are not strictly beliefs (held in a manner that fails to meet standards of
theoretical rationality), but rather items of faith, and as long as doxastic involuntar-
ism does not apply to such items of faith, then JWs’ accepting and abiding by the
tenets of their faith can be understood to signify their choice to commit to a practice
they take to be valuable. Their choice is to commit themselves to a number of sub-
rational, sub-doxastic states, as a necessary element of a broader evaluative commit-
ment to following a particular religious way of life.³¹ The fact that this goal requires
the endorsement of cognitive states that may be (mis)construed as simply theoret-
ically irrational beliefs does not entail that these individuals lack autonomy. Rather,
this feature of religious faith is broadly analogous to Odysseus tying himself to the
mast. Whilst Odysseus forgoes local negative liberty in order to effectively pursue a
broader goal he values, so too can the Jehovah’s Witness forgo the requirements of
theoretical rationality with regards to key cognitive states, as part of a rationally
endorsed global commitment.³²
The above considerations also suggest how we might distinguish religious beliefs
from delusional states. According to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5), a delusional belief is:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what
almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof
or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the
person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith).³³
The distinction that the DSM draws between delusions and religious belief is
unsatisfying for a number of reasons. First, as I highlighted in previous chapters,
this definition is incorrect to assume that a delusional belief must be false.
Furthermore, it is unclear why the fact that a demonstrably false belief is widely
held is sufficient to prevent it from being a delusion.³⁴ Certainly, whether or not such
a false and theoretically irrational belief is ‘ordinarily accepted by other members of
the person’s culture’, does not appear to be directly relevant to the implications that
the belief in question has for the individual’s autonomy. However, my discussion
above suggests that one thing that can matter for the individual’s autonomy is
whether the operant ‘belief ’ in question is truly a theoretically irrational belief, or
whether it is instead a sub-doxastic state to which the individual has voluntarily
committed herself.
³¹ Savulescu briefly alludes to this sort of strategy (amongst others) in his discussion. Savulescu,
‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life Sustaining Treatment’. However, in his discussion of it,
Savulescu assumes that the relevant belief is false. I have not made this assumption partly in view of the
thought that religious beliefs of this sort are unfalsifiable for those who hold them.
³² Dworkin similarly refers to JWs as tying ‘themselves to the mast of their faith’. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy
and the Demented Self ’, 11. Dworkin is primarily concerned with whether we should prioritize past
autonomous decisions over current non-autonomous decisions. In contrast, my discussion of faith
highlights how religious beliefs can be incorporated into autonomous decision-making at all.
³³ American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th
edition). For other criticisms see Bortolotti and Miyazono, ‘Recent Work on the Nature and
Development of Delusions’.
³⁴ Coltheart, ‘The 33rd Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture: Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Delusional Belief ’.
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In accordance with the understanding of autonomy that I have developed here,
voluntary commitment to the sub-doxastic states involved in some religious faith
requires both (i) the understanding that one’s item of faith amounts to adopting a
sub-doxastic state that involves abandoning the norms of theoretical rationality and
(ii) a rationale for doing so. That is, an individual who is to choose to commit to
items of faith voluntarily must have insight into the fact that she lacks epistemic
reasons that warrant belief in her item of faith, and that she must have practical
reasons for maintaining this item of faith despite her lack of epistemic reasons. This is
perhaps suggestive of one way in which delusional states, including religious delu-
sional states, may come apart from sub-doxastic states that can be incorporated into
religious faith.³⁵ If individuals suffering from delusional states lack this insight into
the fact that they are not abiding by norms of theoretical rationality in holding their
beliefs, then it is not clear that they consciously adopt or sustain these beliefs for any
discernible practical reason.³⁶
To conclude this discussion, let me briefly summarize its implications for the
DMC of JWs. First, acknowledging that it is possible for JWs to decide autonomously
about refusing blood transfusion on the basis of faith does not entail that they always
do so. One particularly crucial question is whether their commitment to items of
faith as part of a religious way of life is an autonomous one. There are of course a
number of concerns about the voluntariness of an individual’s adoption of a religious
commitment, particularly amongst children who are vulnerable to what may amount
to manipulative and coercive influence. At the individual level, we may note that in
order for Jack’s decision to refuse treatment to be a reflection of his autonomy, the
operative belief about blood transfusions must be supported by a broader nexus of
beliefs and values that serve to indicate that Jack is rationally committed to the life of
a Jehovah’s Witness. For instance, if Jack does not follow any other tenets of being a
Witness, and lacks other relevant beliefs central to the religion, then it is less clear
that his treatment choice is really a reflection of the sort of evaluative commitment
that undergirds autonomous choice.³⁷ There is nothing elitist about the prescriptions
of my rationalist theory here; in fact, these are precisely the sort of morally relevant
³⁵ One, but not the only difference. Bortolotti, quoting Siddle, suggests that religious delusions can be
distinguished from religious beliefs because: (a) both the reported experience of the individual and her
ensuing behaviour are accompanied by psychiatric symptoms; (b) other symptoms are observed in areas of
the subject’s experience or behaviour that are not necessarily related to the subject’s religious beliefs; and
(c) the individual’s lifestyle after the event giving rise to the report indicates that the event has not been for
the subject an enriching spiritual experience. Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs; Siddle et al.,
‘Religious Delusions in Patients Admitted to Hospital with Schizophrenia’, 131.
³⁶ For difficulties distinguishing delusions from religious experience, see Fulford and Jackson, ‘Spiritual
Experience and Psychopathology’; Bortolotti, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs; Stephens and
Graham, ‘Reconceiving Delusion’. For a wide-ranging discussion of delusions, see Bortolotti, Delusions
and Other Irrational Beliefs.
³⁷ Tellingly, in their discussion, Fulford and Jackson suggest that in order to distinguish between
spiritual and pathological forms of psychotic phenomena, we must ‘consider them as embedded in the
structure of each individual’s values and beliefs’. Fulford and Jackson, ‘Spiritual Experience and
Psychopathology’, 60. My tentative suggestion is that the importance of this distinction is grounded by
its implications for the voluntariness of the commitment to a sub-rational set of beliefs.
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factors that have been taken into account by legal judgements in this area, including
the judgement in the Re T case.³⁸
Second, the approach that I have adopted is compatible with Savulescu and
Momeyer’s recommendation that physicians should draw attention to and seek to
remedy any theoretical irrationality that JWs appear to evidence. More strikingly, it is
also compatible with the fact that this strategy may succeed in changing the patient’s
mind. Savulescu and Momeyer suggest that many JWs would ‘no doubt accept
blood’³⁹ if they were to hold informed rational beliefs. On my approach, this may
be true of those JWs whose propositional faith in the tenets of their religion is purely
doxastic; that is, a JW who believes in the technical sense that a blood transfusion will
rule them out of eternal bliss, a belief they aim to hold in accordance with the norms
of theoretical rationality and which is thus sensitive to epistemic reasons. Such
believers may respond to epistemic reasons to change their religious beliefs.
However, the fact that some JWs would likely not change their minds, does not
entail that they thereby lack autonomy on the approach I am outlining. The reason
for this is that propositional faith can incorporate sub-doxastic elements that are less
sensitive to epistemic considerations, and which can be voluntarily adopted.
4. Rationalist DMC in Anorexia Nervosa, Evaluative
Delusions, and the Significance of Regret
It is sometimes claimed that there is an inextricable link between psychiatric dis-
orders and irrationality.⁴⁰ In turn, this claim might lead one to conclude that
individuals suffering from psychiatric disorders will always lack DMC. Indeed, it
might be claimed that something like this assumption plays a role in the standard
account of autonomy’s stipulation that psychiatric disorders can amount to forms of
controlling influence that undermine autonomous decision-making. However,
irrationality is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of psychiatric disorder.
Individuals in non-clinical populations exhibit various forms of irrationality (under-
mining the claim that this is sufficient for psychiatric disorder), and some psychiatric
disorders can obtain independently of manifestations of persistent irrationality.⁴¹
Furthermore, as Gavaghan notes in his discussion of depression and DMC,
although depression can impact upon all of the standard elements of DMC (such
as those identified in the MCA), ‘. . . to say that depression can result in these
problems . . . is not to say that it invariably, or even usually, does so’.⁴² Indeed, that a
particular medical diagnosis (pertaining to mental disorder or otherwise) does not
³⁸ Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).
³⁹ Savulescu and Momeyer, ‘Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational Beliefs?’, 286.
⁴⁰ For instance, see Edwards, ‘Mental Health as Rational Autonomy’; Szasz, Insanity. For an excellent
discussion of the relationship between rationality and psychiatric disorder, see Bortolotti, ‘Rationality and
Sanity’.
⁴¹ Bortolotti, ‘Rationality and Sanity’.
⁴² Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 244; Giordano, Understanding Eating Disorders, 70; Garasic,
Guantanamo and Other Cases of Enforced Medical Treatment, 26–7.
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entail a lack of decision-making competence is explicitly recognized by the MCA.⁴³
In the context of clinical depression, this is supported by a burgeoning body of
empirical data suggesting that sufferers of the disorder often qualify as competent on
routinely employed competence assessment tests, and the observed phenomenon of
depressive realism.⁴⁴
Accordingly, in considering the DMC of patients suffering from psychiatric
disorders, we cannot justifiably make generalized assumptions about the effects of
‘psychiatric disorders’ per se on DMC, and we cannot assume that a particular
patient is irrational on the basis of their diagnosis alone.⁴⁵ Rather, in considering
the DMC of patients suffering from psychiatric disorders, we must closely attend to
the manner in which a particular disorder manifests itself in a particular individual,
and whether this particular patient manifests either theoretical or practical irration-
ality in her treatment refusal. In short, we must go far beyond the standard account’s
stipulation than psychiatric disorders can amount to a form of controlling influence.
Whilst the most complex problems regarding DMC in the context of anorexia
nervosa are grounded in concerns about the practical rationality of such patients, it
should be acknowledged that these patients can also have deficits in theoretical
rationality. According to DSM V, one necessary (but not sufficient) diagnostic
criterion of anorexia nervosa is that the patient must display:
Disturbance in the way one’s body weight or shape is experienced, undue influence of body
shape and weight on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of recognition of the seriousness of the
current low body weight.⁴⁶
Notice that this necessary diagnostic criterion is disjunctive, and also that the first
and third clause may refer to descriptive beliefs that the anorexic patient holds.
A patient’s experience of body weight or shape could be disturbed in the sense that
they believe (incorrectly) that they are overweight. Alternatively, a patient could
persistently ‘fail to recognize the seriousness of low body weight’ in a descriptive
sense, if she simply fails to recognize that her low body weight could have fatal
implications. Accordingly, on this definition of the disorder, a patient may meet this
necessary diagnostic condition because she believes that she is overweight despite
being a dangerously low weight, or because she fails to appreciate that her low weight
is likely to lead to serious health complications in her case.
However, other patients might only meet this criterion when the clauses are
understood in an evaluatively laden sense. For example, it might be argued that a
⁴³ Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 2 (3[b]). See also Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) FD (1994), in
which a patient suffering from a mental disorder was not deemed to lack capacity to make a treatment
decision for a condition that was not related to their mental disorder.
⁴⁴ Okai et al., ‘Mental Capacity in Psychiatric Patients’; Appelbaum and Grisso, ‘The MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study, I’; Hindmarch, Hotopf, and Owen, ‘Depression and Decision-Making
Capacity for Treatment or Research’; Bortolotti, ‘Rationality and Sanity’; Ackermann and DeRubeis, ‘Is
Depressive Realism Real?’; Radoilska, ‘Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy’.
⁴⁵ Whether or not the courts follow the MCA on this point is another question. See Kong, ‘Beyond the
Balancing Scales’.
⁴⁶ American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th
edition).
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patient fails to ‘recognize the seriousness of her low body weight’ not because of a
failure to hold relevant descriptive beliefs, but rather because she does not attribute a
proportionate degree of consideration to this point in deciding what to do. I shall
return to this point below.
It seems that a strong case can be made for the claim that anorexic patients who
satisfy the above diagnostic criterion in either of the first two ways just outlined lack
DMC. Such patients lack the ability to understand and appreciate material informa-
tion about their condition, and the reasons they have to increase their food intake.
Indeed, some have argued that the beliefs held by patients suffering from anorexia
nervosa can in some cases be near-delusional, although the DSM refrains from using
the terminology of delusional beliefs in the context of anorexia nervosa.⁴⁷ Regardless
of whether we classify such beliefs as delusional, they are not only held in a
theoretically irrational manner, they are also clearly false, and inimical to adequate
understanding of the sort that decisional autonomy requires. Moreover, it seems that
these beliefs are not typically voluntarily adopted as pragmatic sub-doxastic states in
the same way as religious items of faith may be.⁴⁸ As such both the standard account
of autonomy and the rationalist account that I have developed may be invoked to
support the claim that such patients lack DMC.
However, an individual can meet the diagnostic criteria of anorexia nervosa
without holding these kinds of false or theoretically irrational descriptive beliefs.
A patient may be aware that she is dangerously underweight, and realize that this will
have drastic implications for her health, and yet still qualify as suffering from
anorexia nervosa. She will do so if body shape and weight are construed as having
an ‘undue influence’ on her self-evaluation. The case of Keira outlined at the
beginning of this chapter is plausibly an example of such a patient; should we also
claim that Keira lacks DMC?
The DSM criterion of these considerations having ‘undue influence’ is suggestive
of the possibility that anorexia nervosa can involve what Fulford calls an evaluative
delusion. As I discussed in previous chapters, such delusions involve maintaining
theoretically irrational (but not necessarily false) evaluative beliefs.⁴⁹ It seems
highly plausible that anorexic patients can be theoretically irrational with respect
to their evaluation of thinness; there is, for example, evidence of rigidity in the
thinking patterns of anorexic patients,⁵⁰ as well as reports of cognitive dissonance
⁴⁷ Steinglass et al., ‘Is Anorexia Nervosa a Delusional Disorder?’
⁴⁸ Interestingly, there is a long-standing relation between self-starvation and religious asceticism. See
Bemporad, ‘Self-Starvation through the Ages’; Davis and Nguyen, ‘A Case Study of Anorexia Nervosa
Driven by Religious Sacrifice’; Bell, Holy Anorexia. This speaks against viewing anorexia nervosa as simply
a disorder grounded by ideals of thinness and beauty alone. It also suggests that it may not be possible to
draw a sharp distinction between treatment refusals based on religious belief and those based on
pathological thinking patterns associated with a psychiatric disorder. Whilst I lack the space to consider
this point in further detail, we may note that the implications of my theory for ‘holy’ anorexic patients
depends largely on whether they voluntary commit themselves to irrational and demonstrably false beliefs
about their weight and body shape. If they merely commit themselves to a particular evaluation of fasting,
but not to other irrational descriptive beliefs per se that their condition may involve, then these irrational
beliefs can be understood to undermine their autonomous decision-making.
⁴⁹ Fulford, ‘Evaluative Delusions’.
⁵⁰ Elzakkers et al., ‘Mental Capacity to Consent to Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa’.
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(as I shall explore below) that belie a failure to adhere to basic norms of theoretical
rationality concerning responsiveness to evidence and internal consistency.
However, it is important to be careful about how we demarcate the boundaries of
evaluative delusions in this context, given that delusions are typically understood to
undermine DMC. The claim that one dimension of a person’s self-conception (in this
case, body shape or weight) exerts ‘undue influence’ over the patient’s decision-
making, invites the thought that there is an objective standard of proportionate
influence that different values should have on one’s self-conception. On this under-
standing, it might be tempting to claim that an individual holds an evaluative
delusion if their evaluative beliefs do not accord with this standard. However, there
are a number of reasons to reject this approach. First, as I have already mentioned,
standard delusional beliefs are not necessarily false beliefs, so it is unclear why we
should suppose that evaluative delusions must be ‘false’ in the sense that they do not
match up to a known, objectively correct, ranking of values. Second, this view is in
tension with the claim that rational agents can place different weight on different
goods. To put the problem more starkly, if we endorse the claim that anorexic
patients simply fail to track objective truths about proportionate evaluative weight-
ings, then it is not clear why we should not also make similar claims about Isobel. For
instance, Isobel’s negative evaluation of social isolation is arguably disproportionate
given the value of independence, and the value of other goods she might plausibly
pursue if she consents to life-saving treatment.
The boundaries of evaluative delusions are better demarcated by claiming that
such delusions obtain when agents lack epistemic mechanisms for reliably tracking
what evaluative truths about the good there may be, in the way that individuals who
are deluded about descriptive matters similarly seem to lack epistemic mechanisms
for reliably tracking truths about descriptive matters of fact. However, differences
between the spheres of the evaluative and the descriptive, and their respective
relationships to rationality, suggest that our understanding of evaluative delusions
is likely to be far more vague than our understanding of descriptive delusions. There
is widespread agreement on what constitutes the truth about descriptive matters of
fact, so we can normally agree upon whether an individual is delusional with respect
to such matters, and identify their defective epistemic mechanisms. Whilst the
objectivist about practical reasons will agree that there are also truths about value
in the same way that there are truths about descriptive matters of fact, this point is
attended by the significant caveat that these truths about value are far less precise,
and less well-understood than truths about descriptive matters of fact. Accordingly,
even if one accepts the objectivist tenor of demarcating the boundaries of evaluative
delusions by appealing to mechanisms for tracking truths about value and objectivist
reasons, such an approach will allow for only a very blurry demarcation of the
concept.
With these remarks about evaluative delusions in mind, let us return to a more
direct consideration of the question of DMC in anorexia nervosa. Although I have
suggested that Keira’s psychiatric diagnosis is not alone sufficient to justify the claim
that she lacks DMC, we might wonder if there is something about the particular
kinds of desires that anorexic patients hold that makes them particularly problematic
from the point of view of autonomy. In this vein, Tan et al. have claimed that
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anorexic patients can lack DMC to refuse treatment because their refusals are
grounded by pathological values that are incorporated into the diagnostic criteria
of their condition.⁵¹
However, it is not clear how much explanatory power this claim can have with
regards to the question of whether such patients can decide autonomously. Of course,
the mere fact that a particular behaviour is taken to be a constitutive element of a
psychiatric disorder is not alone sufficient to establish that the behaviour is practic-
ally irrational. Irrationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for psychiatric disorder.
More worryingly though, Tan et al.’s claim is problematically circular; the fact that
the evaluative emphasis on low weight is part of the diagnostic criteria of the disorder
we call anorexia nervosa is just to say that the evaluation is pathological.⁵² However,
this does not tell us anything about whether desires grounded by such pathological
evaluations can be held autonomously.⁵³
This is not to say that Tan et al.’s general conclusion that such patients lack DMC
is incorrect; my point here is merely that the support offered for that view is not
satisfactory. To support this claim, we would need some grounds for thinking that
the values that are designated as pathological cannot ground autonomous decision-
making. If there were a plausible story about how pathological desires bypassed or
distorted rational reflection, then this would provide sufficient support for the claim;
however, noting that a desire is pathological because it is incorporated into the
diagnostic criteria of the condition under consideration does not provide us with
this sort of explanatory story. To conclude that such desires cannot ground autono-
mous decisions in the absence of this explanation is thus to presume the very issue at
stake.
The code of practice for the MCA offers a different rationale for suggesting that
patients suffering from anorexia nervosa can lack DMC, even if they are able to
understand relevant treatment information. According to this guidance, the problem
in such cases is not that such a patient’s values are pathological per se, but rather that
their compulsion not to eat might be ‘too strong for them to ignore’.⁵⁴
Whilst this rationale is not circular, it too is unconvincing. Prima facie, we may
find it appealing to claim that agents who decide on the basis of ‘compulsions that
they cannot ignore’ are not autonomous with respect to those decisions. For instance,
the example of Jane the unwilling addict in the introductory chapter seems to be a
paradigm case of an individual who lacks autonomy in this way. Jane is compelled to
act in ways that she does not rationally endorse because she finds her first-order
desire to take drugs to be irresistible; there is a real sense in which she lacks a choice
about how to act.⁵⁵
⁵¹ Tan et al., ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa’.
⁵² Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality andWhat a Patient Values’; Maslen, Pugh, and Savulescu,
‘The Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa’.
⁵³ The problem of definitional circularity arising when competence assessments take into account
diagnostic criteria also arises in the context of clinical depression, and the diagnostic criterion of suicidal
ideation. See Gavaghan, ‘In Word, or Sigh, or Tear’, 253; McLean, Assisted Dying, 41.
⁵⁴ Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice, s 4.22.
⁵⁵ As Craigie and Davies note, this strong sense of compulsion is outlined in Foddy and Savulescu,
‘Addiction and Autonomy’. Notably, the weakened sense of compulsion employed by the MCA code of
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It may be that some sufferers of psychiatric disorders could be in a similar situation
with respect to their pathological behaviour as Jane is to her drug-taking. That is, in
some cases, sufferers of psychiatric disorders might be understood to engage in
impulsive erratic episodic behaviours that they know to be incongruous with their
evaluative judgements, such that these episodes of pathological behaviour can be
appropriately designated as alien to the personality of the sufferer.⁵⁶ However, in
many cases the situation is far more complex, because of the ego-synctonicity of
some psychiatric disorders, whereby affected individuals identify with their patho-
logical behaviours.⁵⁷ If such individuals are ‘compelled’, they are not compelled in the
same way as Jane, who acknowledges the disparity between her actions and her
values.
Indeed, the sense of compulsion that the MCA code of practice is interpreted to
invoke with respect to anorexia nervosa is far broader than that which would be
necessary to merely preclude individuals who are compelled in Jane’s sense from
qualifying for DMC. In their analysis of this feature of the MCA code of practice,
Jillian Craigie and Alisa Davies write that:
Where compulsion is given as grounds for incapacity due to anorexia, it is most often described
in terms of extreme distortions and biases in the decision process, rather than the person being
deprived of a choice.⁵⁸
The relevant question in the present context then is thus whether this weaker sense of
compulsion should be understood to be alone sufficient to undermine DMC.
It is telling that Craigie and Davies note that (weak) compulsions are typically
taken as grounds for incapacity on the basis of something other than the fact that
they are ‘too strong to ignore’. This is important because this feature of (weak)
compulsions alone is clearly not sufficient to undermine DMC. In fact, quite the
opposite is true; rationality may often require that we ground our decisions on
considerations that we cannot ignore, in the sense that they relate to facts that give
us extremely strong reasons. For instance, suppose Sue suffers from very mild
headaches once a year, so mild that she hardly notices them. A friend tells her
about a highly experimental neurosurgical intervention that is being used in the
treatment of life-threatening illnesses, which might cure her headaches, but which is
extremely risky and dangerous, with a 90 per cent mortality rate. Sue has extremely
strong reasons, ones that she plausibly cannot rationally ignore, to refuse to undergo
the procedure. It would be absurd to deny that this sort of rational (weak)
practice would qualify as a form of coercive (rather than compulsive) influence on Feinberg’s schema
regarding the spectrum of force. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 189. For discussion, see
Bolton and Banner, ‘Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy?’ However, in the case of
chronic, non-episodic disorders such as anorexia nervosa, the questions are often more challenging, as
patients’ choices often cohere with their evaluative judgements, as I explore below.
⁵⁶ For further discussion of how episodic psychiatric disorders can undermine autonomy, see Bolton
and Banner, ‘Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy?’ Some evidence suggests that
bulimia nervosa may begin as an impulsive disorder in this manner. See Pearson, Wonderlich, and Smith,
‘A Risk and Maintenance Model for Bulimia Nervosa’.
⁵⁷ Tan et al., ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa’.
⁵⁸ Craigie and Davies, ‘Problems of Control’, 11.
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compulsion is inimical to her making an autonomous decision to refuse treatment in
this case.
Sue has a choice, but she is (weakly) compelled by considerations that she takes to
imply very strong reasons. This distinguishes Sue from Jane the unwilling addict.
However, it is not clear that it distinguishes Sue from Keira; Keira may also be
understood to be (weakly) compelled by considerations that she takes to imply very
strong reasons. Should we distinguish the two? The rationalist approach can offer
two strategies here. First, in light of an objectivist account of reasons, one might claim
that Sue’s apparent reasons clearly track her real reasons, since Sue has a strongly
decisive reason not to undergo the procedure. In contrast, Keira’s apparent reasons
do not similarly track what she has real reason to do. Whilst such a strategy allows us
to distinguish the two cases, it relies on the claim that we have clear and precise
understanding of the evaluative truths at stake in both of these contexts. Given the
potential for doubt on this point, we might prefer a different rationalist strategy that
does not rely on this objectivist claim, and instead appeals to internal deficiencies
with the agent’s practical rationality.
In fact, one may read the courts’ interpretation of the MCA code of practice as
adopting this latter strategy. As Craigie and Davies note in the quoted passage above,
the courts’ interpretation is typically grounded by the claim that anorexia nervosa
appears to ‘distort’ or ‘bias’ the deliberation of sufferers. The focus here then is not on
whether their decisions are grounded by considerations that sufferers cannot ignore,
but rather on whether the disorder biases or distorts the considerations that sufferers
take to imply reasons (of the sort that they cannot ignore).
Such bias and distortion would plausibly represent a morally significant difference
between Sue and Keira with respect to their DMC for their treatment decision.
However, if this strategy is to be a convincing proceduralist basis for claiming that
sufferers of anorexia nervosa lack DMC, then we need an explanation for the manner
in which anorexia distorts and biases practical decision-making. Given my discussion
above, such an explanation cannot simply appeal to the notion of pathology alone,
and it must serve to distinguish sufferers of anorexia from standard decision-makers.
A significant problem in attempting to account for the practical irrationality of
anorexic patients is that in many cases such patients decide to refuse food in a
manner that is rational in light of their own values. As Jillian Craigie notes, self-
reports of recovered patients suggest a significant source of regret amongst such
patients is:
. . . not that they failed to do what they wanted to do – on the contrary they pursued the goal of
thinness very effectively. It seems more likely that the regret these people express has its source
primarily in what they valued.⁵⁹
So the question for a rationalist approach to this issue is whether we can plausibly
have grounds for supposing that anorexia nervosa serves to distort or bias the
patient’s practical rationality despite the fact that patients choose in accordance
with values that they may endorse as part of a coherent character system.
⁵⁹ Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and What a Patient Values’, 331.
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Craigie herself endorses a rationalist approach to DMC that broadly aligns with
my arguments in this book, and suggests three reasons for thinking that a rationalist
approach can answer this question affirmatively.⁶⁰ First, she suggests that consistent
evidence of retrospective regret amongst survivors of anorexia nervosa about their
earlier decision-making would give us grounds for doubting the practical rationality
of anorexic patients. Second, some sufferers report cognitive dissonance with respect
to their evaluation of thinness, and there is evidence that individuals with anorexia
nervosa come to develop powerful internal conflicts due to their distorted affective
states.⁶¹ Finally, neuropsychological research suggests that anorexia is associated with
impaired emotional arousal in decision-making, similar to impairments that have
also been observed in patients who have suffered damage to the ventromedial
cortex.⁶² Although she acknowledges that none of these three strands is alone
sufficient to justify the claim that anorexic patients may be prone to practical
irrationality, Craigie concludes that they jointly begin to present a robust case.
I am broadly sympathetic to Craigie’s approach, and agree that some of this
evidence might plausibly give us reasons to suppose that the practical rationality of
anorexic patients has been distorted by their disorder. However, I shall conclude by
raising some doubts about the strength of the evidence that we can obtain in favour
of this claim from observations of regret. Whilst this is only one strand of evidence
that bears on considerations of practical rationality, it is a particularly salient form of
evidence in Craigie’s analysis. As well as suggesting that it could go some way to
justifying a general claim about a lack of ability to recognize certain reasons amongst
anorexic patients, Craigie notes that evidence of regret amongst JWs can provide us
with sufficient reason to suggest that our policies of abiding by treatment refusals of
such patients may deserve re-examination.⁶³
In considering the significance of regret amongst survivors of anorexia nervosa, it
is important to separate the empirical and the moral issue. The extent to which regret
is experienced by anorexic patients is under-studied, and we should certainly be
cautious in assuming that future regret will be experienced by all anorexic patients.⁶⁴
However, let us assume, perhaps counterfactually, that there is reasonably consistent
empirical evidence of regret amongst survivors of anorexia nervosa.
With this assumption in place, what moral work can it do? The first thing to
acknowledge is that the mere possibility that an individual may regret a decision is
not sufficient grounds for claiming that they cannot make that decision in a practic-
ally rational manner. It is quite possible for a person to make an autonomous
decision that they will later regret, and indeed, part of respecting an individual’s
⁶⁰ For another discussion of how the autonomy of anorexic patients may be undermined by defects in
their use of information, see Giordano, Understanding Eating Disorders, ch. 12.
⁶¹ See also Charland, ‘Ethical and Conceptual Issues in Eating Disorders’; Charland et al., ‘Anorexia
Nervosa as a Passion’ on this point.
⁶² Craigie, ‘Competence, Practical Rationality and What a Patient Values’, 332. ⁶³ Ibid., 333.
⁶⁴ Gavaghanmakes a similar point in the context of depression in Gavaghan, ‘InWord, or Sigh, or Tear’,
250–1. Certainly, in considering only the regret of those who have recovered from the condition, there is a
concern that the sample may be somewhat biased.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 20/2/2020, SPi
     
autonomy is that we allow them to make decisions that they could regret.⁶⁵ For
instance, an individual can validly consent to having an inane tattoo as a 20-year-old
that they are quite likely to regret when they are 50.
However, we might think that there are some exceptions to this general thought
about the compatibility of autonomous decision-making and later regret. In some
cases, our anticipation of another’s future regret may be based on the fact that the
individual lacks some crucial information. For instance, I might anticipate that Peter
will regret deciding to cross a bridge to get to the other side of the river because I am
(but he is not) aware that the bridge is about to collapse. In this case, the account of
autonomy that I have developed here suggests that Peter may not make an autono-
mous decision about crossing the bridge, because of his failure to understand crucial
features of the choice he is making.
Although we might plausibly deny DMC on the basis of anticipated regret when
the latter is used a proxy for the individual’s insufficient understanding at the time of
their decision, it is not clear that this justification is applicable in the context of
anorexia nervosa. Patients suffering from anorexia nervosa can (in some cases) have
sufficient understanding of the implications of the choices that they make. In order
for anticipated future regret to provide a plausible basis for denying DMC in such
cases, we would need to have some basis for prioritizing the individual’s future wishes
over their (sufficiently informed) present wishes. As I explored above though, this
runs contrary to how we think of DMC in standard cases, in which we respect the
patient’s present wishes, rather than the wishes we believe (even with good justifica-
tion) that they will have in the future.
It might be argued that considering this question in the context of anorexia
nervosa involves an obvious disanalogy with other contexts. When we are consider-
ing the present wishes of the anorexic patient, they are suffering from a psychiatric
disorder, whilst the later regret we (might) observe amongst anorexic patients is
expressed once they have recovered. Doesn’t this give us reason to prioritize the later
wishes over the earlier? However, given my discussion in this chapter, it should be
clear that this argument is problematic. We would only have an autonomy-based
reason to prioritize the individual’s (anticipated) future wishes over their present
wishes if we had some independent reason for believing that the individual’s present
wishes are not autonomous, but their future ones will be. For reasons I have discussed
in this chapter, the individual’s disease status alone does not provide this kind of
reason, and nor does the content of their decision.
At best then, evidence of regret could only provide supplementary evidence of a
lack of DMC amongst anorexic patients, once it has already been established that the
individual’s retrospective regret has greater agential authority than their past wishes
had at the time of the decision. Although there is certainly also room for scepticism
about the power of other strands of evidence that Craigie adverts to, it may be the
case that further neuropsychological evidence and phenomenological evidence could
help us to establish this. However, in the absence of another explanation for why we
⁶⁵ McQueen makes a similar point in his analysis of autonomy and regret. McQueen, ‘Autonomy, Age
and Sterilisation Requests’. See also Pugh, ‘Legally Competent, But Too Young To Choose To Be
Sterilized?’
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should prioritize the individual’s (anticipated) future wishes over their present
wishes, appealing to considerations of regret as evidence of a lack of DMC is flawed.
Furthermore, contrary to Craigie’s suggestion, it is not sufficient to establish that JWs
lack DMC, and there is danger in assuming that it would be alone sufficient in
the case of anorexia nervosa. Such an assumption risks covertly basing claims about
the absence of DMC on judgements about the individual’s diagnostic status, or the
content of the decision itself.
Perhaps more importantly though, even if we accept the claim that anorexic
patients may be practically or theoretically irrational with respect to their patho-
logical eating behaviours and beliefs, this does not entail that they lack DMC to refuse
treatment. In order for that to be so, it must also be the case that it is these
problematic beliefs and values that are primarily operative in the patient’s
decision-making process. Yet, this might not be the case. A chronically ill patient’s
refusal of treatment may be based on the quite rational belief that life-saving
treatment is not in her long-term interests, by virtue of the suffering that living
with a chronic and intractable disease can entail. In cases where there is a strong basis
for claiming that the disorder is demonstrably intractable,⁶⁶ it seems that this
decision could be rational, even if we deny that it would not be rational for a patient
to refuse treatment on the basis of a distorted view that being thin is more important
than survival.⁶⁷
In view of the above limitations, where does this leave the rationalist approach to
understanding DMC in anorexia nervosa? It certainly speaks in favour of clinicians
compassionately seeking to investigate why the patient understands weight-loss or a
particular body shape to be good in a reason-implying sense, and whether she takes
her reasons to achieve this good to outweigh the strength of her reasons to pursue
other incompatible goods. Investigation into these matters through the process of
something like radical interpretation may sometimes reveal inconsistencies with
other elements of that patient’s character system, indicating that the patient does
not in fact rationally endorse their overall commitment to this goal at a deep level.
However, suppose that for a particularly chronic sufferer of anorexia nervosa, such
inconsistencies do not arise, and they are able to provide an account of why their goal
is good in a reason-implying sense for them, and how it coheres with persisting
elements of their character system without affective disturbance of the sort that might
distort their practical rationality. Let us assume, perhaps contrary to clinical reality
that such a patient could be presented as a hard case for a rationalist theory of
autonomy. As I have suggested in outlining the strategies available to a rationalist
account here, we are faced with a choice. First, we may concede that such a patient’s
decision can be rational if it is a reflection of the reason-giving facts in this context,
such as those concerning the burden that both the disease and therapy have become
⁶⁶ Although for concerns about the concept of futility in this context, see Geppert, ‘Futility in Chronic
Anorexia Nervosa’.
⁶⁷ Giordano makes a similar point in observing that an anorexic patient’s refusal may be grounded by
beliefs about the quality of her life. See Giordano, Understanding Eating Disorders, 240–1. See also Draper,
‘Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy’, 122.
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for the patient.⁶⁸ If it is rational in this way, then it ought to be respected. Such a
strategy acknowledges both the lack of adequate explanatory support for the claim
that the patient’s ‘pathological’ desires undermine autonomy, the possibility that
individuals can differ significantly on the weight they attribute to different goods, and
the sad fact that continued existence can represent a significant burden for chronic-
ally ill patients.
The alternative is to maintain that such a decision can still be appropriately
described as irrational, even if it does not appear to evidence distorted judgements
or values that the individual does not recognize and accept as her own. How could
such a claim be supported? On an objectivist approach, it might be argued that to
claim that such a decision can be rational is to extend the tenet that ‘individuals can
attribute different weight to the pursuit of different goods’ to a degree that stretches it
beyond credulity. Although I have suggested that truths concerning the comparative
strength of our self-interested reasons are often very imprecise, this is not to say that
there are no circumstances in which we may say that someone is attributing dispro-
portionate strength to a particular kind of reason.⁶⁹
Which of these strategies should the rationalist adopt? The answer to this question
depends on the deeper philosophical issue of just how imprecise the truths concern-
ing the comparative strength of our self-interested reasons are. If we hold a strong
version of this view, according to which these truths are so imprecise that we can
rarely make an objective assessment of the relative strength of the reasons that others
have to pursue different goals, then we should adopt the first strategy, and respect
Keira’s refusal. The question of the extent to which we can know these truths is thus a
more fundamental epistemic barrier facing us when we attempt to make assessments
of DMC in hard cases such as those presented here. On the second strategy, even
allowing for variability in individual views about the comparative strength of reasons
to pursue different goods (thus forestalling, to a considerable extent, the anti-
paternalist objection against a rationalist criterion of DMC), we can claim that it is
irrational to prefer certain goods (such as low weight) over others (such as survival).
On this account, we may understand procedurally rational disagreements about the
good to be possible only within broad substantive boundaries that outline the few
‘known’ truths regarding the comparative strength of different reasons, pertaining
to goods at different ends of the spectrum with regards to their importance to
well-being.
⁶⁸ Although we disagree on the semantics of the concept of rationality and how it features in DMC, the
strategy I am outlining here coheres with Draper’s practical conclusions. See Draper, ‘Anorexia Nervosa
and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy’, 133.
⁶⁹ Culver and Gert similarly appeal to the importance of decisions being grounded by ‘adequate
reasons’, where the notion of adequacy implicitly corresponds to an objective ranking of goods, and
corresponding reasons. They write that ‘A reason is an adequate reason when the harms avoided (or the
goods gained) by suffering the harms of a contemplated act compensate for the harms caused by that act’,
and that ‘a decision or action is irrational if the person making it knows (justifiably believes) or should
know that its foreseeable results are that she will suffer any of the items on the following list: death, pain
(either physical or mental), disabilities (physical, mental, or volitional), or loss of freedom, or loss of
pleasure or be at increased risk of suffering any of these, and she has no adequate reason for her action or
decision’. Culver and Gert, ‘The Inadequacy of Incompetence’, 630–1.
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Which of these strategies we adopt will thus require substantial theoretical com-
mitments in both the nature of well-being and epistemology. I confess to leaning
towards the first strategy, but this requires far more defence than I can provide here.
The difficulty of resolving this issue is, I suggest, precisely why we should find the
case of Keira to be so complex. In this regard, it is worth contrasting the complexity
that this approach raises with the problematic simplicity of the standard view of
autonomy. In simply stipulating that psychiatric disorders can amount to a form of
controlling influence that undermines autonomy, the standard account simply lacks
the conceptual tools to adequately engage with this kind of hard case. In order to
adequately assess DMC here, we must delve deeper into the decision-making pro-
cedure of such individuals, the nature of their beliefs, the reasons that they under-
stand themselves to have, and these other deeper philosophical issues about the
nature of well-being.
Finally, as my discussion here demonstrates, the rationalist can lend some theor-
etical support to widespread and diverging intuitions about DMC in cases of religious
belief and psychiatry. Most importantly though, it shows that sound judgement on
these cases requires a complex consideration of a wide range of factors, that we can
ill-afford to leave to mere intuition alone.
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9
The Prudential Value of Autonomy
The principle of respect for autonomy is undeniably afforded particular salience in
Western bioethics, and accounts of autonomy should aim to give an explanation as to
why that is the case.¹ However, as well as seeking to give an account of the nature of
autonomy’s value, one might also question whether we ought to value autonomy so
much, and how it should be weighed against other values. Our understanding of
these issues will have significant implications for the many bioethical issues in which
considerations of autonomy are invoked.
In this book, I have outlined a broadly Millian understanding of the nature of
autonomy and its relationship to rationality. One might raise the concern that a
Millian account is going to have trouble offering a satisfactory justification for a
stringent requirement to respect autonomy that is consistent with Mill’s broader
utilitarian moral framework.² I shall comment on this particular interpretation of
Mill below, but notwithstanding this issue, it is quite possible to claim that a Millian
conception of autonomy can be adopted into moral frameworks that do not perfectly
align with Mill’s own. As such, my primary concern in this chapter is not how we can
reconcile the value of autonomy within a broader consequentialist understanding of
morality, but rather with how we should understand the value of autonomy itself.
I shall argue that autonomy should be understood as not only instrumentally
valuable, but also valuable for its own sake. The argument that I make for this
claim has important implications not only for how we should weigh the value of
autonomy against other values in bioethics, but also for how we should understand
the nature of well-being.
At the outset, it is important to delimit the scope of my claims about autonomy’s
value in this chapter. It is sometimes claimed that autonomy has moral value, and
that autonomy undergirds the moral value of personhood.³ On this approach, the
principle of respect for autonomy can be understood as a particular instantiation of
the more general moral principle of respect for persons. Modern statements of this
view commonly find their source in Kant’s moral philosophy, and his substantive
account of autonomy.⁴ The moral respect due to a person on this approach reflects
¹ Walker, ‘Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy’, 595. For non-Western perspectives of
autonomy’s value, see Yang, ‘Serve the People’; Kara, ‘Applicability of the Principle of Respect for
Autonomy’; Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 11.
² Walker, ‘Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy’, 603.
³ Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:435.
⁴ For some examples, see Velleman, ‘A Right of Self-Termination?’; Darwall, ‘The Value of Autonomy
and Autonomy of the Will’; Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, particularly 37–44.
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the high moral status that the person has as an autonomous agent, a being with
intrinsic, non-exchangeable worth, or dignity that goes beyond mere price.⁵
As I pointed out in the introduction to this book, we may be sceptical about the
extent to which this Kantian notion of autonomy is the sense that bioethicists
typically intend to invoke in their discussions of autonomy. Whatever its merits,
I shall not discuss it further here. As I have explained in previous chapters, my view
of autonomy departs from Kant’s substantive conception; accordingly, establishing
that my procedural understanding of autonomy can provide a foundation for the
moral value of personhood would require lengthy argument.⁶ Further whilst it is
widely held that the value of autonomy has an important role to play in justifying the
exercise of political power in liberal societies, I shall not be directly concerned with
this question here.⁷ Instead, I shall focus my attention on whether autonomy bears
prudential value; how, and to what extent does autonomy contribute to a person’s
well-being? I limit my discussion to this question in the hope that it has at least some
bearing on other broader questions about the moral and political role of autonomy,
on the assumption that the salient role of autonomy is at least partly attributable to its
significant prudential value.
1. The Nature of Autonomy’s Prudential Value
It is possible to distinguish two ways in which something can be prudentially
valuable.⁸ Consider first, ‘final value’. Something bears final value if it is valuable as
an end, or for its own sake; for instance, knowledge, happiness, and virtue, inter alia,
might plausibly be understood as bearing final value. We can contrast final value with
‘instrumental value’; something has merely instrumental value if it is only valuable
for the sake of something else.⁹ For instance, money has only instrumental value, in
so far as it can be exchanged for other valuable goods.
Accordingly, if we are to claim that autonomy has instrumental value, we must
also give an account of the valuable end to which autonomy serves as a means. Prima
facie, one plausible candidate is well-being, broadly construed; a life lived
⁵ Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:435.
⁶ Jeff McMahan makes some remarks on this sort of project, and endorses the view that personal
autonomy is a significant basis of the moral worth of persons. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, 256–60. In a
similar vein, Marilyn Friedman has argued that the first personal value of autonomy can provide
reciprocity grounds for our moral obligations to others, and that personal autonomy is necessary for
moral autonomy. Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 60–7.
⁷ For a selection of relevant discussions of this topic, see Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, 75;
Christman, The Politics of Persons; Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Mill, On Liberty; Spector, Autonomy and
Rights.
⁸ For discussion of this distinction, see Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’. Korsgaard’s aim in
this paper was to separate the distinction between final and instrumental value from the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic value. The latter distinction pertains to whether or not something bears
value in virtue of its intrinsic, non-relational properties, that is, ‘in itself ’. Although philosophers some-
times claim that autonomy has ‘intrinsic’ value, it seems that this is most naturally understood as the claim
that autonomy has ‘final’ value. Whilst we may value autonomy as an end in itself, it is not clear that we
value it by virtue of its non-relational properties. See Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, 145 for
discussion.
⁹ Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, 170.
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autonomously, it might be claimed, is more likely to lead to the attainment of the
goods that make a person’s life prudentially better. Following Parfit, theories of well-
being are commonly classified into one of the following three types, as schematized
below:
Hedonistic Theories—What would be best for someone is what would make
their life happiest.
Desire-Fulfilment Theories—What would be best for someone is what, through-
out their life, would best fulfil their desires.
Objective List Theories—Certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not
we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.¹⁰
We can also further distinguish enumerative theories of well-being from explanatory
theories. The former sort of theory seeks to answer the question ‘which things make
someone’s life go better for them?’ In contrast explanatory theories of well-being seek
to explain what it is about the things listed by enumerative theories of well-being that
make them good for people.¹¹
The claim that autonomy is only instrumentally valuable is perhaps most congru-
ent with explanatory hedonism; on such a theory, it might be claimed that autonomy
makes a life go better just because autonomy is conducive to happiness (understood
in terms of the experience of pleasurable mental states), which is the only thing that
has final value on this view.¹² This understanding of the value of autonomy is
commonly, although perhaps mistakenly, attributed to Mill.¹³ Such a reading of
Mill might seem natural, given his insistence at the beginning of On Liberty that he
regards utility as ‘ . . . the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions’ (a position that he
defended in hisUtilitarianism).¹⁴Moreover, this understanding might seem plausible
in view of the fact that individuals are in a privileged epistemic position with regards
to the question of what will make them happy. As Mill puts the point:
With respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man/woman has means
of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.¹⁵
¹⁰ Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Appendix I. Although this tripartite classification is widely accepted, it
has recently come under criticism, partly because it ignores Crisp’s distinction between enumerative and
explanatory theories. See Woodard, ‘Classifying Theories of Welfare’. In the interests of clarity and space,
I shall follow philosophical orthodoxy in discussing the tripartite classification, but I shall supplement this
discussion with considerations pertaining to Crisp’s distinction.
¹¹ Crisp, Reasons and the Good, 102–3.
¹² Happiness here is to be broadly understood in terms of the experience of pleasure (or desirable
consciousness) and the absence of pain.
¹³ Robert Young also makes this observation in Young, ‘The Value of Autonomy’, 36. For examples of
this interpretation of Mill, see Berlin, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life’ and Ladenson, ‘Mill’s
Conception of Individuality’. The problem with this interpretation is that it fails to acknowledge the way
in which Mill departed from Bentham’s monistic conception of utility. Mill’s view actually seems to be that
autonomy is incorporated into his understanding of utility.
¹⁴ Mill, On Liberty, 81; Mill, Utilitarianism.
¹⁵ Mill, On Liberty, 74. For a similar observation, see Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’,
91. On the basis of these epistemic considerations, Dworkin refers to this view of the relationship between
autonomy and well-being as the evidentiary view. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the Demented Self ’, 7–8.
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However, even if autonomy can be instrumentally valuable in this way, it is prob-
lematic to claim that it is valuable only in so far as it is a means to happiness. First,
individuals will often be mistaken about what will make them happy; they may in fact
achieve less happiness if they are left to their own autonomous devices than they
would have done otherwise.¹⁶ To illustrate, we can imagine a young man who
rejected his parent’s advice and who autonomously decided that a career in finance
would make him happy, but who comes to regret this decision in later life, when he
realizes that he did not enjoy his career, and his choice meant forgoing a family life
that he now believes his parents were right to suggest would have made him happy.
This observation alone is not an unimpeachable objection to the explanatory
hedonist’s claim that autonomy is only instrumentally valuable; perhaps most people
do know what will make them happy, and counterexamples show only that there can
be individuals whose autonomy lacks prudential value. In order to provide a stronger
argument against the explanatory hedonist’s claim, one would need to show that a
life lived in the absence of autonomy could be worse than a life lived autonomously,
even if the former life involved more happiness.
Consider an example in which this criterion is met. Would one believe that one’s
life would go better if one’s affairs were to be determined by a wise and benevolent
friend?¹⁷ Notably, this is something that Mill explicitly denies:
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of
laying out his existence is the best not because it is the best, but because it is his own mode.¹⁸
More recently, James Griffin captures this Millian insight as follows:
. . . even if you convince me that, as my personal despot, you would produce more desirable
consciousness for me than I do myself, I shall want to go on being my own master.¹⁹
Call the argument implicit in these observations the Personal Despot Argument
(PDA). The thought underwriting the plausibility of the PDA is that autonomy has a
special sort of value for us; there seems to be a value in living a life of one’s own that is
of central and fundamental importance to many of us.²⁰ Our rejection of even the
wise and benevolent personal despot suggests that autonomy bears final value; we
value autonomy for its own sake, and not just because we believe that being
autonomous will lead to our attaining other prudentially valuable ends.²¹ On this
¹⁶ For a similar point, see Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, 32; Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the Demented
Self ’, 8; Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’, 364. Dworkin argues that Mill was also aware of this point.
Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’, 73–4.
¹⁷ Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, 146. ¹⁸ Mill, On Liberty, 131.
¹⁹ Griffin, Well-Being, 9.
²⁰ See also Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, 129–30; Glover, Causing Death and Saving
Lives, 96; Sher, Beyond Neutrality, 176; Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 12. The value that
we tend to place on living a life of one’s own offers a further clue as to why it seems problematic to claim
that it is good, in a reason-implying sense, to live in accordance with an essentialist conception of an
authentic self from which one feels alienated. The problem is that an agent who lives in accordance with
such an alienated self does not seem to be engaged in a project of living a life of her own; rather, she is living
a life of a self that she has dis-owned.
²¹ That the value here is final does not entail that it is not importantly related to other ends. For instance,
Dworkin cashes out the value of autonomy by appealing to considerations of integrity. But the thought
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approach, autonomy is at least partly constitutive of (rather than merely instrumental
to) well-being.
I believe that the PDA captures an important truth, and I shall defend it in greater
detail below. At this point though, we may observe that if the argument is indeed
convincing, then it raises considerable problems for explanatory hedonism; however,
both desire-fulfilment and objective list theories of well-being can accommodate our
intuitive response to these examples, and allow for the view that autonomy has final
value. Consider first desire-fulfilment theories; even if a personal despot could
produce more happiness in your life, she would not be able to fulfil one’s non-
instrumental desire to live a life in which you make your own autonomous decisions.
Alternatively, an objective list theory might simply claim that autonomy is an end
that has final value. Indeed, many modern theorists have incorporated autonomy
into their understanding of well-being in these ways.²² For instance, the desire for
autonomy is a central desire in Griffin’s own informed desire account,²³ and Sumner
claims that well-being consists in ‘ . . . authentic happiness, the happiness of an
informed and autonomous subject’.²⁴ In a similar vein, John Finnis’ description of
the good of ‘practical reasonableness’ included in his objective list account seems to
bear a close relation to autonomy as I have understood it in this book.²⁵
There are, however, important differences in how different theories of well-being
account for the prudential value of autonomy. For instance, on enumerative actual
present desire-fulfilment theories, autonomy is only incorporated into the good life
for a particular person if they actually desire it. In contrast, on enumerative objective
list theories that include autonomy, the final value of autonomy is not contingent
upon the subject’s desires in this way. I lack the space here to defend a full view of
well-being. However, it should be acknowledged that the objectivist view of rational
desires that I have defended in this book is based in part on a rejection of the view
that our desires simpliciter can provide us with reasons. As such, the view of reasons,
value, and autonomy that I have endorsed is incompatible with a purely desire-based
explanatory account of well-being, since on such an account, the fact that something
satisfies one of our desires makes that thing prudentially good for us; this sounds
suspiciously like subjectivism about reasons of the sort that I rejected in Chapter 1.
Accordingly, although the object-given view of reasons is compatible with a subject-
ive desire-based account of well-being (as I discussed in Chapter 2), it is only so with
respect to an enumerative desire-fulfilment account theory of well-being.
here is that living an autonomous life is constitutive of a living a life with integrity, rather than instrumental
to it as a separate good.
²² Notice that a further benefit of incorporating autonomy into one’s theory of well-being is that such
theories are able to explain why the satisfaction of adaptive preferences may not enhance well-being. Sen
raises this point in Sen, Resources, Values and Development, 304. See Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and
Ethics, 166 for discussion.
²³ Griffin, Well-Being, Part One, particularly 33–6.
²⁴ Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, 172.
²⁵ Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 88–90. Savulescu acknowledges the possibility of incorpor-
ating autonomy into an objective list account at Savulescu, ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life
Sustaining Treatment’, 213.
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In view of the failure of explanatory hedonism to adequately capture the value of
autonomy, and the incompatibility of purely desire-based explanatory accounts with
objectivism about reasons, how should we understand the claim that autonomy has
final value? The most plausible remaining strategy is to endorse an explanatory
theory of well-being that appeals to objective values, and to claim that autonomy is
one of the things that have such objective, final value.
However, autonomy should not be understood to be the only good on this sort of
theory; one reason for this is that the realization of some values may require the
absence of autonomy.²⁶ Furthermore, an adequate theory of well-being should allow
for the possibility that pleasurable experiences can contribute in some way to well-
being, even if one is not autonomous with respect to the choice to experience them.
For instance, suppose that your affairs were determined by a benevolent personal
despot, and they were incredibly successful in leading you to do things that led you to
experience highly pleasurable mental states. We can still make sense of the claim that
the pleasurable mental states you would experience would have some prudential
value, even if the prudential value of the life would be severely impoverished by the
absence of autonomy.
One might advance two related further claims here; first that the final value of
autonomy is conditional on other components of the good life, and second, that
autonomy may lack value or even be detrimental to well-being if it is put to bad
uses.²⁷ There is a degree of truth in the first claim; on the theory of autonomy that
I have developed here, there is an inextricable link between autonomy and the agent’s
values. Autonomy itself (and not its value per se) is conditional on the agent’s beliefs
about what constitutes the good life, since autonomous choices must be grounded in
part by these beliefs.
In fact, it is also plausible to claim that something like the reverse relationship
outlined in the first claim is true. Although certain goods (such as pleasure) are
possible in the absence of autonomy, autonomy may plausibly be construed as a
condition of other goods having a particular kind of value for the agent. It is through
achieving the various objective values that partly constitute well-being through the
autonomous pursuit of our own goals that we can understand ourselves as living a life
that is ours. Whilst this need not be understood as either a necessary foundation of all
other values, or even as something that is in fact universally valued, living a life that is
one’s own is prudentially valuable for its own sake. Only in a life in which the agent is
autonomous with respect to the sustainment of the fundamental commitments that
guide her conduct, and in her achievement of other objective goods, is it the agent
herself who can be said to meaningfully realize the values instantiated in that life. It is
this that is sorely absent in the life determined by a personal despot. Autonomy can
thus be construed as being conditional to a particular kind of contribution that other
goods make to well-being, one that serves to amplify the contribution a good makes
in abstraction: that of contributing to a life that is meaningfully the agent’s own.
²⁶ Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 248.
²⁷ Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, 130; Varelius, ‘The Value of Autonomy in Medical
Ethics’, 381.
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The above reflections might be understood to be in tension with the second claim
outlined above. Can autonomy have value (or have this amplifying effect on other
values) even if it is put to immoral uses? I believe that the answer is ‘yes’; to suppose
otherwise is to confuse judgements about the all things considered goodness of states
of affairs, with an assessment of what is good for a person.
To illustrate, suppose that Paul takes a great deal of pleasure from non-
consensually harming people, and his violent actions help him to cultivate a self-
narrative of himself as a dominant and powerful individual, a project that he takes to
define his purpose in life. It is undoubtedly a terrible state of affairs that Paul
performs these harmful actions. We may even plausibly say that his performing
these actions autonomously exacerbates the badness of this state of affairs, and
renders him more blameworthy for the harms caused. Finally, we may also justifiably
restrain Paul from performing these actions by appealing to moral considerations
that outweigh the value of his autonomy. However, I do not see a compelling reason
to claim that it is worse for Paul that he performs these actions autonomously rather
than non-autonomously. These are, recall, actions that he enjoys, and which he takes
to be central to his character and his projects. If his autonomy in performing these
actions makes Paul prudentially worse off, then it would have to be true that the
performance of blameworthy immoral actions is detrimental to well-being, perhaps
on the basis of the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is a necessary constituent of
well-being. However, this is a highly controversial claim that requires defence quite
independently from considerations about the value of autonomy.²⁸
Another line of criticism to objective accounts of well-being that I have sketched
here is that subjective attitudes seem to have an important influence on well-being,
and it is not clear that objective accounts can accommodate this thought. All that
matters for well-being on these theories is that objectively valuable things are
incorporated into the agent’s life; the agent’s own subjective attitudes towards these
goods are not important. Whilst there is considerable debate on the merits of this
point, it suffices for my purposes here to say that if one finds this objection
convincing, then it can be circumvented by adopting a hybrid account of well-
being, according to which both the realization of objective values and one’s holding
subjective positive attitudes towards those objective values contribute to well-being.
Such an account thus incorporates both objective and subjective elements.²⁹
The plausibility of such an account stems from the fact that although we may have
reason to doubt that a theory of well-being that completely ignores individual
preferences and attitudes is mistaken, it also seems plausible to claim that we can
have self-interested reasons to want certain things, such as pleasurable experiences,
loving relationships, and knowledge, even if we do not believe (perhaps incorrectly)
that they will cause us happiness, or even if we do not desire them. Moreover, as
²⁸ For two arguments against this moralistic view of well-being, see Hurka, Perfectionism, 19–20 and
Hooker’s argument from sympathy in Hooker, ‘The Elements of Well-Being’, 25–7.
²⁹ Brad Hooker has recently defended a hybrid account that incorporates autonomy, and addresses
theoretical questions about the limits of (and trade-offs between) subjective and objective elements in
Hooker, ‘The Elements of Well-Being’. See also Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 95–101; Feldman,
Pleasure and the Good Life.
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I explained in Chapter 2, the account of rationality that I have appealed to in this
book allows for a degree of subjectivity, in so far as it is compatible with there being a
plurality of goods, and with the possibility that rational agents can disagree about the
weight that should be attributed to these different goods. Such disagreements do not
arise simply because one party is wrong, and the other is right. Rather it is because of
the imprecise nature of the truths governing many value comparisons.
2. Defending the Personal Despot Argument
As I discussed above, one of the main arguments in defence of the claim that
autonomy bears final value is the PDA. However, this argument has been criticized
on the grounds that it conflates the value that we attach to making decisions for
ourselves with ‘ . . . the value we attach to having our decisions reflect our deepest
goals and values’.³⁰ To illustrate this, Mikhail Valdman suggests a thought experi-
ment in which you have the opportunity to cede your final decision-making author-
ity about how to act to a Personal Expert Committee (PC); this committee is better
than you are at determining how to accomplish your goals and how to live according
to your values.³¹ The PC, however crucially differs from the personal despot of the
PDA. The PC does not determine your values; it only tells you how to live in
accordance with them; the personal despot, on the other hand, might seek to increase
your happiness by also harnessing control over your values.
Should we prefer the PC to self-government? Valdman suggests that we should,
pointing out that we often cede decision-making authority in this way, such as in
organizing our financial affairs.³² He also takes care to pre-emptively respond to a
number of objections to his arguments.³³ Whilst I do not believe that all of these
responses are satisfactory, I shall not pursue them here. Rather I shall raise two new
objections to the PC argument. The first objection calls into question the scope of the
PC example; the second objection suggests that, rather than showing that self-
government has no intrinsic value, the PC example merely indicates that different
elements of autonomy can have different value.
Let us consider the PC in a little more detail. Although the PC would intervene
when it detected flawed practical reasoning, it would always use the agent’s own goals
and values as the basis for its decisions. To illustrate, suppose that David has some
prudential goal X, and has to choose between two possible acts A and B. Suppose that
out of these two acts, only A would serve as a reliable means to David’s achieving X;
in this case, the PC would only intervene if David believed that he prudentially ought
to B.
Valdman’s model is not problematic when the value of the goal (X) is distinguish-
able from the acts that one must perform as a means to achieving that goal. However,
it is problematic when this is not the case. Yet, the value of a number of goals is
inextricably related to the way in which we achieve that goal. To illustrate, suppose
that one valued being able to play a complex piece of music on the piano, say
³⁰ Valdman, ‘Outsourcing Self-Government’, 764. ³¹ Ibid., 770. ³² Ibid., 772.
³³ Ibid., 780–9.
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Rachmaninov’s second concerto. In a crude sense, in order to play this piece, one
would simply need to hit certain combinations of keys, in a certain order, for a
certain time. In order to play the piece in this crude sense, one would need to develop
excellent motor skills and technique, normally through devoting hours to practising
the requisite movements, and to learning the structure of the piece. Whilst it might be
claimed that there is some value in the discipline and effort that this practice requires,
the goal of being able to play Rachmaninov’s concerto in the crude sense under
consideration could retain its value for an agent, even if they achieved it via a more
efficient means that did not involve effort or discipline; for example, instead of sitting
through hours of lessons and practice sessions, suppose (somewhat fantastically) that
one could simply ‘download’ the ability to play the right notes in the right order for
the right amount of time.
In this crude sense of being able to play the piece, the value of the goal is
distinguishable from the means that one takes to achieve it. However, consider
now someone who has a more refined desire to be able to play the Rachmaninov
piece; rather than valuing being able to simply ‘play the right notes’, this person
values being able to play the piece according to their own interpretation of the music.
This might involve, inter alia, their deciding which phrases of the piece need
particular emphasis, and the strength they should exert in pressing the keys at
particular points. Whilst the achievement of this goal requires the same abilities as
the goal of playing the piece in the crude sense, it also requires something more,
something like creativity; and because of this, it seems that the value of the goal is
inextricably linked to the fact that the agent herself exercises her own creativity in its
pursuit.
This is important, since on this understanding of the value of the goal, it does not
make sense to say that one might be able to better achieve the goal by outsourcing to
something like a PC. A PC, an expert tutor, or a futuristic downloadable music
program could make you a better technical piano player; and this technical ability
might be prerequisite for going on to exercise one’s creativity in playing. However,
completely relying on a PC to realize the goal of playing Rachmaninov’s second
concerto in a sophisticated sense would defeat the value of the goal itself.
The point that this example raises is that the relationship between the value of our
goals and the means that we take to achieve them is not always as simple as the PC
argument implies. Whilst Valdman is correct to point out that we often outsource
decision-making authority, the examples he highlights are cases in which the value of
the goal is clearly distinguishable from the manner in which the goal is achieved; for
example, the value we attribute to achieving financial security is rarely taken away if
we attain it by allowing a financial adviser to make our financial decisions for us.³⁴
However, in more complex cases, the value of some goals seems to be at least partly
dependent on the fact that in achieving the goal, the agent herself makes her own
mark in doing so. Rob Goodman captures a similar thought in his distinction
between ‘process goods’ that pertain to excellence in the performance of an activity,
³⁴ Ibid., 772.
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and ‘outcome goods’, that pertain to the benefits that an activity creates.³⁵ Playing
Rachmaninov in the crude sense would qualify as an outcome good in my example,
whilst playing the piece in the sophisticated sense would involve process goods.
The above considerations lend support to the claim that simply ensuring that an
agent’s goals are achieved may not facilitate their autonomy. The fact that some of
our goals are process goods lends support to the claim that, at least in some cases, a
‘ . . . crucial part of the notion of “self rule” is that it is me that achieves my goals’.³⁶
Although it seems that many of the goals that agents tend to have involve process
goods, let us suppose that the PC would not intervene to ensure the achievement of
process goods, and that the objection still stands in relation to a number of other
goals that people tend to have. Even if we concede this point, the objection only
shows that the value of different sorts of autonomy can come into conflict, not that
autonomy lacks final value.
There are two central points undergirding this line of response. The first is that
according to the PC argument, one may fail to be self-governing even when one is
living in accordance with one’s own goals and values. According to the terms of the
argument, one will fail to be self-governing if it is the PC rather than the agent herself
who ensures that they live in accordance with their goals and values. The second
point concerns the distinction that I have drawn upon in this book between global
and local autonomy. As I explained in the introduction, we can understand auton-
omy to be a property of agents in a particular time-slice, with respect to a particular
decision. When we conceive of autonomy in this way, we are considering local
autonomy. In contrast, we can also understand autonomy as a global property that
agents can instantiate diachronically.
Notice that when the PC argument stipulates that one may fail to be self-governing
even if one is living in accordance with one’s own goals and values, the failure here is
a failure of local, rather than global autonomy. After all, ex hypothesi, the PC would
only govern you in accordance with your own deeply held commitments and values.
As such, the PC will only intervene when one’s own local decision-making is likely to
prove counter-productive to one’s pursuit of the long-term goals that may be
understood to undergird one’s global autonomy.
The reason that the PC argument may appear to be convincing is that it fails to
adequately distinguish local and global autonomy. Although it might be true that
there are cases in which we could have good reason to outsource our decision-
making to experts, the strength of this reason is itself rooted in the value of being
able to live what Valdman calls an ‘acceptable’ life, in accordance with one’s own
freely chosen goals and values;³⁷ however, this is simply what it is to be globally
autonomous. Accordingly, the PC argument is only sufficient for proving that the
value of local and global autonomy may sometimes be in conflict, and that we would
³⁵ Goodman, ‘Cognitive Enhancement, Cheating, and Accomplishment’, 146 and 152–4.
³⁶ Sandman and Munthe, ‘Shared Decision Making, Paternalism and Patient Choice’, 66. These authors
make the strong claim that this is always true of respect for autonomy. However, I limit my endorsement of
this claim, as my discussion below shall clarify.
³⁷ Valdman, ‘Outsourcing Self-Government’, 769.
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often prioritize our global autonomy over our local autonomy. Yet, this is not a
problematic conclusion for those who claim that autonomy bears final value.
3. The Value of Different Elements of Autonomy
The second response to the PC objection turns on the claim that it is possible for local
autonomy to come into conflict with global autonomy. On some views of the
relationship between local and global autonomy, this claim would be implausible.
For instance, it would be implausible if one held the view that global autonomy is
simply an aggregate of the instances of local autonomy over time.³⁸ However, in the
introduction, I suggested an alternative understanding of the relationship, according
to which an agent’s global autonomy depends on the extent to which she lives in
accordance with her own diachronic plans and commitments. Ronald Dworkin also
implicitly acknowledges that the value of global autonomy is distinct from the value
of individual decisions in outlining his integrity view of the value of autonomy as
follows:
[A]utonomy makes each of us responsible for shaping his own life according to some coherent
and distinctive sense of character . . . This view of autonomy focuses not on individual decisions
one by one, but the place of each decision in a more general program or picture of life the agent
is creating . . . ³⁹
Despite this, in some cases, being able to make our own local choices is essential to
the facilitation of our global autonomy. This is not simply because of our privileged
epistemic access to knowing which goals we value; rather it is because the goals we
aim to pursue in some cases are process, rather than outcome goods. Making local
decisions about how one pursues such goals is inextricably linked to one’s evaluation
of the achievement of the goal itself.
However, when we consider the pursuit of outcome goods, conflicts between local
and global autonomy become far more acute. In such cases, the value of one’s goal
can be distinguished from the value of making locally autonomous decisions about
how to pursue it. Indeed, it may even be the case that we could better facilitate an
agent’s pursuit of the goal that undergirds their global autonomy by restricting their
local autonomy. Which of these elements of autonomous agency should we
prioritize?
In advocating the PC objection, Valdman himself implicitly highlights one pos-
sible explanation of why global autonomy might have precedence over local auton-
omy. As Valdman suggests, the deep commitments that one must live in accordance
with to live an ‘acceptable’ life are central to our identity, on psychological under-
standings of that concept. This is not true of many of the short-term goals that our
local decision-making concerns. These may sometimes be trivial, and in no way
connected to any of our deep global commitments; I can, for instance, be locally
³⁸ Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History’, 18–19.
³⁹ Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and the Demented Self ’, 8; see also Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 224.
Interestingly, as Foster notes, judges invoked Dworkin’s understanding of the value of autonomy in their
judgement on Chester v. Afshar. See Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 84.
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autonomous with respect to my decision about what to have for lunch. In contrast,
the adoption of a long-term goal requires a far more significant kind of commitment;
in making decisions about such commitments, we can clarify and shape the nexus of
our judgements about what is valuable. As I discussed in Chapter 2, such judgements
play a highly significant role in our character systems. As such, when the two sorts of
autonomy cannot both be realized, concerns pertaining to our sense of identity, of
defining who we are, may give us reason to prioritize our global autonomy over our
local autonomy.
Accordingly, it should not be surprising that patients often believe that the best
way to achieve their global commitments in a medical context is to sacrifice their
local autonomy with respect to their treatment decisions by telling their doctor to ‘do
what you think would be best’. This should be viewed as an expression, rather than an
abdication, of autonomy.⁴⁰ For instance, the patient might not trust herself to make a
difficult local decision that is in harmony with her evaluative judgements, or she may
not feel able to weigh the complex information involved in such a decision appro-
priately. Crucially, in light of my response to the PC objection, the amelioration of a
patient’s condition is typically most naturally understood as an outcome good, rather
than a process good; as such, the patient may outsource her decision-making here
without this undermining the value of her diachronic goal. Accordingly, an agent
may retain her global autonomy in making this request if the patient believes that the
doctor is more likely than she is to make a treatment decision that would best reflect
her own evaluative judgement about what would be good for her in a reason-
implying sense.
In light of this discussion of the significance of global autonomy, one might be
tempted to ask why we should worry about locally autonomous decisions at all,
rather than simply focusing on global autonomy alone. There are two reasons for
why we should resist this temptation. First, as I discussed above, many of the goals
that undergird our global autonomy are process goods. Second, as I explored in
Chapter 6, an individual’s local autonomous decisions can have considerable moral
significance when they concern whether the agent wishes to exercise their power to
waive a claim right. Although I argued that local autonomy has some role to play in
our understanding and justification of rights such as these, the interest they serve to
protect may crucially not be best understood in terms of their contribution to an
individual’s global autonomy. To take Archard’s example again, if one violates
another’s right to bodily integrity by non-consensually inserting a painless mouth-
swab, the wrong done here is not plausibly construed as one of subverting the
victim’s ability to lead her life as she chooses.⁴¹
It is far from clear that considerations of the agent’s own global autonomy are
sufficient to justify the infringement in this case.⁴² More broadly, an autonomous
⁴⁰ In view of my discussion here, we should not view the empirical data concerning patient behaviour
that Foster presents on this point as undermining the significance of autonomy in the manner that he
intimates. See Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 97.
⁴¹ Archard, ‘Informed Consent’, 22.
⁴² For more on the distinction between right violation and infringement, see Thomson, The Realm of
Rights, 82–104.
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agent can plausibly wish to exercise her autonomy by refusing to waive a right against
some interference, even when that interference would facilitate the pursuit of goals
that undergird her global autonomy. The interest it protects may, in some cases, have
greater reason-giving strength for an individual.
Despite these caveats, we should not be blind to the cases in which there can be
conflicts between global and local autonomy in which considerations of global
autonomy might plausibly win out. When the goals in question concern outcome
goods, and facilitating the agent’s pursuit of those goals would not require interfer-
ence of the sort that would violate a powerful claim right, we might plausibly be
justified in prioritizing the agent’s global autonomy over her local autonomy. To
unreflectively assume that appropriate respect for autonomy always demands that we
should respect locally autonomous decisions that will certainly undermine the
agent’s pursuit of what we know to be the goals that undergird her global autonomy,
is to fetishize one kind of autonomy over another, in a manner that does not reflect
the prudential value of these different kinds of autonomy. Respect for autonomy
should thus consider both global and local understandings of that which is being
respected.
The above considerations lend an autonomy-based justification of weak paternal-
ism. According to weak paternalism it is legitimate to interfere with the means that
agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely to defeat their own
ends. For example, suppose Fred is overweight and autonomously wants to lose
weight; however, he chooses means to this end that will not be effective, buying
unproven weight-loss products he finds on the internet, continuing to eat unhealthy
food that hinders his ability to lose weight, and refusing to exercise. The weak
paternalist would claim that we could intervene in order to ensure that David will
choose a more effective means of reaching his goal, perhaps by restricting the
availability of unhealthy foods. On the autonomy-based approach I am outlining,
weak paternalist measures could be justifiable in such cases if the goal in question is
an outcome good, and the measures would not infringe upon a claim right that David
has not waived. Similarly, the above considerations offer the most plausible prospect
of a broadly autonomy-based justification of nudges that undermine local autonomy.
Such a justification would qualify as a weak form of paternalism outlined above.⁴³
Weak paternalism can be contrasted with strong paternalism, which states that it is
legitimate to interfere to prevent people from achieving those ends that they are
mistaken in believing to be good for them.⁴⁴ For instance, suppose that Grant is
overweight but believes that this is not something he ought to worry about; in fact,
Grant values the experience of gastronomic pleasures over his health, and accepts the
health risks that his lifestyle involves. A strong paternalist might potentially claim
that Grant is weighing his values incorrectly here, and that it may be permissible to
somehow restrict Grant’s intake of unhealthy foods. Whilst strong paternalism
requires a particular kind of beneficence-based justification (as I shall explore
below), weak paternalism may be justified by an appeal to the precedence of global
⁴³ For a similar strategy in favour of limiting informed consent procedures, see Levy, ‘Forced to Be
Free?’
⁴⁴ Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’.
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over local autonomy, in so far as it calls for the safeguarding of the agent’s ability to
effectively pursue their own ends, over their freedom to make locally autonomous
decisions about the means to take to their end.
It might be claimed that in advocating weak paternalism, I am betraying my above
comments about the prudential value of autonomy; indeed, Sarah Conly’s recent
book defending a broadly similar strategy was titled Against Autonomy.⁴⁵ I cannot
deny that there is a sense in which the approach that I am outlining here is ‘against
autonomy’. However, the point of this discussion has been that because local and
global autonomy can come into conflict, we have to be against autonomy in one of
these senses if we are to reconcile these conflicts. My argument has been that we
should prioritize the kind of autonomy that often plausibly holds more significant
prudential value, and it is a mistake to believe that this will always be local autonomy.
However, a key point underlying this justification is that the use of weak pater-
nalism must be limited to cases in which it will promote what we know to be the
values and goals undergirding the target’s global autonomy. Given epistemological
barriers to knowing that this will be the case,⁴⁶ the blunt nature of most proposed
paternalist interventions, and the fact that reasonable agents can disagree about the
weight they attribute to different goods, the scope of justifiable paternalist strategies
on this approach will be extremely limited. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, we
should be concerned about the possibility that these features of the justification might
be overlooked, and the back-door perfectionism that could be ushered in under the
guise of such weak paternalist justifications of manipulative interferences.⁴⁷ This
would amount to considerations of beneficence (narrowly conceived in the sense that
I discuss below) being dressed up in the language of (global) autonomy.
To conclude the discussion of the value of different elements of autonomy, could
the decisional and practical dimensions of autonomy be valuable to different degrees?
I have argued that the decisional element of autonomy is theoretically prior to the
practical dimension. This analysis might tempt one to claim that whilst the decisional
element of autonomy might bear final value, the practical dimension of autonomy
might bear only instrumental value.⁴⁸However, this thought should be resisted, since
it fails to adequately capture the point that the way in which we value autonomy for
its own sake is, as I suggested above, inextricably related to our fundamental interest
in living a life that is our own, in acting on the basis of our autonomous decisions.
Even if it were possible to separate the two dimensions of autonomy into discrete
categories (which, I argued in Chapter 5, is doubtful) neither dimension alone seems
sufficient for the project of living a life of one’s own. This point is perhaps clearest
with respect to practical autonomy; the fact that an agent is able to act effectively in
pursuit of an end that she does not autonomously desire does not seem to be valuable
⁴⁵ Conly, Against Autonomy.
⁴⁶ For this reason, the relationship that the individual performing a weakly paternalistic intervention
bears to its recipient can have considerable implications for its permissibility. For the significance of
relationships to understanding permissible manipulative interference, see Blumenthal-Barby, ‘A
Framework for Assessing the Moral Status of “Manipulation” ’.
⁴⁷ Pugh, ‘Coercive Paternalism and Back-Door Perfectionism’.
⁴⁸ In a similar vein, Taylor claims that increasing an agent’s freedoms does not increase her autonomy,
but rather increases the value of her autonomy. Taylor, Practical Autonomy and Bioethics, 6.
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in the same way as the ability to act in pursuit of an end that one autonomously
desires;⁴⁹ only then can this freedom be said to be integral to the agent’s ability to lay
out her own mode of existence.
The value of decisional autonomy is also to a considerable extent conditional on
the presence of practical autonomy, although this point is perhaps less immediately
obvious. The reason for this is that it is difficult to imagine cases in which an agent
lacks all freedoms that are relevant to their practical autonomy. To illustrate,
reconsider the case of the slave philosopher Epictetus. Despite his being enslaved,
and thus seemingly lacking any freedom, one might claim that Epictetus nonetheless
represents the epitome of autonomy, in so far as he defied his lack of freedom by
spending his life in the pursuit of a self-determined goal; namely the pursuit of
philosophical truth. However, this example does not demonstrate that decisional
autonomy alone is valuable for its own sake. Although Epictetus lacked many
practical freedoms, he crucially retained the freedom to act effectively in pursuit of
his goal of philosophizing; to this extent, he had both decisional and practical
autonomy.
Therefore we should reject the claim that one dimension of autonomy is more
prudentially valuable than the other. Neither dimension of autonomy in abstraction
from the other is prudentially valuable for its own sake. Rather, we should under-
stand the conjunction of the two dimensions of autonomy to form an organic whole
which is prudentially valuable for its own sake, and whose value is derived from
fundamental value in the exercise of laying out our own mode of existence, of living a
life that is our own. It is not enough to be autonomous in our practical deliberations;
we must also be able to act on the basis of those deliberations. This, I take it, is part of
what John Harris means to capture in his bold claim (quoted in Chapter 5), that
‘without agency, decision-making is . . . both morally and practically barren’.⁵⁰
4. Autonomy and Conflicting Values in Bioethics
Prior to outlining the sorts of values with which autonomy might come into conflict,
it is crucial to first establish that autonomy can conceptually come into conflict with
other values at all. On some views, autonomy cannot come into conflict with other
values, because autonomy itself is understood to be the source of all other values.⁵¹
I mention this so-called ‘autonomism’ view only to reject it. I do so for the
following reasons: First, there are some values to which autonomy cannot plausibly
serve as a source, because their very possibility presupposes the absence of autonomy.
For instance, certain values such as familial unity and dignity can be found in
⁴⁹ For this reason, I am less concerned than Berlin about unavoidable conflicts between his conceptions
of positive and negative liberty, although I similarly acknowledge the potential for abuse of the prospect of
constraining negative liberty in the name of positive liberty. See Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 44–5.
Further, I am not denying that practical freedoms can have other forms of instrumental value; the effective
pursuit of non-autonomously endorsed goals could lead to other goods such as pleasure. Contrary to what
I have claimed here, Feinberg has argued that freedom has intrinsic value. See Feinberg, The Moral Limits
of the Criminal Law, 211–12. For a comprehensive rebuttal of these arguments see Haworth, Autonomy,
139–47. See also Griffin, Well-Being, 237.
⁵⁰ Harris, ‘ “ . . . How Narrow the Strait!” ’, 249. ⁵¹ Haworth, Autonomy, 7 and 184.
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communities that eschew autonomy, and the presence of these values in such com-
munities is ‘ . . . in part a function of the very absence of individual autonomy’.⁵²
Second, it seems that we can make sense of a life incorporating prudential value even
if it lacks autonomy. As I argued above, whilst we may disagree with the hedonist’s
claim that we should hand over control of our lives to a benevolent personal despot if
we had the chance, this does not entail that such a life would lack any prudential value;
ex hypothesi, it would contain a great deal of pleasure. It seems implausible to claim
that this pleasure would count for nothing simply because the agent in question lacked
autonomy. Finally, we will clearly need further moral principles to guide us in cases of
competing autonomy claims, when satisfying the autonomous preference of an indi-
vidual requires frustrating the autonomous preferences of another.
It would thus be ‘absurdly simplistic’⁵³ to understand autonomy to be the sole
value governing medical ethics. However, the truth in autonomism is that autonomy
seems to be related to a particular sort of value that we understand to be salient; in
section 1, I described this as the value of ‘living a life of one’s own’. For this reason,
although autonomy can conceptually come into conflict with other values in bioeth-
ics, one might maintain that autonomy is likely to win out in such conflicts. Indeed,
one might worry that this understanding of the value of autonomy lends support to
what Onora O’Neill disparagingly calls the ‘consumerist view’ of autonomy, accord-
ing to which considerations of respect for autonomy serve as both necessary and
sufficient conditions for the moral justification of some course of action.⁵⁴ In the
following discussion, I shall explain that this view is neither reflected in medical law,
nor a corollary of the understanding of the value autonomy I have outlined here.
According to the widely invoked four principles approach to biomedical ethics,
our ethical decision-making should be governed by four ethical principles; namely,
the principle of beneficence, the principle of non-maleficence, the principle of
autonomy, and the principle of justice.⁵⁵ In outlining these principles, Beauchamp
and Childress explicitly claim that none of these principles takes priority over any of
the others; as such, it would be a mistake to assume that autonomy should trump
these other values.⁵⁶
One of the clearest examples of where the consumerist understanding of auton-
omy fails is in the context of health resource allocation, where considerations of
autonomy and justice will often conflict. Since the demand for many health resources
(such as organs for transplantation and hospital ward space) far outstrips supply, it is
not the case that the autonomous wishes of all the patients who wish to use these
⁵² See Berofsky, Liberation from Self, 248. Oshana also posits ‘security’ as a value that can conflict with
autonomy. See Oshana, ‘How Much Should We Value Autonomy?’, 113–14.
⁵³ Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 9.
⁵⁴ O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 2.7 particularly p. 47.
⁵⁵ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. In his discussion, Foster suggests that
medical law and ethics should also consider principles relating to professional integrity and rights and
duties of doctors and patients. See Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, ch. 2.
⁵⁶ See Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, especially 57 and 177. However, it is
questionable whether all those who invoke the four principles approach abide by this dictum; see Gillon,
‘Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should Be “First
among Equals” ’.
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resources can be respected. Indeed, when societies have to make decisions about
health resource allocation, considerations of distributive justice will unavoidably take
precedence over considerations of individual autonomy, since it is simply not
possible to satisfy the autonomous preferences of each person to have access to the
scarce resource.⁵⁷ Since individual patients cannot generally be said to have a positive
claim right to a scarce medical resource, an autonomous request for treatment
generates a much weaker moral reason than a patient’s autonomous decision not
to waive negative rights that she does enjoy, when she refuses medical treatment.⁵⁸ In
any case, contrary to what the consumerist view implies, reasons of autonomy are
often not sufficient to justify actions, including the allocation of a scarce resource to
an individual, given the implications that such actions can have for others.
This is quite compatible with the claims I have advanced in this chapter. Even if we
accept the view that autonomy is fundamental to an individual’s well-being, this is
compatible with the claim that moral reasons generated by the well-being (and
indeed the autonomy) of others can be sufficient to outweigh our reasons to respect
the autonomy of the individual herself. Despite his staunch defence of liberty and
individuality, even Mill claimed that considerations of justice can override the
individual’s right to liberty in this way. This thought is apparent in his ‘Harm
Principle’, according to which:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.⁵⁹
Strikingly, the Harm Principle allows for the possibility that an individual’s negative
rights can, in some cases, be permissibly infringed by Mill’s own lights; respect for
autonomy then is not necessary for the moral justification of some actions, contrary
to the consumerist view. Of course, one broadly autonomy-based reason that might
justify a restriction of liberty against an individual’s (occurrent) will is if the individ-
ual can be understood to have implicitly consented to a particular infringement, on
the basis that doing so is a condition of the social contract that affords them a
number of other strong and important protections. For instance, one might plausibly
explain why one may justifiably prevent a would-be thief from robbing a bank in this
way, even if one believes that the thief ’s autonomy would be best served by both
affording him these protections and the freedom to rob the bank.
However, other restrictions of liberty might be justified by the need to safeguard
the interests of others. Infectious disease control is an example where one might
plausibly exercise power over another person against their will in a manner that is
⁵⁷ Pugh, ‘Navigating Individual and Collective Interests in Medical Ethics’.
⁵⁸ If individuals have a positive claim right to a particular medical treatment, this would entail that
physicians have a duty to provide it. We may also note that this might generate reasons that speak against
an autonomy-based positive right to treatment. For instance, one might contend that such a right would
compete with doctors’ right to conscientious objection. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, ch. 8;
Schuklenk and Smalling, ‘Why Medical Professionals Have No Moral Claim to Conscientious Objection
Accommodation in Liberal Democracies’; Cowley, ‘Conscientious Objection in Healthcare and the Duty to
Refer’; Wicclair, ‘Justifying Conscience Clauses’. Alternatively, one might hold that doctors do not have a
duty to perform treatments that violate unwaivable claim rights.
⁵⁹ Mill, On Liberty, 80.
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morally permissible by the lights of the Harm Principle. Suppose a person infected
with the Ebola virus refused to enter isolation voluntarily, and thus risked spreading
the virus to other members of his community; it seems plausible to claim that public
health authorities would be ethically justified in enforcing compulsory isolation on
such an individual. In England and Wales, the right of the state to impose compul-
sory isolation in this sort of situation is legally enshrined in the Health and Social
Care Act 2008.⁶⁰
Contrary to the consumerist view, respecting autonomy thus does not serve as
a necessary condition of all kinds of permissible medical intervention. However,
simply invoking the language of autonomy alone to understand the forms of protec-
tion that are owed to individuals in public health contexts is perhaps too blunt an
instrument; depending on one’s overall approach to ethics, we may also need to take
into account the degree of harm that an intervention will cause (on broadly conse-
quentialist approaches) or the kinds of rights it would violate (on broadly deonto-
logical approaches). To illustrate the importance of this, suppose that instead of
refusing isolation, an individual refused to undergo an invasive medical injection that
was necessary to prevent him from spreading a deadly infectious disease to others. It
is less straightforwardly clear that it would be permissible to impose this treatment;
indeed, in England and Wales, the law allowing the imposition of quarantine
explicitly rules out the imposition of non-consensual treatment, including vaccin-
ations.⁶¹ However, in both cases, we may presume that the moral reasons generated
by considerations of public safety are held constant.
In order to make sense of the intuition that the individual has a stronger claim
against the imposition of a medical treatment than he does against the imposition of
quarantine, it seems that one would have to supplement considerations of the
individual autonomy of the quarantined individual and harm to others with consid-
erations of the quarantined individual’s rights, or the harms that non-consensual
quarantine will do to them. For instance, on a rights-based approach, it might be
claimed that whilst quarantine violates the individual’s right to freedom of move-
ment and association, non-consensual medical treatment violates the recipient’s right
to bodily integrity. It might then be argued that the latter is a more robust right.⁶²
Alternatively, it might be claimed that bodily invasive interventions cause greater
harms than placing restrictions on an individual’s freedom of movement and
association.
As I suggested in previous chapters, it is a mistake to think that the justification of
claim rights that incorporate a power to waive the claim can be entirely divorced
from considerations of autonomy. In a similar vein, we may note that the harmful-
ness of an intervention may plausibly turn to some degree on the strength of the
individual’s autonomous preference to avoid that interference. So these consider-
ations are importantly related to autonomy. However, in order to adequately capture
⁶⁰ Health and Social Care Act 2008, Part 2A, 45.
⁶¹ Ibid. Although see Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 169 for discussion of courts’ reluctance to
preclude the permissibility of non-consensual treatment of competent individuals to save others.
⁶² The UK Health and Social Care Act implicitly seems to endorse this view, in so far as it permits non-
consensual quarantine, but prohibits non-consensual medical treatment.
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the nuances of whether public safety should outweigh considerations of autonomy,
we should also take into account these further considerations. The issue cannot be
settled just by establishing whether the agent has or has not autonomously consented
to the intervention itself.
Furthermore, the nature and degree of the harms that we can expect to prevent by
violating the individual’s autonomy should also factor into our overall weighting of
these competing values. In the case of preventing the spread of a deadly pandemic, we
might claim that we may be permitted to impose a very invasive non-consensual
intervention that would prevent the spread of disease, given the number of lives at
stake; in contrast, many find abhorrent the possibility that it might be permissible to
carry out non-consensual interventions in order to save very few lives. Consider for
instance the permissibility of carrying out a Caesarean section that is necessary to
save an unborn child’s life on a non-consenting competent woman in labour.⁶³
The Harm Principle claims that it can be permissible to intervene on an individ-
ual’s liberty to prevent the non-consensual imposition of harms to third parties that
might otherwise occur. However, it also states that this is the only justification for
such an intrusion on the individual; indeed, the main thrust of the Harm Principle is
that the principle of autonomy trumps considerations of individual beneficence. This
asymmetry between the moral weight of harm to others and harm to self in conflicts
with autonomy may be understood to be a reflection of the fact that the individual
herself may be understood to tacitly consent to harm when they autonomously
choose to engage in self-harming behaviour, whilst third parties do not similarly
consent to being harmed.⁶⁴
Mill himself limited the application of the principle to those ‘human beings who
are in the maturity of their faculties’.⁶⁵ So, the fact that it can be lawful to perform
unwanted beneficial medical procedures on patients who lack decision-making
capacity is quite compatible with the principle. However, even observing this feature
of Mill’s thought, the salience attributed to autonomy on the Millian approach is only
partially reflected in medical law. Contrary to those who perceive a consumerist view
of autonomy at work in modern bioethics, elements of medical law are quite difficult
to reconcile with the Millian understanding of the competing values of autonomy
and well-being. As I explored in Chapter 6, consent cannot serve as a sufficient
defence for certain kinds of intervention; accordingly, it seems that individuals
may plausibly be said to enjoy certain negative claim rights that are not attended
by the second-order power to waive those claims. Since such powers significantly
demarcate the individual’s sphere of autonomy in the law, it seems that the absence
⁶³ For discussion, see Savulescu, ‘Future People, Involuntary Medical Treatment in Pregnancy and the
Duty of Easy Rescue’; Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 169. I have discussed the justification of non-
consensual medical interventions in criminal justice in Pugh and Douglas, ‘Justifications for Non-
Consensual Medical Intervention’.
⁶⁴ Eyal hints at something similar in Eyal, ‘Paternalism, French Fries and the Weak-Willed Witness’.
⁶⁵ Mill, On Liberty, 81.
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of such powers with regard to some claims is best justified by appealing to the
strength of the interest that the claims protect.⁶⁶
Accordingly, even with regards to primarily self-regarding action, autonomy is not
understood in the law to serve as a sufficient basis for the moral justification of any
such action, as the consumerist view of autonomy would hold. In order to assess
whether the law should delimit the scope of this individualistic aspect of the harm
principle, we need to consider the relationship between beneficence and autonomy in
more detail.
In the medical context, the principle of beneficence is sometimes understood in an
extremely narrow sense to pertain only to medical benefits, that is, benefits concern-
ing the end of healing.⁶⁷ On this interpretation, the goal of healing does not merely
take precedence over other goods; it is the only good to which the principle of
beneficence pertains. This interpretation is implausibly narrow; the reason for this
is that we commonly use biomedical technologies in order to pursue ends that go
beyond mere healing, and it can clearly be in our interests to do so. Although much
depends on how widely we define the concept of health in our understanding of the
narrow interpretation, vision enhancement surgery, or cosmetic procedures are
examples of such interventions that can indisputably go beyond mere healing, but
that are still plausibly in the individual’s interests.
In view of this inadequacy, we need to refine the narrow interpretation of benefi-
cence. Even if we maintain that medical interests should play a particularly salient
role in a narrow understanding of the principle of beneficence in medical ethics, a
plausible understanding of the principle should allow it to incorporate a broader
range of benefits. As such, I suggest that we should understand the narrow inter-
pretation of the principle of beneficence to be making the more plausible claim that
medical benefits should override other kinds of benefit that might contribute to well-
being. This allows for the possibility that interventions that do not aim at healing can
still benefit the patient, whilst still affording a particularly salient role to health
benefits in this conception of beneficence.
We can contrast these narrow interpretations of the principle, to a broad concep-
tion of beneficence, according to which the principle can be taken to pertain to any
prudential benefits, without assigning any particular weight to a specific category of
those benefits. To illustrate the difference, on the narrow interpretation of the scope
of beneficence, it is difficult to see how death could ever be in a person’s interests;
such a choice is clearly contrary to the ends of healing, and this end takes precedence
over other prudential goods on a narrow conception of beneficence. However, as
I explained in my discussion of Isobel’s case in the previous chapter, it seems possible
for one to have a future life of prudential disvalue. In such cases, the broader
conception might claim that death can be in a person’s interests.
The extent to which the principles of beneficence and autonomy come into conflict
depends significantly on our understanding of the scope of the principle of
⁶⁶ For instance, on similar matters, Foster writes: ‘There will often be countervailing interests so
powerful that they will outweigh autonomy interests. No one’s autonomy right entitles them to be given
poison, for instance’. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death, 89.
⁶⁷ Pellegrino, For the Patient’s Good.
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beneficence. According to a commonly endorsed view that implicitly endorses
something like the refined narrow conception that I illustrated above, the concepts
of autonomy and beneficence are understood to represent two distinct domains;
the question of what is in a patient’s best interests is understood to be a concep-
tually different question to the question of what a patient autonomously desires.
For instance, in introducing the concept of beneficence, Beauchamp and Childress
point out that ‘[m]orality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously . . .
but also that we contribute to their welfare’.⁶⁸
I shall argue that we should reject the narrow interpretation of beneficence that the
commonly endorsed view relies upon. I have already suggested that we should
understand the principle of beneficence to encompass goods beyond the ends of
healing, and to pertain to prudential goods more broadly. In doing so though, we
should also acknowledge the point that I have defended in this chapter, namely that
autonomy plays an important role in a person’s well-being. Thus, contrary to the
commonly endorsed view, treating persons autonomously and contributing to their
welfare should not be understood as distinct requirements; in order to adequately
contribute to a person’s welfare, we must take into account the agent’s own autono-
mous preferences.
The problem with even the refined narrow conception is that it relies on an overly
objective account of what is in a person’s interests. Recall that on purely objective
accounts of well-being, there are certain things that are intrinsically good or bad, that
all agents have impersonal self-interested reasons to either want or avoid, regardless
of their own attitudes towards these outcomes. The narrow interpretation of the
principle of beneficence in medical ethics takes the end of healing to be the primary
objective good of concern here. However, such a view is unattractive. This claim may
seem somewhat surprising, since in section 1, I endorsed an explanatory account of
well-being that appeals to objective values. However, what is problematic about the
view that I am considering here is not that it relies upon the claim that there are
objective elements of well-being. Rather, the problem with the view that I am
considering here is that it implicitly assumes that there is an objective ranking of
the different objective elements of well-being.
This assumption is problematic because the decisions that we make in medical
contexts concern a far greater range of goods than those that are adequately captured
by the end of healing. Our choices in this domain can have implications for pursuing
the various other goods we may value in our life, and it is a mistake to assume that
rationality requires that we must prioritize health over the promotion of these other
goods. Indeed, whilst the interpretation of ‘best interests’ in medical law traditionally
endorsed the narrow interpretation outlined above, this has shifted towards a
broader conception of beneficence. For instance, best interests assessments under
the MCA incorporate consideration of non-medical issues such as ‘the person’s past
and present wishes and feelings’ and also the ‘beliefs and values that would be likely
to influence his decision if he had capacity’.⁶⁹ This is an example of the way in which
⁶⁸ Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 202.
⁶⁹ Mental Capacity Act 2005, 4(6). Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James,
paragraph 24. Herring et al. argue that this interpretation of best interests is also echoed in the
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the requirements of beneficence are not neatly separated from considerations of
autonomy in medical law.
Even on theories of well-being that incorporate only objective elements, agents can
still rationally disagree about the relative strengths of the self-interested reasons that
different objective goods imply; I have suggested that truths concerning the com-
parative strength of such reasons are often very imprecise. Thus, even if we accept a
purely objective list theory of well-being, we need not accept the claim implicit in the
narrow interpretation of beneficence, that the goods in this list must have a set
impartial degree of goodness, or that there is a supreme value that overrides others on
the list. This point is all the more powerful if we endorse a hybrid view of the sort that
I sketched at the end of section 1, which incorporates both objective and subjective
elements of well-being.
On some objective views of well-being, such as that which is endorsed by the
narrow interpretation of the principle of beneficence, conflicts between the principle
of autonomy and the principle of beneficence will typically arise whenever an agent’s
autonomous desires conflict with the objective ranking of values that the view may
stipulate. Such views of well-being naturally lend support to two types of paternalism;
first, what Feinberg terms ‘hard paternalism’, and second, the sense of ‘strong
paternalism’ that I explained above. According to hard paternalism, a third party
may permissibly interfere with even an agent’s voluntary choices in order to protect
them from the harmful consequences of those choices; by way of contrast, soft
paternalism only permits a third party to interfere with an agent’s involuntary
choices.⁷⁰ We may note that hard and strong paternalism are not necessarily co-
extensive. For example, Sarah Conly’s so-called ‘coercive paternalism’ is hard but
weak, in so far as it allows the state to force people to act (or refrain from acting) in
certain ways and impose actions on them that they would not choose (even if
properly informed), but only in order to ensure that individuals are better able to
achieve their own autonomously chosen goals.⁷¹ For instance, Conly argues in favour
of banning cigarettes on the basis that doing so would be likely to advance individ-
uals’ effective pursuit of their long-term goal of better health.⁷²
The objection that I have raised against the narrow interpretation of beneficence,
and the arguments that I have raised in favour of the final value of autonomy speak
against both hard and strong forms of paternalism. First, contrary to strong pater-
nalism, we seldom have warrant for assuming that rational agents should prioritize a
particular goal, such that we would be warranted in determining that they pursue
that end over other goods. The truths governing the relative weights of objective
goods are imprecise, and rational agents can disagree about the relative weight they
assign to the goods (such as health and pleasure) that are mutually incompatible in a
particular context. Second, with respect to hard paternalism, if we believe that
autonomy has final prudential value, then it may be a mistake to claim that overrid-
ing our autonomous choices is actually in our interests. Autonomy makes a
Montgomery judgement, which I considered in an earlier chapter. See Herring et al., ‘Elbow Room for Best
Practice?’, 9.
⁷⁰ Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 12–13.
⁷¹ Conly, Against Autonomy, particularly 45. ⁷² Ibid., 169–72.
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particular kind of contribution to well-being that cannot be replicated by the
imposition of other good things. This is precisely the insight of the PDA.
The claim that autonomy has final prudential value entails that there is a great deal
of overlap between the values of autonomy and beneficence. This in turn lends
support to the Harm Principle’s contention that considerations of an individual’s
well-being cannot outweigh those of their autonomy. For this reason, many of the
conflicts that are ostensibly conflicts between the two are more aptly construed as
conflicts between different elements of well-being. This provides a philosophical
basis for criticizing those elements of the law that appear to prioritize strong welfare
interests over individual autonomy. Naturally, considerations of autonomy lend little
support to claim rights that are not attended by the power of a waiver. More
strikingly though, given the role of autonomy in well-being, we can also coherently
challenge whether such rights are sufficiently supported by considerations of indi-
vidual well-being. The claim that the law should safeguard unwaivable claim rights
against inter alia sado-masochistic interactions or unusual body piercings, on the
basis of the strength of the interests they protect, is to adopt an impoverished view of
well-being that does not adequately capture the particular contribution that auton-
omy makes not only to a good life itself, but also to the nature of the contribution that
other goods in that life can make to a person’s well-being.
On the view that I am outlining, conflicts between autonomy and beneficence will
be less commonplace; as long as an individual’s choice is autonomous, that should
give us at least a pro tanto reason to believe that respecting that choice will benefit
that person, not because the choice is likely to lead to greater happiness (as the
explanatory hedonist might claim), but rather because on this view there is pruden-
tial value to directing the course of one’s life in accordance with one’s own beliefs
about what is of value, and with one’s own beliefs about which values should take
precedence.
However, the view that I endorse does not entail that there cannot be conflicts
between autonomy and beneficence. Rather, I have suggested here that our analysis
of cases in which there appears to be such a conflict should be more nuanced.
Contrary to the overly objectivist account that the narrow view of beneficence
implies, the fact that an agent has an autonomous preference is a fact that is relevant
to our assessment of what is in their best interests. If an individual harbours an
autonomous preference to engage in a behaviour that they believe they have reason to
perform but that also endangers their life, such as the base-jumping thrill-seeker, or
the gourmand who eats to the point of morbid obesity, there is a sense in which that
behaviour is in their interests. However, whether that behaviour is in their best
interests depends on the strength of their self-interested reasons to refrain from
that behaviour, and the weight that we ascribe to autonomy in our general account of
well-being.
One might worry that the principle of beneficence becomes superfluous on this
approach, since it seems to have been subsumed by the principle of autonomy.⁷³ One
⁷³ Buchanan raises this sort of concern about this approach. See Buchanan, ‘The Physician’s Knowledge
and the Patient’s Best Interest’, 94.
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response to this worry is to interpret the principle of beneficence in a purely negative
sense, by understanding it as ‘ . . . an admonition to the physician not to allow the
interests of others . . . to compromise his or her commitment to the patient’.⁷⁴
However, this reading seems to give the principle too narrow an interpretation,
especially given that it may need to be operative in cases where we must consider
the positive care of an individual who lacks autonomy.⁷⁵ Yet, the principle of
beneficence can still have substance on the understanding of well-being and auton-
omy that I have outlined in this chapter, because it does not entail that the realization
of autonomous choices exhausts the concept of well-being. The concept of ‘benefi-
cence’ can incorporate both the patient’s autonomous choices, and other goods that
agents have impersonal self-interested reasons to want. On this understanding,
conflicts will arise when the agent’s autonomous choice is not co-extensive with
what they have an impersonal self-interested reason to want. To resolve the conflict,
we must compare the strength of these impersonal self-interested reasons, with the
reasons we have to safeguard the agent’s autonomy by respecting their own assess-
ment of what is in their best interests.
That the principle of beneficence still has substance on this understanding
becomes further apparent when we consider cases in which a patient has not and
cannot make their choices clear to their physician. For example, considering what
agents have impersonal self-interested reasons to want can give physicians guidance
when they are dealing with incompetent patients who lack a surrogate decision-
maker or when asking for a competent patient’s consent would be too time-
consuming in an emergency situation. Moreover, as Buchanan suggests, physicians
need to have their own understanding of the patient’s best interests when deciding
which courses of treatment to provide as viable choices for a particular patient and
when making a recommendation to patients.⁷⁶
Conclusion
I have argued that whilst autonomy may often bear instrumental prudential value, it
is primarily prudentially valuable for its own sake. I have also claimed that this
implies that we should broaden our understanding of what is in an agent’s best
interests. However, it should be acknowledged that I have not attempted to assign a
particular definite value to autonomy. I have simply suggested that autonomy
represents a special type of value for us, one that serves to amplify the contribution
of other goods to well-being, in so far as there is a particular value in living a life that
is our own. Yet, I have left open the possibility that this value can have different
weight in different people’s conceptions of the good life. The extent to which
autonomy will contribute to a person’s welfare will depend in part on the extent to
which autonomy conflicts with other outcomes that the agent has reasons to pursue.
These claims are compatible with rejecting a consumerist view of autonomy that
understands autonomy to be both necessary for and sufficient to the moral justifica-
tion of medical interventions. I have argued that the view of autonomy’s value that
⁷⁴ Ibid., 95. ⁷⁵ Ibid. ⁷⁶ Ibid., 95–6.
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I have presented here does not entail the consumerist view. At most, the view of
autonomy’s value that I have presented suggests that respect for autonomy, broadly
conceived, is very often necessary to the justification of permissible medical inter-
ventions that are purely self-regarding. Given the central role that autonomy plays in
well-being, narrowly construed beneficence-based justifications of non-consensual
interventions are likely to come undone. For this reason, although the consumerist
view should be rejected, autonomy still has a considerable bearing on our under-
standing of permissible self-regarding decisions in bioethical contexts.
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Concluding Remarks
In the introduction to this book, I outlined my intention to provide an account of
personal autonomy that can usefully be applied to issues in contemporary bioethics,
and that clarifies its ambiguous relationship with rationality. At the most fundamen-
tal level, I understood the concept of autonomy to denote a particular capacity to
which we seem to attribute prudential value in bioethical contexts, namely, a capacity
that we invoke to capture concerns pertaining to an agent’s ability to both:
(i) Make their own decisions about what to do
And
(ii) To act on the basis of those decisions.
In accordance with this understanding, I suggested that the concept of personal
autonomy incorporates two corresponding dimensions: a decisional dimension, and
a practical dimension.
The theory of autonomy that I have described as the standard view of autonomy in
bioethics is a theory of the decisional dimension of autonomy. On this account an




(3) Without controlling influences that determine their action.
In delineating this theory in the introduction, I suggested that it implicitly bases its
understanding of decisional autonomy on two senses of voluntariness, identified by
Aristotle in book III of The Nicomachean Ethics. Conditions (1) and (3) capture the
Aristotelian sense of voluntariness that pertains to acts that are motivated by forces
that are in some sense internal rather than external to the agent. In contrast,
condition (2) captures the Aristotelian sense of voluntariness that pertains to actions
that are not performed from reasons of ignorance.
I argued that the standard account of decisional autonomy fails to provide an
adequate account of what it is for an agent to make their own decisions, due to an
inadequate conception of the first Aristotelian sense of voluntariness identified
above. I argued that in order to offer a unified, non-stipulative explanation of why
the controlling influences that the standard account appeals to (in condition (3)
above) undermine decisional autonomy, an adequate conception of this sense of
voluntariness requires a broader understanding of forces that can be ‘external to the
self ’.
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The concept of rationality can help in this regard. By attending to different features
of rationality, and how they relate to our beliefs and values, I sought to clarify some
important misunderstandings of the relationship between rationality and autonomy,
and to develop a rationalist account of decisional autonomy. I argued for the
following supplementary rationalist conditions of autonomy:
Theoretical Rationality: Decisional autonomy is precluded by theoretically
irrational beliefs about information that is material to one’s decisions.
Practical Rationality: The autonomous agent’s motivating desires must be rational
in the following sense. They must:
(a) Be endorsed by preferences that are sustained on the basis of the agent’s
holding (rational) beliefs that, if true, would give the agent reason to pursue
the object of the desire.
And
(b) These preferences must cohere with other elements of the agent’s character
system.
The rationalist model I have developed provides a deeper explanation of why
rationality plays such an integral role in autonomy. It sought to provide an answer
to the question of why we should trust that this aspect of our agency is the right place
for the ‘buck to stop’ with regards to autonomous decision-making. In the case of
practical rationality, the answer to this question is that our evaluative judgements
play a particularly central role in our character systems. Practical rationality thus
facilitates our ability to decide in accordance with elements of our character that
should be understood to have agential authority. In the case of theoretical rationality,
the answer to this question lay in the role that rationality plays in developing the sort
of understanding that decisional autonomy requires.
This rationalist account allows for a more nuanced understanding of the sorts of
controlling influence that serve to undermine decisional autonomy than the under-
standing outlined in the standard account of autonomy. It also highlighted the role
that an interpersonal sense of voluntariness can play in our judgements about what
constitutes ‘controlling influence’. Furthermore, by tying a rationalist theory of
decisional autonomy to an analysis of the oft-overlooked practical dimension of
autonomy, I suggested a new way of understanding the role of true beliefs in
autonomous agency, and why some beliefs might appropriately be deemed to be
decisionally necessary, as the cognitive dimension of decisional autonomy implies.
Partly on this basis, I defended the claim that the requirements of informed
consent can be justified by considerations of personal autonomy, a claim also
endorsed by the standard view of autonomy. However, I suggested that a rationalist
account of decisional autonomy suggests that we should reform our understanding of
what informed consent requires. In Chapter 6, I began to make this claim by further
investigating the cognitive element of decisional autonomy, before going on to
consider the implications of this investigation for standards of information disclosure
and tests of materiality. I concluded this analysis by applauding the spirit, although
not the letter, of the recent Montgomery judgement concerning medical negligence,
in its apparent attempt to further the cause of patient autonomy in clinical decision-
making.
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The most controversial aspect of understanding autonomy in a rationalist sense
concerns its implications for our understanding of decision-making capacity.
Contrary to the anti-rationalist tenor of many philosophical treatments of the
issue, I explained that existing medical law implicitly incorporates a number of
considerations pertaining to the rationality of a patient’s decisions. I also defended
the view that a rationalist conception of decisional autonomy would not unduly
restrict the boundaries of decision-making capacity. To further illustrate this point,
I explained how my rationalist approach could be brought to bear on three different
cases of end of life decision-making. In particular, I suggested that a rationalist
approach calls for a more nuanced understanding of whether we should respect
treatment refusals of psychiatric patients, and refusals based on religious beliefs.
By virtue of the objectivist approach to rationalist autonomy that I incorporated
into my understanding of decisional autonomy, and my agreement with the Millian
claim that we have a fundamental prudential interest in ‘laying out our own mode of
our existence’, I claimed that there is an important relationship between personal
autonomy and individual well-being on the approach that I have defended.
In Chapter 9, I sought to explicate the nature of this relationship, explaining how
autonomy could be understood to bear final prudential value, whilst acknowledging
the possibility that we might have prudential reasons to prioritize global autonomy
over local autonomy in some cases. I also suggested that my understanding of the
relationship between autonomy and well-being spoke in favour of reconceptualizing
the nature of beneficence and its conflict with autonomy, a move that is at least partly
reflected in the evolving understanding of ‘best interests’ employed in medical law.
I shall conclude with two rather more general theoretical observations about what
we may broadly conclude from this study. As well as developing an account of
autonomy that avoids the flaws of the standard account of autonomy in bioethics,
I have also been wary of the flaws attending many of the alternative philosophical
accounts of this dimension of autonomy that are often invoked in bioethical contexts.
However, over the course of developing this account of autonomy, I have attempted
to somewhat bridge the gap between philosophical discussions of the concept of
autonomy, and the way in which the concept is invoked in bioethics in other ways.
It is no doubt true that our discussions of autonomy in bioethics, and the related
notions of capacity, consent, and freedom, can of course be enriched by a philosoph-
ically informed understanding of autonomy. However, I also believe that the way in
which the concept of autonomy is invoked in contemporary bioethical issues suggests
some important insights for our philosophical understanding of autonomy.
In particular, the importance of acknowledging both what I have called the practical
dimension of autonomy, and the cognitive element of decisional autonomy in
bioethical discussions should also be extended to our philosophical discussions of
autonomy more generally. Philosophical approaches to the concept of autonomy
should branch out from their somewhat myopic focus on the reflective element of
decisional autonomy, because the different dimensions of autonomy that I have
appealed to here are not just useful for understanding bioethical issues; an adequate
understanding of the nature of autonomy must recognize the influence that each of
these elements of autonomy can have.
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Second, there is no ‘moral danger’ that understanding autonomy in the rationalist
sense that I have outlined here would unduly restrict the boundaries of what would
qualify as an autonomous decision. If there is any moral danger in adopting this
approach, it lies in the highly ambiguous ways in which the concepts of rationality,
autonomy, and value have frequently been treated in bioethical discussions, and the
potential that this raises for misinterpretation and conflict. My hope is that this book
has at the least shed some light on these ambiguities and, perhaps, offered a coherent
way of thinking about these concepts that can help us navigate the various bioethical
issues in which considerations of autonomy are salient.
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